Selected Limitations on the Organization of Treatment in a "Modern" Prison

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SELECTED LIMITATIONS ON THE ORGANIZATION
OF TREATMENT IN A 'MODERN' PRISON

A Thesis

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

in

The Department of Sociology

by

Raymond Paul LeBlanc
B.A., Louisiana State University, 1958
May, 1964
MANUSCRIPT THESES

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ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The writer is especially grateful to Dr. Walfrid J. Jokinen, his major advisor, who has given the encouragement and guidance necessary in the completion of this study. He wishes to express his sincere appreciation to Dr. Julian Roebuck for the helpful suggestions and technical assistance which he contributed in such a generous manner in the preparation of this work. The author also wishes to acknowledge intellectual debts to Dr. Vernon J. Parenton and Alvin L. Bertrand.

To those two inmates of the Louisiana State Penitentiary who adequately accomplished the tedious task of typing this manuscript, the writer wishes to express his personal gratitude. A word of thanks is directed to the many members of the penitentiary staff who made available their time and cooperation in this effort.

Finally, to his wife, Lola D. LeBlanc, the writer expresses his greatest gratitude. Through her sacrifices and personal inspiration the author was granted the time and given the motivation so necessary to the completion of a study of this nature.
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ABSTRACT

In this study a descriptive analysis is made of selected limitations on the organization of treatment at Louisiana State Penitentiary within the past approximate decade. Since it is concerned with a 'modern' prison, the study is applicable to most contemporary American prisons undergoing any phase of the transition from objectives of custody and production to that of treatment orientation.

The study presents (1) a brief historical progression of the 'old' system in Louisiana, making a cursory analysis of the ideology, structure, and method of operation of that penal structure at Angola prior to the 1951-52 prison 'riot'; (2) a survey of the nature of that 'riot' or pervasive force, revealing the results of that upheaval as having necessitated sudden and abrupt change which did not fulfill the needs of that institution; (3) a selective description of some theoretical limitations that were inherent in the American prison system in its evolution and which became a part of the 'new' system, and; (4) a cursory analysis of certain inherent and inbred limitations of the 'treatment program' at Angola within the past approximate decade.

In the way of final conclusion, this study implies that the 'new' system at Angola has failed as a result of limitations placed upon it. Issue is then taken with those concepts held by 'progressive' penologists concerning the evolution of criminal behavior and the future role of treatment in prison. Finally, a brief proposal is advanced for a more realistic prison structure within the correctional process as a whole.
INTRODUCTION

"Many penal institutions in the United States have undergone marked alterations in structure and functional organization which merit careful study, not only to advance knowledge of penal treatment but to contribute to sociological theory and research on problems of social organization."

In recent years increased emphasis has been given the upward struggle of the professional or treatment hierarchy contained in the 'modern' prison. Because of the wide variations in the physical structures, programs of incarceration, and professional, as well as non-professional custodial personnel, general statements about administration of treatment within the American penal system are subject to much qualification. There is, however, one problem which almost all 'modern' prisons face: the limitations imposed on the organization of treatment within the individual structure. Although a multiplicity of these limitations are general and are easily applicable to the penal system as a whole, there are still innumerable localized limitations that affect only the individual institution.

The inherent intent and purpose underlying the compilation and presentation of this study is to present an analysis which

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1 Lloyd E. Ohlin, Sociology and the Field of Corrections, Russell Sage Foundation, (New York, 1956) p. 16.
points out certain of the general factorology relative to the organization of treatment in a 'modern' prison; points up certain limitations to that general organization of treatment; and, finally, points at selected limitations as they exist at Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola an approximate decade following the introductions into that institution of what has been, and is publicly stated to be, a program of treatment organization.

The objective scope of this study is not, as might be assumed, intended as an accusing finger pointing to specific failure to fulfill stated intent and purpose, but rather an attempt on the part of the writer to dramatize the failure as being inherent and inbred, having been indelibly inscribed on the very foundation of the 'treatment program'.

The data were collected and compiled over a four-year period during which the writer was employed in the Department of Classification of the Louisiana State Penitentiary. As the writer has been utilized in all phases of classification work at Angola, which has included duties as a case worker at the institutional Reception Center, inmate counseling, and direct relation to, and participation in, the initial classification and reclassification committees, he has perforce, acquired some small insight into the problems of both the inmate population and personnel which, with the structure of the institution, comprises the totality of organization in prison.

First as an officer without rank, but with designated authority, the writer participated in the reorganization of various sections of 'treatment' and control within the institution. In a word, in the
performance of daily tasks, he found it necessary to acquaint himself with not only the positive aspects of the state's 'correctional' process—probation, institutionalization, and parole—but also the negative factors involved; basically, the limitations on the organization of treatment in the state's primary adult institution. For a proper perspective of the entire field of endeavor, the writer surveyed some of the most recent literature in the field of criminology and penology found in many of the latest text books, journals, periodicals, and unpublished theses.

Data, therefore, were collected by personal observation and participation; informal interviews (while counseling particular inmates of the 'old' system); and relating information so gathered to, and weighing it against, the practical applications and theoretical conceptions offered by penologists and prison administrators laboring in the field of corrections.

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2 It should be noted that until 1956, the penal institution at Angola was the only adult correctional institution in the state. However, in that year, a first-offender institution was established at DeQuincy, Louisiana. Designated the Louisiana Correctional and Industrial School, initially called Louisiana Correctional Institute, it is geographically separated from Angola by about 150 miles. Structurally, and in terms of organization, it is closely related since most of its 400-plus inmate population is obtained from Angola. (The rest of the population, and a smaller percentage, is received from one state colored reformatory and one white and is comprised of incorrigibles at these establishments for juvenile offenders. It is interesting to note that, although L.C.I.S. was originally established as a rehabilitative center for young, first offender criminals (young adults with the best hopes of being 'rehabilitated'), it is now forced to accept older, incorrigible juveniles (possibly, young adults with the least possibility of being 'rehabilitated'). To further complicate the problem of organizing treatment at L.C.I.S., it need only be realized that, of the inmates transferred from Angola to that institution at DeQuincy, all have been in the population for at least thirty days; many have been in for sixty days, and some have been in the actual population for a much longer period.
The method of approach used in this study is designed to present the material in a brief yet comprehensive fashion. In keeping with this, the first chapter contains a brief historical progression of the 'old' system in Louisiana, and makes a cursory analysis of the ideology, structure, and method of operation of that penal organization at Angola prior to the 1951-52 prison 'riot'. This is followed by a discussion of that 'riot' or pervasive force, and points to the results of that force which necessitated sudden and abrupt change but did not fulfill the needs of the institution. The third chapter is devoted to a brief survey of some general and theoretical limitations that were inherent in the American prison system in its evolution, and reveals them as a part and portion of the 'new' system at Angola. In the fourth chapter, a cursory analysis is made of certain inherent and inbred limitations on the 'treatment program' at Angola during the past approximate decade of the 'new' system of prison administration. The study is concluded by a rejection of certain concepts held by 'progressive' penologists concerning the evolution of criminal behavior and the future of treatment in prison. A proposal is then advanced for a more realistic prison structure which would provide ways and means to alleviate, at least in part, some of the limitations on the organization of treatment in a 'modern' prison.
CHAPTER I

A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE LOUISIANA PENAL SYSTEM

The history of the Louisiana penal system at Angola is a chronic rift with unceasing conflict between patent economic factors of operation and popular social reactions or attitudes with regard to punishment of the offender. This internal conflict antedates even the structure's legislative creation in 1900, and touches, in a very real sense, the physical construction of steel and concrete as well as the underlying ideology and intent which support that physical structure. The ultimate ascendancy of the economic factors involved, in almost every instance in which they were pitted against ideological concepts, has established a false criterion by which the success or failure of a particular phase of penal development may be determined, and has made it possible for an untrained and non-professional ex-convict to accurately observe "...that measured strictly in terms of performance and fulfillment of ideological intent and practical objectives, the Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola is a scandalous failure as a correctional institution." This study is concerned,


2Author's Personal Portfolio: Excerpt from a letter addressed to the author by an ex-Inmate of Angola.
primarily, with the illustration of some of the more common limitations and failures of the so-called contemporary facilities of the current penological era manifested in the Angola structure. To adequately present a comprehensive analysis of this subject, however, certain aspects of past eras and past failures must, perforce, be included for the presentation to be complete.

The early Louisiana reaction to deviant, anti-social and criminal patterns of behavior was basically contemporary with the retributive attitudes prevalent in other areas of American colonization, and is graphically illustrated in the following excerpt from Taft:

"...in addition to death, colonial punishments included stocks and pillory where the culprit was subjected to the taunts, ridicule, and missiles of the populace; the whipping post; and the branding iron. The colonies had local jails...but these local institutions were...not true penal institutions but places of detention or for the housing of paupers."3

Reaction to the manifested social action depicted above was slow to arrive in Louisiana, but over a period of years, and by a gradual modification of the old sanguinary laws, the colonial judiciary began sentencing offenders to periods of penal servitude and/or incarceration as a humane alternative to the older, more corporal punishments that had obviously failed to fulfill the original intent of deterring and reducing the incidence of criminal behavior. This new trend of the judiciary, the imposition of periods of incarceration upon the

offender, was premature and without prudent thought to the existing structures that had detention as a fundamental purpose. Many areas had no jails at all. In the few areas, such as Orleans, which had been prudent and prosperous enough to have foreseen the need, the demand had not been met. Existing structures were far overcrowded and congested. In some areas, converted out-buildings which had long since lapsed into unsanitary hovels, unfit for human occupancy, were hastily sequestered into public service as jails. Disrepair, neglect and overcrowding rapidly reached the levels described in the following extract from the manual prepared by the American Correctional Association:

"...congregate confinement, with men, women and children sleeping indiscriminately on the floors of filthy compartments, liquor sold at the jail bar, and neglect and brutality as standard practice. Idleness compounded the bad effects of these conditions." 1

The deplorable conditions pictured in the foregoing, while intended as a description of the colonial jail systems as a whole, were physically manifested in almost every jail in the territory comprising Louisiana. Brutality, licentiousness, and highly un-uniform and un-orthodox systems of incarceration were rife, and costs of maintaining these jails, set aside by the individual communities for this purpose, found their way into the pockets of the keepers. Conditions went from bad to worse and, by 1804, had reached the low level that

engendered the following verbal castigation of the New Orleans jail system by two visiting penologists from France:

"...The place for convicted criminals in New Orleans cannot be called a prison; it is a horrible sink, in which is fit only for those dirty animals found together with the prisoners; it must be observed here that those who are detained here are not slaves; it is a prison for persons free in the ordinary course of life."\(^5\)

Increasing maintenance costs of the local-level jail began to tax the social pocketbook and remarks and observations such as the foregoing served to prick the public conscience. The coupling of these two factors, with the heavier emphasis on the former, motivated increasing public opposition to county \(\text{parish/jail}\) systems. This opposition finally developed to the extent that Governor Claiborne recommended to the Louisiana Legislature of 1804 that a penitentiary be built.\(^6\) This, unfortunately, was an unsuccessful step on his part and although several of Claiborne's successors also strongly advocated construction of a state penal structure, it was not until 1818, six years after Louisiana became officially recognized as a state, that any tangible legislation with regard to the erection of a state prison took place. Moreover, it was not until 1832 that these tentative plans began to take physical and structural


form in the construction of a state prison at Baton Rouge. In this authorization to erect a penal physical plant, a sharp line of demarcation was drawn between two distinct phases of penological development within the state of Louisiana. Because of this sharp division, there was engendered the death of one era, and the birth of another.

Several related factors should be interpolated in an attempt to clarify a seemingly general misconception with regard to this 'delay', 'hesitancy', and 'political dalliance' attributed to the apparently obvious political lethargy in the initiation of a central and state-operated and maintained penal facility. When all factors are presented comprehensively the 'lethargy' takes on many aspects and proportions of prudence and caution. It is one thing to recognize a need for a prison; quite another to fulfill that need. Prisons are not 'just built'. Many related factors must be assimilated and desiminated. These factors must be correlated and classified in order of precedence. Penological development, at this point in Louisiana history, was still in a period of gestation; indeed it was still in diapers in the more advanced northern states; an infant even when viewed from the scope of national development. In fact, the first penal structure in the nation was a scant half-century old and, although other structures had rapidly evolved, penological development was retarded nationally by the advent of a polemic opposition between two schools of penological concept.

\[7\text{Ibid.}, \ p. \ 27.\]
Louisiana was faced with a choice between three alternatives; i.e., adoption of the theoretical concept, ideology, and physical plant inherent in one of the opposing schools of thought, or the establishment of a totally new physical plant and concept. Louisiana, penologically-ignorant, was certainly unable to successfully initiate any penal program of construction and operation that would be peculiar to the needs of Louisiana alone. This narrowed the alternatives to two, the adoption of one of the polemically-opposed systems of the North—the Pennsylvania and Auburn Systems of prison administration.\(^8\)

The polemic warfare between the advocates and propounders of these two systems could have but one result—the ascendancy of the one system over the other. Korn and McCorkle point out that:

"...the result...was to fasten the repressive discipline, the lock step and the downcast eyes of the Auburn system on several decades of American penology—a circumstance which gave penology a new field of prison reform—that, namely, of undoing the repressive discipline it had itself created."\(^9\)

Taft indicates the same general trend of thought by saying:

"Such was the prison which set forth the fashion for prison building and prison programs for fifty years.


