Semester of Graduation

Spring 2026

Degree

Master of Arts (MA)

Department

Philosophy & Religious Studies

Document Type

Thesis

Abstract

The Principle of Sufficient Reason has a long history, but basically put, states that everything that exists has a reason or explanation for its existence. This principle has been a controversial one as it has been used to argue for the existence of God and have been accused of entailing determinism. In this thesis, I will be defending a version of the PSR advocated by Alexander Pruss, that all true contingent propositions need an explanation. I will also argue that the principle of sufficient reason should be restricted to our phenomenal experiences, just like Kant does.

This is in response to Meillassoux’s argument for the Principle of Unreason, a principle that is the opposite of the PSR. The Principle of Unreason states that radical change happens without any explanation. However, restricting the PSR to our phenomenal experiences will also help address some of the classic problems with the PSR. The two that this thesis will look at will be Hume’s skeptical attack on causality, and the objection that the PSR entails a necessitarian type of determinism. These problems will be addressed by appealing to some of the modal ideas behind the view called dispositionalism, which fits well with a PSR restricted to our phenomenal experiences and gives us some interesting insights into modality and causality.

Date

3-27-2026

Committee Chair

Michael Ardoline

LSU Acknowledgement

1

LSU Accessibility Acknowledgment

1

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