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Fatal Attractions: A Sociological Study of the Sex Ratios of Intimate Homicide.

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FATAL ATTRACTIONS: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE SEX RATIOS OF INTIMATE HOMICIDE

A Dissertation

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Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of Sociology

by
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Honor B.A., University of Southwestern Louisiana, 1989
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To Momma
for teaching me to dream
and to Kimberly
that she might also

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ABSTRACT

This study examines the question of why sex ratios of intimate killing vary across relationship type, race, and ultimately - place. The research investigates the influences of rates of family disruption and the direct and indirect effects of gender inequality in communities on various relationship and race specific sex ratios of intimate killing (SROK's). The results of OLS regression analyses reveal that the indirect effects (through family disruption) of gender inequality on relationship-specific SROK's are negligible, but the independent direct effects are considerable. Contrary to much of the criminological literature, higher female-to-male employment in a community does not lead to higher rates of female violence relative to males, but to higher rates of male violence relative to females. The reverse is also true. This leads to the conclusion that the gender group which fares the worst economically is also the group which kills more relative to the other group. No claim is made that it is the individuals who are economically disadvantaged that kill, only that in the context of economic inequality in a community, intimate killing tends to favor the disadvantaged gender group. Additionally, the results reveal that neither the direct nor indirect effects of gender inequality on race-specific SROK's are significant,

although when race is controlled for in the relationship-specific models, a significant effect is found.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Sociology is the scientific study of human social behavior; as such, crime may be considered an appropriate sociological subject matter because it involves victims and offenders engaged in social behaviors. Crime, as with most social phenomena, appears subject to the same patterns of stability across time and variation across place remarked upon by the first sociologists (Stark 1994). One such pattern concerns the distribution of criminal offenses by gender. Criminologists have long recognized that crime and delinquency are gender stratified; that is, males are disproportionately responsible for criminal and delinquent activities. The fact that this is also true across time and place has typically been noted, and then investigated thoroughly for the purpose of providing possible explanations for male involvement in crime.

In part, this seems a logical reaction, for male arrests for serious crimes (index crimes, excluding larceny) are 8 to 9 times more frequent than female arrests (Conklin 1992: 132). Yet, the same level of attention to the lack of female involvement in crime and delinquency has only recently begun to be addressed in the same thorough manner as male crime (Adler 1975; Adler and Simon 1979; Box and Hale 1984; Mann 1984; Smith and Visher 1980;

Steffensmeier 1978, 1980, 1981, 1983; Steffensmeier and Cobb 1981; Steffensmeier and Steffensmeier 1980; Visher 1983). In the U.S., for example, much of the recent criminological interest in female crime has focussed on two types of crime: larceny/theft (for which female involvement is relatively high), and homicides. The latter crime is one characterized, as usual, by high rates of male offending compared to females. Males account for about 85% of all murders and nonnegligent manslaughters in the United States (Flanagan and Maguire, 1992).

Yet a peculiarity of U.S. homicides is that there is one category in which the sex ratio is more equitable: the killing of intimates. One recent investigation of female to male ratios of killing revealed that for every 100 men who kill their wives, 75 women kill their husbands (Wilson and Daly 1992b). This spousal ratio of killing (SROK) is deemed to be very high in comparison to other countries, both industrialized and developing, whose range of SROK's includes values from just 0 (in India) to 40 (in Scotland). Even more interestingly, this same study identified variation across place <u>within</u> the U.S. in SROK values. For example, although the total U.S. SROK is reported as 75, cities like Chicago and Detroit possess much higher SROK's: 102 and 200, respectively. Thus, <u>within</u> the category of spousal homicides it appears true

that, overall, women not only approach equality with men in their killing, but in some places, they may even surpass men in their killing frequency.

Why do women perpetrate more homicides involving intimate relationships than men in some places, but less than men in other places? The purpose of this research is to address this question. More specifically, it is the contention of this author that measures of sexual inequality are important, yet neglected, predictors of intimate killing sex ratios. In addition, the relationship between gender and intimate homicide is explored at the macro level, rather than attempting to explain individual involvement in homicide as most studies have previously attempted to do. Consequently, the analyses focus on community-level explanations of differences in ratios of intimate killing. The focus, then, is on the characteristics of places, not people, that lead to varying killing ratios.

CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE: TOWARD A THEORY OF SEX-RATIO VARIATION IN INTIMATE KILLING

Several recent studies have concluded that the key variables for understanding the variation in homicide rates across time and place cannot be successfully identified until total homicide rates are disaggregated into meaningful categories of killings (e.g., Daly and Wilson 1988; Maxfield 1989; Parker and Toth 1990; Williams and Flewelling 1987; Wilson and Daly 1992b). Otherwise, the implied assumption is that the same factors account for the gross homicide rate as for specific types of homicide such as spousal homicide (e.g., Best and Luckenbill 1990). Yet this assumption clearly is misinformed; numerous microlevel analyses have demonstrated that motivations for killing vary greatly by gender and homicide category. Men are overwhelmingly likely to engage in felony murder and contract killings of strangers or acquaintances, whereas females almost always kill intimates such as spouses, lovers, and children during non-criminal activities such as domestic quarrels (Steffensmeier and Streifel 1993). In addition, killings by women are more often self-defensive or child protective than are killings by men (e.g., Bernard et al. 1982; Browne 1985, 1987; Campbell 1992;

Daly and Wilson 1988, 1992; Dobash et al. 1992; Flinn 1988; Holmes and Holmes 1994; Wilbanks 1984; Wilson and Daly 1987, 1992b). Consequently, analyses will be much more meaningful if homicides are disaggregated into different categories of victim/offender relationships. Only then could questions concerning the gender stratification of homicide be successfully addressed, for only then does the more equitable nature of intimate killing become apparent. This is an important recognition because, historically, most influential criminological theories have either ignored issues of gender and female crime, or misrepresented women when female crime was examined. Certainly this historical neglect of female criminality was somewhat logical, for male involvement in crime has been believed to almost always have eclipsed that of females (Conklin 1992).

Intimate homicides, however, appear to be at least one exception to the male dominance in crime, and point to the need for analyses which examine gender specific victim-offender relationships. To date, few studies have attempted such an analysis and even fewer at the macrolevel. Yet, macrolevel analyses are precisely what is required in order to stay true to one of the original missions of sociology: to explain variation in social behavior across places (Park, et al. 1928). Certainly, as

Wilson and Daly (1992b) have demonstrated, the peculiar gender distribution of intimate killing across place warrants further investigation in order to reveal why it is that women kill more than men in some places, but less than men in others.

An additional concern that has rarely been addressed in the literature is the sex ratio of intimate killing across race or ethnicity. However, much attention has been paid to gross homicide rates and race. Most studies have demonstrated that homicide is more prevalent among blacks (Blau and Blau 1982; Block 1992; Curry and Spergel 1988; Hawkins 1990; Messner 1982; Sampson 1985a, 1987) and Hispanics (Block 1992) than among whites. In the few studies which address racially specific intimate homicide sex ratios, black ratios are apparently higher than white sex ratios (Block 1992; Mercy and Saltzman 1989), but Hispanic sex ratios are lower than black and white ratios (Wilson and Daly 1992b). This is so in spite of the fact that both blacks and Hispanics are over-represented in the urban underclass (Wilson 1984), and both groups have high gross homicide rates. Consequently, explanations which emphasize a direct relationship between underclass status and minority homicides in general cannot account for the differing ethnic outcomes in sex ratios of intimate killing, because the sex ratios deviate from the white

majority in contrary directions. Yet, again, few studies have sought to answer such race-specific questions, and rarely at the macrolevel.

Much of the criminological literature on varying racial violence has focussed on individual factors (e.g., IQ) and subcultural explanations (Wilson and Herrnstein 1985) such as the subculture of violence thesis (Wolfgang and Ferracuti 1967). Structural factors (such as black male joblessness) have been neglected in both general violence research (notable recent exceptions include Sampson 1987, and Shihadeh and Steffensmeier 1994), and especially in the research which examines intimate violence. Social control factors such as formal institutional and informal relational controls have likewise been neglected in research on both general as well as intimate violence (Bankston 1988). Yet structural variables such as sex ratios (Guttentag and Secord 1983) and marriage markets (Wilson 1989; Wilson and Daly 1992a, 1992b), and control variables such as family disruption and kinship networks may be key in the explanation of intimate killing, especially within racial categories, but these all have been largely ignored.

Conceptual Framework

There are two approaches that might be utilized in studying communities and intimate homicide: viewing

communities as units of stratification, or as units of social control. In the stratification approach, variables which emphasize inequality of income, employment, and poverty are proposed to be the link for proper understanding of crime rates (e.g., Allan and Steffensmeier 1989; Blau and Blau 1982). The social control approach, on the other hand, emphasizes social disorganization variables such as community controls and family disruption (e.g., Bursik and Webb 1982; Skogan and Maxfield 1981). The present study strives to use variables from both perspectives in an attempt to explain differing sex ratios of intimate killing, including ratios which vary across race. The key variables to be considered are economic inequality and family disruption.

Stratification: Economic Inequality

Stratification theorists have argued that a direct source of crime may be found in unequal distributions of income which create uncontrollable frustration, hostility and demoralization among the deprived class who ultimately may vent their frustrations in the form of criminal behavior. This frustration becomes exaggerated when income inequality occurs in the context of an egalitarian society, and is based on ascriptive characteristics over which there is no control, such as race [and gender] (Blau and Blau 1982: 118). The Blau's research findings report that

urban areas characterized by extreme inequality between race groups have high violent crime rates. Yet much of the subsequent research in this area has not supported this finding (e.g., Messner and Golden 1985; Sampson 1985b).

Harer and Steffensmeier (1992) have suggested that it is not between-race inequality that is most frustrating but rather it is within-race inequality that produces more hostility and crime. This suggestion is founded upon the literature which demonstrates that reference groups tend to be within-race groups (Hughes and Demo 1989). However, Harer and Steffensmeier (1992) were unable to demonstrate that their hypothesis directly explains not only white but also black crimes of violence. Shihadeh and Steffensmeier (1994) extended the analysis to explore the indirect effects of within-race inequality on violent crime. Most interestingly, their analysis demonstrated that for black violence, within-race inequality mediated by family disruption has a substantial effect.

Stratification theorists and research on family power have also argued that inequality between the sexes can lead to violent crime. At the individual level, Blood and Wolfe (1960, p. 12) identify two sources of power in the marital relationship: "culture and competence". For them, marital power is dictated both by culture, where, in the

U.S., the partner culturally designated to receive power has traditionally been the male, or by the greater competence of one partner to contribute "resources" to the marriage. Since money is a resource, the partner who contributes more should be in a more powerful position, and so theoretically at least, as women's rate of participation in the workforce increases, they should come to an equal sharing of power in marriage. Yet equal sharing of authority may be difficult for some traditional partners because their understanding of the cultural norms conflicts with their partner's expectations due to individual resources (Burke and Weir 1976; Weitzman 1975). For example, an undermining of traditional ascribed male superiority norms may occur through their conflict with employed females' egalitarian power expectations. Whitehurst (1974) and Brown (1980) assert that this conflict will increase husband-wife violence as husbands seek to maintain or re-establish dominance over wives through the use of their greater physical strength.

At the aggregate level, when male frustration due to status inconsistency becomes widespread in a community, there may be an accompanying increase in rates of lethal violence directed at women. In fact, recent macrolevel research has found support for such a theory (Gartner 1990).

Social Control: Family Disruption

Control theory approaches the explanation of norm violation from the perspective that it is not necessarily external forces pushing actors toward deviance and crime but rather the lack of constraints on actions which consequently unleashes criminal behavior. Control theorists emphasize two main forms of control that will usually act to restrain inappropriate behavior: formal and informal controls. Formal social controls (Andenaes 1974; Gibbs 1975; Zimring and Hawkins 1973) involve formal community groups whose membership is drawn from the ranks of families living in the community. Community groups which are formal and institutional in nature include businesses, schools, churches, political and volunteer organizations. Such groups are the primary formal socialization agents for young members of the community, and consequently, if they are well developed their effect in controlling deviant impulses has a much greater potential.

Informal (or relational) controls include kin and friendship ties outside of formal organizational links (Fagan and Wexler 1987; Felson 1988; Hirschi 1969; Nye 1958; Sampson 1986; Toby 1974). These relational controls operate to integrate the individual with the conventional order (Hirschi 1969). The ultimate effect of a strong social bond is to raise the "stakes in conformity" (Toby

1974) to a level at which norm violation will disturb too much the valued interpersonal relationships of the actor. Research has demonstrated that these interpersonal relationships consequently act to control the individual's behavior (Krohn and Massey 1980; Marcos et al. 1986; Sloane and Potvin 1986; Wiatrowski et al. 1981).

Hagan et al. (1987) have proposed a version of control theory which seeks to explain gender stratification in crime in terms of differential application of these relational controls at the individual level. Simply put, their theory postulates that traditional families (father working, mother at home) control their daughters more than they do their sons in order to perpetuate the "cult of domesticity" in them (Hagan et al. 1987, p. 793). Sons, on the other hand, are not taught such passivity and are therefore more open to learning the risk-taking behavior necessary for success in the world of work which they, and not their sisters, will one day enter as adults. However, one unintentional consequence of this lack of control over male children is disproportionate involvement of male juveniles in what has been perceived as one form of risk-taking: delinquency. Presumably, delinquency leads to adult criminality as well.

In more egalitarian families(both parents work), on the other hand, the lack of control is more equitably

dispensed: both sons and daughters are therefore more open to risk-taking so that both will be prepared to compete in the work world as their parents have before them. Consequently, "...as mothers gain power relative to husbands, daughters gain freedom relative to sons" (Hagan et al. 1987, p. 792). This "freedom" includes, however, the freedom to deviate.

The processes by which control operates on individuals, as described above, have traditionally been the focus of social control theorists. More specifically, these theorists have concentrated on the effects of social disorganization variables on individual crimes; for example, coming from a broken home causes juveniles to be delinquent. Empirical research at the individual level, however, has either not been favorable, or has applied only to minor offenses (Rankin 1983).

Recently, social disorganization theorists (Reiss 1986; and especially Sampson 1987) have suggested a link between family structure and rates of crime that extends the traditional focus at the individual level to include social disorganization at the community level. Specifically, the assumption has been extended to include the thesis that communities characterized by high rates of single-parent families tend to have lower rates of participation in formal community organizations (Kellam et al.

1982); consequently, their ability to control crime and other forms of deviance is weakened. Such communities also lack informal control over residents when high rates of single-parent families are present. This stems from the fact that single parents typically have less time and energy to maintain informal supervision over the community because they are more concerned about the sustenance activities necessary to maintain their family. Hagan et al. (1987) intimate that for female-headed households, these sustenance activities on the part of the mother will actually serve to encourage both male and female children to adopt risk-taking activities which may include crime and deviance. When this occurs on a widespread basis, it thus translates into higher rates of crime and deviance for communities.

Control theory also maintains that when other associational links, such as kin and friendship ties, are lacking, then the control capacity of the community is further weakened. However, research suggests that reliance on informal kinship networks differs across race: for black women in single-parent families, there does not appear to be a corresponding strong kinship network (Furstenberg et al. 1990) upon which families can presumably rely for some of the necessary informal controls they may be unable to provide. Therefore, communities with

high rates of black female-headed households may be less "controlled", resulting in a higher black crime rate for those communities.

Economic Disadvantage, Family Formation, and Intimate Violence

The sociological literature has demonstrated the influence of economic inequality on the formation of traditional family structures. At the individual level, when males are economically marginal, females are increasingly less likely to find such males suitable marriage partners (Oppenheimer 1988; Wilson 1984; Wilson and Aponte 1985; Wilson and Neckerman 1985), whereas when females are economically marginal to males, males are less likely to view such females as unmarriageable. As a result, women may tend to choose to either remain single or become divorced because of their perception that their man is an economic liability and not an asset, but men are not equally likely to do the same in similar circumstances. Individuals in the U.S. may simply be more accepting of married women who do not work outside the home than of married men who do not. Certainly, working outside the home is not the sole determinant of economic placement in society, but it may well shape perceptions of persons who do as being somehow less economically marginal.

At the aggregate level, varying degrees of economic disadvantage produce very different rates of family

formation. High levels of male economic disadvantage may lead to an increased rate of female-headed households. When communities experience high levels of such households, formal and informal social controls may become less effective in shaping the behavior of community members in conventional ways. In other words, members of the community (of both sexes) may have an increased freedom to deviate, although, because females experience more economic privilege relative to males, they may also be inclined to experience more freedom, including the freedom to deviate.

On the other hand, communities which experience high levels of female economic disadvantage may tend to also have lower rates of female-headed households, and higher rates of traditional two-parent families. Higher rates of traditional family structures tend to bring with them more effective formal and informal social control mechanisms for directing community behavior into conventional roles. However, these control mechanisms may act less on males than females because males have more economic privilege relative to females and require more freedom of behavior in order to act in ways that prove beneficial in the work world. Consequently, males may be more free to deviate relative to females, and male rates of deviance in the community may therefore be higher than female rates.

