The Origins of Freedom in Mediterranean Antiquity: a Comparative Study of Political Symbolisms Obtaining in the Exodus of Israel and in the Solonic Reform in Athens.

Vernon Leroy Gaylor

Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses

Recommended Citation
https://repository.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/3064

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Scholarly Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU Scholarly Repository. For more information, please contact gradetd@lsu.edu.
INFORMATION TO USERS

This material was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction.

1. The sign or “target” for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is “Missing Page(s)”. If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent pages to insure you complete continuity.

2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame.

3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being photographed the photographer followed a definite method in “sectioning” the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is continued again — beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.

4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value, however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from “photographs” if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver prints of “photographs” may be ordered at additional charge by writing the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and specific pages you wish reproduced.

5. PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as received.

University Microfilms International
300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 USA
St. John's Road, Tyler's Green
High Wycombe, Bucks, England HP10 8HR
GAYLOR, Vernon Leroy, 1943-  
THE ORIGINS OF FREEDOM IN MEDITERRANEAN ANTIQUITY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF POLITICAL SYMBOLISMS OBTAINING IN THE EXODUS OF ISRAEL AND IN THE SOLONIC REFORM IN ATHENS.

The Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, Ph.D., 1977  
Political Science, general

Xerox University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106
THE ORIGINS OF FREEDOM IN MEDITERRANEAN ANTIQUITY:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF POLITICAL SYMBOLISMS OBTAINING IN
THE EXODUS OF ISRAEL AND IN THE SOLONIC REFORM IN ATHENS

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of Political Science

by

Vernon Leroy Gaylor
A.B., Kansas State College, 1965
M.S., Kansas State College, 1968
May, 1977
EXAMINATION AND THESIS REPORT

Candidate: Vernon Leroy Gaylor

Major Field: Political Science

Title of Thesis: The Origins of Freedom in Mediterranean Antiquity: A Comparative Study of Political Symbolisms Obtaining in the Exodus of Israel and in the Solonic Reform in Athens

Approved:

[Signatures]

Major Professor and Chairman

Dean of the Graduate School

EXAMINING COMMITTEE:

[Signatures]

Date of Examination:

December 3, 1976
PREFACE

This study began as the introductory portion of a critical inquiry into the validity of the several modern symbolisms of freedom. It became obvious that such a study could not be undertaken without a simple and clear idea of what freedom really is. Because freedom in the modern world is an object of psychic fixation and partisan cant, the modern imagination cannot offer a definitive understanding. Antiquity affords an uncomplicated perspective which is able to instruct critical judgment about our modern notions of freedom. That is why we have chosen the ancient period of origins as the focus for inquiry.

This study of origins has learned that human freedom in history is indeed a reality, but that in its unadulterated meaning, it is never an independent reality. Freedom derives from divine justice, and apart from divine justice, it has only a sentimental and transient importance. By this understanding, it is certain that the modern inflation of freedom has extensively transported freedom from the range of the real to that of the unreal. The Marxian, the existential, even some liberal notions of freedom implicate freedom in a movement which Eric Voegelin has identified as gnosticism. That is to say, freedom is no longer the redemptive consequence of the justice whose incision into history restores enslaved lives and warring polities. Instead, it is the
goal of a sometimes murderous struggle whose animating inspiration is the fantasy that historical existence can be so transformed as to end the human encounter with evil. If this search for the New Jerusalem were truly a search for the New Jerusalem, it would have to contend with the righteous justice of Yahweh as part and parcel of its search. But since the search is for a secular equivalent to the New Jerusalem, there is no such encounter, and the misunderstanding about freedom and the neglect of real justice continues.

In the humane disciplines of the twentieth century, contemporaneity has become the dominating idol of the mind. Thousands are busy researching and reporting one set or another of contemporary events, institutions, personalities. The end of this interest in contemporaneity is unclear; in that it has no precedent in all of history, it seems an obsessive, self-gratifying quest. The inner spirit which drives this pursuit finds expression in the verse,

HURRY UP PLEASE ITS TIME
HURRY UP PLEASE ITS TIME

One suspects that the greatest value of the idolatry of the contemporary is that it helps people to pass the time.

The interest in archaic meanings is essentially different from the interest in contemporaneity. Plato teaches that the domain of memory, not the domain of here and now, is the source from which we receive certain knowledge about who we are and what we ought to do. Plato understood the
exercise of this memory to be the special talent of philosophy. In our own time, we have not only a philosophic memory but an historic memory as well. These two memories of modern man complement one another. In this study, they work together to inquire into the origins of freedom. Historic fact inspires reflection, and reflection in turn illumines historic fact. This interactive memory is not without its own contemporary value and interest. To remember the meaning of freedom at the time of its origin is to stand against a confusion which beclouds our understanding of freedom and so weakens our ability to live as free people. When we remember in this way, we become mindful that freedom is the privilege which we preserve only through submission to the mastery of justice.
# CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PREFACE ................................................ ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT ............................................... vi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Chapter I. HISTORY AND FREEDOM ................. 1

1. History and Pre-history  
2. The Mediation of History

## II. THE STRUCTURE OF FREEDOM ..................... 38

1. Two Articulations of Freedom  
2. Nominal Freedom in Philo and Epictetus  
3. The Structure of Freedom in the New Testament

## III. REDEMPTIVE LIBERATION IN THE OLD TESTAMENT ... 99

1. The Image of God  
2. The Disgrace of Slavery  
3. The Exodus

## IV. PROPHETIC FREEDOM .............................. 184

1. The Prophetic Memory of Unity  
2. The Holy Righteousness of Yahweh  
3. Freedom and Individuation

## V. GREECE: THE BIRTH OF FREEDOM FROM THE SPIRIT OF JUSTICE ........... 243

1. The Freedom of Human Intermediacy  
2. The Dikē of Hesiod  
3. The Solonic Liberation

## VI. AESCHYLUS: A CONCLUSION ........................... 318

1. Tyranny  
2. The Liberative Suspension of Fate  
3. Conclusion

## BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................... 363

## VITA ................................................. 369
This study investigates the material and symbolic events of both ancient Israel and Greece as they pertain to the formation of a European culture in which freedom is a guiding value.

Chapter one advances the thesis that history is the domain of human severality, and by consequence, of fated unfreedom; as such, historical existence leads to doom. This is the political lesson of both the Iliad of Homer and the Yahwist's story about the fall and exile of man from the garden. In the pre-historic life of man, unity is pervasive, and thus there is no fate or unfreedom. This is the political significance of Plato's Age of Cronos and the Yahwist's portrait of Adam in the garden. In both the sense of free choice and of liberation from bondage, freedom in history happens when severality is mitigated by the incursion of unity into history; the consequence of this incursion is the creative reversal of humanity's descent to fated doom. The Gospel of Luke's paradigm of the Neighbor illustrates this last tenet.

Chapter two seeks an avenue to the origins of freedom in high antiquity. It examines the freedom teaching of the later Stoa and the New Testament. In the paradoxical universe of the Stoa, "freedom" became a nominal value without experiential ramification. Thus the Stoic teaching is not
helpful concerning the search for origins. In the New Testament, however, Paul's letter to Philemon exemplifies the meaning of freedom in a living community. The Fourth Gospel's freedom pericope (John 8.34-36) indicates that freedom is a structured reality, involving the negation of a faulty past and the repositioning of life unto a future which is imbued with the restorative power of the unifying logos. This pericope also shows that the earliest clues concerning the beginnings of freedom are to be found in the J and E sagas of the household of Abram.

Chapters three, four, and five constitute the substantive bulk of the study. They deal with the concrete origins of freedom in Mediterranean antiquity in which a dead past is negated, and life is repositioned unto a new and beingful future. These events include the positioning of Abram as the chosen man of Yahweh, the liberative positioning of Israel as a nation independent of Pharaonic slavery, the positioning of Moses as prophet, and the eighth century prophetic protest against the injustice and bondage wrought by an urban, monarchial society as an offense against the holy righteousness of Yahweh. The parallel materials from Greece consider Hesiod's invocation of the just and righteous will of Zeus against his brother Perses' dishonest attempt to reduce him to penury. Later, and of decisive importance for the history of Europe, is the Solonic liberation in Athens. Solon believed that the justice of Zeus mandated
the end of class strife in Athens. In service of that end, he released the unfortunate from their servile bonds, and repositioned the polis according to the principle of constitutional justice. The unifying allegiance of Solon to justice inspired Europe's seminal liberation.

Chapter six examines the plays of Aeschylus. Aeschylus concludes the period of origins, because in his drama, freedom is understood at last in an overt, political fashion; the same impulse which liberates the slave is seen to imply universal political participation. The study concludes that five meanings obtain from the original appearances of freedom. (1) Freedom is a modality of divine-human unity understood theoretically as *logos*, practically as justice. (2) Freedom requires negation and position relative to the principle of unity. (3) Freedom is essentially antinomian. (4) Freedom is primarily economic. (5) Freedom is complete only with universal participation in political authority.
I. HISTORY AND FREEDOM

Freedom is a concern which is proper to a short period in human existence, but a period which is quintessentially important. Freedom happens in the historical existence of mankind. Outside of history there is neither freedom nor concern for freedom. Both the concern and the reality are exponents of human existence in history. But this vocabulary requires explanation. What do we mean by "history"? Why is there a felt need for freedom in history? How—or by what pattern--does freedom come into history?

In order to address these questions which introduce the inquiry into the historical origins of freedom, we will examine certain primary visions which have given meaning to the life of European humanity. In response to the question as to the meaning of history and the need for freedom in history, the Iliad of Homer is instructive. In the Iliad we behold a fallen mankind which is victim to its own history. The demonic power of this history is so intense that we understand the Iliad as a chronicle of the destruction of the historical world, in history. The Homeric testimonial to the demonic power of history, as fate, was balanced later by Plato's vision of a world of pre-historic innocence which stands before and beyond history as a paradigmatic guide to mankind in history. This is the perfect Age of Cronos. This vision of extra-historic perfection is vital to our
understanding of human freedom, for were there no such vision available as tutor to the human imagination, there could be no freedom in history. At last we will contemplate the Yahwist's account of the creation and fall of man, for the Yahwist's story brings together into a single narrative the vision of pre-historic perfection and the vision of demonic fate in history.

