Measuring the extent of coalition formation in group decision making
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1-1-1997
Abstract
Many group decisions begin with small coalitions that recruit additional members until they satisfy a voting rule. This paper introduces a technique for measuring coalition formation in group decision making. The setting involves N players bargaining over the share distribution of an asset. The N-person game is analyzed as a set of triads, numerically equal to {N!/(N - 3)!}/3!. A three-person game is presented to establish the context and to offer insights into the bargaining process. A four-person game is also presented. The technique finds immediate application in controlled laboratory experiments but has further relevance for numerous real-world contexts.
Publication Source (Journal or Book title)
American Journal of Agricultural Economics
First Page
1288
Last Page
1299
Recommended Citation
Ruppel, F., & Kennedy, P. (1997). Measuring the extent of coalition formation in group decision making. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 79 (4), 1288-1299. https://doi.org/10.2307/1244285