Moore’s paradox as an argument against anti-realism

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

1-1-2012

Abstract

Moorean validities are any in-general invalid inferences such as: “P; therefore I believe that P”. While these are prima facie invalid, they have no counterexamples, since any assertion of the truth of the premise pragmatically forces the conclusion to be true. I first show that Dummettian anti-realists have a seemingly impossible time explaining why Moorean validities are not valid. Then I argue that the anti-realist could restrict applications of Moorean validities to inferential situations outside of the scope of things assumed hypothetically for further discharge. In conclusion, I show how Brogaard and Salerno’s argument against Neil Tennant runs afoul of this restriction and also suggest that famous arguments by Berkeley and Davidson do as well. Phil.: How say you, Hylas, can you see a thing which is at the same time unseen? Hyl.: No, that were a contradiction. Phil.: Is it not as great a contradiction to talk of conceiving a thing which is unconceived? Hyl.: It is. Phil.: The tree or house therefore which you think of, is conceived by you. Hyl.: How should it be otherwise? Phil.: Without question, that which is conceived is in the mind. Phil.: How then came you to say, you conceived a house or tree existing independent and out of all minds whatsoever? George Berkeley-“Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous” [1]. And the criterion of a conceptual scheme different from our own now becomes: largely true but untranslatable. The question whether this is a useful criterion is just the question how well we understand the notion of truth, as applied to language, independent of the notion of translation. The answer is, I think, that we do not understand it independently at all Donald Davidson-“On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme”.

Publication Source (Journal or Book title)

The Realism-Antirealism Debate in the Age of Alternative Logics

First Page

69

Last Page

84

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