Expectations

The above review suggests that economic disadvantage is linked to family formation and that this link may explain varying sex ratios of deviance and crime across communities. With regard to the specific crime of intimate homicide, the literature suggests the possibility that by removing economic dependence in a group, this may make the group freer to kill - for now they are not killing the golden goose. However, very little previous research has examined intimate homicide using sex ratios or racially disaggregated data, and none exist, to this writer's knowledge, which also conduct such analyses across macro social units using characteristics of places, and not people, to explain the structural relationship.

Four major hypotheses guide the following research. The first is that variations in rates of family disruption in urban areas are positively related to total and relationship-specific sex ratios of intimate homicide, independent of other factors. Since high rates of divorce and separation in a community may signal instability and social disorganization in personal relations (Blau and Blau 1982; Sampson 1987), family disruption is expected to be related to sex ratios of intimate killing as well.

The second major hypothesis is that sex ratios of economic disadvantage have an indirect positive effect on

total and relationship-specific sex ratios of intimate killing, mediated by family disruption. This hypothesis is derived from the expectation that sex ratios of economic disadvantage have a direct positive effect on family disruption.

The third and fourth major hypotheses are derived in part from research which has shown that the relationship between family disruption and delinquency is strong among blacks but not whites (Moynihan 1965) and that levels of family disruption are much lower for whites and hispanics than for blacks (Espenshade 1985; Jaynes and Williams 1989; Grebler et al. 1982). The third major hypothesis then, is that within-race sex ratios of economic disadvantage have strong direct positive effects on black family disruption and even stronger indirect positive effects on sex ratios of black intimate homicide than either between-race or total sex ratios of economic disadvantage. Furthermore, it is anticipated that the direct effects of sex ratios of economic disadvantage on sex ratios of black intimate homicide will be insignificant (see Shihadeh and Steffensmeier 1994 for justifications).

The fourth major hypothesis is that within-race sex ratios of economic disadvantage have strong direct positive effects on white and Hispanic intimate killing sex ratios but small or trivial effects through family

structure. In other words, sex ratios of economic disadvantage are expected to be more important predictors of sex ratios of intimate killing for whites and hispanics than are measures of family disruption. Furthermore, within-race gender inequality is anticipated to have stronger direct effects on sex ratios of white and hispanic intimate killing than between race or total measures of gender inequality.

This research goes beyond previous studies in viewing communities both as units of stratification and social control, in disaggregating homicide by intimacy of relationship, in racially disaggregating sex ratios of intimate homicides, in incorporating within-race and between-gender measures of inequality, and in considering both direct and indirect effects of inequality on sex ratios of intimate homicide.

CHAPTER THREE

DATA AND METHODS

The units of analysis for this study are cities in the United States in 1990 that contained more than 100,000 residents (see note 1). Measures of city characteristics were taken from the Summary Tape Files of the U.S. Bureau of the Census, and from the published volumes of the 1990 Census. The crime data were made available by the FBI's Supplementary Homicide Report (SHR) Division. Although numerous criticisms have been leveled against the use of SHR data due to random coding errors, erroneous duplications, logical impossibilities and incomplete or missing records, as yet no better national data set exists that allows examination of the victim-offender relationship in homicides. In addition, suggestions designed to compensate for missing data in the SHR (Williams and Flewelling 1987) do not apply for the purpose of this research because the present analysis is concerned with <u>sex ratios</u> of homicide and not <u>total numbers</u> of homicide (see note 2). Consequently, ratios would remain unaffected by any weighting procedures.

The dependent variable is the female to male sex ratio of intimate homicide (calculated as intimate homicides perpetrated by women per 100 perpetrated by men). Note that the present study focusses on homicide, and not

murder, because the latter involves a social process of defining the act of killing as legally wrong while the data utilized in this study are pre-trial in nature and derived only from police arrest statistics. Consequently, some cases will have been dismissed as homicides (the killing of one human being by another) and others found guilty of murder (homicide with malice aforethought) after the adjudication process. This distinction is not considered necessary for the current study.

The homicides deemed "intimate" include both registered and de facto marital unions between persons of the opposite sex, as well as separated or divorced couples. This variable is disaggregated into two series of variables. The first set of disaggregated dependent variables are relationship-specific sex ratios of intimate homicides, where intimate homicides are examined individually among the four intimate relationship categories. The second set of disaggregated dependent variables are race-specific sex ratios of intra-racial intimate homicides, where intimate homicides are calculated as a sum of the four intimate relationship categories. Although disaggregating by both race and relationship would be ideal, this was not possible because it results in very low frequencies for some race-relationship categories, thereby making any regression analyses extremely

unreliable. However, descriptive analyses were performed which offer some information on the nature and distribution of sex ratios of homicide by race and relationship. Finally, the ratios were created using the pooled homicide count (see note 3) across the years 1988-92 in order to avoid any year-to-year fluctuations (Sampson 1986).

The independent variable of economic gender inequality was measured as the female to male sex ratio of military and civilian employment. Three measures of employment inequality were used. First, a measure of <u>total gender inequality</u> was defined as employed females per 100 employed males. <u>Between-race gender inequality</u> was defined as either: employed black females per 100 employed white males (black model only), or employed hispanic females per 100 employed white males (hispanic model only). <u>Within-race gender inequality</u> was defined as either: employed white females per 100 employed white males (white model only), employed black females per 100 black males (black model only), or employed hispanic females per 100 hispanic males (hispanic model only).

In addition, the independent variable of family disruption was measured as the percentage of total, white, black, or hispanic households with female heads (total, white, black, and hispanic models, respectively).

The control variables included a male marriage pool index, racially disaggregated for selected models (see Sampson 1987 and Wilson 1987) which is a marriage market indicator of the number of employed males age 16 and older per 100 similarly aged females. An additional control variable included mean public assistance payments (see note 4), race-specific for selected models, because these payments vary across place and may influence whether or not marriages are formed or maintained (Murray 1984). This is a potential influence if high welfare payments encourage women to bear illegitimate children or to divorce because eligibility requirements for Aid to Families With Dependent Children specify a female-headed family. Mean per capita income (race-specific for selected models) was also controlled because income levels vary across cities. In addition, a control was entered for percent persons age 15-34 because the association of age with crime is well documented in the literature.

Additional controls included the following: the natural log of city population was included in order to control for variation in city size, while structural density was measured by the percent of housing units in attached units of five or more. This latter control was considered necessary because density of housing units can increase criminal opportunity through the lack of

involvement and guardianship behavior on the part of tenants over their neighbors dwellings and/or activities (Stark 1987; Sampson 1983). Percent white, black, hispanic and Puerto Rican were included as controls, when appropriate to the given model, as crude but frequently used measures of ethnic culture. This control was considered necessary, in spite of the fact that killing ratios were racially disaggregated, because it can be argued that the size of an ethnic population is crucial to the emergence of an ethnic subculture (Curtis 1975).

A further control was entered for the black model for effects of racial segregation because studies have shown that higher residential segregation is associated with higher murder rates (Logan and Messner 1987; Rosenfeld 1986; and Sampson 1985a). Racial segregation was measured using the Index of Dissimilarity, which is a frequently used measure of black-white residential segregation across census tracts in an urban area. The Index ranges from 0 (blacks and whites are evenly distributed) to 100 (blacks and whites are completely segregated).

Although a prudent judgement might determine the need to control for city composition with regard to distribution of the sexes (Guttentag and Secord 1983), initial analyses proved that the sex ratio of the city was collinear with the independent variables measuring gender

inequality, and subsequently, this control measure was omitted from the analyses.

Finally, the effects of region was controlled via the use of Gastil's (1971) Index of Southernness (see Appendix A), which is intended to reflect the number of persons in each state who were born and raised in the South, based on analyses of post-Civil War migration patterns. Gastil's Index ranges from 5 for states having almost no Southern population to 30 for states with "an overwhelming Southern influence" (p. 425). The Index was modified for use in the present study by applying the score for the state to all cities in that state. The purpose of including a measure of region is to control for the high incidence of homicide in Southern states. Gastil's Index was selected because it has been shown to have high correlations (over .80) with the proportion of a state's population that was born in the South (Simpson 1985; Blau and Golden 1986; Huff-Corzine, Corzine, and Moore 1986) and because it is a popular, albeit crude, measure of Southern culture.

The analysis of the data consisted initially of the use of descriptive statistics such as frequencies, correlations, means, and standard deviations. The essence of the analyses, however, were the predictive models tested by OLS regression. Variance inflation factors were also examined in order to assess the problem of

multicollinearity (see Fisher and Mason 1981). The VIF scores did reveal multicollinearity in the models, and consequently, independent variables were eliminated which were apparently already being measured to some large degree by other independent variables. The following equation represents the OLS model that predicts the total and relationship-specific sex ratio of intimate killing:

$$Y = a+\beta_1(welfare)+\beta_2(mean\ per\ capita\ income)+\beta_3(percent\ age\ 15\text{-}35)+\beta_4(percent\ black)+\beta_5(percent\ Hispanic)+\beta_6(percent\ Puerto\ Rican)+\beta_7(Southern\ Index)+\beta_8(pop.)+\beta_9(structural\ density)+\beta_{10}(MMPI[selected\ models,\ see\ Results\ chapter])+\beta_{11}(total\ gender\ inequality)+\beta_{12}(percent\ fem.\text{-}head\ [selected\ models,\ see\ Results\ chapter])[see\ note\ 5]$$

where Y is the natural log of the total or relationship-specific sex ratio of intimate killing. The model predicting the white sex ratio of intimate killing is:

$$Y = a+\beta_1(wht.welf.)+\beta_2(white\ mean\ per\ capita\ income)+\beta_3(percent\ whites\ age\ 15\text{-}35)+\beta_4(percent\ white)+\beta_5(Southern\ Index)+\beta_6(pop.)+\beta_7(structural\ density)+\beta_8(white\ MMPI)+\beta_9(total\ gender\ inequality)+\beta_{10}(white\ gender\ inequality)[see\ note\ 6]$$

where Y is the natural log of the white sex ratio of intimate killing. The model predicting the black sex ratio of intimate killing is:

$$Y = a+\beta_1(blk.welf.)+\beta_2(black\ mean\ per\ capita\ income)+\beta_3(percent\ blacks\ age\ 15\text{-}35)+\beta_4(percent\ black)+\beta_5(Southern\ Index)+\beta_6(Segregation\ Index)+\beta_7(pop.)+\beta_8(structural\ density)+\beta_9(total\ gender\ inequality)+\beta_{10}(black\text{-}white\ gender\ inequality)+\beta_{11}(black\ gender\ inequality)\ [see\ note\ 7]$$

where Y is the natural log of the black sex ratio of killing. The model predicting the Hispanic sex ratio of killing is:

$$Y = a+\beta_1(hisp.welf.)+\beta_2(mean\ hisp.\ per\ capita\ income)+\beta_3(percent\ Hispanics\ age\ 15\text{-}35)+\beta_4(percent\ Hispanic)+\beta_5(percent\ Puerto\ Rican)+\beta_6(Southern\ Index)+\beta_7(pop.)+\beta_8(structural\ density)+\beta_9(total\ gender\ inequality)+\beta_{10}(hisp.\text{-}white\ gender\ inequality)+\beta_{11}(hisp.gender\ inequality)\ [see\ note\ 8]$$

where Y is the natural log of the Hispanic sex ratio of intimate killing.

CHAPTER FOUR

RESULTS

Total Sex Ratios of Intimate Homicide

Descriptive Analyses

Descriptive data on total intimate homicides, their sex ratios, and city characteristics are presented in Tables 1 through 4. It is important to note at the outset in Table 1 that intimate homicides were only a small portion (6.7%) of all killings during the given time period; even when only known victim offender relationships are considered (Table 2), intimate killings still comprise a very small portion (11.8%) of the total. Yet when intimate killings are analyzed in Table 3 with regard to the sex of the killer, a remarkable ratio is revealed; the total sex ratio of killing across large U.S. cities is 58. In other words, on average, 58 women kill their intimate male partners for every 100 men that kill their intimate partners. This critical feature of female intimate killing is not apparent in analyses of total homicide rates, which have consistently revealed that women in general commit only 15 murders for every 100 committed by men (see, for example, Flanagan and Maguire 1992). Appendix B provides a rank-order listing of total sex ratios across place for the purpose of demonstrating the tremendous variation in the ratios, in this particular case from a

Table 1. Total Killings by Aggregate Relationship Type, U.S. 1988-92.

Relationship Type	Number of Killings
Intimate	3,977 (6.7%)
Non-Intimate	29,597 (50.0%)
Unknown	25,710 (43.4%)
Total	59,307 (100.1%)

Table 2. Known Victim-Offender Killings by Aggregate Relationship Type, U.S. 1988-92.

Relationship Type	Number of Killings
Intimate	3,977 (11.8%)
Non-Intimate	29,597 (89.2%)
Total	33574 (100%)

Table 3. Sex of Intimate Killer and Sex Ratio of Intimate Killing by Disaggregated Relationship Type, U.S. 1988-92.

Relationship Type	Sex of Killer: Male	Sex of Killer: Female	SROK
Married	1,101 (27.7%)	537 (13.5%)	49
Divorced	75 (1.9%)	26 (.7%)	35
Cohabitating	264 (6.6%)	230 (5.8%)	87
Girl/Boyfriend	1,071 (26.9%)	673 (16.9%)	69
Total	2,511 (63.1%)	1,466 (36.9%)	58

high of 433 to a low of 8 women killing per 100 men killing.

Table 4 reveals that, on average, females are more economically disadvantaged relative to males; there are only 87 employed females for every 100 employed males. Yet, according to the male marriage pool index, there is still not a sufficient supply of marriageable partners for women; for every 100 women, there are only 78 employed men. Consequently, an average of 22 out of every 100 women will not find suitable marriage partners. The zero-order correlation between gender inequality and the intimate killing sex ratio is significant and in the predicted direction, indicating that in cities where males are disadvantaged economically relative to females, sex ratios of killing intimate partners appear biased in favor of females as killers (r=.17). As predicted, a stronger relationship, however, appears to exist between percent female-headed households and the sex ratio of killing (r=.23), indicating that cities with higher rates of family disruption seem associated with more female-to-male intimate killings. Likewise as predicted, gender inequality is even more strongly associated with family disruption (r=.38), indicating that cities with more economically disadvantaged males relative to females also tend to have higher rates of female-headed households. Six of the

Table 4. Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations of City-Level Structural Variables for Total Model in 187 U.S. Cities in 1990.

Structural Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	Mean	Std. Dev.
1.Total SROK													---	---
2.Mean Public Assistance	-.33†												4244.4	1119.1
3.Mean Per Capita Income	-.30†	.27†											11582.6	2773.2
4.Percent Age 15-34	-.00	.01	-.03										35.2	3.6
5.Percent Black	.33†	-.32†	-.17†	-.05									19.3	17.8
6.Percent Hispanic	-.18†	.32†	-.05	.08	-.27†								12.9	15.1
7.Percent Puerto Rican	.02	.11	-.13*	.04	.17*	.20†							1.5	3.7
8.Southern Index	.09	-.39†	.19†	-.04	.21†	-.05	-.51†						20.2	7.1
9.Population Size[a]	.13*	-.05	-.14*	.02	.25†	.09	.01	.03					333721.7	642219.9
10.Percent Rental Housing 5+ units	.04	.15*	.23†	.27†	.04	.13*	.23†	-.05	.30†				26.9	11.5
11.Employed Males/ 100 females (MMPI)	-.22†	.22†	.45†	.05	-.38†	-.18†	-.20†	.06	-.05	.18†			77.5	19.3
12.Total Gender Inequality	.17*	-.36†	-.21†	-.07	.50†	-.53†	.12	-.17*	.04	.03	-.31†		87.3	9.2
13.Percent Households female headed	.23†	-.03	-.32†	-.14*	.67†	-.00	.33†	-.08	.24†	.28†	-.41†	.38†	14.2	5.9

[a] Original metric shown. Natural log of the cities' populations used in the analysis.
* $p < .05$ † $p < .01$

situational controls (mean public assistance, mean per capita income, percent black, percent Hispanic, population size, and male marriage pool index) also appear significantly correlated with sex ratios of intimate killing (r= -.33, -.30, .33, -.18,.13,-.22, respectively).

Regression Analyses

Table 5 provides the OLS estimates for the model predicting the total sex ratio of intimate killing. The standardized coefficients reveal six significant predictors of SROK's: mean public assistance payments, mean per capita income, percent black, percent Hispanic, structural density, and gender inequality. However, the main predictions based upon theory and past research are not supported. First, in spite of the initial and expected finding of a positive, significant zero-order correlation between percent female-headed households and SROK's, in the regression analysis percent female-headed households no longer are significantly related to SROK's when controls for other factors are considered, thus negating the hypothesis that an indirect relationship exists between gender inequality and killing, mediated by family disruption.