\(^9\)Korn and McCorkle, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 413-414.
in twenty-three states prior to the reformatory movement in 1870. The majority of our modern prisons have the general style of structure and the remains of the discipline of Auburn.  

The ascendency of the Auburn system was due primarily to reasons which were economic in origin. It was rapidly found that communal labor was more profitable and efficient than the labor of men working alone. Operational costs of communal workbenches and tools were far less than the costs for installation and maintenance of individual cell workbenches and in this early period of development, economics was a very important, if not the most important single factor of consideration.

Throughout the nineteenth century the typical American penal system was constituted along Auburn type lines, in that congregate labor was used rather than the separate cell workbench.

The first Louisiana prison was modeled closely parallel to the physical structure and ideology of the Weatherford, Connecticut penal establishment, thus stereotyping into the Louisiana structure all the essentials of the Auburn system. Launched on a three-phase program designed to "curtail expenses, improve prison conditions, and reform men," the program appeared to be an economic success for the first few months. Unfortunately, however, this economic success was at the expense of private enterprise. Industry reacted

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10 Taft, op. cit., p. 483.
12 Leon Stout, op. cit., p. 27.
In a protest, so violent and loud, that immediate efforts were made to modify the program of penal endeavor to the extent that there would be less competition with private industry.\textsuperscript{13} This curtailment of industrial effort and initiative within the penal structure, while effecting the desired reduction of competition with private industry, also caused a decrease in penal revenue that not only impaired the functional penal operation, but produced severe economic repercussions in the form of financial strain on the entire penal economy.\textsuperscript{14} This factor, coupled with the unmollified cries of the outraged businessmen, resulted in legislative action in the State Legislature of 1844.\textsuperscript{15} The final result of that legislation was the enactment of a bill calling for a complete renovation of the prison operation. Although this renovation proved to be far deeper and more drastic than a mere 'face-lifting', it was neither a revolutionary penological development, nor one that was singular to penal development in Louisiana, having as its precedent and model the 'contract' system of prison operation that had been successfully functioning in the penal systems of several northern states since 1831.\textsuperscript{16} Although Allgood mistakenly labels this phase of Louisiana penal development as the 'lease' system (which in actuality did not appear for a number of


\textsuperscript{14} Stout, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 40-42.

\textsuperscript{15} Allgood, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 40.

\textsuperscript{16} DeBeaumont and DeToqueville, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 36.
years, and then only in response to a completely different, though somewhat related, social need), his description is, however, an excellent picture of some of the more basic fundamentals of the "contract" system which, in fact, was the sum and substance of the new penal phase. It is offered here as such:

"The act of the legislature which leased the penitentiary was passed on March 25, 1844, and provided that the entire establishment would be leased for a period of five years or less. The leasee was required to put up a bond and to pay all operating costs and to maintain the prisoners without changing anything in their treatment before securing consent of the state. The physical plant, all tools and machinery and the inventory were to be returned to the state when the lease expired in the same condition as when the lease began. The leasee was to make good any shortages and depreciation..."  

This "contract" system was an immediate success from an economic perspective and high state officials were already envisioning the erection of a state insane asylum, to be built from the surplus earnings of the penal system, only a few years after the new prison had been inaugurated.  

As in the case of the original system of unified penal operation, economic success was relatively short-lived. In this instance, however, private enterprise was amenable to the prison's operation; now it was labor that felt the pinch of competition. The resultant cry was long and loud. Not anxious to relinquish, for a second time, profitable penal operations, state officials adopted but few minor modifications of the new system in token


concession to labor. These token modifications took heavy toll in penal revenue, however, and labor continued its protest in the form of widespread publicity advertising its plight. This publicity served indirectly to orient the mind of the general public to the general state of conditions within the penal system, and certain gradual transitions in the social attitudes toward the prison began to develop. Sporadic "reform movements" began to sound their voices and only the advent of the Civil War prevented far more serious and bitter controversy from developing.

The Civil War left an impoverished and devastated Louisiana in its wake. Cash was extremely scarce, and labor, for the most part, was even more difficult to obtain. The new Board of Control of the state prison found itself unable to establish an economic equilibrium in the maintenance of an urban-industrial prison limited to the contraction of its labor within the confines of what remained of its war-ravaged walls. Mouledous points out that "it was these needs...that finally broke the penitentiary walls and created the dispersed convict camp /lease/ system which lasted until the purchase of Angola...in the early 1900's."19

The walls were broached, and the last quarter of the nineteenth century saw the inauguration, as well as several reorganizations, of various programs of "convict leasing." The state penal facility at Baton Rouge rapidly became a prison in name only as the

19 Mouledous, op. cit., p. 61.
inmates of that institution were rapidly dispersed to 'convict labor camps' scattered about the state on the plantations and levees of the lease holders. This dispersal created many problems of a custodial and administrative nature. The wide dispersal of the camps was not conducive to standardized operation and treatment, and before many months had passed the camps assumed the nature and character of individual penal units, each with its own physical plant, program of operation, and personnel. The structural security of the central institution was gone under the aspects of the dispersal, and the decreased physical security of 'outside' employment necessitated increased physical security of the individual. Leg irons and shackles appeared on the scene and began snapping shut about the convicts' ankles, sharply curtailing their freedom of movement.20 The leaseholder, by virtue of his almost constant presence and the lack of effective means of communication, was nominally the 'keeper', the employer, and the landowner. Extremely long working hours were augmented by poor food in insufficient quantity. The operational premise of the leaseholder appears to have been that sweat, resultant from patent practices of brutality for minor infractions of non-existant and oft-illegal rules, would purge the offender of any inclination to further commission of crime when eventually he was released. Under this new regime the convict was nominally forced to submit to every imaginable indignity.

20Mouledous, op. cit., p. 71.
that could be heaped upon him without impairing his usefulness as a laborer. Conditions such as these continued and soon the work camps, subjected to the same public neglect and private exploitations that had made pestholes of the county jails became indistinguishable from them.

There were frequent reform movements, however, and certain concessions to humane treatment were indeed gained, but these concessions were primarily concessions written in ink on paper rather than translated into practical application and, although humane treatment was the advertised motivation behind many of the movements, the unpublished real purpose was, more often than not, a matter of political and/or economic expediency. Conditions such as these continued unabated until a well organized campaign on the part of the Prison Reform Association began to acquaint the public with the true state of conditions of the penal system. This organization was comprised of many well-versed professionals in the field of penological development. Theirs was no voice "crying in the wilderness." Their observations were well organized and effectively presented; in this was their success. The Prison Reform Association"...in 1898 secured a constitutional provision against the leasing of convicts after 1901."21 Only existing unexpired lease agreements kept the victory from being immediate.

During the "legislative session of the year 1900...a law was passed creating...a new...Board of Control which was to be the

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administrative body under which the new penal system was to operate," and early in 1901, upon termination of existing leases, this Board of Control assumed responsibility for the more than 900 prisoners that had been under the lease agreements. The economic expedient utilized in this assumption of control must be pointed out and emphasized, however. In no way, according to Mouledous, did the state "attempt to centralize its population, but essentially incorporated the lease system by purchasing those large plantations which had previously leased large numbers of convicts." Among these was Angola.

The Board also had assumed responsibility for the operation of four levee camps, a central penal processing center in Raton Rouge, a hospital, a maximum security unit and a women's prison. Such physical dispersion, under even the most favorable of circumstances, could neither truly accomplish the stated humanitarian reforms nor effect any semblance of standardization of treatment. Certain immediate physical reforms were effected, however, as is evident in that the Board of Control "at once stripped the shackles from every man employed in outside work." Rules restricting corporal punishment put the administration of disciplinary flogging directly in the hands of senior officers.

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22 Allgood, op. cit., p. 41.
23 Mouledous, op. cit., p. 72.
24 "Biennial Reports of the Board of Control of the Louisiana State Penitentiary, 1905-07," Legislative Documents (1906-08).
or captains and some attempt was made to provide more adequate facilities for medical treatment. Certain other insignificant concessions to humanitarian motivation were engendered but the alterations effected were minor, and for the most part, no structural change from the lease type operation was visible.

Coupled to this failure to translate that intent and ideology underlying the reform legislation into practical application within the penal operation, was the Board's failure to remain within the economic boundaries of its own ability to produce and earn. Even the high potential of the Angola structure failed to subsidize the heavy losses of some of the other units of the dispersed system. Angola's success did, however, "motivate the Governor in his 1910 report to the General Assembly, to encourage the closing of all penal farms and camps, and the concentration of all prisoners on the Angola plantation." Unfortunately, the Governor's advice was not followed, and the penal system continued to operate as before until the 1916 legislative session abolished the Board of Control, replacing it with the appointment of a general manager "in whom was invested all the duties, powers and responsibilities theretofore exercised by the Board of Control, thus centralizing the management and all authority in the hands of one individual, automatically removing any opportunity for friction and divided counsel, and putting

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26 Mouladous, op. cit., p. 73.
the responsibility for success or failure, so far as the management can determine, squarely upon the shoulders of the general manager." 27

The State Legislature, always the body politic, abolished the Board of Control, replaced it with a general managership, put the reins of full penal control into that general manager's hands, then figuratively chopped off those hands at the elbows by imposing rigid economic restrictions. Mr. Henry Fugua, the first general manager, found himself confronted with the economic dilemma that had been the Achille's heel of his predecessor. He immediately and decisively reacted to this situation. If he was to get no tax monies with which to operate the penal system, he would reduce expenditures to a level compatible with revenue from sale of prison produced goods. The receiving station at Baton Rouge was immediately sold and center of penal operations shifted to profitable Angola. Within two years, the penal system was operating almost entirely as an agricultural operation. 28 Expenditures were held to a minimum and then cut back still further, but one fact remained obvious; however stringent in economy a budget, payroll and other custodial expenses had to be met. In this, the financial strain that had been present in the culmination of the Board of Control was carried over into the operation of the penal system under the general managership.

Refusing to adopt the Board of Control's "necessary evil" philosophy with regard to the high custodial expense of the penal


28Mouledous, op. cit., p. 76.
operation, the general manager, in 1917, established a system of inmate guards.\footnote{Mouledous, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 76.} Public reaction was loud and violent, but in view of the economic crisis at his fingertips, the general manager was equally adamant, and although the public opposition continued in full force, the inmate guard system had proved its custodial and economic success to the extent that, within six months of its establishment, the general manager was able to dismiss over 125 "free" guards, leaving a total of free security of less than 25 employees scattered throughout the system.\footnote{Ibid., p. 77.} Six months later he was able to state in his report to the Governor definite success. The khaki garbed inmate guard, despite the public reaction, became the hated image of repression that continues until the present day. He had become a familiar sight and, in a sense, a symbol of the economic success of the new regime. Other than the establishment of the inmate guard system and a continuing trend to centralize penal operations around the "Angola structure," very little was accomplished during the period from the year 1916, when it was last reorganized, until May of 1952, when a series of completely unexpected events; i.e., internal institutional 'riots' at Angola, engendered the organization and incorporation of a certain modified program of pseudo-therapeutic procedure; i.e., treatment, into a new phase of penal development at Louisiana State Penitentiary.
Summary

Louisiana's reaction to deviant, anti-social and criminal patterns of behavior has been but a 'local reflection' of similar attitudes nationally evidenced in the evolution of the entire American penal system. Until the advent of the 'convict leasing' program, no radical differences were noted in the Louisiana penal system. With this dispersement of 'convict labor camps' and subsequent relinquishment of central authority, there was evidenced a chaotic situation in prison management, resulting in brutal treatment of the prisoners being utilized as labor.

The many deficiencies of the 'dispersement' led to the formation of the Prison Reform Association. In 1898, this group secured a constitutional provision against the leasing of convicts after 1901. It was noted, however, that although there was established a central authority--the Board of Control--the major accomplishment of this act was to incorporate the lease system by purchasing the largest of the plantations that previously 'leased' the majority of convict labor in the older system. Therefore, even though there was a change at that time, it was not a drastic change, nor was it the change for which the Association petitioned.

When economic pressure necessitated a further centralization of the system in Louisiana, Angola was established as the state prison. We have seen that there were various underlying reasons and that immediately many difficulties were encountered; however, the main difficulty was in taking the controlling authority of the prison system from the hands of the Board of Control and placing it into the hands
of a general manager, while, almost simultaneously, allowing the State Legislature to assume economic control by placing rigid restrictions on the monies available to the 'manager' for the operation of Angola. Thus, the General Manager, finding himself in an economically untenable position, utilized drastic expedients, among them the initiation of the inmate guard system in 1917. These divergents from penological concepts are stated as having been economically sound; however, the public reaction to their adoption was violent and, as will be shown, has never abated in its nature.

