Semester of Graduation

Spring 2026

Degree

Master of Arts (MA)

Department

Political Science

Document Type

Thesis

Abstract

In this thesis, I investigate electoral volatility as a potential source of populist support, and the conditions under which mainstream parties strategically coordinate to block populist opponents. While electoral volatility allows populist candidates to thrive by offering the opportunity for them to grasp onto de-aligned voters, I argue that the two-round majoritarian system allows mainstream parties to reset their strategic choices between rounds by deciding to maintain or withdraw their candidates from the election. In Chapter 1, I show that electoral volatility is associated with increasing support for populist radical right candidates (PRRP). In Chapter 2, I demonstrate that mainstream parties are more likely to withdraw in favor of one another when faced with a strong populist challenger, when the ideological distance between them is relatively small, and when the vote share difference between them is large. Using constituency-level data from the three to four last legislative election cycles from the Austrian, Swedish, Italian, Portuguese, and French elections, I find that electoral volatility is associated with growing PRRP support. Then, using constituency-level data from the 2024 French legislative election, I show that withdrawal is significantly more likely when the populist candidate is strong and when the ideological distance be- tween mainstream contenders is smaller, and when the vote share between mainstream candidates is higher. The findings contribute to broader debates on electoral system incentives, party strategy, and democratic resilience.

Date

3-27-2026

Committee Chair

Thiago M.Q. Moreira

LSU Acknowledgement

1

LSU Accessibility Acknowledgment

1

Available for download on Saturday, March 27, 2027

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