Concept grounding and knowledge of set theory
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1-1-2010
Abstract
C. S. Jenkins has recently proposed an account of arithmetical knowledge designed to be realist, empiricist, and apriorist: realist in that what's the case in arithmetic doesn't rely on us being any particular way; empiricist in that arithmetic knowledge crucially depends on the senses; and apriorist in that it accommodates the time-honored judgment that there is something special about arithmetical knowledge, something we have historically labeled with 'a priori'. I'm here concerned with the prospects for extending Jenkins's account beyond arithmetic-in particular, to set theory. After setting out the central elements of Jenkins's account and entertaining challenges to extending it to set theory, I conclude that a satisfactory such extension is unlikely. © 2009 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
Publication Source (Journal or Book title)
Philosophia
First Page
179
Last Page
193
Recommended Citation
Roland, J. (2010). Concept grounding and knowledge of set theory. Philosophia, 38 (1), 179-193. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-009-9186-4
