Identitätsphilosophie and the Sensibility that Understands

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

9-1-2016

Abstract

Many contemporary scholars argue that Schelling’s version of intellectual intuition retains certain central features of the Kantian and Fichtean conceptions. One of the common claims is that, as with Kant and Fichte, Schelling’s intellectual intuition is the power of the subject’s productive understanding. However, we show that for the Schelling of the Identitätsphilosophie period, intellectual intuition is the power not of an understanding that intuits, or a productive intellect, but of a receptive and penetrating sensibility that understands.

Publication Source (Journal or Book title)

Comparative and Continental Philosophy

First Page

255

Last Page

270

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