The system, nevertheless, remained more or less intact until 1952. No events were evidenced to give concrete substance to the fact that there existed a very explosive situation. It has been recognized, however, that pervasive ferment was at work; pervasive pressure toward change was building up; and that the pervasive force necessary to disrupt the status quo would soon be evidenced by violence in the form of a series of prison "riots."
CHAPTER II

RIOT AS PERVERSIVE FORCE

Even a cursory inspection of some of the more recent sociological studies dealing with penological development and the field of corrections presents a most interesting, yet appalling paradox and one for which there appears to be no apparent explanation. Detailed studies have been published on the organization, both structural and ideological, of the American penal system as well as comparative evaluations of methods and techniques. Treatment has been considered, evaluated, and promulgated. Ideological penology has, in short, reached the threshold of what could easily be its 'golden era', yet sociology has almost totally ignored the vital sociological factors to be found in a thorough investigation of the wave of riots and other mass disorders which swept over prisons in every section of the country in the 1950's.\(^1\) Ohlin very correctly asserts that "these riots provided one of the most striking phenomena of collective behavior which have occurred in recent years in the United States,"\(^2\) and yet, where are the studies and reports of

\(^1\)American Correctional Association, Manual of Correctional Standards, op. cit., p. 14. (underlined by the writer for emphasis)

the sociological investigations into the causative factorology inherent in these mass disturbances? There are but few and these are both cursory and general. That sociology should overlook, or look over, as the case may be, these riots, is indeed a paradox of the first magnitude to this writer.

One result of this apparent sociological disinterest is that the riots continue to remain but regrettable statistical entries in penological history with only superficial investigations as to the causative factors producing equally superficial and unscientific findings and explanations. These 'explanations' may be labeled, for the most part, 'second-guesses' on the part of journalists and non-professional penal personnel and, almost without exception, they exaggerate the significance underlying the absence of organized escape attempts. They have deduced, by the process of elimination of any escape factor, that the riots and mass disturbances were very active attempts on the part of the rioting prisoners to dramatize prison conditions and demand public hearings, that the riots were attributive to, and the direct result of, prevalent disciplinary techniques and physical abuse. Acceptance of this contention, however, is in effect an attempt to translate, or transliterate rather, the demands of the prisoners into rationalized explanations for the occurrence of the demonstrations.

This transliteration, at best, has produced only superficial rationalizations and conjectures that fall completely to touch upon

\[Ohlin, \text{ op. cit., p. 22.}\]
the underlying causative factors of which the prisoners' demands were but symptomatic. This is most obvious when it is realized that in almost every single instance the demands of the rioting prisoners were not formulated until after the disturbance was already in progress and, such being the case were no more than the attempt, on the part of the spokesmen and ringleaders, to justify the occasion of the disturbances and at the same time to create a favorable public impression of the violence and mob action by dramatizing the riots as being the righteous reaction, on the part of the rioters, against tyrannical abuse of prisoners' rights as human beings. These demands, for the most part, were petty grievances and protests relating to clear cut and rationalized objectives, such as medical care, parole practice, food, and in some cases even, were protests directed against certain forms of treatment programs. Although brutality, abuse of rules, disciplinary action, and inhumane conditions of existing management were keynotes in almost every disturbance, it is singularly significant, as Ohlin points out, that conditions were far worse in prisons where no riot occurred. Concomitantly with this is the significance in the geographical fact that the riots were heavily concentrated in the northern states, where penal administrators are generally agreed that the most penological progress along lines of humanitarian


penal reform had been made. Space prohibits an analytical evaluation of prisoner demands at this point which, if effected, would but draw a full circle, producing very little actually relevant to truly valid causative factors. However, this is not to reject in toto as valueless, the results of such an evaluation, for it must be admitted that protest against conditions and agitation for self-aggrandizement were obviously factors, though factors among many other factors, in the causative factorology of the phenomena of the riots, and as such do partially explain the occurrence of the riots.

The true explanation is preponderant and cannot be explained away with only superficial inquiry into obvious factors a propos of the disturbances. A far more reasonable explanation would be found, it is felt, in the theory that such events have resulted more from evidences of administrative weakness and impotency resulting from, and characterized by, a harmful decentralization of authority with breakdowns of cooperation between different administrative units within the system, than from evidences of administrative force. This administrative weakness is amplified in that penal administration and personnel, as well as the prison organization itself, have not kept abreast of the needs of the individual prisoner as an individual apart from the other prisoners. This theory is supported in substance


7Ohlin, op. cit., pp. 7-22.

8Reckless, op. cit., p. 585.
by the findings of the Committee on Riots. 9

The general effects and results of the riots are far-reaching and entail much, but are decidedly vague in that "no complete and definitive survey has been made of the effects of the riots on the prisons in which they occurred." 10

Speaking in very general terms of these effects and results of the riots, the Manual of Correctional Standards prepared by the American Correctional Association says:

"It is known that some institutions have been given public support for improvement of bad conditions, others became worse than ever under the weight of public condemnation, and others stood still. It is difficult to say in what degree stagnation and retrogression since the riots are due to the stiffening of public opinion against the prisoners and against modern correctional methods, which many unthinking people hold responsible for the riots, and in what degree are due to soaring construction costs and salary scales, which make the replacement of archaic and inadequate physical plants and the provision of vitally needed personnel difficult or impossible for many states." 11

Although change and reorganization of the physical ideology and practical application of that ideology in the field of corrections are attributed to many and varied causative factors, the student of penology and the professional correctional worker rapidly becomes aware that all reasoned change is but the result of a pervasive ferment which is constantly at work within and without the field of corrections. This pervasive ferment follows a progressive continuum

which ranges "from simple suggestions for change in procedures to fundamental challenges at the very structure of contemporary correctional institutions."^{12}

This ferment has several sources, only three of which, however, are basic, and should be considered. Modification, change, and/or pressure for change in technique and practice has, to a large degree, stemmed from basal concern for human dignity and is founded upon humanitarian considerations. These considerations for human dignity have progressed to repugnance and revulsion at many of the more extreme measures and techniques of punishment which, in turn, has created and stimulated a general discontent with many of the benign procedures of custody.

The second basic source of ferment for change extends beyond considerations of humanitarianism and is the irrefutable evidence of the complete lack of success on the part of the field of corrections to demonstrably reduce crime through incarceration. In speaking of this, Dr. Richard Jessor said: "This is a fundamental fact (the demonstrable inability to reduce crime through present-day penological efforts) that raises doubt about the adequacy of correctional work. Besides the acknowledged high rate of recidivism,\*  

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\*Interpolated Footnote: It must be pointed out, all arguments to the contrary, that there is in actuality, no such thing as 'recidivist rate'. Present, unrelated and for the most part uncoordinated state penal systems, are not able to compile true recidivist rates because of the transient nature of the criminal, lack of proper cooperative communication facilities between institutions, and absence of a central statistical research and data assimilation center. The existing so-called recidivist rates are but an implication of multiple offenders undergoing incarceration.
there is considerable concern that incarceration itself, may contribute to resumption rather than termination of criminal activity. If this is the case, then the entire correctional system is, of course, working to its own disadvantage.\textsuperscript{13}

It must be pointed out at this point, that the two sources of ferment for change which have just been mentioned are but the natural manifestations of the sympathetic and rationalization factors in the psychological make-up of the prevalent social order. They are engendered by no scientific or professional research. They follow, generally, a progressive continuum of pressure for change that begins, as has been said, with simple suggestions. There is usually no reasoning inherent in the cumulative pressure for change; it is the product rather, or rationalization of illogical and often incorrect factors.

The third source of ferment is engendered by the increasing empiricism in those branches of the behavioral sciences that have, in more recent decades, become more and more interpolated and interwoven into and upon the field of corrections. There is nothing sentimental or sympathetic in this source of ferment. It is engendered by a scientific understanding developed within the empiricism of a true scientific study in a true scientific background.\textsuperscript{14} Its authors and originators are professionals, motivated not by subjective rationalization, but by objective reasoning within the scope of the profession for which they were trained. Although it is this third source

\textsuperscript{13}\textit{Jessor, op. cit.}, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{14}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 6-7.
of ferment alone that is objectively interested in scientifically engendered organizational change and modification, the importance of the changes and pressures for change generated by the first two sources of ferment should not be swept aside purely because they are non-professional and unscientific. An inverse or reverse treatment would be more appropriate and correct, for a cursory survey of the teleology of modern penology will clearly indicate that insofar as actual initial or primary perpetuated change or modification is concerned, the perpetuating factor directly involved, has in almost every instance been in the form of pervasive ferment from one of these unscientific sources; i.e., humanitarian consideration and concern for human dignity coupled with discontent at the inability of the present structure or techniques to decrease the incidence of crime in the community. Any transition or change engendered from the third and scientific source of ferment has been invariably, in most cases, secondary, effected only in an attempt to scientifically and effectively respond to demands for change engendered by the first sources of ferment.

It is only one step further to the seemingly logical conclusion that any and all engendered change in the theoretical and/or actual organizational structure of a penal institution may be attributed to the presence of ferment from one or more of these sources of actuating factors of pervasive ferment. This conclusion can be not only misleading but completely incorrect. While it is true that nearly all reasoned change is attributable to the presence of a ferment from the third or scientific source, it is equally as true that change
and modification has been affected through eruption of pervasive force or pressure; i.e., change engendered by traumatic and explosive factors in which there was no 'period of gestation' or pressure build-up. Shock and impact, amplified by unexpectedness and surprise, augmented still further by the complete lack of preparation or existing attitude of unconcern, have substituted and replaced the pervasive ferment. This pervasive force engenders reactions out of proportion and balance, and hence, sudden, sharp and demanding pressure for change deposing unconcern, disassociation, disinterest and complacency with the suddenness of insurrection.

A striking example of change engendered without benefit of pervasive ferment is manifest in a study of Louisiana State Penitentiary during that approximate decade following the recorded internal turmoil of 1951-52. The stated motivating factors which engendered the shift from punitive to "treatment" methods and techniques were based on humanitarian considerations coupled with an increasing concern of the inability of the state penal unit to either deter the rate of criminal incidence or to curb the rising return of 'recidivists'. This motivating factorology, it is seen, is identical to that inherent in the first two sources of ferment. In this case, however, the ferment, which was evidenced by the fact the reformers were already after the governor near to election year, was nullified and negated by the complacency of a political administration whose primary interest insofar as prison was concerned, was in the maintenance of the status quo without undue unfavorable publicity. Penal
methods and techniques were of no interest to these politicians as long as the prison continued to operate within its ability to "pay its own way."

A rigidly enforced "curtain of silence," which was augmented by the natural "buffering agent" of almost total geographical isolation, afforded prison officials a free rein as to method, technique, disciplinary measures and organizational operation. Many miles distant from the nearest metropolis, the state capital, the institution took on the real—yet unreal, there—but not there, proportions of vagueness and disassociation usually reserved for "the never-met distant relative in another state." The institution was there. The public acknowledged the fact, but could not relate the operation, maintenance, or function of the establishment to themselves.

With the exception of certain modernizations, there was small change in the structure of the Louisiana State Penitentiary of 1918, and that institution as it appeared in February of 1951. It was comprised primarily of eight widely dispersed camps in the midst of a sprawling, geographically isolated farm. Clinton, in his article for the American Journal of Correction, graphically portrays these camps as "consisting of wire enclosures surrounding dilapidated two-story brick structures which accommodated filthy kitchens, dirty dining rooms, clothing issue rooms, etc., on the ground floor; and, double, or even triple its normal capacity of bunks, on the top floor.

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15 Allgood, op. cit., p. 48.
Living conditions, it could be said, did nothing for the morale.\textsuperscript{16} Nearly all of the authority having to do with custody and discipline of prisoners was relegated to a 'camp-captain' who was placed in charge of each individual camp. These captains 'held court' and meted out punishment as they saw fit with very little interference from higher authority. The individual camps functioned much as individual operations. There was little, if any, cooperation between them and often the normal aloofness developed into open hostility. There was no central maintenance set-up or facility. Each camp maintained, repaired, and built much of their own equipment in their own machine, blacksmith, and carpenter shops.\textsuperscript{17} Educational facilities for inmates of the penitentiary prior to 1952, were virtually non-existent.\textsuperscript{18} Years before, in 1944, a citizens' committee had been appointed by the governor to inspect the prison. In their report they castigated and condemned existing health and sanitary facilities and conditions.\textsuperscript{19} In 1951, these conditions and facilities were worse, if anything. No new facilities had been built and few repairs made on the existing ones. Depreciation had done the rest.


\textsuperscript{17}Allgood, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 52-53.

\textsuperscript{18}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{19}Unpublished report of the "Advisory Committee to the Department of Institutions, to Governor Sam Jones," New Orleans: April 1, 1944, p. 16.
Each camp captain had three subordinates who, like the camp captain, lived with their families in "residences" built on the periphery of the camps. Custodial duties fell in the main to khaki-clad, semi-literate inmate guards. The institution was not operated primarily for the protection of the existing social order. Security was a secondary function of the administration. Escapes and attempted escapes were frequent and common. Mouledous accurately pinpointed security's order of precedence in the functioning of the prison when he said "as long as the penitentiary operated without drawing excessive public criticism, security, like other non-occupational activities was lax."  