In addition, although significant, the direct relationship of gender inequality to SROK's is opposite of the predicted direction (β=-.26), indicating that in cities

Mean Per Capita Income	-.02	.00	-.29†
Percent Age 15-34	-1.71	1.87	-.07
Percent Black	1.60	.63	.31*
Percent Hispanic	-1.30	.58	-.21*
Percent Puerto Rican	-1.70	2.23	-.07
Southern Index	-1.10	1.34	-.08
Population Size (ln)	-3.50	9.31	-.03
Percent Rental Housing 5+units	1.99	.75	.25*
Employed Males/100 Females (MMPI)	-.59	.42	-.13
Total Gender Inequality	-2.61	1.02	-.26*
Percent Households Female-headed	-1.32	1.85	-.09
Intercept	917.32	198.80	
R^2		.26	

b and s.e. are multiplied by 100.
* p < .05
† p < .01
F = 5.06
Significance of F = .000

where males are economically disadvantaged relative to females, sex ratios of killing intimate partners tend to be biased against females as killers. The reverse is also true: in cities where females are economically disadvantaged relative to males, sex ratios of killing intimate partners appear biased in favor of females as killers. In other words, it seems to be conditions of relative disadvantage which determine the direction of sex ratios of killing in favor of whichever gender happens to be economically disadvantaged. Apparently, the disadvantaged kill more relative to the advantaged.

Of the control variables, the estimates for black culture and structural density have significant predictive value (β=.31 and .25, respectively); they are positively associated with SROK's, indicating that cities with a higher percentage of both blacks in the population and dense housing are likely to be cities in which females kill their partners more than do males. Other control variables, including mean public assistance payments, mean per capita income and percent Hispanic have significant predictive value (β=-.21, -.29, and -.21, respectively); they are inversely associated with SROK's, indicating that cities with higher welfare payments, per capita incomes, and Hispanic populations seem to have more males as intimate killers than females. The total model, however,

explains only a modest amount of the variance in SROK's (R^2=.26), thus, the model appears underspecified even if significant. Overall, the findings appear to lend support to the traditional criminological view that economic inequality is directly related to(at least)intimate violence, perhaps via the fostering of feelings of deprivation and resentment, but even then, in ways contrary to much of the theoretical literature pertaining to female involvement in crime.

Relationship-Specific Sex Ratios of Intimate Homicide

Descriptive Analyses

When homicides are disaggregated by relationship type, as in Tables 6 through 8, it becomes apparent that while intimate homicides are only a small portion of total homicides, certain categories of intimate killing are more frequent than others. In Table 6, married killings comprise only 2.8% of all killings, and in Table 7, 4.9% of all known victim-offender killings. However, in Table 8, we see that they comprise the second largest category of intimate killings (41%). The most frequent form of intimate killing is that of girlfriends and boyfriends, making up 44% of all intimate killings. Still, according to Table 6, girl/boyfriend homicides are only 2.9% of all killings and 5.2% of known victim-offender killings (Table 7). Cohabitating killings and divorced killings round out

Table 6. Total Killings by Disaggregated Relationship Type, U.S. 1988-92.

Relationship Type	Number of Killings
Married	1,638 (2.8%)
Divorced	101 (2%)
Cohabitating	494 (.8%)
Girl/Boyfriend	1,744 (2.9%)
Non-Intimate	29,597 (50.0%)
Unknown	25710 (43.4%)
Total	59,307 (100.1%)

Table 7. Known Victim-Offender Killings by Disaggregated Relationship Type, U.S. 1988-92.

Relationship Type	Number of Killings
Married	1,638 (4.9%)
Divorced	101 (.3%)
Cohabitating	494 (1.5%)
Girl/Boyfriend	1,744 (5.2%)
Non-Intimate	29,597 (89.2%)
Total	33574 (101.1%)

Table 8. Intimate Killings by Disaggregated Relationship Type, U.S. 1988-92.

Relationship Type	Number of Killings
Married	1,638 (41%)
Divorced	101 (3%)
Cohabitating	494 (12%)
Girl/Boyfriend	1,744 (44%)
Total	3,977 (100%)

the intimate murders presented in Table 8 with only 12% and 3%, respectively. Their portions of total homicides in Table 6 (.8% and .2%, respectively) and known victim-offender homicides in Table 7 (1.5% and .3%, respectively) are so small they are almost negligible. Yet, analyzing intimate killing more closely reveals some distinct differences.

Referring back to Table 3, which presents the total sex ratio of killing for each intimate relationship type, we find some very interesting patterns: the overall sex ratio of killing for large cities (as noted earlier) is 58. Yet, within the individual categories of killing, there is much variation around the total SROK, ranging from a low of 35 in divorced killings to a high of 87 in cohabitating killings. Intimate friendships are second highest with a sex ratio of 69, followed by married killings with a sex ratio of 49. Apparently, it is more dangerous to be either a divorced female or a cohabitating male in large U.S. cities. Still, Table 3 masks the tremendous variation in sex ratios of killing across cities, which, when added together, produce these total scores for each relationship type. Appendices C-I provide a rank-order listing of relationship-specific SROK's for the purpose of demonstrating this substantial variation across place.

Married Sex Ratios of Intimate Killing

Descriptive Analyses

Descriptive data on married sex ratios of intimate killing and city characteristics are presented in Tables 3 and 9. In Table 3, the total sex ratio of married killing across large U.S. cities is 49. In other words, approximately 49 wives kill their husbands for every 100 husbands who kill their wives. Table 9 reveals the same economic disadvantage of women relative to men as in the cities in the analysis of total SROK's: only approximately 87 women are employed for every 100 employed men. Likewise, this analysis reveals a lack of suitable marriage partners for women, with only 78 employed men for every 100 women. The zero-order correlation between gender inequality and married SROK's is significant, and in the predicted direction, seeming to indicate that in cities where females are economically disadvantaged relative to males, SROK's are biased in favor of males as killers. Likewise, as expected, a stronger and significant relationship exists between percent female-headed households and the married SROK ($r=.26$), apparently indicating that cities with lower rates of family disruption are inclined to more husband-on-wife killings than wife-on-husband killings. Furthermore, the relationship between percent female-headed households and sex ratios of economic disadvantage also

Table 9. Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations of City-Level Structural Variables For Married Model in 173 U.S. Cities in 1990.

Structural Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	Mean	Std Dev
1.Married SROK													—	—
2.Mean Public Assistance	-.34†												4,264.9	1,148.8
3.Mean Per Capita Income	-.27†	.27†											11,613.5	2,620.7
4.Percent Age 15-34	.01	.02	.00										35.1	3.6
5.Percent Black	.38†	-.34†	-.18*	-.07									19.6	18.1
6.Percent Hispanic	-.22†	.39†	-.00	.10	-.29†								12.7	14.2
7.Percent Puerto Rican	-.05	.11	-.11	-.02	.15*	.22†							1.4	3.3
8.Southern Index	.22†	-.40†	.16*	-.03	.22†	-.09	-.51†						20.5	6.9
9.Population Size[a]	.09	-.06	-.14*	.04	.25†	.11	.03	.01					346,669.1	663,979.0
10.Percent Rental Housing 5+ units	-.11	.15*	.23†	.24†	.01	.17*	.19†	-.08	.33†				27.0	11.2
11.Employed Males/ 100 females (MMPI)	-.19†	.22†	.44†	.06	-.40†	-.13*	-.18†	.04	-.06	.17*			77.8	19.6
12.Total Gender Inequality	.13*	-.38†	-.21†	-.11	.50†	-.55†	.10	-.14*	.05	.01	-.32†		87.1	9.2
13.Percent Households female headed	.26†	-.03	-.30†	-.16*	.67†	-.05	.29	-.06	.25†	.30†	-.39†	.38†	14.2	5.9

[a] Original metric shown. Natural log of the cities' populations used in the analysis.

* $p < .05$

† $p < .01$

conforms to expectations (and findings in the total model); the association seems to indicate that cities with more economically disadvantaged females (relative to males) also have lower rates of female-headed households (r=.38). In addition, six of the situational controls (mean public assistance, mean per capita income, percent black, percent Hispanic, Southern Index, and male marriage pool index) are also significantly correlated with sex ratios of married killing (r=-.34,-.27,.38,-.22,.22,-.19, respectively). These are approximately the same six as the total model, with the only difference in the substitution of Southern Index for city population.

Regression Analyses

Table 10 provides the OLS estimates for the model predicting the sex ratio of married killing. The standardized coefficients reveal five significant predictors of married SROK's: mean public assistance payments, mean per capita income, percent black, percent Hispanic, and gender inequality. Just as with the total model, when controls for other influences are entered, the initial significant zero-order correlation between percent female-headed households and married SROK's does not remain significant. Consequently, the hypothesis that an indirect relationship exists between gender inequality and SROK's is disconfirmed. Even the direct relationship

Table 10. OLS Regression Estimates Predicting the Logged Married Sex Ratio of Intimate Killing in 173 U.S. Cities in 1990.

Structural Variables	b	s.e.	β
Mean Public Assistance	-.02	.01	-.19*
Mean Per Capita Income	-.01	.00	-.17*
Percent Age 15-34	1.68	2.18	.06
Percent Black	1.40	.73	.24*
Percent Hispanic	-1.49	.74	-.20†
Percent Puerto Rican	-.89	2.94	-.03
Southern Index	.87	1.60	.06
Population Size (ln)	.07	10.83	.00
Percent Rental Housing 5+units	-.43	.90	-.05
Employed Males/100 Females (MMPI)	-.18	.49	-.03
Total Gender Inequality	-3.04	1.21	-.27†
Percent Households Female-headed	2.70	2.18	.15
Intercept	225.28	229.27	
R^2		.28	

b and s.e. are multiplied by 100.
* p < .10
† p < .05
F = 5.14
Significance of F = .000

between gender inequality and married SROK's, although significant and the strongest predictor of SROK's, is not in the expected direction (β=-.27), further mimicking the findings in the total model that in cities where conditions of relative economic disadvantage between the sexes exist, sex ratios of married killing tend to favor the sex of the disadvantaged as intimate killers.

Of the control variables, the significant four were also significant in the total model (and in the same directions). Percent black is positively associated with married SROK's, indicating that cities with higher proportions of blacks in the population tend to be cities in which wives kill their partners more than do husbands (β=.24). In other words, predominantly black communities seem inclined to have more women killing their husbands than vice versa.

The control variables of mean public assistance, mean per capita income, and percent Hispanic are all negatively predictive of married SROK's, indicating that cities with lower welfare payments, per capita incomes, and Hispanic populations tend to have more husbands as killers than wives (β=-.19, -.17,-.20, respectively). The total married model explains only 28% of the variance in married SROK's, suggesting the model, although significant, is underspecified.

Overall, these findings remain highly consistent with the total model in the tendency to support traditional theories of a direct relationship between inequality and violence, at least for some forms of intimate violence, but in ways which diverge dramatically from the usual explanations for female involvement in violence.

Girl/Boyfriend Sex Ratios of Intimate Killing

Descriptive Analyses

Descriptive data on sex ratios of girl/boyfriend killing and city characteristics are presented in Tables 3 and 11. In Table 3, we see that the total sex ratio of intimate friend killing across large U.S. cities is 69. In other words, 69 girlfriends kill their boyfriends for every 100 boyfriends who kill their girlfriends. In Table 11, additional city characteristics are presented, and these remain highly consistent with previous models, reporting (within tenths of degrees) the same proportions of marriageable men, female headed households, and gender inequality. The zero-order correlations, although generally in the direction of the previous models, do depict slightly different relationships. One difference is that the correlation between gender inequality and intimate friend SROK's in not a significant association, although it is in the predicted direction(r=.10). Another difference involves one of the situational controls: percent

Table 11. Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations of City-Level Structural Variables for Friends Model in 163 U.S. Cities in 1990.

Structural Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	Mean	Std. Dev.
1.Friends SROK													—	—
2.Mean Public Assistance	-.23†												4,259.4	1,127.7
3.Mean Per Capita Income	-.24†	.23†											11,519.5	2,710.1
4.Percent Age 15-34	-.05	-.00	-.00										35.4	3.5
5.Percent Black	.18*	-.35†	-.17*	-.07									20.6	17.9
6.Percent Hispanic	-.08	.38†	-.02	.10	-.27†								12.6	14.1
7.Percent Puerto Rican	.03	.10	-.15*	.05	.16*	.24†							1.6	3.9
8.Southern Index	.01	-.41†	.19†	-.02	.20†	-.10	-.54†						20.3	7.1
9.Population Size[a]	.14*	-.08	-.15*	-.00	.23†	.12	-.01	.03					359,881.0	681,880.2
10.Percent Rental Housing 5+ units	.06	.12	.23†	.31†	.03	.19†	.21†	-.03	.31†				27.1	11.5
11.Employed Males/ 100 females (MMPI)	-.18*	.22†	.44†	.06	-.39†	-.15*	-.20†	.07	-.05	.19†			77.5	20.1
12.Total Gender Inequality	.10	-.40†	-.19†	-.12	.51†	-.51†	.12	-.1*	.03	.04	-.32†		87.5	9.1
13.Percent Households female headed	.17*	-.02	-.31†	-.17*	.65†	-.03	.34†	-.11	.22†	.32†	-.39†	.39†	14.5	6.0

[a] Original metric shown. Natural log of the cities' populations used in the analysis.

* $p < .05$

† $p < .01$

Hispanic is not significantly related to SROK's in this model, although it remains in the same general direction (r=-.08).

Regression Analyses

Table 12 provides the OLS estimates for the model predicting the sex ratio of girl/boyfriend killing. The standardized coefficients reveal that the strongest predictors of intimate friend SROK's are structural density and gender inequality (β=.28 and -.23, respectively). Still, gender inequality does not affect SROK's in the expected direction, as in previous models. Also consistent with previous findings is the lack of significant predictive value in the variable percent female-headed households, again disconfirming the possibility of an indirect causal relationship between sexual inequality and intimate killing mediated by family disruption.

Of the control variables, some differences do appear in this model: four are significant, but only mean public assistance payments, mean per capita income, and structural density are consistent with the total model in both significance and direction (β=-.22, -.22, and .28, respectively). In this model, the percent of the city's populations which are between the ages 15 and 34 are inversely related to SROK's, indicating that the older the population of a city, the more boyfriends tend to kill

Table 12. OLS Regression Estimates Predicting the Logged Friends Sex Ratio of Intimate Killing in 163 U.S. Cities in 1990.

Structural Variables	b	s.e.	β
Mean Public Assistance Pmt.	-.02	.01	-.22†
Mean Per Capita Income	-.01	.01	-.22†
Percent Age 15-34	-5.71	3.53	-.15*
Percent Black	1.35	1.06	18
Percent Hispanic	-1.24	1.07	-.13
Percent Puerto Rican	-2.75	3.74	-.08
Southern Index	-2.91	2.32	-.15
Population Size (ln)	.04	15.83	00
Percent Rental Housing 5+units	3.34	1.43	28†
Employed Males/100 females (MMPI)	-.97	.71	-.14
Total Gender Inequality	-3.46	1.76	-.23†
Percent Households female-headed	-2.24	3.25	-.10
Intercept	734.95	364.90	
R^2		.15	

b and s.e. are multiplied by 100.
* p < .10
† p < .05
F = 2.26
Significance of F = .01

girlfriends than vice versa (β=-.15). In addition, percent black and percent Hispanic are not significantly predictive of girl/boyfriend killing as they are for the total model. Overall, the model explains only 15% of the variance in girl/boyfriend SROK's, suggesting that the model is under specified. Still, the results remain consistent with the total model in support of a direct relationship between sexual inequality and relative violence among intimates, albeit in a rather startling direction for females.

Cohabitating Sex Ratios of Intimate Killing

Descriptive Analyses

Descriptive data on cohabitating homicides, their sex ratios, and city characteristics are presented in Tables 3 and 13. In Table 3, the total sex ratio of cohabitating killing is 87, the closest of any relationship category to sexual equality in killing. For every 100 cohabitating men who kill their partners, 87 cohabitating women kill theirs. In Table 13, additional city characteristics remain consistent with the total model, with only 2 to 3 percentage points difference in average proportions of marriageable men, female-headed households, and gender inequality in the 97 cities in the sample. The significant zero-order correlations are generally the same as the total model with only the following exceptions: the

Table 13. Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations of City-Level Structural Variables for Cohabitating Model in 97 U.S. Cities in 1990.