After we have examined these primary visions which symbolize both the predicament of unfreedom in history and of perfection before history, we will turn to the problem of the mediation of history. By mediation we mean liberation, the event by which mankind is set free from the fated powerlessness whose consequence is always cruelty, slavery, death. There are two approaches to the question of how history is mediated. One is that the process of history itself has a propensity to self-mediation. This view finds no support in the documents which inform us about the origins of freedom. The other is that the demonic course of history is mediated when—and only when—human apperception becomes sufficiently deepened as to imagine the vision of pre-historic perfection. Consequent upon this divine imagining is the liberation of the slave, the release of the captive, the feeding of the orphan, and most importantly, the attempt to embody the vision of perfection in a permanent structure of constitutional order. Countries that are just and free are the enduring product of this powerful and true imagining which cuts into history and makes of mortal existence a vessel for eternal being.
1. History and Pre-History

Rachel Bespaloff says of Hector: "What he fled from, what he now confronts, is not the 'gigantic Achilles,' but his own destiny; he meets the appointed hour when he will be sent to pasture in Hades."¹ Later she interprets the fate of Hector and the other characters in a reflection about history. She writes: "For the Greeks, history is simply the stage of the tragedies of force and the dramas of collective passion; it has no awareness of divine justice and makes no appeal to it."² This understanding of history as an existential domain of fated unfreedom seems strange to us, for we are heirs to a culture which has learned to view history as somehow being the arena of God's saving march through the world in time. And so it is. But this saving project is not proper to history itself; it is opposed to history, as history. It moves against the demonic current in history to individuation and fated doom.

The analogue in our own time to the Homeric view of fate is the attitude of modern science to the issue of human freedom. The epistemology of modern sciences—especially behavioral sciences—is in large measure the product of Hume's thinking. Of the possibility for freedom, Hume wrote:

We may imagine we feel a liberty within ourselves, but a spectator can commonly infer our actions from our motives and character; and even where he cannot, he

²Bespaloff, On the Iliad, pp. 121-122.
concludes in general that he might, were he perfectly acquainted with every circumstance of our situation and temper, and the most secret springs of our complex-ion and disposition. Now, this is the very essence of necessity, according to the foregoing doctrine.3

Hume is our key to Homer, for the spectator about whom he speaks is essentially the same as the poet as far as freedom is concerned. Neither conceives that there is a possibility for man to free himself in the sense of beginning anew through repositioning his life against the past and toward the future. Each attempt at newness is seen as being quietly but surely shaped by all that has gone before. The hero of our culture is Saul of Tarsus, blind in Damascus, almost ready to see anew and thus to begin again as a person free of the accumulated past.4 But to Hume and to Homer this character is impossible, for they are the spokesmen for history in its absolute form.


4Our culture is Judeo-Christian, and its primary document is the Bible. The Bible attitude to sacrality and the problem of history is unique. The Bible teaches that sanctification happens within history, not in a sacred time and space reserved apart from history. (See Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion, tr. Willard R. Trask [New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1959], pp. 110-113.) Thus, Paul's conversion took place not in the sacred precinct of the synagogue, but on the road, which is to say, in history.
Poetry and science are not the same, for they serve different ends. Poetry punctuates its chronicle of the demonic by amplifying the moments of immortal beauty which appear ephemerally in the pauses between successive gales. Science conquers the material world and thus enhances human existence by bringing knowledge and material comfort to man in historical existence. But with the peculiarly human concerns the attitude of poetry and science is the same. This is so because both the Iliad and the modern empirical human sciences comprehend man in the same way. That is, the methodology common to both interprets human existence as an affair which is severely individual and particular. It is for this reason that they understand man's thought, word, and deed either as fated or as effected. When the pattern of human life is synthesized by a spectatorial intelligence in such a fashion as to make human existence commensurate to the mechanical sequence of causes by which the individual balls upon a billiard table act and react, then man's career on earth will be understood as a fated affair. Fate is nothing besides the totality of causes bearing upon a particular person. Only in poetry—not science—are we permitted to behold in a single moment the cumulative effects of the accumulated causes. This is the moment of doom.

This attitude then which rests upon the assumption that human existence is essentially particular must necessarily deny the possibility of freedom, for as this study will show, freedom happens in response to the awareness that there is a
reality beyond the particular self which is superior to the particular self and its individual history. Only if there is a whole reality which transcends the self is it possible for the self to become estranged from the causes which propel it in the direction of doom. When this whole reality is sought out as the ground for action, then the causal sequence is interrupted. Whenever we use the word "free" this is what we mean. Whether we speak of the liberation of slaves or the exercise of free choice, we mean that there is a breach between achieved history and the decisive present. Aside from its merit as a seminal document of culture, the Iliad is a work of genius for its conscious portrayal of a world which is left to history alone, a world in which there is no check upon the passionate force of particular ambition other than the force of a counter ambition. The political lesson of the Iliad is that history, unmediated, leads to world destruction.

The Iliad is not a story about sin and fall. Rather, it is a story about guilt and fallenness; it knows of no prior state of innocence. The Iliad is a poetic heightening of the ongoing helplessness of mankind in historical existence, and the tale of the Trojan war with its senseless cruelty is the poet’s medium for the deliverance of his analysis of the lot of man in history. To say that humanity is fallen is to say that it is divided against itself, for division leads to death. The primary division of humanity is the sexual polarity which sets male and female apart. The
Iliad illustrates that the sexual division is parent to all subsequent division in history. For this to be clear it is necessary to consider some information about the cause of the Trojan war which the Iliad does not relate. The archaic deity Strife dropped a golden apple inscribed "For the Fairest." Hera, Athena, and Aphrodite all desired the apple, but Zeus refused to decide amongst them. Thus Hermes appointed Paris, son of Priam, king of Troy, to make the award. Aphrodite described to the youth the sexual gifts of Helen, the wife of Menelaus of Sparta, and promised to make Helen the lover of Paris if she should be chosen. Paris gave Aphrodite the apple, and she in turn expedited the theft of Helen. Agamemnon's expedition against Troy followed.5

The pattern here is as follows: Strife, an aspect of the primal Chaos which underlies all ordered reality, broke forth as sexual lust (Aphrodite), which caused theft, adultery and insult, which in turn caused a war which caused death for men, slavery for women and children, and the complete destruction of a country. A similar sequence occurs in Book I of the Iliad. Agamemnon appropriates Achilles' captive concubine, Briseis. This theft causes the brooding wrath to descend on Achilles, and this wrath, in turn, causes all manner of outrage. To us, it seems that at each crucial step in either of these causal sequences a choice might have been made which would have altered the result. But the poet

will not permit this to happen because his project is etiological in an almost scientific way. He shows just how great catastrophes happen. That is, they happen when the men who move events do not find the power which would free them to choose life instead of death. They do not have this power because each is locked inside himself, unable to imagine some completion which would enable him to see keenly and carefully, and so avoid disaster.

In the Iliad, the character who most visibly displays this impotence is Achilles, the absolute lover of self. If there is an Homeric devil, it is neither Aphrodite nor Ares, for they are but deifications of elemental forces in nature, self, and culture. The devil must be a developed personality, like Achilles. Like Achilles he must be paradoxical, powerful and at the same time utterly unfree. Achilles is just this demonic super person in history, the hero whose eroticism reaches not toward life but toward death. Achilles personifies an aspect of human leaning which we discover both within self and beyond self, externalized in the world according to the division of labor. It is the leaning of the killer who makes of the other a victim, of the captor who makes of the other a slave, of the tyrant who makes of all life a mad and lamentable experiment. Achilles is a special kind of culture héro, the prototype of those immortals of history whose project is wrought on the forge of unmitigated individuation. The individuation of Achilles is not the moral individuation of the hero which liberates from
the embrace of the Female, at once nutritive, seductive, and murderous. It is instead the false individuation of the totally fallen, totally historical self. Achilles is like Bonaparte or Stalin, a moral solipsist. This character, whenever he appears in history, sterilizes the earth.

6See e.g. the confrontation of Gilgamesh and Ishtar, Epic of Gilgamesh, tablet VI, and Odysseus' victory over Circe, Odyssey, X. The whole Iliad is arrested within the pre-moral zone of Female domination. While Zeus, the Father, is neutral, Hera and Athena engineer the destruction of Troy. Aphrodite protects her votary, Paris, and preserves the adultery which has caused the mess. Achilles himself is very much a mother's boy. The concern and help which Thetis bestows upon her son show him as something less than a mature adult.

7Some classicists would find this comparison and conclusion exceptionable, for they have learned to perceive Achilles as he was perceived by the Greek audience which attended the rhapsodes' recitation of Homer. Their scholarly studies of the Iliad are built upon this self-limiting perspective. This perspective of the uncritical hearer is narrower, however, than the perspective of Homer; along with the popular indulgence of the hero, Homer shows us attributes in Achilles that are clearly demonic, and they are part and parcel of a syndrome which causes world destruction.

In dealing with this tendency in Achilles, one commentator has it that Achilles is an entirely worthy young prince whose appalling truculence is the result of "acute neurosis." The neurosis is caused by the wrongful loss of Briseis and the consequent death of Patroclus, about which Achilles has guilt feelings. (See Andre Michalopoulos, Homer [New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1966], pp. 95 passim.) This observation seems beyond dispute, but to employ psychologistic terminology in an effort to exculpate the hero is to evade the point of the whole story. Achilles is neurotic because he is the most visible entity within a powerless world. This world is powerless even to send a stolen woman back to her husband. To attribute some final importance to the neurotic consequences of Achilles' insulted manhood is as romantically personal as would be an assessment of Bonaparte which places the conqueror's unhappy childhood at the center. "Neurotic" is a sub-heading within a larger category. It is a synonym of "unfree" equally with "slave" or "prisoner." Like those realities, its necessary condition is the extreme individuation of man in historical existence.
Priam goes to the camp of Achilles to claim the body of his son Hector, and Achilles refrains from killing him. Is it largesse that Achilles shrinks from killing Priam; is there a flicker of the light of nobility in this otherwise cinderous personality; is the sparing of Priam a free act? Beyond doubt the Greek audience understood Achilles' behavior to be noble, and perhaps even free. But we are in a position to know more of freedom than they—or Homer—could know. As the parable of the Neighbor will show, the free act requires more than an abatement of wrath; it must involve the giving of something more than a corpse in exchange for ransom. It must involve the bestowal of life where survival is in doubt.

