Nominalism and Causal Theories of Reference
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1-1-2009
Abstract
According to contemporary nominalism, there are no abstracta. A common way of arguing against the existence of abstracta deploys a causal theory of reference. In short, we have no good reason to believe in what we cannot refer to and, since reference is causal and abstracta are causally isolated, we cannot refer to abstracta. In this paper, I examine just how far this sort of argument takes nominalism. © 2009, Philosophia Press. All rights reserved.
Publication Source (Journal or Book title)
SATS
First Page
51
Last Page
67
Recommended Citation
Roland, J. (2009). Nominalism and Causal Theories of Reference. SATS, 10 (2), 51-67. https://doi.org/10.1515/SATS.2009.51
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