Inferentialism and tacit knowledge
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
12-1-2004
Abstract
A central tenet of cognitivism is that knowing how is to be explained in terms of tacitly knowing that a theory is true. By critically examining canonical anti-behaviorist arguments and contemporary appeals to tacit knowledge, I have devised a more explicit characterization in which tacitly known theories must act as justifiers for claims that the tacit knower is capable of explicitly endorsing. In this manner the new account is specifically tied to verbal behavior. In addition, if the analysis is correct then it follows that the scope and nature of cognitivist appeals to tacit knowledge are largely mistaken. © 2004 Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies.
Publication Source (Journal or Book title)
Behavior and Philosophy
First Page
503
Last Page
524
Recommended Citation
Cogburn, J. (2004). Inferentialism and tacit knowledge. Behavior and Philosophy, 32 (2), 503-524. Retrieved from https://repository.lsu.edu/prs_pubs/78