Structural Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	Mean	Std. Dev.
1.Cohabitating SROK													—	—
2.Mean Public Assistance	-.06												4,208.1	1,222.8
3.Mean Per Capita Income	.01	.25†											10,938.9	2,297.7
4.Percent Age 15-34	-.04	.10	-.07										35.1	3.3
5.Percent Black	.37†	-.22*	-.06	-.07									25.5	18.8
6.Percent Hispanic	-.20*	.24*	-.08	.13	-.31†								15.9	17.8
7.Percent Puerto Rican	-.07	.14	-.10	.08	.16	.11							1.7	4.2
8.Southern Index	.11	-.42†	.06	-.06	.07	.02	-.58†						20.3	6.8
9.Population Size$_a$	.25†	.05	.02	-.04	.21*	.05	-.00	-.03					473,240.7	865,932.6
10.Percent Rental Housing 5+ units	.12	.18*	.30†	.06	.05	.06	.24†	-.07	.35†				27.5	12.8
11.Employed Males/ 100 females (MMPI)	-.16	.21*	.46†	-.01	-.32†	-.18*	-.15	.04	.02	.23*			74.4	24.5
12.Total Gender Inequality	.13	-.31†	-.14	-.22*	.58†	-.59†	.17	-.20*	.02	-.02	-.24†		87.7	9.8
13.Percent Households female headed	.28†	.06	-.21*	-.11	.59†	-.12	.29†	-.15	.16	.43†	-.31†	.42*	16.0	6.9

$_a$ Original metric shown. Natural log of the cities' populations used in the analysis.

* $p < .05$

† $p < .01$

correlation between gender inequality and cohabitating SROK's is not significant, although it is in the predicted direction (r=.13).

In addition, there are differences in the situational controls: male marriage pool index and mean public assistance payments are not related to cohabitating SROK's, although they are in the same general direction as those in the total model (r-.13 and -.06, respectively). Finally, mean per capita income is not significantly related with the dependent variable and, in fact, is in the opposite direction of that in the total model (r=.01).

Regression Analyses

Table 14 provides the OLS estimates of the model predicting the sex ratios of cohabitating killing. The standardized coefficients reveal that neither family disruption nor gender inequality predict cohabitating SROK's, although gender inequality approaches significance, and remains consistent with the total model in direction (β=-.26). Furthermore, percent female-headed households not only does not predict these SROK's, but is in the opposite direction of that in the total model (β=.15). Of the control variables, the only one to significantly predict cohabitating SROK's is percent Hispanic (β=-.27), indicating that in cities with larger Hispanic populations male cohabitants are relatively more likely to

Table 14. OLS Regression Estimates Predicting the Logged Cohabitating Sex Ratio of Intimate Killing in 97 U.S. Cities in 1990.

Structural Variables	b	s.e.	β
Mean Public Assistance	-.00	.02	-.00
Mean Per Capita Income	.01	.01	.06
Percent Age 15-34	-.99	6.13	-.02
Percent Black	2.41	1.77	.23
Percent Hispanic	-2.98	1.58	-.27*
Percent Puerto Rican	-4.77	6.34	-.10
Southern Index	.53	4.34	.02
Population Size (ln)	42.15	25.87	.18
Percent Rental Housing 5+units	.81	2.34	.05
Employed Males/100 females (MMPI)	-1.69	1.04	-.21
Total Gender Inequality	-5.10	3.19	-.26
Percent Households female-headed	4.24	4.95	.15
Intercept	-37.05	663.01	
R^2		.24	

b and s.e. are multiplied by 100.
* p < .10
F = 2.27
Significance of F = .015

kill their partners than vice versa. The overall model, as was true for all previous models, seems underspecified as it can account for only 24% of the variation in cohabitating SROK's.

Divorced Sex Ratios of Intimate Killing

Descriptive Analyses

Descriptive data on sex ratios of divorced killing and city characteristics are presented in Tables 3 and 15. In Table 3, we see that the total sex ratio of divorced killing is 35, the furthest of any relationship category from sexual equality in killing, or the nearest of any to the pattern of sexual stratification of homicide in general. For every 100 divorced men who kill their ex-wives, only 25 divorced women kill their ex-husbands (see note 9). Table 15 reveals that the mean score for gender inequality is again proximate to that in previous models. In addition, we see here that no significant correlations exist between the independent and dependent variables. In fact, the relationships tend to be opposite those found in the total model. However, because the sample size is small (N=55), significance becomes much harder to obtain, as evidenced by the several large β values in Table 16 which lack significance.

Table 15. Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations of City-Level Structural Variables for Divorced Model in 55 U.S. Cities in 1990.

Structural Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Mean	Std. Dev.
1.Divorced SROK											—	—
2.Mean Public Assistance	- 06										3961.4	1287.5
3.Mean Per Capita Income	- 03	06									10,508.7	1,689.1
4.Percent Age 15-34	13	00	12								35.1	3.4
5.Percent Black	11	- 20	05	- 16							23.3	19.6
6.Percent Hispanic	- 04	14	- 14	- 03	- 42†						13.4	15.8
7.Percent Puerto Rican	- 00	10	- 10	.04	16	15					.6	1.1
8.Southern Index	- 11	- 39†	19	- 16	19	17	- 36†				22.5	6.4
9.Population Size[a]	- 01	17	.17	.14	.15	34†	41†	- 08			501,308.7	625,091.5
10.Percent Rental Housing 5+ units	- 05	29*	.24*	22*	- 10	27†	15	- 06	34†		27.3	13.3
11.Total Gender Inequality	- 02	- 20	- 11	-.26*	.46†	- 45†	- 02	-.23*	- 13	- 12	87.1	9.9

[a] Original metric shown. Natural log of the cities' populations used in the analysis.

* $p < .05$

† $p < .01$

Regression Analyses

In Table 16, the OLS estimates confirm that none of the variables in the model predict divorced SROK's. In addition, the direction of the associations appear in start contrast to the total model. For example, gender inequality appears positively related to divorced SROK's (β=.22), apparently indicating that cities in which men are economically disadvantaged relative to women are also likely to have more divorced women killing their ex-husbands than vice versa, and cities in which women are economically disadvantaged relative to men, divorced men are more likely to kill their ex-wives than vice versa.

Another contrast with the total model can be found in the inverse relationship between percent black and divorced SROK's (β=-.34), seeming to indicate that cities with larger numbers of blacks in the population also tend to be cities where divorced men kill more often than divorced women. Furthermore, the large β value signifying the relationship between Southernness and divorced SROK's (β=.34) apparently indicates that the more Southern cities tend to be cities in which divorced women kill their ex-husbands more than divorced women kill theirs. Both of these variables, although not statistically significant (due more than likely to sample size), are crude attempts to measure a group's culture.

Table 16. OLS Regression Estimates Predicting the Logged Divorced Sex Ratio of Intimate Killing in 55 U.S. Cities in 1990.

Structural Variables	b	s.e.	β
Mean Public Assistance	-.01	.01	-.15
Mean Per Capita Income	.00	.01	.00
Percent Age 15-34	2.60	4.78	.09
Percent Black	-5.13	3.35	-.34
Percent Hispanic	-8.12	2.16	-.07
Percent Puerto Rican	-14.03	16.59	-.16
Southern Index	1.67	1.04	.34
Population Size (ln)	.63	1.26	.10
Percent Rental Housing 5+units	-.12	1.25	-.02
Total Gender Inequality	-2.20	2.10	.22
Intercept	233.57	417.70	
R^2		.09	

b and s.e. are multiplied by 100.
F = .46
Significance of F = .906

Conclusion

The preceding analyses of relationship-specific sex ratios of intimate killing were prompted initially by curiosity about a subject in the criminological literature which has received little attention until recently. The few studies which have focussed on intimate killings, by type of intimacy, and sex ratios of intimate killing have not necessarily combined the same four relationship categories into the one category of intimate homicides. For example, Wilson and Daly (1992b) omit the rather large category (in terms of frequencies of killing) of girlfriend/boyfriend killings. They offer no justifications for having excluded what seems a logical and necessary category of intimate killing from the total.

As a precautionary measure, then, a factor analysis was performed early in the present study in order to determine if indeed the relationship categories "hang" together on one factor that might then be called the "total sex ratio of intimate killing". Interestingly, the factor analysis revealed three distinct loadings for married, divorced, and cohabitating SROK's while girl/boyfriend SROK's loaded low not only on a factor by itself but also low on the married and divorced factors. At this point, it was decided that relationship-specific

analyses were called for in order to try to determine if these relationship-specific ratios of killing were predicted by the same or different variables.

The results from the preceding analyses seem to indicate that generally the same variables predict relationship-specific SROK's as they do total SROK's, with some exceptions as noted (and with the rather stark contrasts in the divorced model possibly influenced by small sample size). Furthermore, all models account for only a small portion of the variance in SROK's, and thus each may be said to be underspecified. Underspecification leads to new questions such as those which ask why is it that the sex ratios tend to load separately under a factor analysis, indicating that cities in which one type of intimate SROK is found do not tend to also have many of the other types of intimate SROK's present during the same time period? If the variables included in the present analyses do not address this question adequately, as they apparently do not, then which variables will? Obviously, something non-random is occurring with regard to the distribution of relationship-specific SROK's across place, but what? These are questions which at present have no answers, but which future research must address.

At least two main findings in the preceding analyses deserve further mention: the changes in the direction of

relationships when analyses moved from bivariate to multivariate techniques, and the lack of an indirect relationship between sexual inequality and intimate killing. First, it is necessary to note that in all but the divorced model, gender inequality was positively correlated with sex ratios of killing in the zero-order correlation matrices, but inversely associated when multivariate analyses and controls were implemented. In the divorced model, zero-order correlations revealed that gender inequality was negatively correlated with sex ratios of divorced killing, but positively associated when OLS controls were in place. This suggested the possibility that another factor, or factors, were confounding the relationship between gender inequality and SROK's. Exploratory analyses revealed that only when both mean public assistance payments and percent black were controlled in the total model did the sign of the relationship between gender inequality and SROK's change.

At this point, the decision was made to explore for a possible interaction between the two suspect control variables. The results from that investigation are displayed in Table 17. When only welfare is considered, it still has significant predictive value; it is negatively associated with total SROK's, indicating that cities with higher welfare payments tend to have more male intimate

Table 17. OLS Regression Estimates with Interaction Effects Predicting the Logged Total Sex Ratio of Intimate Killing in 187 U.S. Cities in 1990.

Structural Variables	b	s.e.	β
Mean Public Assistance	-.26	.01	-.32†
Mean Per Capita Income	-.09	.00	-.28†
Percent Age 15-34	-.33	1.86	-.07
Percent Black	-12.72	1.79	-.25
Percent Hispanic	-14.15	.58	-.24**
Percent Puerto Rican	-15.29	2.22	-.06
Southern Index	-3.60	1.39	-.03
Population Size (ln)	-33.96	9.26	-.03
Percent Rental Housing 5+units	18.30	.75	.23**
Employed Males/100 females (MMPI)	-5.63	.42	-.12
Total Gender Inequality	-25.79	1.02	-.26**
Percent Households female-headed	-12.90	1.84	-.08
Mean Public Asst*Pct. Black	.01	.00	.54*
Intercept	9359.94	198.01	
R^2		.27	

b and s.e. are multiplied by 100.
* p < .10
** p < .05
† p < .01
F = 4.95
Significance of F = .000

killers than females. When only percent black is considered, although not significantly related to the dependent variable, it also is inversely associated, seeming to indicate that cities with higher black populations have more males than females engaging in intimate killing. Having only one or the other present in a city is insufficient to drive females to kill more intimate partners relative to males. However, Table 17 also reveals that indeed a significant interaction exists between mean welfare payments and percent black in a city. This interaction seems to reveal that when both variables occur together in a city, they have much stronger effects on total SROK's than either does when alone (β=.54). We can interpret the interaction to mean that when there are both higher welfare payments and higher proportions of blacks in a city's population, total SROK's of killing are biased in favor of females as intimate killers.

Turning now to the relationship-specific divorced model, because it was the only model which differed in direction from the total model with regard to the association between gender inequality and SROK's, analyses were performed in order to check for possible interaction effects here as well between average welfare payments and percent black. The results are presented in Table 18, and seem to indicate that no significant interaction is

Table 18. OLS Regression Estimates with Interaction Effects Predicting the Logged Divorced Sex Ratio of Intimate Killing in 55 U.S. Cities in 1990.

Structural Variables	b	s.e.	β
Mean Public Assistance	-.02	.01	-.29
Mean Per Capita Income	.00	.01	.01
Percent Age 15-34	3.00	4.80	.11
Percent Black	-2.34	4.37	-.47
Percent Hispanic	.50	1.27	-.08
Percent Puerto Rican	-13.46	16.62	-.15
Southern Index	-3.69	3.68	-.24
Population Size (ln)	-10.65	21.79	-.09
Percent Rental Housing 5+units	-.16	1.25	-.02
Total Gender Inequality	-1.98	2.11	.20
Mean Public Asst*Pct. Black	.00	.00	.78
Intercept	241.23	418.28	
R^2		.11	

b and s.e. are multiplied by 100.
F = .50
Significance of F = .893

present. Again, however, it is necessary to note that these estimates may be unreliable because of the smallness of the sample, which may explain why there are β values as large as .78 but which are still not significant.

Finally, in none of the analyses thus far has family disruption been a significant predictor of SROK's across cities, thus negating the possibility of an intervening causal link between sexual inequality and intimate killing. According to the OLS estimates in the total model (revised to include interaction effects in Table 17), however, race is a significant and direct predictor of sex ratios of intimate killing (via both the interaction between percent black and welfare payments, and percent Hispanic). This would seem to indicate that there is a need to further examine these SROK's, disaggregating by race, in order to try to determine what it is about the presence or absence of a particular ethnic group in cities that influences SROK's. Furthermore, it is necessary in order to try to determine what it is about cities that influences race-specific SROK's. To these questions we now turn.

Race-Specific Sex Ratios of Intimate Homicide

Descriptive Analyses

When homicides are disaggregated by race and relationship, it becomes apparent that there are differences

by both race and relationship in terms of relative frequencies of killing (see note 10). In Table 19, black killings make up the bulk of known victim-offender killings (66.2%) while Hispanic killings comprise the smallest portion (10.9%) and white killings round out the total with 23%. This same pattern holds true across aggregate relationship types as well, with black killings being the most frequent in both intimate and non-intimate exchanges (7.2% and 59%, respectively), followed by white killings (3.7% and 19.3%, respectively) and finally by Hispanic killings (.7% and 10.2%, respectively). Table 20 further disaggregates intimate killings by race and type of intimacy. This table confirms the general tendency noted in Table 19, with one exception: excluding divorced killings, blacks are more likely to kill their intimate partners than either whites or Hispanics. For divorced killings, whites are slightly more likely to kill their ex-spouses than are blacks or Hispanics (1.3% v. 1.1% and .1%, respectively). Furthermore, Table 20 reveals that both whites and Hispanics are more likely to kill their legal spouses than any other intimate relationship type; in fact, for both races, over 50% of their intimate killing occurs against spouses (643 out of 1126 and 110 out of 211, respectively). Black intimate killing, on the other hand, is more frequently located in the

Table 19. Frequency of Known Victim-Offender Killing by Race of Killer by Aggregate Relationship Type, U.S. 1988-92.

Relationship Type	Race of Killer: Black	White	Hispanic	Total
Intimate	2,201 (7.2%)	1,126 (3.7%)	211 (.7%)	3,538 (11.6%)
Non-Intimate	17,996 (59%)	5,879 (19.3%)	3,104 (10.2%)	26,979 (88.4%)
Total	20,197 (66.2%)	7,005 (23.0%)	3,315 (10.9%)	30,517 (100.1%)

Table 20. Frequency of Known Victim-Offender Killing by Race by Disaggregated Relationship Type, U.S. 1988-92.

Relationship Type	Race of Killer: Black	White	Hispanic	Total
Married	703 (19.9%)	643 (18.2%)	110 (3.1%)	1,456 (41.2%)
Divorced	38 (1.1%)	46 (1.3%)	5 (.1%)	89 (2.5%)
Cohabitating	349 (9.9%)	83 (2.3%)	33 (.9%)	465 (13.1%)
Girl/ Boyfriend	1,111 (31.4%)	354 (10.0%)	63 (1.8%)	1,528 (43.2%)
Total	2,201 (62.2%)	1,126 (31.8%)	211 (5.9%)	3,538 (100%)

girlfriend/boyfriend category than any other intimate relationship; just under 50% of all black intimate killings are of this type (1111 out of 2201).

Table 21 presents the race-specific sex ratios of killing for each intimate relationship type. Several observations deserve emphasis. First, the total sex ratio of killing for blacks is very close to gender equality in killing at 90, indicating that 90 black women kill their intimate partners for every 100 black men who kill theirs. Both white and Hispanic SROK's are dramatically lower, reflecting a high degree of inequality in killing between the sexes. For whites, only 31 women kill their intimate partners for every 100 men killing theirs. For Hispanics, the sex ratio is even lower: for every 100 men who kill, only 22 women do. In general, this pattern holds true across the specific relationship types, with blacks having higher sex ratios of killing than either whites or Hispanics. In only one instance do Hispanics not have the lowest SROK relative to whites and blacks: cohabitating killings. In this instance, whites have an SROK of only 22 to the Hispanic SROK of 27. In fact, cohabitating appears to be the most dangerous relationship type for male Hispanics, although all categories are still far more dangerous for Hispanic females than for males. For Hispanic females, the most dangerous relationship apparently

Table 21. Race-Specific Sex of Intimate Killer and Sex Ratio of Intimate Killing by Disaggregated Relationship Type, U.S. 1988-92.