The prison administrators (if indeed they could be so labeled), and officials, were for the most part semi-literate, 'poor-white trash' living in idyllic existence, a "life which mimicked that of the passing plantation aristocracy," on a plantation which, in the general manager's own words, "...held 18,000 acres of the most fertile land this side of the River Nile...a 750 acre lake alive with fish...a surface population of ducks, which, in their gorgeous plumage, compete with the myriad colors of the lake."  

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20Mouledous, op. cit., pp. 80-81.
21Ibid., p. 80.
22Ibid., p. 80.
In addition to the aesthetic beauty afforded by the natural environment, was the existence of an inmate labor force which provided the self-imagined "plantation-owner" the necessary "labor" to raise his chickens, cows, horses, vegetables, and flower gardens as well as cook and clean house for the 'boss-lady'. These privileged jobs were assigned to 'good ole nigras' who were allowed to live in small shacks behind the 'boss's' residence where they would be available to the lady of the house. The institution and inmate labor, artistry, or skill provided these 'plantation owners' with their every need. The only demands upon these officials, as has been said, was maintaining the status quo without the incurrence of unfavorable publicity. To maintain this status quo, insofar as the solvency of the operation was concerned, they were given unofficial "free rein" to take any measures and methods necessary, official executive restraining orders from the governor notwithstanding. The official restraining orders were merely "duly received, acknowledged, and filed for future reference."

This had led to a continuous concentration of occupational activities in farming which was the major source of revenue. Almost all inmates were engaged either directly or indirectly in farm work. Prison industry, what little there was of it, was closely

24 Houladous, op. cit., p. 81.

25 Author's Personal Portfolio; inmate source.

26 Sugar Mill, cannery, abattoir, etc.
related and, where possible, incorporated into the agricultural activity. The work day for the prisoner began early when "the last one out the gate got laid out cold from a crack over the head with a big hickory stick with a knob on the end. Lots of times we had to run all the way to the section we was working, convict guards yelling and cursing us all the way. If we slowed down, they'd ride over us with horses and sometimes club us with shotguns. Half the time we were so worn out and dog-tired that we almost couldn't work when we got to the fields."27

The prisoners were formed into squads called 'lines' and dispersed to the various areas of the farm for which their camp was responsible. They were accompanied by an unarmed 'strawboss' or 'line-pusher' and several armed inmate guards. Intermittently throughout the day's work the field foreman would make the rounds to see that the quota was being fulfilled, and "to give overt and immediate support to the guards' authority by doling out whippings. The guards were also given unofficial authority to mete-out such punishment, and used this power as a means to speed up the work pace as well as to punish rebellious inmates."28

An excellent example is seen in the following:

"...a common practice was to place each man on a row of cane, cotton, or some other crop that required weeding, hoeing, harvesting, etc. The job would then begin like

27Author's Personal Portfolio: inmate source.

28Mouledous, op. cit., p. 85.
a footrace fifty or more men each with his own row to work and the last five to reach the far end of the row would be whipped."

Although a 1944 Executive Order signed by Governor James H. Davis had officially prohibited the flogging or lashing of state prisoners, there are definite indications, as has been already indicated, that no more than token compliance to the order was taken on the part of prison officials. This 'token compliance' was, for the most part, but the omission of the entry recording the administered flogging in the inmate's record folder. Evidence indicates that lashing and flogging continued, however unofficially, as the popular form of punishment and disciplinary measure until well into 1951. Another prevalent form of punishment is illustrated by Allgood as "including a system whereby the prisoner was handcuffed to a post at a height parallel with his chin. He was required to remain in this position for the greater part of the day in the hot sun or stiff breeze."

To the foregoing may be appended "...and mostly they held our noses after we was 'cuffed-up' on the cross and poured a big glass of castor oil down our throats. Sometimes we could vomit back after the guards had gone, but if we couldn’t..."

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29 Ibid.
30 Allgood, op. cit., p. 59.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Author's Personal Portfolio: Inmate source.
The physical structure of the penal establishment at Angola, as has been said, was highly rural. The adjacent rural parishes and few small communities in the area greatly benefited from the labor and talents of the inmates. Inmates were unofficially "loaned as laborers, skilled workers, and even entertainers."34

Foodstuffs of all description are described by Mouledous, as passing "freely through the gates. Hunting, fishing and similar recreational activities were permitted" on the prison acreage. Escapes were frequent but were "looked over" by the families of the area because they perceived Angola as an economic benefit that far out balanced the 'risk' to life and limb presented in an escapee who was "in a hurry to get somewhere else."

The combination of these factors combined to create a complex deprivational-privilege system of life which was violently opposed to any suggestion of change. No real amount of pervasive ferment could 'work' and build pervasive pressure under conditions as existed. It would take something more severe and traumatic to shake the lethargy from a state stunned by complacency.

From all indications there were none of the usual signs to announce its approach, no harbinger to herald its imminence. Official records contain nothing but the routine incidence of violence and bloodshed, isolated and seemingly unrelated incidents involving personal disputes. Certainly there was nothing that would indicate

34Mouledous, op. cit., p. 82.
the "series of riots and self-mutilations on the part of the inmates of the Louisiana State Penitentiary" that was to erupt into violence and destructive existence early in February of 1951.

Perhaps the best picture of the wake left by the storm of violence that swept over Angola is contained in Clinton's article as it appeared in the American Journal of Correction:

"The story broke on a tip from an inmate who had just been released. 'I'd have done it myself if I'd had much longer to go', he told reporters as he described how a number of inmates had injured themselves, perhaps risking permanent disablement, by slashing their heel tendons with the razor blades issued to them. Reporters went to the prison on Sunday...After much insistence by the newsmen it was finally agreed that they could interview some of the prisoners—and a carefully selected group of them were brought into the office of the camp Captain at old Camp 'E', the site of most of the heel-stringing and the traditional trouble spot of the penitentiary since it was the camp to which were assigned the inmates hardest to handle...as witness followed witness, the story began to have a familiar ring, almost as if it had been learned by rote. But other inmates, when, after much persuasion, the warden agreed to let the reporters enter the camp compound 'at their own risk', insisted that the bat and stick were common punishment for infringement of rules laid down by the captain and subject to change without notice—or even, as one inmate put it, 'just because he feels like hitting someone.' At the prison hospital...the claims of brutality were even more emphatic, backed up by specific examples, some of which were even further backed up by the bruises and welts on the backs and shoulders. It was sickening."

As was stated in the foregoing, most of the heel tendon slashings and disturbances occurred in what was called old Camp 'E',

36Clinton, op. cit., pp. 4-5.
37Along with Camp 'E' as indicated, there was Camp 'H' for white first offenders; for colored inmates there were Camps 'A', 'C', 'G', 'I', and 'H'. Inmate guards were maintained in separate quarters at Camp 'H'.
a camp occupied by white multiple offenders considered to be recidi- 

vists and referred to as 'red hats'. One of these 'red hats', even-
tually released and subsequently re-incarcerated on new charges in 
the new prison, had the following to say about the riots:

"...fellows in the 'red hat' gang got a belly full and used 
razor blades on themselves and some others. They figured 
that this would attract some attention from the outside, 
and that's what we wanted since the reformers were already 
after the governor and this was close to election year."38

From another inmate source:

"Actually there wasn't any riot. We were just protesting 
mistreatment and brutality. Food was bad and there wasn't 

enough of it; there were beatings for nothing at all and 
shootings were happening almost every day. We worked from 
dawn until dark and then some. We were forced to live like 
animals in filthy camps where dope, liquor, sex /homosex-

uality, forced or otherwise/, and gambling were unlimited. 
The camps were run by convict gangs and controlled by brutal 
and sadistic officers. Cuttings and killings were daily 
occurrances. Convicts engaged in 'small businesses' like 
selling beds to the fresh fish—or even selling the fish 

themselves /for forced sex purposes/. What food that could 
be stolen was also peddled, sometimes for large sums. There 
was no recreation, no education, no doctor or adequate medi-
cal facilities and the two chaplains were not well-known or 
utilized, since most of the convicts—like myself—never 
had any dealings with them."39

As is indicated in the foregoing, the much-publicized 'riots'
at Angola must be set-off with quotation marks around the word 'riot'.
The 'riots', in fact, were non-existent. There were heel-tendon 
slashings, and self-mutilation on the part of some of the inmates. 
There were minor disturbances which were "uncontrolled" but which 
were never, at any time, out of control.

38Author's Personal Portfolio: Inmate source.
39Ibid.
The subsequent publicity which exploded into headlines may be attributed to reasons too numerous to name. It must be remembered, too, that the newspapermen 'had an ax to grind'. Except for an occasional carefully guided tour for legislative committees of chamber of commerce groups and the like--tours that carefully avoided the worst and showed only the best, which was none too good at that--Angola in the early fifties was strictly "off-limits." Newsman smarted at rebuffs, resentment built up against prison officials within the profession. The ax grew duller and duller. Then, the insuppressible self-mutilations and internal disturbances at Angola presented the newsman with an excellent 'grindstone' on which to 'whet' their axes. They were not slow to take advantage of the opportunity. After leaving Angola that Sunday in February of 1951, "they had a story to tell." The recounting of that story gained for the Louisiana State Penitentiary nationwide publicity and a reputation as "America's Worst Prison." In addition to the "grudge" was the very real nature of the charges of brutality and inhumane treatment. They, indeed, warranted publicity and action. Social reaction to the news stories was drastic and immediate. Clinton frames that action in the following terms:

"The flame began to grow and that fire was spotted directly under the Governor's chair, then occupied by Earl K. Long...He reached a decision. He would appoint a 'citizens' committee'...Committees to investigate

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Angola were nothing new in 1951, but such committees were usually administration friends who could find nothing drastically wrong...But Long's selections for the committee were well balanced both from the standpoint of political affiliations and experience background. They did a thorough, painstaking job, including several trips to the penitentiary...and untold hours of research by individual members before coming up with a series of 30 recommendations. As one member, with some seriousness, told the Governor: "What it boils down to is tear the place down and start over!".*41

Another factor, as was said, was the close proximity of the gubernatorial election. Dying embers from the 'expose bonfire' were seized by active Kennon supporters, carefully fanned to renewed life, and then planted in the 'political haystack' of a hotly-contested, bitterly fought race for the governor's chair. This 'haystack' made fine fuel as may be seen from the result of Kennon's "modernization of Angola" platform, which he repeated over and over from every political stump in the state.*42 "Other candidates began adopting the 'plank' for their platform, adding to the public awareness.*43

The first result, as has been stated, was the list of thirty recommendations submitted to 'lame-duck' Governor Earl K. Long and which also included the verbal recommendation of one serious-minded committee member that the best thing to do would be to tear the place down and start over.*44 This is not, however, quite what happened.

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*41 Clinton, op. cit., p. 5.
*42 Ibid.
*43 Ibid., p. 6.
*44 Ibid., p. 5.
It must also be pointed out, that the publicity engendered by the Angola disturbance, coming as it did in close proximity to election year, was but fat in the political fire, as a review of the political campaign of the following year will testify. Robert Kennon's "clean-up Angola" platform had strong opposition on the grounds that drastic penal change would constitute a capitulation to the prisoners.45

Outcries from other states too, opposed the drastic changes proposed in the recommendations submitted to the departing Governor Earl K. Long. These came in the fear that appeasement of the Angola convicts would tend to stimulate the rash of riots that was then continuing, and would continue, in other institutions.46

Predominating the committee's recommendations to the Governor was the procurement of a professional penologist, establishment of a planned program of rehabilitation, and the elimination of the system of shotgun carrying inmate guards as the prison's custodial force.47 These three recommendations coupled with the other 27, still unacted upon the following year, as has been said, became key issues in the political race for governor, and "...the subsequent


46 cf. Ibid., "It is only too clear that appeasement of inmate rioters in some penal institutions has stimulated riots in others..."

47 Clinton, op. cit., p. 5.
policy changes that occurred in the administration of the prison and
the drastic physical changes in the prison plant were the direct re-
sults of the fulfillment of... Governor Robert Kennon's campaign/...
promises, "and thus was initiated the program of change that even-
tually led to the partial downfall of the old regime, and opened the
door somewhat, onto a new phase of penal development in Louisiana in
which rehabilitation was the stated aim.

Summary
The internal turmoil or 'riot' at Angola did engender pervasive
force; in this is its significance. Pervasive ferment demands change;
pervasive force demands immediate change, and immediate moves were
made toward a re-organization and re-orientation of the prison from
historical lines of the custodial-productive archetype toward a phi-
losophy and organization of treatment orientation. This 'shift' in
theoretical concept and practical application of that concept was imple-
mented by unreasoned half-way measures in an attempt to effect full
change, and simple measures in the attempt to effect drastic and com-
plex change. This accomplished, to some extent, change in the physi-
cal structure and ideological concepts of the prison's purpose and
function, but did not alter it to the extent that it became in any
way a "model prison" or, as connoted, a 'treatment centered' corre-
ctional institution

It has already been noted that the pervasive force initiating
the changes was due to simple humanitarian considerations and concern

48 Mouledous, op. cit., pp. 119-120.
for human dignity. The demand was for immediate, drastic alteration; not for planned, systematic and scientific change. The demand was satisfied; not the need.
CHAPTER III

EVOLUTION OF CONFLICT OF PRISON OBJECTIVES

Nearly all 'contemporary' or 'modern' organizations have had certain limitations imposed upon them by the multiple and varied contributing factors of their evolution. In organizational structures and institutions that are completely dependent upon the tax-dollar for their existence, maintenance, and operation, these limitations, cross purposes and contradictory motives and objectives become more pronounced. In the case of the prison, society is 'footing the bill' and does not hesitate to make conflicting and contradictory demands upon that structure.