Priam is too old to fight, and he is beyond the child producing years. For this saddened old king death would be merciful. Like his father Priam, the boy Lycaon is unable to fight, but his inability is the result of his youth. He is no threat to Achilles or the Achaeans, except inasmuch as his young life holds the promise of a future for his house and country. Achilles is at his demonic best in the murder of Lycaon. Lycaon has begged Achilles for his life, and Achilles answers him.

"So, friend, you die also. Why all this clamour about it? Patroklos also is dead, who was better by far than...

---

We will observe in the concluding section of this study that Aeschylus considered a psychological explanation for the terrified unfreedom of Orestes, and then rejected it as inadequate to the magnitude of Orestes' guilt. The guilt was real, and it required a real expiation, not an apology.

8See Iliad, XXIV, 138 ff.
you are. Do you not see what a man I am, how huge, how splendid and born of a great father, and the mother who bore me immortal? Yet even I have also my death and my strong destiny [moira krataïē], and there shall be a dawn or an afternoon or a noontime when some man in the fighting will take the life from me also either with a spearcast or an arrow flown from the bowstrong."

So he spoke, and in the other the knees and the inward heart went slack. He let go of the spear and sat back, spreading wide both hands; but Achilles drawing his sharp sword struck him beside the neck and the collarbone, and the double-edged sword plunged full length inside. He dropped to the ground, face downward, and lay at length, and the black blood flowed, and the ground was soaked with it.9

Achilles' untroubled acceptance of his own death is the product of a conscious nihilism which can only be the attitude of mankind in its radically individuated historical aspect. It has its match only in the saint's acceptance of death. Death for the saint is the gathering point of a perfect completion; for the nihilist it is the event of perfect fragmentation.10

The murder of Lycaon shows compactly the central problem of the Iliad. The individual character of human life in historical existence is accompanied by a vacuum of meaning, and the consequence of this absence of meaning is powerlessness, unfreedom. All unfreedom in history happens according


10A classicist in sympathy with Achilles understands the nihilism differently. Of Achilles he writes: "Only after abandoning all human hope does he at last, in the scene with Priam, achieve his greatest communion with humanity." (Whitman, Homer and the Homeric Tradition, p. 205.) This same author (p. 160) finds Achilles' address to Lycaon as "friend" as an indication of a sort of "communion" with Lycaon. One is forced to wonder if "friend" once had a different meaning than it has now.
to the format of the episode involving Achilles and Lycaon. There is one who is physically powerless to prevent his enslavement or abuse, and there is another who is spiritually powerless to understand why he should not satisfy himself in some manner by appropriating the life of another. Achilles murders (or enslaves—brands—castrates—tortures—sells) Lycaon because he understands no reason why he should not do so. The concrete life—like the life of Hector with his family—is meaningless to this disconnected individual; his own life and the lives of his fellow men become sublimated unto an infinite project of immortal fame. The quest for immortal fame is itself a confession of the vacancy of historical existence, and both the vacancy and the infinite quest are inherent in history itself. Because of the meaninglessness of the individuated life pattern which history requires of its inhabitants, the infinite quest which devolves from this emptiness propels history to self-destruction.

If the self-destruction of peoples in history is to be avoided, there must be some means by which individuation can be retarded. There must be some means of unifying historical mankind in such a way that the inner unity can overcome the exterior diversity. In concrete terms this means that the survival and prosperity of historical mankind is contingent upon the subordination of the human will to the divine will. But the theology of the Iliad shows us the problematical side of this matter also. The world-destructive
conflict has begun precisely because the intention of Paris fell into accord with that of Aphrodite. Pitiable Helen, aflame with guilt and foreboding about the increasingly barren future, identifies the problem more penetratingly than any other character in her reproach of Aphrodite. She suggests that the goddess has no true claim to divinity: "abandon the gods' way, turn your feet back never again to the path of Olympos . . ."\textsuperscript{11} The point is that not just any god or gods are capable of assuring the survival of historical mankind. As we will observe, only the true God, the God whose content is righteousness, is capable of directing mankind in history to life and to freedom.

Homer is like a "pure" scientist. His analysis lays bare the pattern which binds events into a story. But it is not his job to improve the pattern. The poet is aware that the radical problem to which the nihilism of Achilles and the others is kindred is the inadequacy of divinity in the face of the need of historical mankind for salvation. In compensation for the absence of salvation or even its possibility, Homer urges his audience to the contemplation of immortal beauty. To be sure, this contemplation has been edifying, and is perhaps Homer's most lasting gift, but it has nothing to do with our inquiry into the origins of freedom. Freedom did not originate with beauties such as Helen and Hector. It gained substance within the wind-scorched frames of herders and farmers. Freedom arrives in the world

\textsuperscript{11}Iliad, III, 406-407.
concomitant with the subordination of beauty before a reality more divine.

The gods of man in historical existence are of two kinds. We can witness this duality in our familiar Christian religion. There is the nutritive god who created the physical world, who orders the seasons, and in general performs those many necessary functions which maintain nutritive life as a going concern. Above this is the God who comes to the soul in its longing for order and peace, a God whose command and blessing reveal to man the way of righteousness. Just as the former deity is nutritive, the latter is divine; it is God's reality for man as a being who is at once within and beyond the nutritive environment. It is this latter aspect of divinity which is absent from the Iliad and above all else it is this absence which makes of the Iliad an absolutely historical document. The nihilism of individuated mankind in history shows itself through this mankind's fixation with nutritive ends. The unbridled lusts for sexual gratification, for wealth, for domination, even for destruction, are essentially nutritive impulses which have run wild because they are not integrated within an organic structure of self or of culture. This is the symbolic significance of Aphrodite's mischief in the Iliad. The sexual impulse without which life cannot continue has become as particular and as destructively isolate as the mortals who are its practi-
tioners. The inadequacy of the Homeric Olympian pantheon to the needs of a human society adumbrates the historical inadequacy of Greece itself. The anthropomorphic gods themselves were particular fixtures within a fallen history from which there was no recourse. It was against this inadequacy that Hesiod's new theology would rise in a rebellion which was only partially successful.

In Plato, the severest critic of Greek culture, we find an anti-Homeric, anti-Olympian vision of God and man. This vision is pre-history. It is the absolute ground which Plato sets up against history so as to elevate the level of life in history and thus to avoid destruction. Plato leaves no doubt that he is dealing in a concept of pre-history, for he chooses as the name of the beatific epoch before our own the "Age of Cronos." In the old literature--especially in Hesiod--Cronos, the father of Zeus, had been bad, and his defeat at the hands of his son represented a moral advance. Plato thus repudiates the symbolism of a whole culture. The "Age of Zeus" is coincidental with the historical period of human existence, and to Plato, its righteousnesses are as filthy rags. The rehabilitation of Cronos is part of a

12 This is not to suggest that Greece was wholly defenseless against the kind of behavior which the Iliad chronicles. In both the Homeric and anti-Homeric strains of the culture, there is respect for the Apolline injunction in favor of moderation, against rapacious outrage. But even the injunction is an expression of inadequacy and uncertainty. The experience of the culture with its heroes, both legendary and historical, had taught it the value of caution. "Moderation in all things" is at base a pragmatic rule which is likely to get one through life with a minimum of difficulty when there is no fuller vision to provide direction.
larger attempt to introduce into the Greek imagination a novel element whose purpose is to free the culture from its tendency to partisan destructiveness. "Freedom" is not an explicit goal in the project of Plato, yet without recourse to the vision of wholeness before or beyond history, of which the Age of Cronos is representative, freedom within history would be impossible.

Plato was heir to the philosophic monism of Parmenides, and that reflective monism was itself a philosophic appropriation of the very oldest strata of Mediterranean symbolism of the eternal condition of the world before history, division, and falsehood. That world is an absolute unity and its earliest symbol is the euroboros, the snake which clasps its tail in its mouth. The euroboros is truly pre-historic because it is entirely pre-oppositional. Neumann writes: "It slays, weds, and impregnates itself. It is man and woman, begetting and conceiving, devouring and giving birth, active and passive, above and below, at once."13

13 Eric Neumann, The Origins and History of Consciousness (New York: The Bollingen Foundation, Inc., 1954), p. 10. A more differentiated visual symbol which is also made from the closed circle is the Taoist t'ai chi. That symbol represents both pre-history and history, for while the perimeter conveys the same meaning as the euroboros, the internal division of yin from yang suggests the sexual polarity which produces the "ten thousand things." In respect of this generative capability, the internal contents of the symbol are divisible into an infinitesimal number of smaller figures. This possibility of infinite division within the universal wholeness is fascinating because it seems to tell a story about the relationship of history to pre-history which is decidedly different from the Mediterranean and Western understanding. For this understanding history occurs as a rupture of pre-history and of a radical dissociation from it
Plato's description of life in the Age of Cronos is a highly differentiated, mythical representation of the same undivided reality which is symbolized by the archaic visual symbol of the eurorboros. Plato's myth of the Age of Cronos couples this reality to the cyclic understanding of time.

In the Statesman, Plato accounts for human evil and political decline in terms of the cyclic pattern of the Cosmos. In one cosmic period, the Age of Cronos, God himself directs the rotation of the cosmos. When this period has ended, then begins the Age of Zeus when the cosmos rotates in the opposite direction. This opposite rotation is the underlying condition for the fallenness of world history. But here, we are concerned for the God-governed age, for it is Plato's vision of pre-history.

In that era God was the supreme governor in charge of the actual rotation of the universe as a whole, but divine also, and in like manner was the government of its several regions, for these were all portioned out to be provinces under the surveillance of tutelary deities. Over every herd of living creatures throughout all their tribes was set a heavenly daemon to be its shepherd. Each of them was all in all to his flock—providing for the needs of all his charges. So it befell that savagery was nowhere to be found nor preying of creature on creature, nor did war rage nor any strife whatsoever. There were numberless consequences of this divine ordering of the world, but we must leave them all aside save those concerning man, for we must go on to explain the origin of our traditions concerning man's life in that paradise. A god was their shepherd and had charge of them and fed them even as men which is repaired only with great difficulty. E.g., the Age of Cronos ends and that of Zeus begins with a reversal in the direction of the world's rotation. The t'ai chi however bespeaks a life experience in which multiplicity is inherently subordinated before the initial wholeness of all.
now have charge of the other creatures inferior to them — for men are closer to the divine than they. When God was shepherd there were no political constitutions and no taking of wives and begetting of children. For all men rose up anew into life out of the earth, having no memory of the former things. Instead they had fruits without stint from trees and bushes; these needed no cultivation but sprang up of themselves out of the ground without man's toil. For the most part they disported themselves in the open needing neither clothing nor couch, for the seasons were blended evenly so as to work them no hurt, and the grass which sprang up out of the earth in abundance made a soft bed for them. This is the story, Socrates, of the life of men under the government of Cronus.14

Abundance, peace, youth—these are the most visible endowments of life in this great time. In this myth, unity is present on three levels; there is no need for mediation in this perfect world. At the lowest level, most immediately involving the affairs of life, we note that mankind is earth-born. Man's sexual endowment has not yet become evident or necessary; each human life is integral within the greater unity of the world. Only in history need the family assemble so as to mediate a manifest sexual polarity which bisects humanity. At the intermediate level, there is no government. Inasmuch as politics becomes a mediatory necessity with the rise of multipolarity of society, it also belongs to history. At the highest level formal unity is expressed in Plato's monotheism. This unity is given content in the fact of God's pastoral direction of human affairs. For Plato—as for Micah in an earlier period and another place—the reality of one

God implies world perfection.