Characteristics of Killers										
	Black			White			Hispanic			
Relationship Type	Male	Female	SROK	Male	Female	SROK	Male	Female	SROK	Total
Married	378 (10.7%)	325 (9.2%)	86	488 (13.8%)	155 (4.4%)	32	90 (2.5%)	20 (.6%)	22	1,456 (41.2%)
Divorced	24 (.7%)	14 (.4%)	58	35 (1.0%)	11 (.3%)	31	5 (.1%)	0 (0%)	0	89 (2.5%)
Cohabitating	153 (4.3%)	196 (5.5%)	128	68 (1.9%)	15 (.4%)	22	26 (.7%)	7 (.2%)	27	465 (13.1%)
Girl/ Boyfriend	602 (17.0%)	509 (14.4%)	85	266 (7.5%)	88 (2.5%)	33	52 (1.5%)	11 (.3%)	21	1,528 (43.2%)
Total	1,157 (32.7%)	1,044 (29.5%)	90	857 (24.2%)	269 (7.6%)	31	173 (4.9%)	38 (1.1%)	22	3,538 (100%)

is that of divorce, with an SROK of 0. An interesting pattern exists with regard to cohabitation: for both Hispanic and black males, cohabitating is the most dangerous relationship. In fact, for blacks, gender equality in killing is not only achieved, it is surpassed and becomes inequality with a female bias: the black cohabitating SROK is 128, indicating that for every 100 black men who kill their cohabitating partner, 128 black women kill theirs. Black women, on the other hand, are most at-risk by divorce, where only 58 women kill their ex-spouse for every 100 men who do. Contrasting this pattern with the SROK distribution for whites, another notable difference emerges: cohabitating is actually the safest relationship category for white males, and the most dangerous for white females (SROK=22), while girl/boyfriend relationships are the most dangerous for white men, and the safest for white women (SROK=33). Further variation in sex ratios of killing across race, relationship, and place are presented in Appendices C-I.

White Sex Ratios of Intimate Killing

Descriptive Analyses

To recall, Table 21 demonstrated that the total white sex ratio of killing across large U.S. cities is 31. In other words, 31 white women kill their intimate partners for every 100 men who kill theirs. In Table 22, further

Table 22. Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations of City-Level Structural Variables for White Model in 167 U.S. Cities in 1990.

Structural Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Mean	Std. Dev
1.White SROK											—	—
2.White Mean Public Assistance	-.32†										4,235.0	760.6
3.White Mean Per Capita Income	-.23†	.35†									16,797.1	4,117.0
4.Percent Whites Age 15-34	-.03	-.05	.07								34.1	3.6
5.Percent White	.06	-.11	-.16*	-.00							69.7	16.7
6.Southern Index	.20†	-.27†	.17*	-.07	-.14*						20.2	7.3
7.Population Size$_a$	.14*	-.07	.09	.07	-.38†	.026					356,794.4	674,050.6
8.Percent Rental Housing 5+units	-.00	.16*	.35†	.24†	-.23†	-.062	.34†				26.8	11.1
9.Employed White Males/ 100 White females (WMMPF)	-.07	.17*	.45†	.22†	-.10	.28†	.06	.16*			83.6	8.2
10.Total Gender Inequality	-.01	-.30†	.02	-.06	-.24†	-.15*	.06	.02	-.60†		87.2	9.0
11.White Gender Inequality	-.05	-.19†	-.01	.02	.28†	-.32†	-.09	.03	-.66†	.79†	83.7	8.0

$_a$ Original metric shown. Natural log of the cities' populations used in the analysis.

* $p < .05$

† $p < .01$

descriptive data are presented regarding city characteristics for the sample of cities in the white model. The mean for total gender inequality is only slightly larger (87.2) than for within-race gender inequality (83.7), suggesting that economic disadvantage for white women is slightly worse than for women in general. Only about 83 white women are employed for every 100 white men, but about 87 women in general are employed for every 100 men in general. In addition, the analysis reveals a lack of suitable marriage partners for white women, with only about 84 employed white men for every 100 white women. Neither of the zero-order correlations for total gender inequality or white gender inequality are significantly related to white sex ratios of intimate killing and both are contrary to expectations regarding the direction of the relationship (r=-.01 and -.05, respectively), indicating that cities in which females (white or in general) are economically disadvantaged to males (white or in general, white sex ratios of intimate killing may be biased in favor of females as killers. Furthermore, four of the situational controls (white mean public assistance, white mean per capita income, Southern Index, and city population) appear to be significantly correlated with white sex ratios of intimate killing (r -.32, -.23, .20, .14,

respectively). All but Southern Index were also significant in the total model.

Regression Analyses

Table 23 presents the OLS estimates for two separate models predicting the white sex ratio of intimate killing (see note 11). Each model examines the separate effect of inequality measures. Both models, however, identify the same four significant predictors of the white SROK: white mean public assistance payments, white per capita income, Southern Index, and city size. Neither total nor within-race gender inequality are significant predictors of white killing ratios, nor are they in the expected direction (β=-.02 and -.11, respectively), although the direction is consistent with the findings in the total model, suggesting that in cities in which conditions of relative economic disadvantage exist between the sexes, white or in general, white SROK's tend to favor the sex of the disadvantaged. On the other hand, white mean welfare payments and white per capita income are significantly predictive of white sex ratios of killing (β=-.19 and -.23, respectively, in model 1; β=-.21 and -.19, respectively, in model 2), indicating that cities with higher average white welfare payments and white per capita incomes tend to be cities in which white males kill their intimate partners more often relative to white females. In addition, city

Table 23. OLS Regression Estimates Predicting the Logged White Sex Ratio of Intimate Killing in 167 U.S. Cities in 1990.

Structural Variables	Model 1			Model 2		
	b	s.e.	β	b	s.e.	β
White Mean Public Assistance	-.03	.02	-.19*	-.03	.01	-.21**
White Mean Per Capita Income	-.01	.00	-.23**	-.01	.00	-.19*
Percent Whites Age 15-34	-1.76	2.88	-.05	-1.28	2.93	-.04
Percent White	.93	.74	.12	1.16	.69	.14
Southern Index	3.65	1.62	.20**	3.31	1.62	.18**
Population Size (ln)	28.24	14.80	.16*	27.57	14.67	.16*
Percent Rental Housing 5+units	1.25	1.03	.10	1.33	1.03	.11
Employed White Males/ 100 White females (WMMPF)	.01	2.06	.00	-1.20	2.18	-.07
Total Gender Inequality	-.23	1.88	-.02	—	—	—
White Gender Inequality	—	—	—	-1.81	2.16	-.11
Intercept	-337.37	426.99	—	-132.67	383.99	—
R^2	.18			.19		

b and s.e. are multiplied by 100.

* p < .10 F = 3.91 F = 4.00

** p < .05 Significance of F = .000 Significance of F = .000

size and city southernness are significantly, and positively, predictive of white SROK's (β=.16 and .20, respectively, in model 1; β=.16 and .18, respectively, in model 2), indicating that cities which are larger in size and more southern in composition are more likely to be cities in which white women kill more intimate partners relative to white men.

This latter finding is especially interesting because it lends support to much of the literature which has argued in favor of a southern subculture of violence, and apparently suggests that white women are only more violent relative to their men when they live in southern cities. The results do not appear to support a claim that racial culture is an important predictor of white SROK's, because percent white is a non-significant variable in the models, but rather, regional culture is an important variable. It may be that a regional subculture of violence levels the killing differences between white men and women which exist elsewhere. Still, neither white model explains more than a modest amount of the variance in white SROK's (R^2=.18 and .19, respectively), suggesting the models, although significant, remain underspecified.

Black Sex Ratios of Intimate Killing

Descriptive Analyses

Descriptive data on black SROK's in Table 21 demonstrated that the total black SROK across large U.S. cities is 90, indicating that for every 100 black men who kill their intimate partners, 90 black women do the same. In Table 24, further descriptive data are presented regarding city characteristics for the sample of cities in the black model. The mean for total gender inequality is slightly larger (88.6) than for between-race gender inequality (83.2), suggesting that economic disadvantage for black women relative to white men is slightly worse than for women's disadvantage to men in general. However, when within-race gender inequality is examined, a striking difference is found: the mean for black gender inequality is much higher than either total or between-race inequality (107.7), indicating that economic disadvantage for black men relative to black women is much worse than for white men relative to black women, or for men to women in general. There are approximately 108 employed black females for every 100 employed black males in this sample of cities, a gender bias which favors women over men, and which suggests a lack of suitable marriage partners for black women. As stated in the methods chapter, the black male marriage pool index was collinear with the inequality

Table 24. Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations of City Level Structural Variables for Black Model in 137 U.S. Cities in 1990.[a]

Structural Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	Mean	Std. Dev.
1.Black SROK												—	—
2.Black Mean Public Assistance	06											3,894.5	1,138.8
3.Black Mean Per Capita Income	09	45†										9,019.7	2,079.8
4.Percent Blacks Age 15-34	05	-.05	40†									36.1	3.9
5.Percent Black	-.18*	-.25†	-.28†	-.30†								25.4	17.1
6.Southern Index	-.00	-.50†	-.15*	10	18*							20.8	7.5
7.Segregation Index	-.14*	-.37†	-.61†	-.44†	54†	01						56.4	15.7
8.Population Size$_c$	-.11	03	-.03	-.12	08	-.04	41†					397,338.6	737,381.9
9.Percent Rental Housing 5+units	-.01	15*	.32†	.27†	-.05	-.07	01	.26†				27.8	11.9
10.Total Gender Inequality	-.16*	-.29†	-.28†	-.24†	.50†	-.15*	.46†	-.05	-.01			88.6	9.5
11.White-Black Gender Inequality	09	-.04	.65†	.57†	-.27†	15*	-.63†	-.22†	08	-.31†		83.2	7.6
12.Black Gender Inequality	-.14*	-.32†	-.36†	-.34†	.47†	-.08	.50†	-.07	-.05	75†	-.34†	107.7	14.9

[a] Black model used cities with populations of 5000 or more Blacks.

[c] Original metric shown. Natural log of the cities' populations used in the analysis.

* $p < .05$

† $p < .01$

measures, further supporting such a claim, but requiring removal of the index from the analysis.

The zero-order correlation between total gender inequality and black SROK's is significant, but contrary to the expected direction (r=-.16), indicating that an association exists between male economic disadvantage and black SROK's where the SROK's are biased in favor of black males as killers. Furthermore, the correlation for between-race gender inequality is non-significant, but in the predicted direction (r=.09), indicating that cities in which black women are employed at higher rates than white men, black SROK's favor black females as killers. Within-race inequality is also significantly correlated with black SROK's, but as with total gender inequality, in a direction contrary to expectations (r=-.14), seeming to indicate that black females are likely to kill more relative to black males in cities where black women are economically disadvantaged to black men. Only two situational controls appear significantly correlated with black SROK's: percent black (r=-.18), and the Index of Dissimilarity (r=-.14), apparently suggesting that in cities where there are larger black populations and in cities where there is a high degree of racial residential segregation, black men tend to kill their intimate partners more than vice versa.

Regression Analyses

Table 25 presents the OLS estimates for the black model, none of which turn out to be significant predictors of the black sex ratio of intimate killing, in spite of the significant zero-order correlations. Apparently, gender inequality does not have an important effect on SROK's when situational controls are applied. So, although the total model, (in Table 5) indicated that the percent of a city which is black is positively predictive of total SROK's, this seems not to be true when considering only black SROK's.

In addition, race-specific city-level characteristics provide no further clues about why percent black is important in the total model. We simply know, on the basis of the descriptive data in Table 21 that, on average, black women are more dangerous (relative to black men) than either white or Hispanic women (relative to white and Hispanic men). The results in Table 25, so far as they do not support a structural explanation of black SROK's, do pose at least one alternative explanation, based in part on the findings regarding white SROK's in Table 23. In other words, since structural variables do not explain what it is about percent black that predicts intimate killing, perhaps cultural variables do. However, the

Table 25. OLS Regression Estimates Predicting the Logged Black Sex Ratio of Intimate Killing in 137 U.S. Cities in 1990.

Structural Variables	b	s.e.	β
Black Mean Public Assistance	-.00	.00	-.04
Black Mean Per Capita Income	.00	.00	.08
Percent Blacks Age 15-34	-1.51	3.79	-.05
Percent Black	-.91	.88	-.12
Southern Index	-.00	1.92	-.00
Segregation Index	.47	1.40	.06
Population Size (ln)	-23.35	17.67	-.15
Percent Rental Housing 5+units	.11	1.09	.01
Total Gender Inequality	-1.33	1.89	-.10
White-Black Gender Inequality	-.33	2.63	-.02
Black Gender Inequality	-.47	1.20	-.06
Intercept	512.97	399.15	
R^2		.05	

b and s.e. are multiplied by 100.
F = .66
Significance of F = .77

Southern Index is also not significantly related to black SROK's, making such an argument somewhat more difficult.

Still, it is possible to argue that percent black is actually a surrogate measure for southern culture in that almost all blacks in the U.S. have roots in the South. Consequently, blacks may be carrying the southern tradition of female violence with them, though not necessarily living in southern cities any longer. Still, most blacks are probably little more than a generation removed from the South Smith 1974), since 80% of blacks were living in the South only as recently as 1930 (Guttentag and Secord 1983, p. 211). This could explain, in part, why the Southern Index fails to be a significant predictor of black intimate violence (see note 12).

However, even if there is some validity to the regional culture argument, the crude measure of percent black does not capture the notion of either southern or black culture completely, for the model is still underspecified. Numerous other variables not addressed in the present research could also be important: for example, the effects of social isolation, ghetto life experiences, and being a member of the underclass may all figure prominently in the explanation of black intimate killing ratios.

Hispanic Sex Ratios of Intimate Killing

Descriptive Analyses

In Table 21, the total Hispanic SROK across large U.S. cities is 22; for every 100 Hispanic men who kill their intimate partners, only 22 Hispanic women act in similar manners. This SROK score is the furthest of any racial group from sexual equality in killing, or the nearest of any to the pattern of sexual stratification of homicide in general. In Table 26, further descriptive statistics are presented regarding the characteristics of the 43 cities in the Hispanic sample. The mean for total gender inequality is somewhat small (80.8) than for between-race gender inequality (89.3), suggesting that economic disadvantage for Hispanic women relative to white men is slightly better than for women's disadvantage to men in general. Only about 81 women in general are employed for every 100 men in general, but about 89 Hispanic women are employed to every 100 white men. However, within-race gender inequality is a much different story. The mean Hispanic gender inequality is much lower than either total or between-race gender inequality (68.1), indicating that the economic advantage for Hispanic men relative to Hispanic women in this sample is much better than for white men relative to Hispanic women, or for men in general relative to women in general. There are only

Table 26. Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations of City-Level Structural Variables for Hispanic Model in 43 U.S. Cities in 1990.[a]

Structural Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	Mean	Std. Dev.
1.Hispanic SROK												—	—
2.Hispanic Mean Public Assistance	04											4,687.9	1,630.0
3.Hispanic Mean Per Capita Income	- 05	03										8,630.4	2,497.1
4.Percent Hispanics Age 15-34	- 11	- 08	33*									41.5	4.1
5.Percent Hispanic	09	11	- 47†	- 13								25.4	15.4
6.Percent Puerto Rican	- 25*	.38†	197	- 05	05							5	3
7.Southern Index	- 02	- 74†	- 09	.24	- 04	- 32*						22.0	3.1
8.Population Size,	- 05	- 03	- 28*	- 03	22	- 20	11					418,158.3	587,789.4
9.Percent Rental Housing 5+ units	- 06	.06	.21	.36*	- 16	05	18	.27*				29.4	16.2
10.Total Gender Inequality	- 13	- 40†	23	03	- 55†	- 06	38†	- 14	36†			80.8	7.2
11.White-Hispanic Gender Inequality	- 02	- 30*	31*	.28*	.035	04	23	- 25	10	.02		89.3	5.1
12.Hispanic Gender Inequality	02	- 34*	55†	- 17	- 23	- 08	10	- 11	04	.44†	.21†	68.1	12.2

[a] Hispanic model used cities with populations of 5000 or more Hispanics.

[b] Original metric shown. Natural log of the cities' populations used in the analysis.

* $p < .05$

† $p < .01$

approximately 68 employed Hispanic women for every 100 employed Hispanic men, a gender bias which favors men over women, and which suggests a surplus of suitable marriage partners for Hispanic women. As noted in an earlier chapter, the Hispanic male marriage pool index was collinear with the measures of gender inequality (which actually strengthens the claim that the data are suggestive of a male surplus) and therefore the index was omitted from the analysis.