Each prison, penitentiary, and/or correctional institution is endowed with its own specific set of problems; however, one problem that is general and common to all such institutions is the conflicted orientation of the public; i.e., the diverse and conflicting public or social attitudes regarding the ultimate purpose and objective of prison. That these diverse related theories of the collective social mind are not necessarily logical or rational is insignificant. They exist and do influence; that is their importance. They exercise a very definite influence upon the internal organizational structure of the modern American penal unit and, because they do possess this
Influential quality, and because no other single factor has had such an impact and effect on the organization of treatment and the structural constitution of these institutions, they must be recognized and clearly understood.

I. CONFLICT OF SOCIAL ATTITUDES

There exists today basically four distinguishable attitudes toward the control and prevention of crime. Each implies a specific program of action which, in turn, implies a specific resultant function that the prison is expected to accomplish. Briefly stated, these attitudes are ones of retribution (retaliation), deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.¹

Retribution

The oldest of these justifications of social attitudes, retribution, is also probably the most natural; it is the animalistic and instinctive tendency to strike back or retaliate in vengeance. Palmore gives an excellent description of this attitude in the following paragraphs:

¹Four social attitudes will be discussed in this chapter. Reckless in his excellent work, op. cit., expands these attitudes to five, which he lists as retribution, expiation, deterrence, protection, and rehabilitation; however, retribution and expiation are more or less the opposite ends of the same telescope, and any remarks made concerning retribution must, of necessity, incorporate and subsume remarks regarding expiation.

²It is interesting to note that all four of these attitudes are justifications of punishment and the establishment of the prison.
"Retribution represents the emotional satisfaction experienced by an outraged community. No enlightened student of the subject recognizes it as being a legitimate object of punishment in a civilized society. It is the same thing as revenge. When stung, it is a man's instinct to strike back. The public is human. When a heinous offense is committed people quite naturally cry out for a punishment that 'fits' the crime. Aside from soothing animal passion, revenge does no good, of course, but we must not delude ourselves that because this is demonstrably an irrational attitude it no longer exists. It does exist, and in considering ways and means of making 'punishment' a useful and constructive thing of actual benefit to the people as a whole, its existence presents one of the essential frontiers of the educational process."

Deterrence

A second attitude with regard to crime and crime control is the idea that the imposition of suffering and hardship will act as a deterrent to crime. Even anthropologists of the Margaret Mead genre are able to demonstrate, with numerous case and field histories, the existence of such an attitude in the most backward and primitive societies. In fact, in almost every society without exception, there is a general consensus of opinion that "sparing the rod will spoil the child." Psychologists have coined such terms as conditioned reflex and motivational stimuli to cover these undercurrents of feeling. It is a relatively easy and seemingly natural step from the attitude of retribution to an attempt at rationalization for wanting revenge. In other words, these two attitudes are parallel in this respect to geological strata: first, there is the older, more primitive attitude of imposition of suffering upon an offender because of

3Palmore, op. cit., p. 6.
the outrage and anger felt, and secondly, there is a modified, refined, and 'culturized' attitude by means of a rationalization which imposes suffering in order to constrain or deter others from criminal behavior. It must not be thought, however, that some sort of evolutionary development in American society's attitudes toward crime control is being posited here. All four of the attitudes that are being discussed have always, in some form or other, been part and parcel of the general American attitude toward crime. By the imposition of suffering and incarceration upon the person of the offender it was felt that society was protecting itself, and was having a salutary effect upon public morality. In other words, while the first attitude—that of retribution—looks directly toward the criminal, the second attitude, deterrence, shifts the emphasis or purpose of punishment to society itself. It is for society's long-range benefit that a criminal is made to suffer, since it is believed that the infliction of pain on offenders inculcates fear of the consequences of perpetuating like offenses in others.

Deterrence strikes a classical theme throughout the whole history of penology. Cesare Beccaria, whose writing at the end of the eighteenth century had much to do with renovating the system of punitive justice in Europe, contended vigorously that the intent of punishment should not be to torture the offender or to undo the crime (expiation) but "to prevent others from committing like offenses."^4

He insisted also that a "punishment, to be just, should have only that degree of severity which is sufficient to deter others."\(^5\)

Less venerable and philosophical, but more contemporary and to the point, is the following excerpt from the previously cited work of Palmore:

"The extent to which the threat of punishment deters people from crime is not susceptible of satisfactory proof, nor, indeed, has there been developed as yet any consistent set of comparative statistics by which we can measure the real corrective effect of any particular system of punishment on those who have been subjected to it. The statistics simply are not there, and we have to grope in what common sense and experience tell us is the right direction. But even without scientific proof..."\(^6\)

**Incapacitation**

The third attitude follows from the second. It holds that protection from the criminal is per se desirable, and should be demanded; i.e., whether a criminal is punished or not, society feels that he must be isolated from the community in order that the community may be temporarily made safe from recurrent violations by the particular offender in custody. The theoretical considerations that underlies this type of justification are sound. In practice, however, obstacles and difficulties abound. The following words from Reckless bring out a few of the innate pitfalls of this attitude:

"Theoretically, the justification of punishment as a measure of social defense is sound. In reality the recent laws of social defense give very small and uncertain coverage on violators. The number of offenders, habitual or abnormal,

\(^5\)Ibid., p. 51.

actually reached under the administration of these laws is pitifully small. The special provisions for their protective detention and parole are not adequate. On the other hand, if imprisonment is conceived as protection of society..."7

Rehabilitation

Finally, there is interest by society in reforming or rehabilitating the criminal. Primarily, this attitude is assumed for the sake of reducing criminal incidence, since rehabilitation would apparently lower the rate of recidivism. In a sense, then, this attitude is a variant upon, and congruent with, the idea that society must be protected against the criminal. In fact, if this attitude is carefully scrutinized, a last analysis of it will bear witness that rehabilitation is not all for the offender's benefit, but rather is equally concerned with the welfare of society.8 Whether the offender continues his deviate pattern or not, he is likely to remain among society anyway and run out his life's course by fair means or foul, either in prison or out. If he remains a criminal, it seems obvious that he will take more from society than he will contribute. It will be society that will pay the difference in the long run. On the other hand, if he becomes a productive, self-supporting, law-abiding citizen, such expense is circumvented. Consequently, even if the nobler aspects and altruistic ideology of rehabilitation is

7Reckless, op. cit., p. 447.

8Rehabilitation is defined, from a strictly penological viewpoint, as the modification of an inmate's attitudes and values and the inculcating of a sense of social responsibility which, hopefully, will result in the curtailment of the individual's law-breaking activities.
shoved completely into the background, it remains a matter of cold logic that, in the long run, the public is the victim of any system or concept that is not geared as highly as possible to the correction of the personality problems that have made a criminal out of a man or woman who might otherwise be a useful citizen. Palmore points out:

"Concede that there will be some or even many who cannot be transformed by the best processes of the behavioral sciences. So what? Certainly everyone must agree that we are foolish not to do what we can. That much is self-evident."9

These four basic attitudes of contemporary American society with regard to criminal control and management are tersely and cogently summarized by Donald Cressey:

"Prison programs are to make life unpleasant for persons who have made others' lives unpleasant, to isolate offenders so that they cannot commit crimes during periods of time, to reform them, and to have a deterrent effect on criminal behavior in the general population as well."10

In the United States of today, these four attitudes are predominant and society at large feels that prison programs should be compatible with and conform to each of these specific ideas about crime control. The prison is expected to adequately perform each specific function simultaneously, and thus results internal conflict—the conflict between punishment11 and rehabilitation. As Cressey observes:

9Palmore, op. cit., p. 7.

10Donald R. Cressey, et. al., "Limitation On Organization of Treatment," Theoretical Studies In Social Organization of the Prison, (Social Science Research Council: 1960) p. 82.

11Punishment need not be in the form of physical or mental brutality, but might be an instrument of public justice in the form of control, discipline, and loss of freedom.
"The fundamental organizational problem in progressive contemporary prisons arises from the directive to inflict punishment by custodianship while maintaining a program based on a new conception of the process of reformation, namely, rehabilitation through treatment."

II. CONFLICT OF ORGANIZATIONAL INTENT

Few problems of an organizational nature appeared in the early American prison. The structure could easily meet the expectations of society with regard to attitudes since the social demands of that era could be fulfilled by an organization centered around punishment, and with punishment as its ultimate goal and purpose.

It was only later, and then gradually, that organizational strain was introduced into the penal system. Its inception was in the wake of an ever increasing wave of doubt as to the social need for retribution and deterrent punishments more severe than mere deprivation of liberty. This strain was amplified and magnified by still another concept that began to take root in the path of its predecessor: a doubt as to whether reformation could be effected or achieved by application of punishment of any type. With a progression in the general trend in penal ideology that men are sent to prison as punishment and not for punishment, so did the internal conflict and organizational strain progress. The old organizational methods were left relatively intact while the new ideas and theoretical considerations were tacked on in haphazard fashion without any thought to the

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12 Cressey, op. cit., p. 82.
old order. Ohlin makes this clear when he observes:

"...It is in the prison system (as compared to juvenile institutions) that the sociological investigator is likely to find the greatest contrast between the old and new in penal practice...and, consequently, it is in this specific area that limitations to organizations of treatment are more readily observable."

He later states: "The prisons of the United States reflects a heterogeneous mixture of traditional penal procedures and the latest in correctional techniques."

The correctional establishment of the current day is indeed a paradox among organizational structures in that within the organization boundaries of the whole, the basic penal structure provides for three distinct and separate organizational stratifications or chains of command which both overlap and, at the same time, are polemic. The divergent objectives of these hierarchies are not to be integrated, but yet are very intricately related.

Although Korn and McCorkle are not in total accord with the following, it may be said in general, for the purpose of this study, that the responsibilities exacted of the three subsidiary organizational stratifications are (1) custody-discipline; (2) convenience; and (3) treatment.

Cressey, in his excellent study, has designated the three subsidiary organizations as keeping, using, and serving. He then goes

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13Ohlin, op. cit., p. 13.  
14Ibid.  
15Korn and McCorkle, op. cit., p. 471.  
16Ibid.
The objectives of each hierarchy require that its roles and processes of role integration take definite forms. The model of an organization for help and treatment to inmates is an archetypal mental hospital; for using them, an industrial organization, such as a lumber camp, where employees both work and live together; for keeping them, a prison on the order of the early Pennsylvania institutions. Each organization includes a specific kind of relationship between employees and inmates; a specific pattern of communications, authority, and decision making; and a specific system for distributing rewards and punishments. These features vary significantly among the three kinds of organizations."17

The polemic nature of the divergent objectives precludes equation or equality of precedence. Therefore, as in any structure where a multiplicity of objectives or purposes is to be perpetuated simultaneously, it becomes predominately evident that some order of precedence be assigned to the objectives. There could be no comprehensiveness to the function of the structure as a whole without this order of precedence to clarify the conflicts between the juxtaposed divergencies of operation. Unfortunately, the deciding factor of precedence appears to be seniority rather than any scientific attempt to fulfill a need. Sheer custody, primarily by token of its antiquity and established position, has become the primal functional factor of the structure of prison.

The almost invariable ascendency of the custodial function and organization may be attributed, in many cases where even advanced treatment facilities and programs are implemented, to the failure

17 Cressey, et. al., op. cit., p. 80.
to effect a corresponding degree of de-emphasis on the custody-discipline organization as increasing emphasis is placed upon the role and role processes of the treatment structure. The continued perpetuation of this failure stems largely from the rather narrow concept that accurate moment-to-moment knowledge of and control over the whereabouts and destinations of all inmates is a purely custodial function and objective. Actually, nothing could be further from the truth.

Both Convenience and Treatment are aware of the essential significance and elemental need of a controlling function or role. A prisoner may be neither utilized nor treated unless he is available for that utilization or treatment. Movement must be controlled and somewhat curtailed even in the most liberal administration of treatment, but to completely relegate this function to the custodial organizational is the absurd result of custody's organizational 'seniority' which was mentioned earlier. Both Convenience and Treatment are relative 'upstarts' in the penological concept. Security operations were among the well established functions of the traditional punitive philosophy and administration. And, as such, the composite organizational structures of convenience and treatment either saw no need for a duplication of services or, because of their timorous introduction, were reluctant to engage in open hostility with the custody-discipline structure as to whom should be the author of what procedure. This original 'reluctance' and 'timorousness' became, with the passage of time and condonement of action, a passive acceptance of subservant roles by both 'treatment' and 'convenience'.