The truth of world unity is seen incompletely in history. The fragmentary evidence of this truth in history becomes intelligible only upon the complete witness of pre-history.

More explicitly than any other Greek writing, Plato's Age of Cronos stands in opposition to the pattern of events which pervades the Iliad. It opposes pre-historic divinity, concord, and peace against the Iliad's historical demonism, discord, and war. But with regard to our special concern, in neither vision is there human freedom. Freedom happens in history only when the pre-historic vision of unity penetrates history, and becomes both reason and justice for history. The philosopher ruler—who is the dominant interest of the Statesman—is capable of rescuing history because of his own assimilation unto the pre-historic reality of divine harmony. Even if Plato does not tell us as much, we know from the other (and older) sources that when such a ruler appears in the historic world, his rule brings not only justice but freedom as well. To oppose an eternal unity against the causal particularity of the world in time is to set mankind free from its slave past and to direct it to a more complete embodiment of being itself. Because of his hope for a beingful future, the liberator is likewise the constitution maker.

The Yahwist's account of the creation, perfection, and fall of man concludes our elaboration of the ideas of pre-
history and history. The Yahwist's story is especially instructive for it incorporates the meanings of both the Age of Cronos and the Wrath of Achilles into a single literary structure which traces the course of the man, Adam, from creation to exile. In the Adam narrative there are four themes which have relevance here. These are (1) the pre-history of man, (2) individuation as possession, (3) individuation as knowledge, (4) the curse of historical existence.

The pre-history man is comprehended within the symbol of the man in the garden of Eden. The man here is in union with both God and nature; indeed, he is that union, since he is a composite character, made of earth and inflated by the divine breath. The description of Adam in the garden corresponds generally to the vision of the Age of Cronos. The vision is one of abundance, timeless repose, and complete absence of sexual polarity at either the human or animal levels of existence. The reality of life in the garden is a wholly relational reality. In this world-garden there is not an inch of the terrain of distance and impersonality from which a causal order might take root and grow.

Then it occurred to the Creator that the man was alone, and that he needed a helper. Attendant upon the introduction of the female was the fall from innocence. Why then did Yahweh decide thus? This question cannot be answered within the framework of myth, and if it is pursued, the myth and its

15Genesis 2.4-3.24.
meaning collapse beneath the pressure of an enraged rationality. The question of theodicy is an exponent of the intellect in history, and any answer to it will be the product not of myth but of prose discourse. The myth is not so much explanatory as etiological. The Adam story gives an account of the origin of individuation and strife in history from a more permanent world reality which is before all history and all misfortune.

Bible religion is accustomed to view the "fall of man" as happening coincidentally with Eve's yielding to temptation. This interpretation corresponds with the understanding of the Yahwist narrator himself. But that hardly exhausts the matter. The myth shows us that the "fall of man" occurs in two sequential steps. The first of these steps is taken when Adam awakens from his sleep and finds that the unity of the garden has been interrupted by the introduction of the sexual principle.

This at last is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh; She shall be called Woman because she was taken out of Man.16

This triumphal claim of possession is the first swaying movement of the calamitous fall; it marks the instant when history begins.17 The passage records neither murder nor en-

16Genesis 2.23. All Bible quotations are from the Revised Standard Version.

17The first sentence of Rousseau's Third Discourse is the secular parallel to the speech which the Yahwist attributes to Adam: "The first man who, having enclosed a piece of ground, bethought himself as saying, 'This is mine,' and found people simple enough to believe him, was the real founder of civil society." This is a seminal inspiration of
slavement, but we know that both will follow soon. The possessive speech of the man thus exhibits a formal similarity within the Yahwist narrative to the murder of Lycaon in the Iliad. Both Adam and Achilles show themselves as particles set in contrast against some other. The creature asserts his partiality against the unity of the Creator and the intended wholeness of the creation.

This assertion of the man shows something further about the condition of division and misery that occurs in history. History as the slave form of being human is not given in the sheer fact of multiplicity, or even of human power in the world. The man in the garden "... gave names to all cattle, and to the birds of the air, and to every beast of the field ..."18 But this man with the great power of naming is not the fallen, historical creature whom we behold a moment later, for even in the act of naming, he has not yet

modern leftism, and its understanding of the predicament of man in history makes explicit a truth which was not yet apparent to Homer or the Yahwist, i.e., that the most patent source of historical misery is inequality itself. From inequality derives slavery, the absolute condition of powerlessness, an imposed non-being. In both Israel and Greece the connection of fallenness to inequality became understood sometime between the eighth and sixth centuries. Modern leftism is the heir to this discovery, and its understanding of freedom is thus a more nearly authentic understanding than is the conservative attitude which esteems tradition, even evil tradition, and couples freedom to the assertion of individual proclivity.


18 Genesis 2.20.
discovered his own individuality and the claim of possession which follows upon it. The man who names the animals is still the lesser partner who lives in unity with the God and the garden.\(^{19}\) Only with his comprehension of his otherness from the female does his individuation articulate itself, to self, through the act of possessing another. As historical materialism correctly understood, the possession of a woman in history amounts to a division of labor in which slavery

\(^{19}\)Buber's reflection on these concerns explains the radical distinction between Adam, the integrated namer, and Adam, the disintegrated possessor. He writes:

> Man's will to profit and to be powerful have their natural and proper effect so long as they are linked with, and upheld by, his will to enter into relation. There is no evil impulse till the impulse has been separated from the being; the impulse which is bound up with, and defined by, the being is the living stuff of communal life, that which is detached is its dis-integration. (Martin Buber, \(I\) and \(Thou\), tr. Ronald Gregor Smith [New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958], p. 48.)

Buber's term "relation" means the same as this study's term "unity." That is, when one meets another as Thou (not as He or It), both exit from history. To relate with another is to enter into a supra-personal unity. Because in unity there is no severality, there can likewise be no causality, no fate. To relate is thus to be free.

Beyond this thetic identity, our purpose in this study is different from that of Buber. In \(I\) and \(Thou\), Buber called on twentieth century man to come out of history, out of his world of the finite It, whose several predicates amount to nothing. This study which seeks the origins of freedom in history is primarily a political study because freedom is primarily a political reality. A political study can never --even for an instant--exclude the It world from its gaze. From the political vantage point, the relational possibility in man's humanity is a possibility for the world of It. Will the world in history be worse or better? The answer depends on how fully political reality in history has come to embrace as its orient the presence of a Thou whose ultimate being is before history.
is incipient.\textsuperscript{20}

The second step, individuation as knowledge, follows upon the first. The text shows that possession is come by in innocence; the shattering of the world of pre-history obtains as the individual discovers himself through the mode of possession. But the quest of knowledge is quite different. It follows from the initial experience of individuation. Like the unlimited drive of Achilles for conquest and vengeance, it is an assertion of the projected infinity of the individual. As such it is an enlarged form of possession by which the individual aspires to possess all that is through the power of cognition.

And the woman said to the serpent, "We may eat of the fruit of the trees of the garden; but God said, 'You shall not eat of the fruit of the tree which is in the midst of the garden, neither shall you touch it, lest you die.'" But the serpent said to the woman, "You will not die. For God knows that when you eat of it your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and evil."\textsuperscript{21}

For this passage to become intelligible, it is first necessary to explain the usage "good and evil." It is a Hebrew idiom with the sense of "all things."\textsuperscript{22} The first couple has been promised an omniscience which will in turn bestow immortality. But the serpent has lied to the woman, and his lie is the lie of historical humanity to itself, for as mankind


\textsuperscript{21}Genesis 3.2-5.

increases its exercise of cognition, the severality of existent things becomes increasingly apparent to consciousness. The consciousness which knows (in the Occidental sense of knowing finite things) is a consciousness which sensitized to the fact of its own impending terminus in defeat and death. This is hardly to be like God.

These accomplishments, the discovery of self in possession of persons and things and the amplification of individual selfhood in intellection are the material and ideal modes of historicization. Their consequence is the accursed burden of history.

To the woman he said,
"I will greatly multiply your pain in childbearing; in pain you shall bring forth children, yet your desire shall be for your husband, and he shall rule over you."
And to Adam he said,
"Because you have listened to the voice of your wife, and have eaten of the tree of which I commanded you, 'You shall not eat of it,' cursed is the ground because of you; in toil shall you eat of it all the days of your life; thorns and thistles it shall bring forth to you and you shall eat the plants of the field. In the sweat of your face you shall eat bread till you return to the ground, for out of it you were taken; you are dust, and to dust you shall return."²³

In both the Greek and Hebrew foundations of our European culture we witness a recognition of the same facts about historical existence. That is, human existence in history is particular, and subject to a dominating misery which particular persons serve, as agents of cause, and encounter, as recipients of effect. In the end there is death, at once the

²³Genesis 3.16-19.
cessation of historical man's project of particular finitude and the exposure of the false infinity to which this man pretends. Historical man is unfree because he is ensnared within a series of causes which move him through a career of misery to his death. It is for this reason that the mediation of history in both Israel and Greece—and in the European culture which grew from their union—is the discovery of freedom.

The symbols which this study will examine make it plain that in its broadest possible meaning, freedom is the triumph of life over death. If we speak of a free person or of a free polity, the ultimate meaning of our words is that the history of that person or polity has been so mediated that its intentions and actions enhance all life, and thus deny death its claim to a share in reality. Pre-history is life eternal, and freedom in history is the epiphany of life eternal in time.