The zero-order correlations reveal that only one situational control, percent Puerto Rican, is significantly associated with Hispanic sex ratios of intimate killing (r=-.25). Apparently, the higher a city's population of Puerto Ricans, the more likely Hispanic males will kill their intimate partners relative to Hispanic women. No other zero-order correlations attain significance, although within-race gender inequality is in the predicted direction (r=.02) suggesting that those cities in which Hispanic women are at a relative economic disadvantage compared to Hispanic men may tend to experience a bias in Hispanic SROK's in favor of Hispanic females as killers. The various measures of gender inequality also do not achieve significance, nor are they even in the predicted direction.

Regression Analyses

When OLS controls are applied, as in Table 27, the only significant predictor of Hispanic SROK's is percent Puerto Rican (β=-.34), which remains in the same direction as noted in the discussion of the zero-order correlations. No measures of inequality predict Hispanic SROK's either. However, caution should be used in dismissing the structural link too quickly, due to the very small number of cities in the sample (N=43). Still, it is interesting to note that percent Puerto Rican is inversely predictive of Hispanic SROK's, while percent Hispanic (although not significant) is positively related to the Hispanic SROK. The fewer Hispanics in a city, the more likely the Hispanic SROK is biased in favor of males as killers, but the fewer Puerto Ricans in a city, the more likely the Hispanic SROK is biased in favor of females as killers. What is it about the Puerto Rican culture in large U.S. cities that influences intimate killing in such a direction? Unfortunately, the present model with its structural variables does not reveal the answer to that question.

Conclusion

The foregoing analyses of race-specific sex ratios of killing were prompted initially by the deficiency of these types of analysis in the criminological literature. The few studies which have focussed on intimate killing, by

Table 27. OLS Regression Estimates Predicting the Logged Hispanic Sex Ratio of Intimate Killing in 43 U.S. Cities in 1990.

Structural Variables	b	s.e.	β
Hispanic Mean Public Assistance	.01	.00	.15
Hispanic Mean Per Capita Income	.00	.01	.03
Percent Hispanics Age 15-34	-4.17	5.95	- 16
Percent Hispanic	.34	1 72	05
Percent Puerto Rican	-111.33	63.37	- 34*
Southern Index	3.55	9 61	10
Population Size (ln)	-23 12	25.34	- 19
Percent Rental Housing 5+units	77	1.56	12
Total Gender Inequality	-3.04	4.34	- 21
Hispanic-White Gender Inequality	- .41	4.36	- 02
Hispanic Gender Inequality	.61	2.60	07
Intercept	435.51	823.33	
R^2		.14	

b and s.e. are multiplied by 100.
* p < .10
F = .47
Significance of F = .906

race, and sex ratios of these killings either did not classify as "intimate" the same four relationships used in this study, or they did not examine race-specific SROK's across a large number of communities, or they did not attempt to use structural variables to explain the variance in the ratios (e.g., Block 1992; Wilson and Daly 1992). This portion of the present study was undertaken in order to compensate for this inadequacy in the research on SROK's.

The race-specific findings seem to indicate that generally, the same variables which predict total and relationship-specific sex ratios of intimate killing do not also predict race-specific SROK's. In fact, although race is a significant predictor of total SROK's, it is significant in only one race-specific SROK: percent Puerto Rican is negatively associated with Hispanic sex ratios of intimate homicide. Furthermore, all measures of gender inequality are unimportant in predicting any race-specific SROK. In addition, very few control variables seem to have a substantial influence on racially disaggregated sex ratios of killing.

CHAPTER FIVE

DISCUSSION

The previous analyses suggest four main findings for the present study. First, family disruption has no appreciable effect on any of the intimate homicide sex ratios. These results cast doubt on the theory that weakened community institutions, such as the family, fail to effectively control the behavior of community members and ultimately contribute to variation in sex ratios of intimate violence in the community. In actuality, this theory has been questioned in the past as to its ability to adequately explain adult behavior, while recent community level research has demonstrated that in fact weakened community controls do seem to have a much stronger effect on juvenile than adult criminal behavior (Shihadeh and Steffensmeier 1994). The present study seems to confirm, then, that community controls play only a minor role in shaping the overwhelmingly adult behavior of intimate homicide, nor do they seem to serve as an indirect link between gender stratification in a community and that community's sex ratios of intimate killing.

Second, although gender inequality has no detectable indirect effects on SROK's via family disruption, it has substantial direct effects. The direct coefficients for gender inequality are significant for two of the four

intimate killing relationships (the exceptions are cohabitating and divorced SROK's). However, the measure approaches significance in the cohabitating model, and the small sample for the divorced model may have produced unreliable results. Furthermore, the coefficient for gender inequality in the total model, which aggregates the intimate killing relationships into one general sex ratio of killing, is also significant.

These findings are consistent with the more traditional, albeit individual-level, criminological theory that economic inequality directly affects crimes of violence by demoralizing the class of persons who are economically deprived relative to others (Blau and Blau 1982). At the structural level, however, this research shows only that intimate killing takes place in the context of gender inequality in communities, but whether those who actually kill are indeed frustrated and demoralized remains to be seen. At present, no claim can be made that those who kill are also those who are economically disadvantaged. The present research seems to suggest only that individual problems may be exacerbated under community conditions of gender inequality. In such circumstances, everyone in the community may have less of an investment in the social institutions of the community. Furthermore, conditions of gender inequality seem to change the opportunity structure

for this type of killing. For example, males seem to become less valued when their social capital is lower in communities with high rates of female-to-male employment while females seem to be valued less when their social capital is lower in communities with low rates of female-to-male employment.

Third, although economic inequality is linked to intimate violence, the association is not in the predicted direction. A number of criminologists have argued on behalf of the theory that a general behavioral and psychological convergence has occurred between men and women in the U.S. as traditional sex roles have declined, including an increase in "male-like" criminality by women (e.g., Adler 1975; Nettler 1978; Hagan, Simpson and Gillis 1987). Female employment certainly breaks with traditional sex roles, but the present research offers substantial evidence that communities experiencing high rates of such a break actually <u>decrease</u> (rather than increase) in female involvement in intimate killing, relative to male employment and male intimate killing. In other words, the context of economic inequality seems an important influence <u>regardless of the gender of the economically deprived class</u>. It may be the relative lack of employment from one gender to another, in an era when cultural ideals emphasize employment for <u>both</u> women and men, that provokes

intimate violence of one type or another in a community. Again, no claim is being made that it is the same individuals who are economically deprived who also kill, only that conditions of inequality in employment correspond in marked ways to intimate killing ratios.

Thus, this research seems to demonstrate that when there are high levels of gender inequality in a community's workforce, and that inequality is biased in favor of males, female rates of intimate killing may increase relative to males. On the other hand, when gender inequality in the workforce is biased in favor of females, male rates of intimate killing may increase relative to females.

Fourth, the variables which predict total and relationship-specific SROK's generally do not seem able to also predict racially disaggregated sex ratios of intimate killing. Although race appears important in the total model, for example, the race-specific models were unable to provide much clue as to why that is true. Elaborate measures of race-specific gender inequality proved useless in explaining SROK's, and in fact, the relative size of the coefficients suggests that of all three measures, total gender inequality (not racially specific) is a better predictor of race-specific SROK's than either between or within-race gender inequality.

Although there is some debate in the sociological literature regarding the existence of a Southern regional "culture of violence", there is also some support (e.g., Gastil 1971; Reed 1982; Bankston et al. 1985; Bankston et al. 1990). Culture is, of course, an inferred effect and something which can only be measured indirectly via yardsticks such as percent white, black, Hispanic and/or southern region - all variables which at their best are only crude gauges for culture. Still, the Southern culture of violence thesis suggests that the South possesses higher rates of homicide because of a unique tradition which values the use of violence in disputes, particularly those defined as disputes of honor. Furthermore, the thesis implies that where a culture of violence is present, the rate of homicide should be higher for all affected races than is the case where it is not (Franklin 1956, Pp. 36-37).

When applying such an argument to <u>sex ratios</u> of killing, the implication is that Southern culture levels gender differences in violence. This implication seems to find support in the white model, which appears to suggest that white women living in large Southern cities are more dangerous relative to men than white women living in large cities elsewhere.

In addition, speculation regarding the findings in the black model suggests further support for this conclusion, if percent black is conceived as a surrogate measure for Southern culture, since almost all U.S. blacks have a Southern heritage (Smith 1974). Black females, then, may be acting in tradition with their Southern heritage of female violence, consequently offering at least one explanation of why black SROK's are higher across large U.S. cities: they are biased in favor of black females as killers because the Southern culture of violence levels gender differences in killing. Reed (1982, p. 146) has suggested the following, which, when applied to the current research, offers a thoughtful conclusion:

> If Southern violence were due simply to a lack of social control, we would expect the most violence from those who are the least well socialized, those who have not learned to want to do what they are supposed to do. A cultural explanation means the opposite: the best socialized, those who understand what is expected of them, will be violent sometimes, because sometimes, violence is what is expected.

CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS

The purpose of this study was to gain some understanding as to why sex ratios of killing vary across intimate relationships, race, and ultimately - place. The central question was: what is it about some places that drives more women to kill their partners than men to kill theirs, and vice versa? In seeking answers to this question, the present study built on recent research in the subjects of communities and crime (Sampson 1987; Harer and Steffensmeier 1992; Shihadeh and Steffensmeier 1994) and sex ratios of intimate killing (Wilson and Daly 1992b; Block 1992).

This research examined the importance of family disruption and the direct and indirect effects of gender inequality in communities on various relationship and race specific sex ratios of intimate killing. The results of the analyses reveal that the indirect effects of gender inequality on relationship-specific SROK's are negligible, but the independent direct effects are considerable. Contrary to much of the literature, higher female-to-male employment in a community does not seem to give women as a group the "power to kill". Rather, in the context of gender inequality, violence in such communities tends to favor the group which is also, on the whole, economically

deprived. The results also seem to reveal that neither the direct nor indirect effects of gender inequality on race-specific SROK's are significant, but Southern region/culture has a direct and positive association for white SROK's.

It is necessary to note the possibility that the research presented here may err in the interpretation of statistical significance with regard to the direction of the causal arrow. Certainly it is imaginable that the sex ratio of killing influences the level of inequality between gender groups in a community. However, there is very little logic to this reversal: if high rates of men killing women occur in a community, why would that make men as a group more economically disadvantaged? Because logic seems absent from such a conclusion, the findings were interpreted with the causal inference proceedirg in the opposite direction only.

A number of implications may be drawn from the findings of this research. First, these results emphasize the need to disaggregate general homicide rates when engaging in homicide research because the overall rates mask startling differences in the gender stratification of violent crime when relationships of victims to offenders are considered. Future research should therefore be careful

to disaggregate homicide rates into more meaningful and consistent behavioral/relationship categories.

Second, although recent studies have emphasized the importance of considering indirect effects of key predictive variables (e.g., Shihadeh and Steffensmeier 1994), the search for direct effects should not be completely abandoned, since some may have strong effects on intimate, if not on general, violence. The focus on explaining general violence, and the failure to empirically link inequality with it, has led to misleading generalizations regarding inequality and intimate violence.

Third, because gender inequality seems to have no apparent effect on race-specific sex ratios of intimate killing, and few race-specific key sociological variables seem explanatory either, future research should seek to better specify the race-specific models. For example, if black SROK's are indeed influenced by Southern heritage, it may be possible to construct an Index of Southernness that is less biased against blacks. Furthermore, race effects may be confounding the effect of regional culture in the total model as well. Again, a better, or race-specific Index of Southernness might reduce the severity of this problem.

Finally, future analyses might concentrate on what role "self-help" social control plays, if any, in the

variation of sex ratios of killing. Black (1983) has argued that in communities where formal legal institutions do not (or cannot) function adequately, because they are considered either inappropriate or unavailable, residents in the community may be more inclined to "help" themselves and/or each other by using lethal responses to perceived wrongs. The question would be, then, do sex ratios of intimate killing vary in the context of inadequate formal legal responses? Does one gender or another tend to respond more violently in such a context? And how, if at all, does gender inequality relate to the response? There may be an indirect relationship of inequality to intimate killing, mediated by legal response. Future research might seek to explore this possibility.

NOTES

1. This research contains 8 different models and each model produced a different sample size. The total model, which included only a selection for city size (100,000+ residents) yielded a sample of 187 cities. The relationship-specific models included 173 cities (married killing), 163 cities (girl/boyfriend killing), 97 cities (cohabitating killing), and 55 cities (divorced killing). The race-specific models included a selection for 5000+ blacks in the black model, yielding 137 cities and a selection for 5000+ hispanics in the hispanic model, yielding 43 cities. The white model included 167 cities. The black and hispanic selections were made in order to insure a large enough ethnic population in question to constitute a "community" of, for example, hispanics, where presumably an ethnic subculture has formed.

2. All descriptive analyses will use original metrics of the sex ratios of killing, but regression analyses will use the natural logs of the ratios in order to reduce skewness.

3. Where female to male ratios of killing include values of zero in the numerator or denominator, those cities received replacement of respectively either the lowest or highest ratio score for that series of ratios. This transformation is justified on the grounds that a 0:N or N:0 ratio is very meaningful, albeit mathematically problematic. When fewer women kill intimates than men, a low sex ratio of killing results, and therefore by setting the 0:N ratio equal to the lowest real ratio a measurement of the inequality of killing is still obtained on the grounds that negative infinity is in fact what the 0:N ratio represents. In other words, I simply bounded the ratios. Likewise, a ratio of N:0 is very meaningful and setting the ratio equal to the highest real ratio gives a measure of the disproportionate killing by women compared to men. Unfortunately, bounding the ratios artificially lowered the variance in SROK's by place by making places that are very different essentially the same. For example, a city that has a total of 40 wives killing husbands, and no husbands killing wives is very different from another city which has 2 wives killing husbands, and no husbands killing wives. Yet, using the method described above, both cities would receive the maximum ratio score for their series of SROK's. Future analyses might focus on eliminating such bias without losing valuable data in the process. Ratios of 0:0 were dropped from the analysis.

4. The welfare variable is, by necessity, a total measure of public assistance, rather than simply a measure of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). However, DeFronzo (1983) reported an extremely high correlation (.87) between the two, and consequently I use the total measure as a proxy for AFDC.

5. The models predicting percent female-headed households were estimated but not reported because all models predicting sex ratios of killing demonstrated a non-significant effect by percent female-headed households on the dependent variable. Consequently, only direct effects were examined in the present analyses. Also, sex ratio of the city was omitted from the total and relationship-specific models due to multicollinearity problems.

6. Sex ratio of the city, and percent white female-headed households were omitted from the model because of multicollinearity problems.

7. Sex ratio of the city, black male marriage pool index, and percent black female-headed households were omitted from the model because of multicollinearity problems.

8. Sex ratio of the city, hispanic male marriage pool index, and hispanic female-headed households were omitted from the model because of multicollinearity problems.

9. Male marriage pool index and percent female-headed households were omitted due to multicollinearity problems. However, a separate analysis was executed in order to determine if the percent of female-headed households is a significant predictor of divorced SROK's, and it is not. Consequently, the analysis excludes these two variables.

10. All racially-specific analyses utilize only known victim-offender relationships of intra-racial character, consequently column and row totals differ from those in which race disaggregation is absent. For example, in the period 1988-92 there were a total of 59,307 homicides known to the police, but only 33,974 of those involved known victim-offender relationships, and of those 30,517 were intra-racial in character.

11. Two separate models were necessary in order to test the effects of total gender inequality and white gender inequality because of collinearity problems between the two variables. The two models are essentially presented as a heuristic device, to illustrate the fact that the two variables appear to be measuring the same thing, and that

omitting variables as I have throughout this research does not seriously compromise the results.

12. In fact, Gastil (1978) admits his Southernness Index does not reflect patterns of black, but rather white, southern migration. Consequently, use of his Index may have distorted the true relationship between southern culture and black sex ratios of killing. If this is so, it also explains the modest zero-order correlation between percent black and Southern Index. Were the Index better constructed, the two should be highly correlated with one another, but because the Index has a white bias, percent black must serve as a surrogate measure for the South and Southern culture.

