Are turing machines platonists? Inferentialism and the computational theory of mind

Authors

Jon Cogburn
Jason Megil

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

8-1-2010

Abstract

We first discuss Michael Dummett's philosophy of mathematics and Robert Brandom's philosophy of language to demonstrate that inferentialism entails the falsity of Church's Thesis and, as a consequence, the Computational Theory of Mind. This amounts to an entirely novel critique of mechanism in the philosophy of mind, one we show to have tremendous advantages over the traditional Lucas-Penrose argument. © 2010 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.

Publication Source (Journal or Book title)

Minds and Machines

First Page

423

Last Page

439

Recommended Citation

Cogburn, J., & Megil, J. (2010). Are turing machines platonists? Inferentialism and the computational theory of mind. Minds and Machines, 20 (3), 423-439. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-010-9203-1