2. The Mediation of History

In seeking the origins of freedom in Mediterranean antiquity, the substance of this study will address the question of mediation. In this introductory discussion, we identify the two types of approach to the problem of mediation. These are, in turn, the gnostic and the thymic or cardiac, the intellectual and the spiritual. The former attempt at mediation appears first in late antiquity and it is the product of a burgeoning intellectualism combined with profound dissatisfaction over existential circumstance. The ideolo-
gies of modern experience are heir to this combination. They share with it a scientism which promises release from the misery of historical existence. To illustrate this kind of thinking, we will examine Kant's essay on universal history. Of much higher antiquity is the mediative tendency which relies on the power of the heart to reach out for union with God and man. This tropism is pre-intellectual; it is the passion of passions. Its goal is no set of finite objects, but an embrace of life in its wholeness. To illustrate this truly archaic mode of mediation, we have chosen the paradigm of the Neighbor which appears in the Gospel according to Luke. The Neighbor is like the liberators to whose life-making activity our own history is the continuing witness.

The gnostic liberation from historical bondage is science-dependent. It understands human misery to be the result of causality, and it imagines a private knowledge (gnōsis) about the pattern of causes. This knowledge will facilitate the knower's deliverance from historical existence and its unhappiness. In its ancient form, gnosticism became associated with the Ptolemaic innovation in astronomy. Professor Burkitt wrote that before the Ptolemaic system became current, Near Eastern peoples had conceived the universe as a tent with the earth as its floor. For the new astronomy the planets moved regularly around the earth in concentric spheres. Because of their regularity, they determined human life astrologically. The cosmos was thus a prison of sorts. The gnostic who knew the mysteries could pass through these
life-determining spheres and reach the good God who dwelled beyond the spheres, and thus beyond all created existence in time. In this way he achieved a blissful freedom from experiential reality.  

Modern ideology replicates in form and spirit the gnosticism of late antiquity and it is no less troublesome than its ancestor. It appropriates both the general notion of science, causality, and also the specific understanding of whatever science is contemporaneously ascendant. Notions of mechanism and evolution are such specific ideas. Kant's "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose" is the initial effort in this genre. It applies the con-  


25 That Kant's essay is the first of this type of progressive theory of history is the observation of R. G. Collingwood. The identification of the theory as ideology and as gnosis is our own. In this assessment, we follow the guideline which Voegelin established for judging political literature. That is, Kant's essay expects the eschatological event to occur in history. See R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1948), pp. 100-101, and Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), chapter IV, sections 3 and 4.  

Since this study refers several times to Voegelin's theory of political gnosis, some comment is necessary. Voegelin taught that modern ideological movements replicate the broad movement in late antiquity known as gnosticism. They expect a qualitative change in the terms of historical existence, an essential modification of what Voegelin calls "the structure of reality." Accordingly, the eschaton of orthodox Christianity is moved within history by this gnosis, and given a secular, political coloration. From Puritanism to Maoism, this general pattern is evident.  

Due to an interest in precision, we need to observe here that Voegelin's use of "gnosis" is based on an analogy. Ancient gnosticism and modern ideology are analogous in that
cept of mechanism to the problem of history. Ego derivative strife, like gravitation in nature, is conceived as the force which is leading history to its eventual perfection. This reliance on mechanism as the motor of human progress is curious, for it is the production of the author of the Second Critique, the most penetrating of the modern discussions of freedom.

Kant's essay understands by "history" the same range of evils which we have observed in the Iliad and in the fall of man from the perfection of the world-garden. Man's partial, historical qualities separate him from the life of concord which he would enjoy in their absence. But the evil of man's self-seeking activities is not complete unto itself. This evil has a beneficent underside in that it is the cause of all advances in both material and moral culture. Kant believed that the particularity of mankind in historical existence is in truth a subsidiary part of a greater process which is incrementally bringing universal peace, justice,
lawfulness, and an international constitutional order.26 Thus, like the gnostic cosmos, the Kantian world of historical existence is ostensibly a dungeon of torment. But Kant, like the gnostics, knows that all is not as it seems. In truth there is a secret staircase about whose location Kant—and those initiates who are privy to his syntactical mysteries—are knowledgable.

Proposition Eight is the crux of the essay.

The history of the human race as a whole can be regarded as the realisation of a hidden plan of nature to bring about internally—and for this purpose also externally—a perfect political constitution as the only possible state within which all natural capacities of mankind can be developed completely.

We can see that philosophy too may have its chiliastic expectations; but they are of such a kind that their fulfilment can be hastened, if only indirectly, by a knowledge of the idea they are based on, so that they are anything but over-fanciful. The real test is whether experience can discover anything to indicate a purposeful natural process of this kind.

... [H]uman nature is such that it cannot be indifferent even to the most remote epoch which may eventually affect our species, so long as this epoch can be expected with certainty. And in the present case, it is especially hard to be indifferent, for it appears that we might by our own rational projects accelerate the coming of this period which will be so welcome to our descendants.27

26 See especially Proposition Four, "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose," in Kant's Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 45. This appears to be a secularization of the Stoic-Augustinian theodicy which has it that the cosmos, or God, tolerates evil as a tributary force in the making of an ultimate good. The crucial difference between Kant and his predecessors is that Kant held that the ultimate beatitude would become manifest in history, through the "natural" workings of the historical process itself.

27 Kant's Political Writings, p. 50. Italics are from the text.
The meaning is simple, even banal: Intellectuals should learn to know the formula of the process so that they will be able to hasten its realization.

In his innocence, this gentle and erudite contemporary of Mozart bids his reader to put the theory to the test of experience. Experience has shown that the practitioners of this kind of gnosis were not patient men like Kant. They were indeed convinced chiliasts whose notions about the science of racial types or of economic laws—alogous to Kant's mechanism—inspired their adherents to entirely un-Kantian behavior. Kant's "Universal History" is a very minor article within the philosopher's total effort. For those who took the progressive science of history so seriously as to make it the dominant theme of their lives, the effort to force history to display its latent perfection bore fruit which was quite different from Kant's imagined "perfect political constitution." In pursuit of this vision of historical fulfillment, the pursuers became less like Kant and more like Achilles. Rather than lead the world to beatitude, they made death more real than life. If experience is the test of the progressive theory, then the theory is false. The attempt to assist the historical process to its destined conclusion is diabolical. The consequence of chiliasm is not heaven in time, but an interminable last judgment of the damned.

The reason that the gnostic solution to the liberation of mankind from historical bondage has failed consistently is that there is no self-mediating process to be known—no
"hidden plan of nature"—in history. The most archaic docu-
ments of our culture inform us that history as history is a
slave dominion wherein the particularity of mastery mandates
a particularity of submission. The truth which obtains from
a reflection on the origins of freedom in history is that
this particularity causes mediation only inasmuch as wrong
causes a perceived need for right. This is not to say that
wrong is in some dialectical way a part of the right which
responds against it, for wrong is—as the Anaximander frag-
ment implies—a part of nature proper, while right is divine.
Bondage causes liberation in the same way that a burn causes
therapy. If we are sane, we would never predicate "good" of
a burn. We would predicate "good" of the healthy condition
of the flesh before the burn, or of the healed condition of
the flesh after the burn. If this is not understood, then
it will seem that the mediation of history, liberation from
bondage and abuse, is somehow automatic, and hence that human
responsibility for the condition of the world is an option.
Just as some burns are not treated and do not heal, but in-
volve the host in infection, pain, and death, so it is with
the assertion of the particular self in history. If this
particular assertion is not curbed by the power of a good
will whose freedom is the condition of its determination by
universal Reason, then the human project is left to history
alone. Whenever this has happened, the generation of Lycaon
is beckoned to Sheol in the flower of its youth.

The study of the origins of freedom show that history
is mediated according to no inevitable process. Liberation occurs only when one appears who participates in the world-creative power which is the essence of divinity. This responsible creature opposes history without regard to personal safety or fortune, and in his opposition inures the power to make free. Nowhere is this truth revealed with keener poignancy than in the parable of the Samaritan, or more aptly, the parable of the Neighbor. This parable is the perfect vision of freedom for it shows its twofold nature. The Neighbor is free to turn outside of his own biography, and because of his turning, he is able to perform in history as redeemer, as savior, as liberator. 

The redeemer symbol is from Israel, the savior from Greece. Each reflects the experience of its culture with the threat of unfreedom and the event of liberation. Our European culture was constructed during the Roman period from the materials of these two Mediterranean cultures. Of the several documents which those cultures produced, none are more authoritative than the Synoptic gospels and the dialogues of Plato. The remarkable characteristic which these documents share is their nearly complete silence about freedom. Yet, when we read them, we recognize in them the trait which we identify at once as freedom. The parables of Jesus display this lesson consistently: negate the past, begin anew. For our gestalt and its vocabulary, the newness of this commitment to the Kingdom is freedom itself, and indeed, Saint Paul taught us to understand it as such. Much the same is true of the Socratic understanding of the "Know thyself." To experience oneself as microcosmos is to become free of an ignorant and guilty past.

Why then the silence about freedom? Quite possibly it is because—as we will observe in the following chapter—"freedom" lends itself readily to a nominalization which sunders connection with experienced reality. Moreover, the popular preoccupation with freedom tends to detract from the awesome weight of responsibility which freedom in its true meaning imposes. The identification of freedom with individual whimsy is a consequence of popular fixation with individuation, the form of freedom, to the exclusion of the righteousness which is freedom's empowering content. In view of
This is the parable of the Neighbor:

"A man was going down from Jerusalem to Jericho, and he fell among robbers, who stripped him and beat him, and departed, leaving him half dead. Now by chance a priest was going down that road; and when he saw him he passed by on the other side. So likewise a Levite, when he came to the place and saw him, passed by on the other side. But a Samaritan, as he journeyed, came to where he was; and when he saw him, he had compassion, and went to him and bound up his wounds, pouring on oil and wine; then he set him on his own beast and brought him to an inn, and took care of him. And the next day he took out two denarii and gave them to the innkeeper, saying, 'Take care of him; and whatever more you spend, I will repay you when I come back.' Which of these three, do you think, proved neighbor to the man who fell among the robbers?" He said, "The one who showed mercy on him." And Jesus said to him, "Go and do likewise." 29

The parable is a story about history and its mediation. Each of the characters in the story is a particular entity in his own history, going from one definite place to another, pursuing some finite goal. Inevitably, someone is injured as particular ambition is gratified. But there appears one who, upon beholding the injury, forgets in an eternal moment his own historicity. This forgetting of one's finite historical past and its projected future in the blessed moment is the primary event of liberation, for it is the moment in these hazards, our most authoritative texts decline to name the reality to whose presence they point.