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APPENDIX A. INDEX OF SOUTHERNESS

City-State Location	Index Score	City-State Location	Index Score
Alabama	30	Kansas	20
Arkansas	30	Maryland	20
Georgia	30	Missouri	20
Kentucky	30	Nevada	20
Louisiana	30	Ohio	20
Mississippi	30	Idaho	15
North Carolina	30	Michigan	15
Tennessee	30	Oregon	15
Virginia	30	Washington	15
Arizona	25	Iowa	10
Florida	25	Nebraska	10
New Mexico	25	New Jersey	10
Oklahoma	25	New York	10
Texas	25	Pennsylvania	10
Arkansas	20	Utah	10
California	20	Connecticut	5
Colorado	20	Maryland	5
Washington, D.C.	20	Minnesota	5
Hawaii	20	Rhode Island	5
Illinois	20	South Dakota	5
Indiana	20	Wisconsin	5

APPENDIX B. RANK-ORDER TOTAL SEX RATIOS OF KILLING ACROSS PLACE

Place	SROK	Place	SROK	Place	SROK
Fort Lauderdale, FL	433	Chula Vista, CA	100	Dayton, OH	[illegible]
Cedar Rapids, IA	433	Escondido, CA	100	Detroit, MI	[illegible]
Ann Arbor, MI	433	Waterbury, CT	100	Norfolk, VA	[illegible]
Omaha, NE	433	Hollywood, FL	100	Fort Worth, TX	[illegible]
Lincoln, NE	433	Tampa, FL	100	Cleveland, OH	[illegible]
Lansing, MI	[illegible]	Peoria, IL	100	Houston, TX	[illegible]
Springfield, MO	[illegible]	Rockford, IL	100	New Orleans, LA	[illegible]
Huntsville, AL	[illegible]	Warren, MI	[illegible]	Toledo, OH	[illegible]
Jersey City, NJ	[illegible]	Raleigh, NC	[illegible]	Columbus, OH	[illegible]
Paterson, NJ	[illegible]	Albany, NY	[illegible]	Spokane, WA	[illegible]
Erie, PA	[illegible]	Akron, OH	[illegible]	Anchorage, AK	[illegible]
Flint, MI	[illegible]	Allentown, PA	[illegible]	St. Louis, MO	[illegible]
Jackson, MS	[illegible]	Pasadena, TX	[illegible]	Charlotte, NC	[illegible]
Irving, TX	[illegible]	Alexandria, VA	[illegible]	Mesa, AZ	[illegible]
Abilene, TX	[illegible]	Virginia Beach, VA	[illegible]	Macon, GA	[illegible]
Montgomery, AL	[illegible]	Milwaukee, WI	[illegible]	Portsmouth, VA	[illegible]
Ontario, CA	[illegible]	Chicago, IL	[illegible]	Sacramento, CA	[illegible]
Jacksonville, FL	[illegible]	Louisville, KY	[illegible]	Columbus, GA	[illegible]
Knoxville, TN	[illegible]	Gary, IN	[illegible]	Birmingham, AL	[illegible]
Indianapolis, IN	[illegible]	Shreveport, LA	[illegible]	Aurora, CO	[illegible]
Memphis, TN	114	Atlanta, GA	[illegible]	Denver, CO	[illegible]
Mobile, AL	[illegible]	Oakland, CA	[illegible]	Miami, FL	[illegible]
Tulsa, OK	[illegible]	Rochester, NY	[illegible]	Evansville, IN	[illegible]
Pasadena, CA	[illegible]	Waco, TX	[illegible]	Topeka, KS	[illegible]

(table con'd.)

Place	SROK	Place	SROK	Place	SROK
Kansas City, KS	67	Long Beach, CA	50	Bridgeport, CT	33
St. Paul, MN	67	Wichita, KS	50	Springfield, IL	33
Elizabeth, NJ	67	Salem, OR	50	Grand Rapids, MI	33
Reno, NV	67	Mesquite, TX	50	Greensboro, NC	33
Portland, OR	67	Las Vegas, NV	49	Syracuse, NY	33
Beaumont, TX	67	Washington, D.C.	48	Pittsburgh, PA	33
Chesapeake, VA	67	Minneapolis, MN	44	Nashville-Davidson, TN	33
Newport News, VA	67	Boston, MA	43	New York, NY	31
Little Rock, AR	64	San Antonio, TX	42	Corpus Christi, TX	31
Durham, NC	63	Los Angeles, CA	41	El Paso, TX	30
Albuquerque, NM	63	Tucson, AZ	40	Richmond, VA	30
Bakersfield, CA	60	Pomona, CA	40	Oceanside, CA	29
Inglewood, CA	60	Hartford, CT	40	Hampton, VA	29
Garland, TX	60	New Haven, CT	40	Salt Lake City, UT	
Baltimore, MD	57	Oklahoma City, OK	40	Hayward, CA	28
Amarillo, TX	57	Austin, TX	38	San Francisco, CA	28
Lubbock, TX	56	San Diego, CA	38	Vallejo, CA	28
Philadelphia, PA	54	Phoenix, AZ	38	Colorado Springs, CO	26
San Jose, CA	54	Lexington - Fayette, KY	38	Savannah, GA	25
Dallas, TX	53	San Bernardino, CA	36	Fort Wayne, IN	25
Cincinnati, OH	52	Buffalo, NY	36	Arlington, TX	25
Newark, NJ	52	Torrance, CA	33	Baton Rouge, LA	24
Tempe, AZ	51	Santa Ana, CA	33	Fresno, CA	21
Glendale, CA	51	Moreno Valley, CA	33	Glendale, AZ	20

(table con'd.)

Place	SROK	Place	SROK
Berkeley, CA	[illegible]	Oxnard, CA	[illegible]
Stamford, CT	[illegible]	Thousand Oaks, CA	[illegible]
Winston-Salem, NC	[illegible]	Simi Valley, CA	[illegible]
Arlington, VA	[illegible]	Lakewood, Co	[illegible]
Stockton, CA	[illegible]	Tallahassee, FL	[illegible]
Kansas City, MO	[illegible]	Orlando, FL	[illegible]
Huntington Beach, CA	[illegible]	Boise City, ID	[illegible]
Honolulu, HI	[illegible]	Overland Park, KS	[illegible]
Scottsdale, AZ	[illegible]	Springfield, MA	[illegible]
Fremont, CA	[illegible]	Worcester, MA	[illegible]
Concord, CA	[illegible]	Sterling Heights, MI	[illegible]
Santa Clarita, CA	[illegible]	Independence, MO	[illegible]
Salinas, CA	[illegible]	Yonkers, NY	[illegible]
Fullerton, CA	[illegible]	Eugene, OR	[illegible]
Garden Grove, CA	[illegible]	Providence, RI	[illegible]
Orange, CA	[illegible]	Sioux Falls, SD	[illegible]
Irvine, CA	[illegible]	Plano, TX	[illegible]
Riverside, CA	[illegible]	Laredo, TX	[illegible]
Rancho Cucamonga, CA	[illegible]	Tacoma, WA	[illegible]
Sunnyvale, CA	[illegible]	Madison, WI	[illegible]
Santa Rosa, CA	[illegible]	Anaheim, CA	[illegible]
Modesto, CA	[illegible]		

APPENDIX C. RANK-ORDER MARRIED SEX RATIOS OF KILLING ACROSS PLACE

Place	SROK	Place	SROK	Place	SROK
Montgomery, AL	300	Beaumont, TX	133	Tucson, AZ	[illegible]
Fort Lauderdale, FL	300	Shreveport, LA	133	Garland, TX	[illegible]
Jacksonville, FL	300	Oakland, CA	117	Atlanta, GA	[illegible]
Macon, GA	300	Memphis, TN	114	Houston, TX	[illegible]
Cedar Rapids, IA	300	Bakersfield, CA	100	Birmingham, AL	[illegible]
Rockford, IL	300	Inglewood, CA	100	Little Rock, AR	[illegible]
Flint, MI	300	Pasadena, CA	100	Bridgeport, CT	[illegible]
Ann Arbor, MI	[illegible]	Huntington Beach, CA	100	Wichita, KS	[illegible]
Reno, NV	[illegible]	New Haven, CT	100	Minneapolis, MN	[illegible]
Rochester, NY	[illegible]	Evansville, IN	[illegible]	Durham, NC	[illegible]
Gary, IN	[illegible]	Indianapolis, IN	[illegible]	Amarillo, TX	[illegible]
Virginia Beach, VA	[illegible]	Springfield, MO	[illegible]	Louisville, KY	[illegible]
Ontario, CA	[illegible]	Greensboro, NC	[illegible]	Anchorage, AK	[illegible]
Jackson, MS	[illegible]	Elizabeth, NJ	[illegible]	Albuquerque, NM	[illegible]
Akron, OH	[illegible]	Erie, PA	100	Lubbock, TX	[illegible]
Raleigh, NC	[illegible]	Allentown, PA	100	Sacramento, Ca	[illegible]
Waco, TX	[illegible]	Chesapeake, VA	100	Newark, NJ	[illegible]
Warren, MI	[illegible]	Cleveland, OH	86	Huntsville, AL	[illegible]
Omaha, NE	[illegible]	Fort Worth, TX	[illegible]	Glendale, CA	[illegible]
Irving, TX	[illegible]	Charlotte, NC	[illegible]	Pomona, CA	[illegible]
Abilene, TX	[illegible]	Detroit, MI	[illegible]	Chula Vista, CA	[illegible]
Newport News, VA	[illegible]	Mobile, AL	[illegible]	Stockton, CA	[illegible]
Columbus, GA	[illegible]	Chicago, IL	[illegible]	Vallejo, CA	[illegible]
Tulsa, OK	[illegible]	Baltimore, MD	[illegible]	Aurora, CO	[illegible]

(table con'd.)

Place	SROK	Place	SROK	Place	SROK
Lexington - Fayette, KY	[illegible]	Cincinnati, OH	36	Honolulu, HI	[illegible]
Jersey City, NJ	[illegible]	Long Beach, CA	33	Washington, D.C.	[illegible]
Columbus, OH	[illegible]	Grand Rapids, MI	33	Salt Lake City, UT	[illegible]
Salem, OR	[illegible]	St. Louis, MO	33	Scottsdale, AZ	[illegible]
Knoxville, TN	[illegible]	Syracuse, NY	33	Tempe, AZ	[illegible]
Pasadena, TX	[illegible]	Portland, OR	33	Berkeley, CA	[illegible]
Arlington, VA	[illegible]	El Paso, TX	31	Fremont, CA	[illegible]
Hampton, VA	[illegible]	Oklahoma City, OK	[illegible]	Hayward, CA	[illegible]
Norfolk, VA	[illegible]	San Jose, CA	[illegible]	Concord, CA	[illegible]
Portsmouth, VA	[illegible]	Baton Rouge, LA	[illegible]	Fresno, CA	[illegible]
Richmond, VA	[illegible]	Austin, TX	[illegible]	Santa Clarita, CA	[illegible]
Spokane, WA	[illegible]	Dallas, TX	[illegible]	Torrance, CA	[illegible]
Phoenix, AZ	[illegible]	Glendale, AZ	[illegible]	Salinas, CA	[illegible]
New Orleans, LA	[illegible]	Los Angeles, CA	[illegible]	Fullerton, CA	[illegible]
San Antonio, TX	[illegible]	Santa Ana, CA	[illegible]	Garden Grove, CA	[illegible]
Milwaukee, WI	[illegible]	Savannah, GA	[illegible]	Orange, CA	[illegible]
San Diego, CA	[illegible]	Winston-Salem, NC	[illegible]	Irvine, CA	[illegible]
Mesa, AZ	[illegible]	Corpus Christi, TX	[illegible]	Riverside, CA	[illegible]
Toledo, OH	[illegible]	Oceanside, CA	[illegible]	Moreno Valley, CA	[illegible]
Dayton, OH	[illegible]	Fort Wayne, IN	[illegible]	San Bernardino, CA	[illegible]
Pittsburgh, PA	[illegible]	Denver, CO	[illegible]	Rancho Cucamonga, CA	[illegible]
Nashville-Davidson, TN	[illegible]	Kansas City, MO	18	Escondido, CA	[illegible]
Las Vegas, NV	[illegible]	New York, NY	18	San Francisco, CA	[illegible]
Philadelphia, PA	[illegible]	Anaheim, CA	[illegible]	Sunnyvale, CA	[illegible]

(table con'd.)

Place	SROK	Place	SROK
Santa Rosa, CA	11	Topeka, KS	11
Modesto, CA	11	Springfield, MA	11
Oxnard, CA	11	Boston, MA	11
Simi Valley, CA	11	St. Paul, MN	11
Colorado Springs, CO	11	Independence, MO	11
Lakewood, CO	11	Paterson, NJ	11
Stamford, CT	11	Yonkers, NY	11
Waterbury, CT	11	Providence, RI	11
Hollywood, FL	11	Sioux Falls, SD	11
Miami, FL	11	Plano, TX	11
Tallahassee, FL	11	Mesquite, TX	11
Boise City, ID	11	Arlington, VA	11
Peoria, IL	11	Tacoma, WA	11
Springfield, IL	11	Madison, WI	11
Overland Park, KS	11		

APPENDIX D. RANK-ORDER INTIMATE FRIENDS SEX RATIOS OF KILLING ACROSS PLACE

Place	SROK	Place	SROK	Place	SROK
Huntsville, AL	1000	Milwaukee, WI	130	Portland, OR	[illegible]
Chula Vista, CA	1000	Tulsa, OK	120	Anchorage, AK	[illegible]
Escondido, CA	1000	Dayton, OH	117	Sacramento, CA	[illegible]
Waterbury, CT	1000	Mesa, AZ	100	Cincinnati, OH	[illegible]
Peoria, IL	1000	Tempe, AZ	100	Cleveland, OH	[illegible]
Springfield, MO	1000	Pasadena, CA	100	Columbus, OH	[illegible]
Omaha, NE	[illegible]	Moreno Valley, CA	100	Portsmouth, VA	[illegible]
Lincoln, NE	[illegible]	Ontario, CA	100	St. Louis, MO	[illegible]
Jersey City, NJ	[illegible]	Aurora, CO	100	Houston, TX	[illegible]
Erie, PA	[illegible]	Miami, FL	[illegible]	Montgomery, AL	[illegible]
Abilene, TX	[illegible]	Tampa, FL	[illegible]	Atlanta, GA	[illegible]
Paterson, NJ	[illegible]	Chicago, IL	[illegible]	Rockford, IL	[illegible]
Jacksonville, FL	[illegible]	St. Paul, MN	[illegible]	Shreveport, LA	[illegible]
Lansing, MI	[illegible]	Albuquerque, NM	[illegible]	Charlotte, NC	[illegible]
Louisville, KY	[illegible]	Las Vegas, NV	[illegible]	Oakland, CA	[illegible]
Topeka, KS	[illegible]	Albany, NY	[illegible]	Boston, MA	[illegible]
New Orleans, LA	[illegible]	Allentown, PA	[illegible]	Detroit, MI	[illegible]
Irving, TX	[illegible]	Dallas, TX	[illegible]	San Jose, CA	[illegible]
Jackson, MS	[illegible]	Arlington, VA	[illegible]	Colorado Springs, CO	[illegible]
Denver, CO	[illegible]	Alexandria, VA	[illegible]	Springfield, IL	[illegible]
Knoxville, TN	[illegible]	Norfolk, VA	[illegible]	Austin, TX	[illegible]
Flint, MI	[illegible]	Spokane, WA	[illegible]	Salt Lake City, UT	[illegible]
Indianapolis, IN	[illegible]	Memphis, TN	[illegible]	Little Rock, AR	[illegible]
Toledo, OH	[illegible]	Akron, OH	[illegible]	Fort Worth, TX	[illegible]

(table con'd.)

Place	$ROK	Place	$ROK	Place	$ROK
Birmingham, AL	67	Minneapolis, MN	38	Hampton, VA	..
Durham, NC	60	San Francisco, CA	36	Kansas City, MO	1?
Virginia Beach, VA	60	Mobile, AL	33	Winston-Salem, NC	1?
Washington, D.C.	58	Berkeley, CA	33	Richmond, VA	1?
San Bernardino, CA	57	Hayward, CA	33	Baton Rouge, LA	11
Philadelphia, PA	53	Long Beach, CA	33	Stockton, CA	1?
Baltimore, MD	51	Santa Ana, CA	33	Scottsdale, AZ	?
Inglewood, CA	50	Fort Wayne, IN	33	Concord, CA	?
Pomona, CA	50	Lexington - Fayette, KY	33	Santa Clarita, CA	?
Torrance, CA	50	Reno, NV	33	Salinas, CA	?
Hartford, CT	50	Corpus Christi, TX	33	Anaheim, CA	?
Columbus, GA	50	Fresno, CA	33	Fullerton, CA	?
Evansville, IN	50	Gary, IN	29	Garden Grove, CA	?
Wichita, KS	50	San Diego, CA	28	Huntington Beach, CA	
Kansas City, KS	50	Glendale, AZ	25	Orange, CA	?
Warren, MI	50	Tucson, AZ	25	Irvine, CA	?
Raleigh, NC	50	Bakersfield, CA	25	Rancho Cucamonga, CA	?
Elizabeth, NJ	50	New Haven, CT	25	Oceanside, CA	?
Rochester, NY	50	Oklahoma City, OK	25	Sunnyvale, CA	?
Chesapeake, VA	50	Nashville - Davidson, TN	25	Vallejo, CA	
Newark, NJ	47	Newport News, VA	25	Santa Rosa, CA	
Los Angeles, CA	47	Phoenix, AZ	..	Modesto, CA	
New York, NY	44	Greensboro, NC	20	Thousand Oaks, CA	?
San Antonio, TX	43	Buffalo, NY	20	Lakewood, Co	

(table con'd.)

