Institutional origins of unemployment compensation: An empirical analysis of the developing world, 1946-2000

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

1-1-2006

Abstract

Why do some countries institutionalize a social program compensating the unemployed while others do not? My main argument is that the choice to have an unemployment insurance program is a function of 1) the distribution of unemployment risks within a country and 2) political processes through which demands for insurance are realized. The distribution of industrial-specific risks and workers' employment status are the driving force in shaping workers' demands. In developing countries, these demands are more likely to be realized under democratic regimes. An event history model for 102 developing countries from 1946 to 2000 is used to test the arguments. Copyright © 2006 The Berkeley Electronic Press. All rights reserved.

Publication Source (Journal or Book title)

Business and Politics

First Page

27

Last Page

56

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