In the Synoptics, the one important usage which our translations render as "liberty" is a quotation by Jesus from Trito Isaiah (Luke 4.8). It is significant that the Greek term here is an inflection of aphesis, not eleutheria, the standard term for "freedom" whose connotations in the Hellenistic vocabulary were as numerous as those of our own word. Aphesis is more restrictive; it has the sense of release from bondage following upon the forgiveness of debt or crime.

which man remembers—in the Platonic sense of remembering—the wholeness which is his permanent being. This is the moment in which the liberator is himself created, and pursuant upon his own creation follows his recreation of the historical world. The Neighbor within history is the analogue of God before history.

We recognize Moses and Solon as liberators because of the obviously liberative character of their accomplishments, but it is important to understand that beneath the practicality of any liberation there dwells an empowering mass which is primarily ontic. The Samaritan is neither traveller nor rescuer nor healer, nor even "good." In a substantive sense the Samaritan is Neighbor. It is because of the amplitude of this symbol that we have chosen this parable to introduce the liberative mediation of history. A neighbor is no isolate particle in a fated progression; he is instead the cosmos in completion for his fellow men. He is the adversary of fate. Because he is Neighbor, the Samaritan obtains both inclination and power to act against the demonic current of history. Like Adam in the world-garden, the Samaritan as Neighbor is opaque to himself. His finite identity and ambition have fallen away; he interrupts his journey. Like Adam, the powerful namer, the Neighbor shows his power as restorer.

There remains one consideration about the symbolism of the parable of the Neighbor. In this story there is no pretense to a false beatitude. There is no chiliasm. The en-
tire narrative takes place within history. The Samaritan does not take the victim of the robbers to heaven; he takes him to a hotel. He does not place him in the charge of angels; he pays money to the innkeeper for services rendered. For an inquiry which is concerned with the origins of freedom and the archaic meaning of the concept of freedom, this imagery is extremely significant. The documents which instruct us about the origins of freedom make it plain that freedom is a reality which requires an improvement of the structures of the object world in time. The Marcionite wish to transport the meaning of life away from its concrete embodiment in the structures of created existence is the most menacing of all heresies. To succumb to this wish is to leave the world to the mercy of tyrants and slave merchants. This study of the origins of freedom reveals that the concern from which all of our ideas about freedom would grow is a charitable concern about the miserable condition of man in history. The neighborly response to this concern was not to redefine meanings so as to conceal the inevitability of his-

30 The revival of this attitude has been one achievement of the existential movement. Consider this passage from Berdyaev: "God is certainly not the constructor of the world order, or an administrator of the whole world. God is the meaning of human existence." (See Nicolai Berdyaev, Slavery and Freedom, tr. R. M. French [New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948], p. 87.) The ancients believed that God was the meaning of existence because of his involvement as constructor (Israel) or as administrator (Greece) of the world in time. Freedom came into history as a viable, palpable consequence of this belief; it has no concrete meaning apart from the belief that existence in time is in some sense a vessel for divine reality.
torical existence. It was instead to remember the whole meaning of life which historical man had forgotten. To remember is to enter into the truth which makes man free.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF FREEDOM

1. Two Articulations of Freedom

This study is an exercise in looking backward to a time of origins. For this reason, the materials which this chapter examines are of passing interest. That is to say, we must pass them on the way to the origins of freedom, and we must cognize them as we pass them, for there is no way to get to the origins of freedom in history without passing through the Hellenistic period of late antiquity. The Hellenistic age is the great intersection which couples modern life and thought with its true and firm moorings in high antiquity. The age effects this coupling, usually not with deep insights of its own, but rather through the articulation of a conventional vocabulary which associates the later life and thought of Europe with the early, seminal insights of Israel and Greece. Terms such as "law of nature" and "right reason" become conventional in this period. The symbol "freedom," as a basic goal of life, is also conventionalized in this period.

As the Hellenistic age emptied itself into the new, Roman age, two competing understandings of freedom were articulated. One of these is the Stoic position. The freedom teaching of the Stoa is properly Hellenistic; it is "indigenous" to its time, an ideology of sorts. As such, it afforded philosophic foundation for caesarism, and also, as we will
show, a formula for the criticism of imperial tyranny.¹ The other understanding is that of the Christian New Testament. It is basically anti-Hellenistic. Both survive in European thought.

The freedom which the Stoa advocates is "nominal" freedom. The Stoa reveres the term "freedom," but it has little interest in the affairs which common sense always identifies with freedom, i.e., affairs of real and daily human life. Beyond a strict personal regimen which is called freedom, the Stoa does not identify freedom with physical well being or with economic independence or with a permanent and powerful involvement in the life of one's civic community. The most immediate and pervasive explanation for the Stoa's subjectivist understanding of freedom is its intense mentalism. The Stoa did not embrace the Hellenistic dualism of mind (or soul) and body until the teaching of Poseidonius appeared in the first century B.C.² But it seems that such a development was inevitable, given the emphasis on mental control of all life which is central to the Stoa. If we identify the truly beingful part of humanity as its mind, and if we imagine concomitantly that the body is essentially a stranger to the mind, then freedom will seem to be an affair which has little to do with one's visible existence in the world. In-


stead, freedom will be internal and invisible, a mental disposition which asserts itself in objective reality only on a sporadic basis. Philo tells us that Zeno, the founder of the Stoa, showed his freedom when he chewed off his own tongue so as to avoid giving information to those who were torturing him.\(^3\) Even in the absence of a doctrine which holds that the body is negligible, or worse, such an example speaks louder than words.

The Stoa uses the word "freedom," but it departs grossly from the concrete and palpable meaning which this word held for the period in antiquity in which freedom emerged. From Stoic freedom to Gnostic bliss there is not too long a step, since both have ceased to respect the body as the objective and visible vessel of human life. In this chapter we examine the Stoic position on freedom as it appears in Philo (20 B.C.-50 A.D.) and Epictetus (50 A.D.-135 A.D.).\(^4\) The attitude of these two writers regarding the meaning of freedom is much the same. They are especially pertinent in this chapter since they occupy the same period in which the New Testament "structure of freedom" was propounded.

Stoic freedom is nominal, but Christian freedom is real.


\(^4\) Philo is not usually considered to be a Stoic. The great task of his life was to assimilate the Hebrew Scriptures to the vocabulary and mentality of the Hellenistic world view. He belongs in this discussion however because his freedom treatise is essentially Stoic. F. H. Colson, the translator and editor of the complete Philo collection, identifies the treatise as an argument in support of the Stoic paradox. See F. H. Colson, tr. *Philo*, IX (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940), 2.
The freedom teaching of the New Testament is the authentic link which connects the modern appreciation of freedom with the origins of freedom in Greek and Israelite antiquity. New Testament freedom is real because its freedom is a visible, daily affair; it is more than a venerable name, more even than a disposition of the mind. Freedom in the New Testament is real in the sense that it integrates mind and body in a program of action which seeks to accomplish the salvation of person and world. The New Testament Christianity then is at base anti-Hellenistic. It begins in Palestine with the ministry of Jesus. Near the beginning of that ministry, the earliest of the Synoptic gospels establishes that the forgiveness of sins—an internal rectification—is not by itself a complete restoration of the person. The body is to be healed as well.\(^5\) The Apostles Creed's insistence on the resurrection of the body is anti-Hellenistic in the extreme. Christian freedom, moreover, is not individual. Like the freedom which was first emergent in earlier antiquity it is freedom which obtains in an organized community, the church. The church is neither a nation in the Israelite sense, nor is it a Greek polis. But it is nonetheless a real community which imparts a substantive identity to the members who participate in it. Freedom is the modality by which this participation becomes possible.

The New Testament teaching of freedom is articulated in the writings of Paul and the Fourth Evangelist. Paul under-\(^5\)Mark 2.3-12.
stands Christian freedom in terms of a contrast with other possible dispositions toward life. This contrast carries with itself a new attitude toward status distinctions in the world, especially toward the socio-legal distinction between freeman and slave. The Fourth Evangelist's understanding of freedom is conceptually organized. That writer's articulation instructs the core thesis of this study, which is that there is in historical reality a "structure of freedom" which can be found in both the ancient and modern experience of freedom. This structure of freedom consists in an incursion into historical existence of the beingful reality which we have understood as the prehistoric endowment of humanity. This beingful reality is divine, and as man becomes open to it, his openness frees him for the future. The structure of freedom poses two great moments which meet in an historical present. These are the moments of negation and position. Freedom negates an old present and makes it past, while it posit a new, supra-historical present as the beginning of a human future which will participate in the divine measure.

In order to elucidate this structure of freedom, this chapter examines in turn the Stoic paradox of freedom as it occurs in Philo and Epictetus, and then the New Testament formulation. The Stoic position is largely a distortion of the ancient understanding, and this distortion is worth investigating in order to show what freedom is not. But even in this misunderstanding of freedom there is a partial memory of what freedom had meant to the old, pre-imperial world of antiquity. The Christian freedom teaching of Paul and
the Fourth Evangelist remembers clearly the early meaning of freedom, and preserves this meaning for the European future.

2. Nominal Freedom in Philo and Epictetus

In the following passage from his treatise on freedom, Philo describes an event which took place in his home city, Alexandria:

A short time ago, when some players were acting a tragedy, and reciting those lines of Euripides,

The name of freedom is worth all the world;
If one has little, let him think that much,

I saw the whole audience so carried away by enthusiasm that they stood upright to their full height, and raising their voices above the actors, burst into shout after shout of applause combining praise of the maxim with praise of the poet, who glorifies not only freedom for what it does, but even its name.®

It is clear from this description that by the time in which Philo writes, the noun "freedom" has begun to command a kind of totem power, not only with philosophers and poets, but with the Hellenized audience as well.® It is possible that the power of the name increases in proportion to the loss of real freedom that an historical community has suffered. If this is the case, the emotive response to the name "freedom" conveys a deep and largely unconscious feeling of opposition to unfree circumstances.