The American prison system, the general 'upward struggle' toward treatment notwithstanding, still has its die-hards; lagging and backward systems which retain the visible scars if not the actual presence of over-crowding, inhumane, and non-standard methods and techniques of discipline; sub-standard and deficient administration by politically appointed administrators. These administrators, in their lack of professional training, continue to question and deny the legitimacy of treatment. They attempt to retain the sheer custodial aspect of the old traditional-type prison where little or no attempt at non-punitive reform is implemented. Religion, education, and higher forms of recreation are viewed as unnecessary accoutrements and obstacles to complete totalitarian rule.

When faced with the demands resultant from the eruption of a pervasive force from within or without, these administrators doggedly cling to the custodial orientation, yet yield to the irresistible pervasive pressure by token compliance. They employ treatment specialists, set up classification and treatment programs on paper, then 'administer so-called treatment activities as measures to help insure security, or define as treatment the distribution of 'amenities' or 'privileges'.

*As an analogy of such a penal system, the author is reminded of an institution; i.e., Arkansas State Prison, which boasts of having an inmate population of 2400, and which is operated and controlled by thirty-nine employees with the aid of "prison guards" and "foremen."

18 Cressey, et. al., op. cit., p. 86.
In the implementation of a paper program of treatment and the adoption of the so-called treatment measures as an aid of security, these same administrators virtually abort the intent and purpose of treatment by transforming the role of the professional into a custodial role, thereby reducing to a subordinate position and authority the trained professional.

**Summary**

It has been shown that the most general problem encountered in the evolution of the American prison system has been the conflicted orientation of the public; i.e., the diverse and conflicting public or social attitudes regarding the ultimate purpose and objective of prison. It has further been illustrated that, because social expectations and demands of past eras were easily satisfied by a structure which was constructed for, and ideologically dedicated to, pure punitive-custodial functions, this conflict was not always present. In a word, the prison offered the ideal setting in which to perpetuate punishment and isolation of the offender, with resultant internal organizational efficiency of the penal structure and external satisfaction for the body social.

However, fortunately or unfortunately, as the case might be, society proved its human quality by changing its mind. This shift, occurring after the status quo had been firmly established within the penal structure, resulted in internal conflict whenever any additions were attempted within an organization of polemically opposed concepts.
It has been illustrated that one of the obstacles emerging has been the conflict of organizational intent which, along with divergent social attitudes, are emeshed into the confused sphere of practical application.
CHAPTER IV

SELECTED LIMITATIONS OF THE 'NEW' SYSTEM

Within the most cursory inspection of the Louisiana State Penitentiary as that institution functioned and operated in the fall of the year 1962, the close of an approximate decade following the internal disturbances and conflict of 1951-52, there is revealed a most obvious manifestation of change. The pervasive force engendered by the multiplicity of contributing factors accompanying the 'riots' had, indeed, visibly and drastically altered both the physical and ideological structure of the prison.

Closer inspection of the 'new' system brings to light the presence of three obvious flaws; i.e., the engendered change was perpetuated by pervasive force rather than ferment and thus was too precipitant—was effected too rapidly over too short a space of time; it was motivated by humanitarian considerations and basic concern for human dignity and not from planned penological reconstruction; it had engendered ill feelings between inmates and free personnel, which had been carried over into, and made a part of, the 'new' system.

The resultant structure of the 'new', but unplanned system, was cross-stitched and interwoven with patent limitations imposed upon and restricting the very purpose and intent inherent in the 'new'
The 'new' system was, indeed, by virtue of the very multiplicity of self-imposed limitations, a failure insofar as perpetuation and effectuation of the organization of treatment was concerned. As has been stated, the penal structure at Angola was not torn down and rebuilt.

Conflict between the 'old' and the 'new' was bitter. The differences between the practical operation and theoretical concept inherent in each were too polemic to permit conciliation. Any and all change engendered was upon and into existing residuals and relics from the 'old' and is manifested in that every particle of change was effected upon the site or geographical location that had been selected and utilized for the establishment and perpetuation of the 'old' system. It was thus that one of the most patent limitations to certain phases of the 'old' system was carried over and magnified to new and even greater proportions of importance.

1. GEOGRAPHICAL ISOLATION

Two economic factors figured strongly in the original purchase of the Angola penal plantation when the state resumed control of

Instead, ill-planned and non-scientific establishment of a new prison and system adapted to, and founded upon, remnants of the 'old' prison and system was effected. By intent, this new system was to be segregated and separated from the old; i.e., it was to replace and supercede the 'old' while, at the same time, utilizing certain physical, organizational, and theoretical aspects of that 'old' system and prison.
the prisoners "leased" out in 1901. Angola was the largest of several adjacent penal plantations.* It was already established and equipped for penal operation. Any attempt to move the prisoners that had been assigned to that 'lease holder' would have proved costly indeed inasmuch as the state had no ready-made place in which to incarcerate or detain them until other provisions could be made. Coupled to this was the very high agricultural potential of the land.

It is suggested that the Angola plantation\textsuperscript{2} was retained as the site of the 'new' system that was engendered during that pervasive decade under discussion for primarily the same reasons and which, if the truth were known, would probably prove to be almost entirely economic in nature. The decision, if any such decision was called for or made, could possibly also have been made with an eye cast toward the 'natural' security barriers offered by the very nature of the surrounding vicinity.\textsuperscript{3} Coupled with these natural obstacles, the prison is rendered nearly inaccessible to normal traffic.\textsuperscript{4}

\textsuperscript{*}See: Mouledous, op. cit., for an excellent physical description of the properties now comprised by the Angola Structure.

\textsuperscript{2}Ibid. Note: The area designated as Angola today is comprised of what was, during the days prior to 1900, eight plantations.

\textsuperscript{3}The Mississippi River presents a near-impossible, often fatal natural barrier against escape on three sides of Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola. The formidable Tunica Hills, a wild, desolate, and for the most part, uninhabited territory that ranges from three to twenty-three miles in depth, stands silent, a natural and unsalaried guard, to the east.

\textsuperscript{4}Louisiana State Penitentiary is serviced by a secondary state highway or, as an alternative, an ill-scheduled and faulty
These factors, when coupled with one another, render Louisiana State Penitentiary for all intents and purposes, an isolated institution for the inmate population, and a 'closed community' for those employees and their dependents who reside therein.\(^5\)

Very definite and somewhat obvious limitations upon the organization of treatment within the Louisiana penal structure have been engendered by that institution's geographical isolation. The progression of time has, in no way, modified or mitigated these geographically engendered limitations; the inverse being the actual fact as may be seen in the lack of adequate communication facilities. Baton Rouge, the state capital, is sixty-five miles away and may be contacted only by telephone and radio-telephone. This has led to a strong decentralization of certain institutional departments, among them the financial-bookkeeping-audit divisions. Offices for each have been established both at the institution, the logical location for such an office, and at Baton Rouge. In the past decade there has been an increasingly strong trend to place emphasis on the character, function and nature of the Baton Rouge section.

\[^5\] Cf. Donald Clemmer, The Prison Community, (Boston: Christopher Publishing House, 1940). Note: The housing area or personnel community at Louisiana State Penitentiary, officially designated "Killarney Heights," and unofficially known as "Bee Line," is comprised of an approximate 120 family-unit dwellings, one of which has been occupied by the writer since July, 1961. In addition, there is a trailer park which, at one time, was the site of between sixty and eighty trailer units.
which, in turn, has strongly de-emphasized the role of the institution section. This is especially true in the case of the specific departments cited, as may be seen in the fact that the institution offices have assumed nominal aspects. This has contributed to much unnecessary double-handling and duplication of effort and many avoidable errors in bookkeeping; personnel payrolls have been tardy as is almost the general rule in any transaction with regard to inmate funds. Highly significant also is the prison administrator's imposed lack of information concerning one of the prison's most important necessities: i.e., funds with which to operate the institution. The administrator is equally handicapped through the de-emphasis on the institution's function in the transaction of almost any and all business concerning the institution. Such transactions are invariably conducted in the Baton Rouge offices of the departments, approximately sixty-five miles distant from the administrator who is responsible for that institution.

Any legal matters or litigation with regard to the inmate population and/or the personnel must be conducted in the courts and parish offices of St. Francisville, a rural community that is the seat of legal jurisdiction for the parish and prison, and which is over twenty miles distant.

6It is interesting to note that many inmates feel that due to its experiences and proximity to the Angola structure, the population of St. Francisville (comprised of 'hicks' or 'hoosiers' convict vernacular-wise) is prejudiced in judging inmate trials, among other things. This points directly towards a prison's personnel and inmate population experiencing 'very real' problems which, it is felt, could otherwise have been curtailed if not completely avoided by the removal of the prison to a suburban location with more desirable communication facilities.
Because the operation of the physical plant and the perpetuation of any program of penal administration has always engendered and imposed certain regrettable, yet necessary, restricting factors upon the leisure hours and activities of its employees, nearly all prison personnel communities function in a partial or quasi-closed state of existence. In the case of the social unit comprised of the personnel community at Louisiana State Penitentiary, the situation is magnified and amplified by virtue of its geographical isolation and the highly rural adjacent area. The personnel community at Angola is an almost absolute closed social unit because of this geographical isolation. Any and all leisure and social life must spring from within the community itself, hence it is not balanced or rounded. Recreation is limited, and for the most, aimed at juvenile dependents with nearly nothing in the way of adult diversion. Concentrated both in size and population it presents a perplexing paradox of factors, which either directly or indirectly engender limitations on the organization of treatment within Louisiana State Penitentiary.

As has been said, the community under discussion is small—much smaller, in fact, than the most rural of population centers. As has also been stated the physical proportions of this community are such that it is highly limited in size. The continuum of difference in prestige-level at the two ends is polemic in nature. The result of this in any small but open community would be the engenderance of a distinct caste system. In the case of the closed social unit of which the personnel community at Angola is comprised, it has
developed even further and extended beyond the normal limitations of social caste systems, becoming inclusive of what might be termed, in loose fashion, as possessing many aspects of an "out-caste" system insofar as social and leisure life is concerned. The persons directly affected most by the existence of this underlying and preponderant element of life within the personnel community are the dependents. This has and does lead to implications far beyond the surface in the "home life" of an employee whose dependents are so affected. In these cases the "home life" is usually not one conducive to the perpetuation of efficiency in his institutional assignment. His morale, understanding and reasoning power are affected and thus his official decisions. The inmate population with whom the employee must, by virtue of his duties, come into contact, is affected and becomes, indirectly, the real sufferers for the autocracy of the personnel community.

Still another item of consideration that is presented in the 'closed' community factor of the Angola personnel community is that both the employee and his dependents are virtually on twenty-four hour "duty" in that the chief topic of conversation with co-workers and dependents is the prison. Any attempt at casual relations with co-workers and dependents during leisure hours almost invariably develops into a carry-over of the "casualness" into the official or working hours, where jocularity and familiarity between employees engender a tendency on the part of the inmates working for, with, and around these employees to attempt that same jocularity and familiarity.
The social life within the community at Angola is bi-partite and thus a seeming paradox. During the day, when the employee is at the prison, certain "social barriers" are dropped or at least lowered. There exists many "day-time" associations between wives of personnel that seemingly "cease when the whistle blows." This can, does, and has had serious implications which develop into repression and depression.

Significant also, to any organization of any program of treatment, is the demoralizing effect that the inaccessibility of the prison has upon both the personnel and dependents as well as the inmate population. This inaccessibility greatly curtails the visits from friends and relatives. The importance of such visits may be expressed in terms of alleviating boredom, stimulation of social activity, and the like.

One of the primary limitation factors with regard to organization of treatment at Louisiana State Penitentiary has been manifested in an inability to acquire qualified professionals.\(^7\) The foregoing factors engendered by the geographical location of the institution have played a predominate role in this. Foreknowledge of the 'little' such resident living has to offer, coupled to

\(^7\)That social isolation and the closed community status is indeed a predominant factor in the acquisition of professionals, is seen in the fact that since July, 1961, when the resident doctor at Angola submitted his resignation to enter private practice, there has been no resident doctor at the institution housing better than 3,000 inmates. The position is not unattractive, including an adequate salary which is implemented by full and free maintenance, adequate private practice, civilian assistants, and numerous qualified inmate attendants. Although the position was vacated in 1961, it is still vacant.
repugnance at the only alternative--commuting daily to and from St. Francisville has, in many cases, outweighed and over-balanced any benefits the prison has to offer prospective professional employees. As a result, family-minded professionals tend to locate elsewhere, and even if they do decide in favor of Louisiana State Penitentiary, their tenure is usually short-lived and contingent upon the first "better-offer" they receive. This inability to acquire a high-calibre of professional has resulted, in some cases, in the employment of semi-, and unqualified individuals who have little or no actual professional experience and who, in themselves, have become a highly limiting factor to the organization of a treatment program of which they know little or nothing.

As was observed in the foregoing, the inaccessibility of the prison to visits from friends and relatives has had an equally demoralizing effect upon the inmate population. To the prisoner, visits represent a 'break' or 'bright spot' in an otherwise dull and regimented life. The knowledge that visits are not forthcoming because of the inaccessibility of the geographical location of the institution in which they are incarcerated, gives rise to certain conscious and subconscious resentments which, coupled with other resentments, produce strong emotional barriers and limitations to treatment within the individual prisoner and the inmate population in general.