Place	$ROK
Bridgeport, CT	
Stamford, CT	
Tallahassee, FL	
Orlando, FL	
Honolulu, HI	
Springfield, MA	
Worcester, MA	
Grand Rapids, MI	
Sterling Heights, MI	
Independence, MO	
Eugene, OR	
Providence, RI	
El Paso, TX	
Beaumont, TX	
Lubbock, TX	
Waco, TX	
Arlington, TX	
Tacoma, WA	
Madison, WI	

APPENDIX E. RANK-ORDER COHABITATING SEX RATIOS OF KILLING ACROSS PLACE

Place	SROK	Place	SROK	Place	SROK
Anchorage, AK	1400	Rochester, NY	1400	Los Angeles, CA	[illegible]
Mobile, AL	1400	Toledo, OH	1400	Birmingham, AL	[illegible]
Bakersfield, CA	1400	Dayton, OH	1400	Phoenix, AZ	[illegible]
Long Beach, CA	1400	Cincinnati, OH	1400	Santa Ana, CA	[illegible]
Sacramento, CA	[illegible]	Portland, OR	1400	Tampa, FL	[illegible]
Ontario, CA	1400	Philadelphia, PA	1400	Tulsa, OK	[illegible]
Oceanside, CA	1400	Knoxville, TN	1400	Fresno, CA	[illegible]
San Jose, CA	1400	Memphis, TN	1400	Montgomery, AL	[illegible]
Denver, CO	[illegible]	Mesquite, TX	[illegible]	Glendale, AZ	[illegible]
Stamford, CT	[illegible]	Waco, TX	[illegible]	Santa Clarita, CA	[illegible]
Washington, D.C.	[illegible]	Fort Worth, TX	[illegible]	Inglewood, CA	[illegible]
Hollywood, FL	[illegible]	Austin, TX	[illegible]	Pomona, CA	[illegible]
Miami, FL	[illegible]	Dallas, TX	[illegible]	Salinas, CA	[illegible]
Macon, GA	[illegible]	Norfolk, VA	[illegible]	Orange, CA	[illegible]
Chicago, IL	[illegible]	New York, NY	[illegible]	Riverside, CA	[illegible]
Kansas City, KS	[illegible]	Atlanta, GA	[illegible]	Moreno Valley, CA	[illegible]
Baltimore, MD	[illegible]	Oklahoma City, OK	[illegible]	San Diego, CA	[illegible]
Flint, MI	[illegible]	New Orleans, LA	[illegible]	San Francisco, CA	[illegible]
Grand Rapids, MI	[illegible]	Houston, TX	[illegible]	Stockton, CA	[illegible]
Detroit, MI	[illegible]	Oakland, CA	[illegible]	Bridgeport, CT	[illegible]
St. Louis, MO	[illegible]	Baton Rouge, LA	[illegible]	Hartford, CT	[illegible]
Jackson, MS	[illegible]	Columbus, OH	[illegible]	New Haven, CT	[illegible]
Newark, NJ	[illegible]	Lubbock, TX	[illegible]	Fort Lauderdale, FL	[illegible]
Buffalo, NY	[illegible]	Corpus Christi, TX	[illegible]	Tallahassee, FL	[illegible]

(table con'd.)

Place	SROK	Place	SROK
Savannah, GA	..	Cleveland, OH	..
Springfield, IL	..	Eugene, OR	..
Fort Wayne, IN	..	Pittsburgh, PA	..
Topeka, KS	..	Providence, RI	..
Lexington-Fayette, KY	..	El Paso, TX	..
Springfield, MA	..	Pasadena, TX	..
Kansas City, MO	..	Amarillo, TX	..
Omaha City, NE	..	Abilene, TX	..
Albuquerque, NM	..	Laredo, TX	..
Reno, NM	..	San Antonio, TX	..
Syracuse, NY	..	Milwaukee, WI	..
Akron, OH	..	Honolulu, HI	.

APPENDIX F. RANK-ORDER DIVORCED SEX RATIOS OF KILLING ACROSS PLACE

Place	SROK	Place	SROK	Place	SROK
Birmingham, AL	.200	Columbus, GA	.33	Jackson, MS	.
Mesa, AZ	.200	Anchorage, AK	.20	Charlotte, NC	.
San Diego, CA	.200	Mobile, AL	.20	Albuquerque, NM	. .
Atlanta, GA	.1..	Glendale, AZ	.1.	Las Vegas, NV	.
Boston, MA	.09.	Tucson, AZ	.20	Oklahoma City, OK	.1.
Flint, MI	.08.	Fresno, CA	.20	Tulsa, OK	.1.
Detroit, MI	.00.	Los Angeles, CA	.20	Philadelphia, PA	.2.
Springfield, MO	....	Sacramento, CA	.2.	Sioux Falls, SD	.
Dayton, OH	....	Stockton, CA	.1.	Beaumont, TX	.
Pasadena, TX	.	Modesto, CA	.1.	Waco, TX	.
Lubbock, TX	.	Miami, FL	.1.	Amarillo, TX	.
Tacoma, WA	.	Macon, GA	.2.	Austin, TX	.
Phoenix, AZ	.	Springfield, IL	.2.	Dallas, TX	.
El Paso, TX	.	Chicago, IL	.2	San Antonio, TX	.2.
Abilene, TX	....	Louisville, KY	.2.	Norfolk, VA	.2.
Nashville - Davidson, TN	.	Baton Rouge, LA	.2.	Virginia Beach, VA	.
Houston, TX	..	Baltimore, MD	.2.	Madison, WI	.
Long Beach, CA	..	Grand Rapids, MI	.2.		
Cleveland, OH	.	Kansas City, MO	.2.		

APPENDIX G. RANK -ORDER WHITE SEX RATIO OF KILLING ACROSS PLACE

Place	SROK	Place	SROK	Place	SROK
Ontario, CA	300	Elizabeth, NJ	100	Akron, OH	50
Vallejo, CA	300	Allentown, PA	100	Salem, OR	50
Hollywood, FL	300	El Paso, TX	100	Newport News, VA	5
Macon, GA	3	Pasadena, TX	100	Richmond, VA	5
Cedar Rapids, IA	300	Abilene, TX	100	Birmingham, AL	43
Springfield, MO	300	Virginia Beach, VA	86	Las Vegas, NV	42
Lincoln, NE	300	Detroit, MI	83	Columbus, OH	40
Erie, PA	3	Fort Worth, TX	80	Memphis, TN	4
Garland, TX	4	Knoxville, TN	75	Tucson, AZ	38
Irving, TX	.	Albuquerque, NM	71	San Antonio, TX	3
Sacramento, CA	1	Tulsa, OK	71	Nashville - Davidson, TN	41
Jacksonville, FL	1	Baltimore, MD	67	Moreno Valley, CA	33
Omaha, NE	1	Waco, TX	67	San Bernardino, CA	33
Indianapolis, IN	1	Spokane, WA	67	Miami, FL	33
Huntsville, AL	1	Anchorage, AK	60	Honolulu, HI	33
Mesa, AZ	1	Austin, TX	60	Fort Wayne, IN	33
Tempe, AZ	1	Houston, TX	57	Evansville, IN	33
Chula Vista, CA	1	San Diego, CA	55	Minneapolis, MN	33
Columbus, GA	1	Bakersfield, CA	50	Jackson, MS	33
Atlanta, GA	1	New Haven, CT	50	Charlotte, NC	33
Peoria, IL	1	Springfield, IL	50	Reno, NV	33
Louisville, KY	1	Lexington-Fayette, KY	50	Toledo, OH	33
Shreveport, LA	1	Greensboro, NC	50	Pittsburgh, PA	33
Warren, MI	1	Raleigh, NC	50	Corpus Christi, TX	33

(table con'd.)

Place	$ROK	Place	$ROK	Place	$ROK
Amarillo, TX	34	Portland, OR	14	Rancho Cucamonga, CA	5
Tacoma, WA	33	Arlington, TX	14	Oceanside, CA	5
Los Angeles, CA	31	New York, NY	13	San Francisco, CA	5
Phoenix, AZ	31	St. Louis, MO	11	Stockton, CA	5
Philadelphia, PA	31	Glendale, AZ	10	Sunnyvale, CA	5
Kansas City, MO	24	Chicago, IL	8	Santa Rosa, CA	5
Cleveland, OH	24	Milwaukee, WI	7	Modesto, CA	5
Little Rock, AR	22	Mobile, AL	6	Oxnard, CA	5
Oakland, CA	22	Montgomery, AL	6	Thousand Oaks, CA	5
Huntington Beach, CA	21	Scottsdale, AZ	6	Simi Valley, CA	5
New Orleans, LA	21	Berkeley, CA	6	Aurora, CO	5
Dayton, OH	20	Concord, CA	6	Lakewood, CO	5
Long Beach, CA	20	Santa Clarita, CA	6	Bridgeport, CT	5
Colorado Springs, CO	19	Glendale, CA	6	Hartford, CT	5
Wichita, KS	19	Pasadena, CA	6	Stamford, CT	5
Boston, MA	18	Torrance, CA	6	Waterbury, CT	5
Grand Rapids, MI	18	Salinas, CA	6	Washington, D.C.	5
Salt Lake City, UT	18	Anaheim, CA	6	Tampa, FL	5
Norfolk, VA	18	Fullerton, CA	6	Savannah, GA	5
Oklahoma City, OK	17	Garden Grove, CA	6	Rockford, IL	5
Fresno, CA	16	Orange, CA	6	Overland Park, KS	5
Denver, CO	16	Santa Ana, CA	6	Baton Rouge, LA	5
Cincinnati, OH	15	Irvine, CA	6	Springfield, MA	5
San Jose, CA	15	Riverside, CA	6	Worcester, MA	5

(table con'd.)

Place	SROK	Place	SROK
Flint, MI	5	Providence, RI	5
Sterling Heights, MI	5	Sioux Falls, SD	5
St. Paul, MN	5	Plano, TX	5
Independence, MO	5	Mesquite, TX	5
Durham, NC	5	Beaumont, TX	5
Winston-Salem, NC	5	Lubbock, TX	5
Jersey City, NJ	5	Dallas, TX	5
Paterson, NJ	5	Arlington, VA	5
Newark, NJ	5	Hampton, VA	5
Buffalo, NY	5	Portsmouth, VA	5
Rochester, NY	5	Madison, WI	5
Syracuse, NY	5		

APPENDIX H. RANK-ORDER BLACK SEX RATIO OF KILLING ACROSS PLACE

Place	SROK	Place	SROK	Place	SROK
Anchorage, AK	800	Arlington, VA	800	St. Louis, MO	136
Hayward, CA	800	Alexandria, VA	800	Beaumont, TX	133
Bakersfield, CA	800	Portland, OR	700	Chicago, IL	130
Pomona, CA	800	Jersey City, NJ	600	Indianapolis, IN	127
Ontario, CA	800	Paterson, NJ	600	Memphis, TN	127
San Bernardino, CA	800	Huntsville, AL	500	Montgomery, AL	125
Chula Vista, CA	800	Denver, CO	275	Oakland, CA	118
Oceanside, CA	800	Jackson, MS	267	Akron, OH	117
San Jose, CA	8	Mobile, AL	250	Columbus, OH	117
Aurora, CO	8	Knoxville, TN	233	Houston, TX	115
Bridgeport, CT	8	Pasadena, CA	200	Gary, IN	114
Waterbury, CT	8	Peoria, IL	200	Dayton, OH	113
Fort Lauderdale, FL	8	Rockford, IL	200	Dallas, TX	111
Hollywood, FL	8	Wichita, KS	200	Norfolk, VA	108
Tampa, FL	800	Flint, MI	200	Inglewood, CA	100
Evansville, IN	800	Raleigh, NC	200	Santa Ana, CA	100
Lansing, MI	800	El Paso, TX	200	Colorado Springs, CO	100
Ann Arbor, MI	800	Waco, TX	200	Hartford, CT	100
Omaha, NE	8	Virginia Beach, VA	200	Albany, NY	1
Erie, PA	8	Milwaukee, WI	184	Rochester, NY	1
Corpus Christi, TX	8	Toledo, OH	167	Syracuse, NY	1
Amarillo, TX	800	Tulsa, OK	150	Cleveland, OH	1
Abilene, TX	800	Miami, FL	150	Arlington, TX	100
Salt Lake City, UT	800	Jacksonville, FL	150	Fort Worth, TX	100

(table con'd.)

Place	SROK	Place	SROK	Place	SROK
New Orleans, LA	96	Macon, GA	57	Richmond, VA	43
Atlanta, GA	93	Buffalo, NY	57	Stockton, CA	43
Shreveport, LA	89	Baltimore, MD	56	Baton Rouge, LA	43
Louisville, KY	86	San Diego, CA	56	Fort Wayne, IN	43
Long Beach, CA	83	Berkeley, CA	50	Winston-Salem, NC	43
San Francisco, CA	83	Stamford, CA	50	Fresno, CA	34
Durham, NC	83	Washington, D.C.	50	Tempe, AZ	33
Detroit, MI	82	Springfield, IL	50	Salinas, CA	33
Little Rock, AR	80	St. Paul, MN	50	Huntington Beach, CA	33
Charlotte, NC	77	Greensboro, NC	50	Rancho Cucamonga, CA	33
Los Angeles, CA	76	Elizabeth, NJ	50	Escondido, CA	33
Newport News, VA	76	Austin, TX	50	Vallejo, CA	33
Birmingham, AL	74	Hampton, VA	50	Oxnard, CA	33
Newark, NJ	73	Portsmouth, VA	50	Tallahassee, FL	33
Columbus, GA	67	Nashville - Davidson, TN	47	Orlando, FL	33
Topeka, KS	67	New York, NY	45	Springfield, MA	33
Kansas City, KS	67	Phoenix, AZ	40	Grand Rapids, MI	33
Chesapeake, VA	67	Lubbock, TX	40	Independence, MO	33
Cincinnati, OH	64	San Antonio, TX	40	Kansas City, MO	33
Boston, MA	63	New Haven, CT	43	Providence, RI	33
Las Vegas, NV	63	Savannah, GA	33	Garland, TX	33
Oklahoma City, OK	60	Lexington-Fayette, KY	33	Irving, TX	33
Sacramento, CA	60	Minneapolis, MN	33	Tacoma, WA	33
Philadelphia, PA	58	Pittsburgh, PA	33		

APPENDIX I. RANK-ORDER HISPANIC SEX RATIO OF KILLING ACROSS PLACE

Place	SROK	Place	SROK
Glendale, CA	300	Long Beach, Ca	11
Torrance, CA	300	Los Angeles, CA	11
Lubbock, TX	300	Pomona, CA	11
Ontario, CA	300	Salinas, CA	11
Fresno, CA	100	Irvine, CA	11
Bakersfield, CA	100	Riverside, CA	11
Abilene, TX	100	Moreno Valley, CA	11
San Antonio, TX	70	Sacramento, CA	11
Santa Ana, CA	5	Oceanside, CA	11
Phoenix, AZ	4.	San Francisco, CA	11
Anaheim, CA	33	San Jose, CA	11
San Bernardino, CA	25	Modesto, CA	11
Fort Worth, TX	25	Grand Rapids, MI	11
Dallas, TX	25	Raleigh, NC	11
Stockton, CA	20	Eugene, OR	11
Houston, TX	17	Garland, TX	11
San Diego, CA	14	El Paso, TX	11
Corpus Christi, TX	14	Waco, TX	11
Mesa, AZ	11	Amarillo, TX	11
Hayward, CA	11	Austin, TX	11
Concord, CA	11	Arlington, VA	11
Santa Clarita, CA	11	Alexandria, VA	11
Inglewood, CA	11		

VITA

DeAnn Kalich Gauthier was born in Houston, Texas in June 1968. She graduated cum laude from Westfield High School in May 1986, whereupon she left Texas for the first time to live in southern Louisiana and pursue studies in the field of sociology at the University of Southwestern Louisiana. She was awarded the Honor Baccalaureate degree in December 1989, and immediately began working toward her Master's degree in sociology at Louisiana State University in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. She earned her M.A. in May 1991, and then began completing the requirements for her Ph.D. She now lives with her husband and two young children in Erath, Louisiana.

DOCTORAL EXAMINATION AND DISSERTATION REPORT

Candidate: DeAnn K. Gauthier

Major Field: Sociology

Title of Dissertation: Fatal Attractions: A Sociological Study of the Sex Ratios of Intimate Homicide

Approved:

Major Professor and Chairman

Dean of the Graduate School

EXAMINING COMMITTEE:

Date of Examination:

September 22, 1995