This inflation of the name "freedom" is familiar to us,


for modern symbolization parallels to some extent the Hellenistic increment in audibility of the term, "freedom." That is to say, real freedom is historically rooted in the life of an independent community. When great empires arise and destroy the autonomy of communities, as in late antiquity, or when centralizing economic and political structures supplant the old, liberal pattern of human organization, as in modernity, there is a concomitant loss of real freedom. But the loss of the material basis of the free life of a community does not entail that the symbol lose its power. In Hellenistic, as in modern times, the symbol retains and even increases in power. If political reality is implacably obstreperous in its resistance to the exercise of real freedom in the community, then the symbol lodges its power in the immaterial endowment of the human person. The mind or the soul becomes the dwelling place for freedom, and the bodily reality is consigned to insignificance and disgrace. This explains why in Stoicism and Gnosticism in antiquity, and in existentialism in modernity, freedom takes an intensely personal configuration. In certain times there is no alternative. The symbol can be kept warm and vital only if it is

8 Thus, R. M. Grant speculates that Gnosticism does not originate simply from the Hellenistic world view with its dualism. Rather, he believes that its primary spring is from Jewish apocalyptic. In Roman Palestine during the early empire, there were several insurrections against Rome which were inspired by the apocalyptic vision that God was about to restore autonomy to the Jewish nation. These insurrections were crushed with great carnage. When it became evident that the apocalyptic vision would not achieve material success, that vision was followed by a Gnostic retreat into the self. See R. M. Grant, Gnosticism and Early Christianity (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), pp. 27 ff.
held close against the bosom. That the meaning of the sym­bol is distorted is an unfortunate, but necessary, consequence of its subjectivization.

The Stoic paradox about freedom shows the extent of the personalist distortion of freedom. The paradox is stated in several ways. Philo's title conveys one formulation: "Every Good Man Is Free." Several centuries earlier, Zeno, who had been influenced by the paradigmatic lives of Socrates and the Cynics, Diogenes and Crates, had originally formulated the paradox in terms of wisdom; the wise man alone has both virtue and freedom.\(^9\) In either formulation, it is undeniable that there is an authentic historical thread, since the early records of freedom show that the men who are most free are indeed good and wise, and that they are conspicuously better and wiser than the common run of men. If we know nothing else of Solon, we know that he was good and wise, and that his goodness and wisdom influenced his work. But the Stoic formulations are nonetheless paradoxical because the Stoic doctrine insists that it is only those who are good and wise who are free. This idea is in conflict with experiential reality, for in that reality, there are some men who are wicked or stupid, or both, and who are likewise free and perhaps even wealthy and powerful. Likewise, there are some men who are good and wise who are slaves, chattels of men who are quite possibly inferior to themselves in terms of

goodness and wisdom. The intention of the Stoa in asserting this paradox is to accuse men who are materially free, but who are wicked as well, and thus to convert them from wickedness to goodness. Likewise, the paradox tends to encourage people of low station who are good to continue in their goodness, by assuring them that they are free despite their material circumstances. The most manifest accomplishment of the Stoic paradox however is to make "freedom" a purely nominal term which lacks existential relevance.

There are two main forces which prompt the Stoic nominalization of freedom. One is the rise of cosmopolitan empires and the consequent dwarfment of the old communities in which freedom took form. The other is closely related to this. It is that the immorality of slavery had become transparent while slavery remained a necessity for the maintenance of an advanced, highly differentiated historical existence. With the reduction of old national and political boundaries to inconsequentiality before imperial authority, it became difficult to maintain a theory of natural slavery. If all are subject to Rome, then it is hard to convince oneself that one's own people are inherently superior to all other peoples and that they can be rightfully enslaved. Already in the writing of Aristotle, when the cosmopolitan age was dawning, natural slavery was an idea that could be asserted only with caution and much stipulation. The Stoa had to comprehend

10See Pohlenz, Freedom in Greek Life and Thought, pp. 112-114.

11See Aristotle, Politics, 1253b-1255b. If Diogenes
the historical fact that Diogenes, one of its early models, had in fact been enslaved.12

When the evil of slavery has become transparent, three remedies present themselves. The first is abolition. In all of antiquity, only one group advocated this solution. This was the Jewish Essene sect in Palestine.13 It is symptomatic that the Essenes lived a simple, pious, community life which showed a much lower degree of historical development and differentiation than did the ambient world. Like more recent forms of egalitarian communalism, this group approximated the unitarian pattern of the pre-historic Age of Cronos or world-garden, and was thus empowered to resist the slave institution which is consequent upon historical variegation.

A second remedy is that chosen by Christianity. For present purposes, it is enough to say that Christianity weakened slavery as an institution without demanding its abolition.

The third remedy was that of the Stoa. By defining reality in terms of paradox, it was possible to tolerate virtually any practise by establishing a mental distance which makes the world of daily conduct seem small and minor. This de-

Laertius' reproduction of Aristotle's will is authentic, it seems that Aristotle was ambivalent about the institution which his Politics defends as a natural, and mutually beneficial relationship between master and slave. The will orders the manumission of Aristotle's slaves upon his death. See Diogenes Laertius, Lives, Book V, 15.

12 Epictetus, Discourses, IV, I.

tachment could even lead to a sort of establishmentarian callousness. Diogenes Laertius tells us that Chrysippus taught as follows about Zeno and his disciples in respect of their wisdom and freedom:

... the wise are infallible, not being liable to error. They are also without offence; for they do no hurt to others or to themselves. At the same time they are not pitiful and make no allowance for anyone; they never relax the penalties fixed by the laws, since indulgence and pity and even equitable consideration are marks of a weak mind, which affects kindness in place of chastizing. Nor do they deem punishments too severe.\(^{14}\)

This is an example of the cultivated apathy of the Stoic. The Stoic understood "pathos" not simply as suffering, but as disease itself, and the disease is a condition inhering in the sensory manifold which is at base an endowment of the human body.\(^{15}\) To be without the disease of compassion is thus as desirable as to be without the disease of lust. This uncharitable mien becomes possible whenever the inner life becomes radically detached from the career of the body in the world. Even the slave who subscribes to this philosophy can view with detachment what happens to his body in the world, because he does not believe that what happens to that body is really happening to himself.

The Stoic's paradoxical use of the name "freedom" leads the Stoic to an absurdist travesty of commonly experienced reality. Within this absurdity however there is a genuine,


\(^{15}\) Rist, Stoic Philosophy, pp. 72-73.
political opposition, a negation of present political evil, and thus, incipiently, an understanding of true freedom. Beneath both absurdity and opposition there dwells a memory of the real freedom of old. This memory is not even conversant with the twisting of freedom which the paradox has accomplished. It is a pure memory. We must now examine in turn these three aspects of the Stoic freedom teaching: its absurdity, its oppositional force, its memory.

In developing his main theme that to be good (or sometimes Philo says "wise") is to be free, Philo argues that to be sold does not make one a slave. If a member of a family is kidnapped and is subsequently ransomed by the family, the fact of his having been ransomed does not make him a slave to the family. If a person kidnapped or taken captive in war is sold to a master, this does not make him a slave if he is really a free (= good) person. Beautiful young girls in this situation are often able to turn the master into their own "slave." (It is hard to see how this connects with the thesis that the good are inherently free. Furthermore, Philo withholds comment on what alternatives lie for those who are no longer young and beautiful; the way in which their goodness stays enslavement remains problematic.) This argument concludes with the following passage:

If selling constitutes slavery we should have to assert that a person who had bought some lions is master of the lions, whereas if the beasts do but turn menacing eyes upon him, the poor man will learn at once by experience the cruel and ferocious lordship of those whom

he has purchased. Well then must we not suppose that if lions cannot, still less can the wise man be enslaved, who has in his free and unscathed soul a greater power of resistance to the yoke than any he could make with the naturally slavish body and all the vigour of its physical strength?17

If Philo had ever seen a lion pacing from wall to wall in a cage, the power of his convictions must have led him to suppose that the cat had resolved, as an act of will, to take exercise. The image of the captive lion, and the implicit contrast of this animal with the same beast in its natural setting, show the extent of the Stoic paradox's deviation from the standards which are established in visible reality. The imputation of invisible qualities as compensation for visible imperfection is a symptom of powerlessness and decay. Visibly, the caged lion is not free. The caged lion can be free only if the term "lion" is understood as an exact synonym for "free." In this event, verbal representation has ceased to admit any binding connection to visible reality.

Such absurdities are frequent in Epictetus, and in their political implications they approach satire.

In his long discourse, "On the Calling of the Cynic," Epictetus places the following words in the mouth of the Cynic whom he holds up as a model for all men:

Look at me, I have no house or city, property or slave: I sleep on the ground, I have no wife or children, no miserable palace, but only earth and sky and one poor cloak. Yet what do I lack? Am I not quit of pain and fear, am I not free?18

17 Philo, Every Good Man Is Free, 40.

Now the early cynics of whom Epictetus was thinking as he spoke thus were rather like a Callicles who had been converted to philosophy. They were fierce ascetics who despised the ordinary customs, pleasures, and status distinctions of settled life. In this passage from Epictetus, however, we are not concerned about its historical model of early cynicism, but about its understanding of freedom. The speaker asks, rhetorically, about one who has no house, city, property, family, wardrobe, "Am I not quit of pain and fear, am I not free?" Epictetus is entirely serious here; this is not satire. But from a common sense point of view, it is absurd. The attributes which Epictetus has summed up as "free" are more commonly understood as the attributes of a slave. The Genesis story of Hagar and her son, which we will examine in the following chapter, shows a far more primitive and non-intellectual approach to the visible life circumstance of one who has no property or tribal identity. She is not "quit of pain and fear" because of these attributes. On the contrary, pain and fear are the salient facts of experience for her. Finally, Hagar has incurred the attributes of homeless-

19 In Plato's Gorgias, Callicles savagely advances the sophistic argument that nature is at odds with social convention and law. He thus rejects Socrates and all that Plato understood the paradigmatic life of Socrates to imply. Cynicism later embraced the paradigmatic life of Socrates, but maintained also the ascendancy of nature over convention. Cynicism's use of this sophistic concept resulted in a doctrine of human equality which rejects conventional distinctions amongst men. One consequence of this must obviously be to cast suspicion upon slavery. See Plato, Gorgias, 482e-484c; Diogenes Laertius, Lives, Book VI, 38; Hadas, Hellenistic Culture, pp. 13-16.
ness, etc., because she is a slave and is therefore powerless to avoid them. The contrast of the Hagar who has been cast out of the household to the Cynic through whom Epictetus speaks shows in the most pronounced way the contrast between the old understanding of freedom and slavery and its late, subjectivist distortion. In Epictetus, there is a veritable "transvaluation of values" by which the visible marks of slavery are transformed into badges of virtue and of freedom as well.