From the discussion as it has progressed thus far, it is seen that many and complex other limitations could be found in a closer
study of the geographical isolation of Louisiana State Penitentiary. It is felt, however, that for the purpose of this study, the presentation has been sufficient to dramatize some of the more visible 'limitations' inherent in the location and isolation of the institution.

II. ECONOMICAL BARRIERS

We have presented and discussed the existence of pervasive force, an impulse more traumatic than pervasive ferment. A study of the American penal system, and closer to home, of the Louisiana penal system, will illustrate and prove that in every single instance without exception, change engendered from pervasive force has been subservient and subject to a strong ascendancy of the economic factors over the intent and purpose inherent in the change and/or alteration.

As was shown in the foregoing paragraphs, the limitations inherent in the geographical location and isolation of the 'old' system were transliterated over into the 'new'. By the same token, the foremost economic limitations of the 'old' system or regime were carried over also.

It has been revealed in an earlier chapter that the basic functions and operations of Louisiana State Penitentiary are agricultural in nature; a factor engendered, maintained and sustained through political lethargy and resultant economic necessity. The fact remains, however, that the majority of the population of Louisiana State Penitentiary is of urban origin and paradoxically, the officials and custodial
officers of that institution continue to be predominately from rural background. This contrast, the dissimilarity of background, interests, and education has interjected specific and direct limitations upon successful communication between the perpetuators of any program of treatment; the persons upon whom the treatment is to be effected; and the persons upon whose shoulders the administration of such a program will fall.

Therefore, labor—a mandate by the court—is thus, for a majority of the total working inmate population, of an agricultural nature and completely alien to the average urbanite inmate's inclination or capabilities. It should be pointed out also that this type labor is not conducive to skill-gaining on the part of the inmate performing it, and it is highly improbable that any elements of agricultural labor could be applied to an urban setting where a majority of the inmates plan to return upon their respective releases. Nevertheless, he is 'forced', so to speak, to perform mental agricultural tasks that are completely foreign to his experiences, and is punished for any failure to comply with and fulfill the work standards and quotas set by rural 'taskmasters'. Viewed in such a light by the average inmate, labor becomes distasteful and repugnant. Even the inmate in a non-agricultural assignment finds the very real threat of being "swung to the farm line," his constant, unwanted, but realistic companion as he goes about his daily tasks. This engenders fear, especially with the advent of a harvest season, and will continue to breed uneasiness, suspicion and anything but a 'climate' or condition conducive to treatment.
Consequently, labor, long promulgated by penologists as being a privilege has, in Louisiana State Penitentiary by virtue of economic necessity, become a punishment.

The continuation of the old administrative goal of profit into the new regime is seen in the carry-over of that hated symbol of economic expediency, the armed inmate guard. This 'carry-over', in itself an admission of the weaknesses inherent in the program of stated rehabilitative measures and methods, almost completely nullifies any of the stated objectives. This "major-residue" of the old order has imposed upon the new order much of the 'control-of-the-inmate-foremost' ideology inherent in the old system.

The inmate guard, since the establishment of the system of permitting one inmate to guard another, has engendered a definite feeling of employment-insecurity among the lower echelon security officers whose duties and those of the inmate guard are closely related. There is the ever-present reminder that in many instances within the memory-span of the personnel present, the inmate guard has filled positions of free personnel which have been terminated due to lack of funds. This sense of insecurity on their part develops into open hostility, belligerence and lack of cooperation between

\footnote{\textit{Mouledous, op. cit., pp. 99-117. (Mouledous offers an excellent coverage of "The Inmate Guard" as cited.)} Note: Angola consists of a prison population of approximately 3600 inmates, which is supervised, worked and served by a staff of prison personnel numbering about 320 paid employees and 200 inmate guards.}

\footnote{\textit{Ibid., p. 99.}}
the two phases of the custodial force. It very definitely engenders, for the most part, an atmosphere of discontent not conducive to any organization of treatment.

Not to be overlooked among the limitations engendered and imposed by the continued presence of the inmate guard as an integral unit of the rehabilitative program is the effect his presence produces in the general inmate population. He is hated, feared and, in general, creates a high feeling of resentment and belligerence within those whom he guards. Although his power and authority have been grossly curtailed, and although his superiority has become nominal, he remains the reflected image of his former self and, as such, engenders feelings completely incompatible with treatment.

Of extreme importance, also, is the pungent fact that this inmate--the inmate guard--remains in a position whereby it is virtually impossible for him to become the recipient of any benefits accruing from a rehabilitative program, even though it may become functional for the general population of the institution. Another unenviable aspect of his 'unique' position is that no skills he may hope to gain in the performance of his tasks while in prison can be realistically utilized in 'free' society upon his release from prison. In short, this man must, for the reasons noted, leave prison as he came in, as there is no portion of the treatment program that would be applicable in his case.

Economically, the inmate guard, currently being utilized as an expedient in fulfilling custodial duties, also acts as a strong
deterrent to the appropriation of funds for the procurement and maintenance of lower-echelon treatment personnel, without which no treatment-oriented program can become functional. Custody, rather than treatment, has been transliterated into the new era by the carry over of the inmate guard in his quasi-official role of the non-professional custodial officer.

III. SUBSTITUTIVE 'TREATMENT'

Concomittant with the abrupt decrease in indignities, Louisiana State Penitentiary has seen, in the approximate decade following the internal disturbances of 1951-52, a sharp rise in the 'amenities'; i.e., those concessions to human dignity which tend to make life more bearable and liveable for the prisoner; 10 easing the stress of a rigidly controlled life, "they keep the jungle of prison life cut back." 11 As so admirably pointed out by Reckless, "most people and most prison administrators believe that when a prison has reduced its indignities and increased its amenities, it has gone about as far as a progressive institution can or should go." 12

10 Among these amenities as exist in the Angola penal structure, are smoking privileges and a weekly issue of two packages of smoking tobacco, commissary privileges, payment of from 2¢ to 5¢ per hour for labor, visiting and writing privileges, special furloughs, reading materials, radio (including a closed-circuit radio station broadcasting by and for the inmates), TV, weekly movies, sports, dentures, glasses, etc.

11 Reckless, op. cit., p. 572.

12 Ibid., p. 573.
In Louisiana State Penitentiary we find that in many instances this indeed has been the situation; however, in other respects, a close observation renders positive evidence that in some cases, certain of the amenities have been adopted or introduced as treatment measures, or as low cost substitutes for phases of a true treatment program. As such, the amenities fall even to fulfill the basic intent of amenities, per se. This economic expedient has strongly limited any true organization of treatment in a Louisiana penitentiary where amenities are pointed to as phases of 'treatment'.

IV. SUBJUGATED PROFESSIONAL

Classification is no innovation to the American penal system; however, it has only been during the past generation and a half that it, per se, has been stressed for inherent value contained. With respect to the Louisiana penal structure, it has only been within the past approximate decade that the idea has been implemented that newly admitted prisoners should be properly studied, classified, and assigned to housing and 'phase of program'.

Classification, properly implemented, maintained and sustained is a vital phase of any treatment program, but in Louisiana State Penitentiary has become, in its own abortion, a limitation to the treatment it was engendered to support.

Classification of inmates to a 'phase of program' is an impossibility, for no true program exists. Classification officers, the only personnel in the employ of the Louisiana State Penitentiary
that might possibly be termed 'professionals' are relegated to secondary positions which are subordinate to those officers who emphasize the necessity of maintaining order and for motivating inmates' work—even if that work interferes with desirable treatment practices. In a word, precedence is given to custody-discipline, convenience, and treatment, usually in that order or, on rare occasions, convenience, custody, and treatment. In such a structure, it is easy to understand why the writer, in his current position as a sociologist and professional worker, i.e., classification officer, is not primarily expected to rehabilitate nor counsel inmates, but rather to reduce friction, complaints,

13The 'phenomenon' of an order of precedence in which Convenience (Production-Maintenance-Welfare) is paramount is manifested at various intervals in the history of Louisiana State Penitentiary where economical factors have almost invariably reigned supreme in the operations. As one upper echelon, policy-making official is ascribed to have shouted: 'Damn the escapes, get them bastards to work! We got money to make.' And indeed, this attitude has, on more than one occasion, been the deciding factor in the order of precedence in that institution.

cf. Roy E. Buehler, "Our Professional Responsibilities in the Field of Corrections," Federal Probation, September, 1960. His observation: "An interesting complex of problems present themselves around our institutions and seem to be a malodorous growth peculiar to the institution idea. I refer to the phenomenon in which the perpetuation and the maintenance of the institution becomes a primary value...The needs of the spit and polish department must be met regardless of the inmate and his needs. Since the institution needs public support to exist at all, so public relations techniques are adopted which succeed in obtaining support for the status quo. We do not acquaint the public with our deficiencies..."

14For example, the author has been approached on various occasions by inmates who are experiencing difficulty with one or more members of the inmate population. In his position, in the eyes of the prisoner, he is understanding and sympathetic, and will help solve the problem without "causing a stink" or "divulging the source."
or disturbances among the prison population, and to "cool down" prisoners who are becoming threats to peaceful routines, the concept of maintaining the status quo, or the policy of "don't rock the boat." Being often utilized as a 'pacifist' and inmate counselor, he is forced to assume positions and utilizations completely alien to the field for which he, the classification officer, was trained.\textsuperscript{15}

V. CONFLICTED PURPOSE

The stated intent and purpose for which the Louisiana State Penitentiary is operated is contained in a few words interpolated into Paragraph 854 of the \textit{Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950}\textsuperscript{16} and is stated in connection with the outlining of the duties of the head of that institution:

"...the purpose (for which the Louisiana State Penitentiary is operated) being to restore and reform the individual to a better man physically, intellectually and morally."\textsuperscript{17}

A general information brochure compiled and edited by the staff of Louisiana State Penitentiary enumerates three major functions of the institution as being:

1. To punish persons charged with and found guilty of violating our criminal laws.
2. To protect society by keeping convicted felons confined.

\textsuperscript{15}cf. \textit{Manual of Correctional Standards}, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 262.

\textsuperscript{16}\textit{State of Louisiana, Revised Statutes of 1950}, Title 15.

\textsuperscript{17}\textit{Ibid.}
3. To provide a channel through which prisoners may, by their own efforts, improve themselves, physically, spiritually, intellectually, morally, and socially."

From the foregoing, it may readily be observed that the penal structure at Angola, like so many other 'modern' correctional institutions, has as its stated intent the punishment of prisoners through punitive measures while, at the same time, effecting the reform of the prisoners through non-punitive measures. Here, an entirely new and diametrically opposed concept; i.e., treatment towards rehabilitation, was forced into and attached onto a system which has been designed for the exact opposite objectives. Thus, the long-range theory of complete rehabilitation to protect society and the criminal, faced its opponent, punishment, in the latter's own "backyard."

It was imperative, therefore, that organizational conflict emerge from such an attempted graft. Couple to this the fact that, at Angola, this impossible graft was attempted in a radical and non-scientific fashion, following in the path of a violent institutional upheaval or 'riot', and into a system of custody, punishment, and production which was only slightly impaired, not destroyed and re-built or re-oriented along lines of progressive penological practices.

The previously cited general information brochure contains, in continuance, that "...on the basis of the foregoing functions, the

staff at Louisiana State Penitentiary has adopted the philosophy that men are sent to prison as punishment and not for punishment."19 However, A. J. W. Taylor points out some very pertinent facts relevant to this change of prepositions:

"The staff of a prison works against the historical background of prison as a place of punishment. The current trend is to refer to imprisonment as punishment, but this change of preposition implies a change of attitude that has not yet completely been made...Principles of reformation and retribution and individualization of treatment, are not easily augmented in a punitive setting."20

VI. REPEATED REGRESSION

Special limiting factors based on economic expediency periodically appear which drastically curtail the operation functions of the Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola. A drastic budget cut in 1962, was such an incident and a brief analysis of the implications inherent therein is presented at this point of the study. A pertinent excerpt from the proceedings of the 92nd Annual Congress of Correction which met in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, in September, 1962, reveals conclusions arrived at by that professional group regarding this situation:

"Whereas, We have been reliably and authoritatively informed that certain disturbing conditions appear to be endangering the correctional progress which has been made during the past decade in Louisiana, and

Whereas, If such conditions are allowed to exist the correctional system of Louisiana in our judgement will suffer a serious setback.

19 Ibid., p. 2.

Therefore, Be it Resolved, That the American Correctional Association, at its 92nd Annual Congress of Correction, views with deep concern the drastic cut in the current appropriations of the Louisiana Department of Institutions which, if not rescinded, will result in the discharge of more than one hundred correctional officers and training and treatment personnel at the State Penitentiary at Angola, replacement of the officers by armed inmate guards, and crippling of the rehabilitation program. The Association considers this a disastrous reversal of the significant reform and reorganization of the Louisiana Penitentiary which began in 1952 and received the approval and approbation of the American Correctional field.\textsuperscript{21}

VII. CUMULATED EFFECTS

From the discussion which has preceded, it is tentatively correct to assume that correctional progress of a type has been accomplished at Louisiana State Penitentiary in that approximate decade following the outbreak of prison 'riots'. However, the disturbing conditions mentioned above did not only seem to be endangering progress at Angola, as predicted (progress which was already endangered by numerous limitations on organization of treatment; i.e., progressive penology, at that institution), but were in fact a decided reality when the drastic cut in appropriations for the Louisiana Department of Institutions was initiated in the fall of 1962. Although all institutions felt the impact of such action to some degree, the prison at Angola was the most crippled, receiving a slash in appropriations of approximately one-third of the overall

annual operating budget. The extent of the damage done to the overall effectiveness of the penitentiary is best measured in terms of such action greatly intensifying an already seemingly impossible state of affairs.

