Anti-Luck Epistemologies and Necessary Truths
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
9-1-2011
Abstract
That believing truly as a matter of luck does not generally constitute knowing has become epistemic commonplace. Accounts of knowledge incorporating this anti-luck idea frequently rely on one or another of a safety or sensitivity condition. Sensitivity-based accounts of knowledge have a well-known problem with necessary truths, to wit, that any believed necessary truth trivially counts as knowledge on such accounts. In this paper, we argue that safety-based accounts similarly trivialize knowledge of necessary truths and that two ways of responding to this problem for safety, issuing from work by Williamson and Pritchard, are of dubious success. © 2010 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
Publication Source (Journal or Book title)
Philosophia
First Page
547
Last Page
561
Recommended Citation
Roland, J., & Cogburn, J. (2011). Anti-Luck Epistemologies and Necessary Truths. Philosophia, 39 (3), 547-561. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-010-9295-0