An immediate, and possibly the most obvious manifestation of the budget cut, was seen in the loss of personnel: Two of three educational supervisors resigned; two of three of seven classification officers were lost to the institution; and, slightly less than one hundred 'security' (correctional) officers, as predicted, were forced to terminate their employment. The replacement of these officers by armed inmate guards was a simple administrative accomplishment inasmuch as a 'necessary evil', which had been partially destroyed but not discontinued by 'correctional progress', was, simply speaking, increased both numerically and in status and authority. Although not re-instituted with the strength and prestige found in the 'old' system, the inmate guard once more attained a position of power which called forth opposition and fear from both the employees and inmates of the peniten-

22 Two resigned outright. The director resigned to become Associate Warden of Custody and Treatment, replacing an experienced penologist in that capacity who resigned to teach.

23 One of the three experienced officers who remained had, in actuality, been taken from classification about one year before and placed in the newly created position of Personnel Training Officer, which had been a very progressive step in the organization of treatment at Angola. Unfortunately, the 'gain' to classification constituted a loss to the prison program inasmuch as the position of Personnel Training Officer was abandoned and discontinued.

24 See page 30.
The negative effect upon morale in both areas was, and is, quite evident—"The shadow of the old system is upon us." To be sure, these conditions soon led to drastic alterations in the structural or administrative hierarchy at Angola, innovations which greatly reduced the over-all efficiency and progressive efforts of the administration and staff.

For example, when this writer became employed in the Classification Department at the end of October, 1959, the administration eluded the impression of at least being interested in the possibility of establishing and maintaining a total system consistent with the treatment archetype, with the administrative hierarchy being organized in descending order as follows: Warden, with the medical and finance departments under his direct supervision and control; Associate Warden of Treatment and Custody, with duties as first assistant to the Warden, and; Associate Warden of Maintenance and Production, whose duties were defined by the Warden.25

In the early part of 1963, the administrative hierarchy was altered to include the following positions, but not necessarily in regards to importance or authority: Warden;26 Associate Warden of Treatment and Custody;27 Industrial Coordinator;28 and, Executive

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25This statement indicates authority on the part of the Warden over and above custody and production and maintenance. Further discussion will reveal a delineating change in authority.

26The position of Warden, at this point, would be best described as being one of responsibility for prison control and security, but not for its operation.

27His position, in the hierarchy of direction of the program, was from second to fourth.

28This position was created without consultation with the
Assistant. Recently, the Executive Assistant assumed the position of Acting-Warden, leaving the former position currently vacated and the other two positions in the hierarchy relatively unchanged. Logically, then with these conditions in the upper echelons of the managerial group, with resultant confusion and fear of further change, accompanied by low morale on the part of non-professional employees (especially) and the inmate population, Louisiana State Penitentiary might very well again acquire that title previously ascribed to it by the American prison system—"America's Worst Prison."

Warden. The Industrial Coordinator was not selected by him, and his powers were defined by the Administration in Baton Rouge.

29 This position was created by the Warden for aid in supervision of maintenance and finance. It should be noticed that the larger part of the finances was handled in Baton Rouge, and the funds were divided into two funds as follows: (1) General Fund for prison operation—maintenance, treatment, custody, etc.; (2) Revolving Fund for the establishment and perpetuation of Industry and production.

30 Must secure political approval from Baton Rouge.

31 It is predicted, with reason, that the Governor will appoint the current Chief of Security as Acting-Warden.
 CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

Immediately following the establishment of the 'new' prison at Angola, a sociological analysis of the transition of the Louisiana penal system was made. Restricted almost entirely to a study of the Louisiana State Penitentiary, since that was the only adult penal institution being operated in the state at the time,1 this work advanced certain conclusions which are quite definitely related to the current study. In view of their recognized import, they are revealed here as follows:

"(1) that criminologists and penologists have, through many years of experience and study, devised a reasonably efficient plan for the operation of the modern American prison,...
(2) that there was too great a contrast between this recommended plan and the old Angola prison...for a high degree of efficiency to be maintained at the Louisiana Institution,
(3) that the new prison at Angola compares favorably with the recommended plan and may be expected to fulfill the functions of a prison to a higher degree of efficiency."2

In the accomplishment of its intent and purpose, the current analysis has illustrated that modern penology is representative of

1In the introductory pages of the current analysis, it was revealed that in 1958, the Louisiana Correctional and Industrial School was established at DeQuincy, Louisiana, as an institution for young adult first offenders.

2Allgood, op. cit., p. 111.
a pendular swing in complete reversal of former doctrine with an indiscriminate rejection of past experience that has been unfortunate.\(^3\) It has further demonstrated that, with the incorporation of old ideologies and structures into a 'new' system, certain and definite inherent and inbred limitations emerge to obstruct organizational intent. In a word, it has dramatized failure in that 'modern' prison at Angola as a result of theoretical and practical limitations on its 'treatment program'; and has offered the implication that any prison plagued by these 'problems', and others associated with them, will meet with little success in an attempt to accomplish rehabilitation in the individual offender.

With what appears to be an almost complete disregard to the apparent failure of the contemporary correctional institution, and to the limitations on modern methods and techniques at that level of applied penology, more "progressive" elements continue to make expensive recommendations for expensive treatment within the confines of the institution. Placing stress upon "corporate responsibility (the determinative influence of culture and the group) and/or psychiatric deviation (including relatively minor influences of emotional stress and volitional inadequacy) in inducing crime,"\(^4\) they aim at effecting an atmosphere of normalcy within the prison setting through the institutionalization of a high degree of treatment and a corresponding minimization of punishment, i.e., custody, discipline, and

\(^3\)Tappan, *op. cit.*, p. 259.

\(^4\)Ibid., pp. 259-260.
control. An example of this ideology or concept is seen in the proposed "therapeutic community," a partial outline of which follows:

"The settings of the institutions represent to as large an extent as possible the normal aspects of family and community life...The roles of attendant and nurse become minimally custodial and are primarily defined in terms of social interaction with the patients...The entire structure of the institution, its formal organization and administrative arrangements, has to be convergent upon the idea of treatment."5

The apparent failure of existing 'correctional institutions' to accomplish that intent and purpose inherent in modern or "progressive" penology leads to the seemingly logical conclusion that the prison is per se a degenerate and total failure. That this deduction is no newcomer to penology is seen in the existence of certain radical minority groups which advocate the abolishment of the penal structure in toto. The fallacy of this is seen in the absence of any existing alternative or satisfactory substitute for the penal institution regardless of the disadvantages, limitations and/or apparent failure inherent in that structure; and the readily available evidence that it must, perforce, persist in its essential character6 to fulfill a necessary role in an orderly society, and a specific and definite function within the correctional process as a whole. In keeping with this, the theory has been advanced that effort should be made to determine what treatment

5ESSOR, OP. CIT., P. 9.

6It has been realistically observed that the prison can be little more than an expedient compromise to serve conflicting ends.
is best, under what conditions, and for what type of man, so that men get enough of the kind of treatment they need, if treatment be their need, for it to take effect."

It has been observed that many of the prisoners confined in our prisons for the stated purpose of receiving treatment toward rehabilitation are, to a large extent, accidental and circumstantial criminals who, generally possessing conventional values when committed, are in no need of such attention. Comprising for the most part those offenders who do not return to prison, they owe their 'rehabilitation' not so much to the influences of institutional life, but rather to their ability to resist such effects. Since it costs about one-tenth as much to supervise a person adequately on probation as it does in an institution, it is easy to see the advantages to a community on a cost basis, to say nothing of the advantages of keeping the offender away from the perils of incarceration.

Almost every criminologist and penologist the world over would agree that the larger the institution the more difficult it is to treat and rehabilitate the offender. Yet, the general trend in America has been to establish larger institutions while the courts continue to sentence more and more offenders to prison in a seemingly obvious attempt to fill the newly created establishments.

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9It has been observed that in this country probation exists in name only. In Louisiana, as in most other states, probation officers are under-trained, under-paid, and over-worked. The system
At the other extreme of this selected continuum of incarceration, there are to be found many prisoners who are impervious to all known treatment methods and/or corrective techniques for convenience, the "unreformables." Yet, as reflected throughout this work, modern or "progressive" penology continue to accept and perpetuate the ideology or concept that all offenders can and should be treated and rehabilitated. For too many years this idealistic approach to the problem of correction has obstructed most attempts on the part of practical penologists and progressive prison administrators to accomplish rehabilitation with any degree of success. In a word, this extensive concept has been for many years a major theoretical limitation on the practical organization and perpetuation of treatment in the prison.

Since these "unreformable" prisoners possess definite and recognizable behavioral traits or personality defects which are quite difficult to conceal, the already available ordinary prison classification programs could provide the necessary machinery for the purpose of identification. In lieu of such recognition, these prisoners could be segregated and removed from the path of those offenders who can be helped. This would not mean that this particular group of inmates would become "forgotten men." It would mean, however, that they would be isolated from society and segregated from other prisoners, and would be, to a large extent, subjected to the rigors of custody, of probation is often misused, either by the probating of wrong offenders or, as suggested, by over-conservatism in the proper use of this media of correction.
discipline, and control; i.e., punishment, until, and if, some means of treatment or method of correction was designed for them. 10

Between the accidental and circumstantial criminals on the one hand, and the "unreformables" on the other, there are found convicts in all degrees of tractability. To subject them all to the same kind of treatment, or administer upon them the same degree of punishment, would most definitely produce more failures than successes. Therefore, even with the acceptance and utilization of the preceding concepts of probation and complete segregation, the preponderant question of how to effect long-range success via prison would remain.

Starting from this point and with the protection of society as the goal, prisons could be vastly different. For the Louisiana System, and the American prison system as a whole, there would be more prisons; they would be smaller, less isolated from society, both physically and ideologically, and they would be much cheaper to build and operate. There would be more of them because methods and techniques of treatment in each would be geared to inmates of a specific level of reformability. 11 And because the majority of prisoners are tractable, custody, discipline, and control; i.e., punishment, in most of these prisons would be slight. In others, those housing prisoners who are less tractable, less reformable, and more hazardous to society,

10 The placement of these prisoners into such a negative category need not end efforts to unearth a remedy. Research into the enigma of the "unreformables" should most certainly continue.

11 Perhaps Louisiana has exhibited this concept with the establishment of that selective first-offender unit at DeQuincy; although this institution has already encountered noticeable limitations.
restrictive controls and punitive measures would be progressively increased as the situation required. Finally, each prison would develop sensible programs designed to help inmates prepare themselves for reentry into society, and perhaps prepare society for this return.12 This would be done with the thought in mind that, regardless of their record or how many times they have repeated, most are not hopeless cases in terms of correction.

It has been observed that, among the major variables upon which a man's success depends after discharge from prison, is that of the influence of the post-prison environment.13 Experience has shown that many men are returned to prison because they were granted a sudden and complete discharge from the institution, or were released via a system of parole which, similar to our current methods of probation, exists in name only. With this insight and for that reason, prisons would perpetuate some type of pre-release center,14 or corrections would include a system of release via parole that had been purged of many of the limitations currently restricting the effectiveness of probation and the prison.

The system here proposed is, at one and the same time, general and specific. To get it accepted would require an almost complete reversal of social attitudes, ideology and concepts of "progressive"

12Prison programs would be based upon a system of 'positive' and 'negative' treatment; i.e., reward and punishment, the basis of control in society.

13Tappen, op. cit., p. 668.

14At the time this study was being prepared, a plan of this type was being inaugurated in at least one American prison.
penology, and the current political and economical policies toward prisons maintained on the national and state levels. To make operative such a plan would probably require more time, effort, and trained personnel than the penological world could supply for some years to come. The benefits of such a system, however, even adopted in part, would be immediate and considerable especially in terms of economics and protection of society. Accepted in full, it would give prison a realistic purpose which has been lacking for these many years that it has been in existence.
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Times Picayune. New Orleans, December 2, 1944.
The writer was born in Morganza, Louisiana, June 26, 1935. He received his elementary education in that town and was graduated from high school in Port Allen, Louisiana.

In September, 1954, the writer matriculated at Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, and received his B.A. in June, 1958.

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On October 30, 1959, the writer was employed by the Louisiana State Department of Institutions as a classification officer at the Louisiana State Penitentary. In January, 1961, he was elevated to his current position of Assistant Director of Classification.

On August 13, 1960, the writer married the former Lola Durbin of Waterproof, Louisiana. They now have two children, Kristie Marie and Raymond Paul, Jr.
EXAMINATION AND THESIS REPORT

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Major Field: Sociology

Title of Thesis: Selected Limitations on the Organization of Treatment in a 'Modern' Prison

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Date of Examination:

May 12, 1964