There is more than this, however, in the absurdities of Epictetus. We behold a real power and bravery in the way in which Epictetus reduces the common goals of life to absurdity. One suspects that in the philosopher's heart, it is not the common goals that are wrong, but rather that in his time and place, they become wrong because one must seek them within the world tyranny of Caesar. In his discourse "On Freedom," Epictetus details the career of the slave who is set free. The slave imagines that all will be well when he is set free, but his yearning for freedom is only the beginning of his troubles. He will have to pay a tax on his manumission. The slave believes that his status hampers him, and that freedom will mean equality, self mastery, freedom of movement. But actually he will get hungry after he is freed, and then he will have to enter prostitution or be reduced to a state of free labor even more menial than was his lot as a

21 Epictetus, Discourses, IV, I.
slave. Or he may become rich, and then he will fall in love with a slave girl who will make him miserable. He will wish to be a slave again. To make his freedom tolerable, he will enter the military and work his way up in it. "Lastly, when he gets the crown to his career and is made a senator, once more he becomes a slave again as he goes to the senate; then he enjoys the noblest and sleekest slavery of all."\(^{22}\)

This argument continues that the highest stage of slavery is to be Caesar's friend, for to do this one must become a flatterer. A flatterer must speak and act against his own will, and thus he is in truth a slave. In the course of advocating the Stoic, personalist conception of the free will, the choice of materials which Epictetus uses to illustrate the thesis allows him to accuse the whole political system. The conceptual absurdity that the slave is free and the freeman slave is employed to expose an existential absurdity in which to be great amongst men entails the loss of honesty and self mastery.

The idea that the friend of the emperor is in truth a slave is a satire whose intensity can hardly be grasped within a world in which chattel slavery has been abandoned. This satire has become possible because the name "freedom" is separated from the historical circumstances in which freedom came to flourish. Freedom for the Stoa is not the commonly shared characteristic of the non-slave males of a community. Rather, it is a personal and subjective ability to will the

\(^{22}\)Epictetus, Discourses, IV, I, 408.
good and to prohibit the body from interfering with the will. For this reason, Stoic freedom enlarges the personal realm at the expense of the public, common realm. The Stoic idea of freedom maintains a connection to the political sphere, however, through its opposition to political evil. Opposition is articulated in characteristically Hellenistic terms. One opposes the tyrant by maintaining the integrity of the soul. The integrity of the soul is maintained by the forfeiture of the body.

Philo believes that many people who are free will prefer death and dismemberment to enslavement. He recites a list of individuals and peoples; both mythical and historical, who went willingly to death rather than accept tyranny and enslavement. Epictetus engages the tyrant in a dialogue. (Is he thinking of Domitian?) The eloquence of his contempt eludes paraphrase. He speaks thus to the tyrant:

For who pays regard to you as a man? Show me. Who wishes to become like you? Who regards you as one like Socrates to admire and follow?
"But I can behead you."

Well said. I forgot, of course, one ought to pay you worship as if you were fever or cholera, and raise an altar to you, like the altar to Fever in Rome.

What is it then which disturbs and confounds the multitude? Is it the tyrant and his guards? Nay, God forbid! It is impossible for that which is free by nature to be disturbed or hindered by anything but itself. It is a man's own judgments which disturb him. For when the tyrant says to a man, "I will chain your leg," he that values his leg says, "Nay, have mercy," but he that values his will says, "If it seems more profitable to you, chain it."

"Do you pay no heed?"

No, I pay no heed.

"I will show you that I am master."

23Philo, Every Good Man Is Free, 105-120.
How can you? Zeus gave me my freedom. Or do you think that he was likely to let his own son be enslaved? You are master of my dead body, take it.

"Do you mean that when you approach me, you pay no respect to me?"
No, I only pay respect to myself; if you wish me to say that I pay respect to you too, I tell you that I do so, but only as I pay respect to my water pot.24

This impiety toward one who rules the world and is worshipped as a deity is shocking. It bespeaks an opposition which approaches real negativity, for while neither Philo nor Epictetus promulgates a doctrine of negative freedom, the ingredients of the understanding are present here. The respect of tyrants is a result of wrong opinions, and wrong opinions are the result of letting one's disposition toward life be influenced by forces other than one's own will.25

The free will of the free person thus stands solid against the material might of the tyrant, and inasmuch as it is given to immaterial resolve to negate material force, Stoic freedom does negate tyranny. That it must negate the tyrant's venom by annihilating the body may seem to be foreign to any discussion in which "freedom" can be intelligible, but this is not the case. While the Stoa deprecated the body, Judaism and Christianity respected it, but all were required at this period in history to render up the body in order to avoid imperial contamination of the most sacred things.

Furthermore, one must consider the alternative to this Stoic forfeiture of the body. Stoic negativity remains polit-

24Epictetus, Discourses, I, XIX, 257.
25Epictetus, Discourses, I, XIX, 259.
ical; it does not become cosmic. Although the Stoa rids the soul of its earlier, intimate ties to the material world, the separation is not absolute. The Stoa continues to show concern for right political order in the world, although the concrete means for making this concern effectual have vanished. The Stoa does not push the anthropological dualism of soul and body to its cosmic conclusion. It does not become Gnosticism! Even in the transvalued world in which Stoic freedom takes form, the world itself is not damnable. Instead, the world is providential. The Stoa negates not the world, but the tyrant. Political evil occurs, as in old Greece, as a function of ignorance, misorientation to the true pattern. When the world is viewed thus, it is still important to show political concern. The new, personal freedom of the Stoa thus retains a limited connection to political reality. This connection obtains as a personal negativity against tyranny.

The political gradient of Stoic freedom is negative. It is problematical whether there is anything in this philosophy that can be identified as positive freedom. The commitment of the Stoic "free" will to duty is well known, but this is a determined commitment. 26 There is no "if" here; there is no dialogue within the soul over the question of openness or closure. Indeed, in the old Stoa, and again in Epictetus, there is a conscious refusal to accept the soul as a multi-tropic composite which may act reasonably or

26See Pohlenz, Freedom in Greek Life and Thought, 136-137.
unreasonably, freely or unfreely, according to the particular element which has come to dominance. Instead, the soul is a unitary structure which sometimes commands but always consents to events; thus it is necessarily "free." For the Stoic then, the great lesson in life is to follow, lest one be dragged. In either case, nothing truly happens against the will. All is in some sense voluntary. Inasmuch as the unitary, subjective will is a subsidiary part of world reason, there can be no real freedom. The Stoa is quite right in its understanding that freedom consists in willing and doing good, but its assumption that the will is always inclined to the good is at odds with experience. Just as the Stoic paradox denies the physical reality of slavery, the doctrine of the free and good will denies the metaphysical reality of slavery. That is to say, it minimizes the reality and power of evil in man and the world. The Stoic position then is not a doctrine of freedom which is won through struggle against physical bondage and base inclination. Instead, it is ideal determination. This ideal determinism approximates to a theory of mechanism which becomes reminiscent of the gnostic ideologies of modernity. Epictetus tells us that the calling of the citizen is to be totally absorbed in the process, to be like a hand or foot which, if it had reason, would subordinate every impulse to the pattern of the whole body. This thought concludes:

That is why it is well said by philosophers that "if

the good man knew coming events beforehand he would help
on nature, even if it meant working with disease, death
and maiming," for he would realize that by the ordering
of the universe this task is allotted him, and that the
whole is more commanding than the part and the city
than the citizen. "But seeing that we do not know be­
forehand, it is appropriate that we should hold fast to
the things that are by nature more fit to be chosen;
for indeed we are born for this."28

As in his negativity, Epictetus stops short of gnosis in his
positivity. We do not know the entire pattern, but if we
did . . . There can be no doubt that this statement and
others like it display a positive attunement to right reason,
the metaphysical core of reality. But they have nothing to
do with freedom, except perhaps in an undilutedly nominal
sense.29

28Epictetus, Discourses, II, X, 29.

29It is significant that when Paul uses this same meta­
phor of the church as a composite body in I Corinthians,
chapters 12-14, the problem of the body's proper coordination
is not viewed as a problem involving knowledge of a pattern.
Knowledge is singled out for demotion in importance. In­
stead it is a problem of love. If one has love, then one
will function in harmony with the other members of the body.
If we reduce this Pauline treatment to Stoic language, the
problem which Paul poses is: "Is your will free? Have you
been moved by love?" For the Stoa, the issue remains: "Your
will is free. Are you wise enough to manifest this freedom?"
The Pauline treatment, rather than the Stoic, suggests the
tension of freedom and unfreedom within the core of the self,
i.e., the part that loves, the part out of which free posi­
tivity proceeds. True positive freedom comes then as a pos­
itive answer to the question: "Who are you?", not "What do
you know?" Professor Rist's remarks about the early Stoa
shed light on this matter. He writes:

If the reason of the virtuous man is wholly "consis­
tent," then all his acts will be morally good, as the
Stoics held, and he will not make any real choice be­
tween good and evil. It is probably not accidental
that the early Stoics avoid the Aristotelian word for
choice [proairesis], both when talking about external
goods and when observing that virtue is to be chosen
for its own sake. For in any ordinary sense of choice
The reason why this ethical positivity has nothing to do with freedom cannot be identified satisfactorily at the level of Stoic metaphysics or anthropology. Instead, a descent to the political arena is necessary. In this quotation from Epictetus, it is ironic that Epictetus has seen fit to mention the relationship of the city and the citizen. This is an intrusion from an older, more primitive mentality that is not manifestly a concern of the Stoa. In this passage it amounts to little more than a figure of speech, for to the Stoa, man is a citizen of the **cosmos**. Now how should we translate this term? Should we say "world" or "universe"? We must say both, for the Stoa intends both. What the Stoa explicitly does not mean by **cosmos** is "city" or "nation" or "people." Where positive **freedom** occurred in antiquity, it occurred as a liberation, followed by a positioning—or rather, a re-positioning—of life stations and experiences within a community. That community was a cosmion, a micro-cosmos. It was not and could not be the cosmos itself, for such a reality would be too large and too dissociative to support action. Identity with the whole would not be real, but imaginary, and a re-positioning of life would likewise

---

Rist, *Stoic Philosophy*, p. 15. See also Pohlenz, *Freedom in Greek Life and Thought*, pp. 120-121 and 134. For a discussion which emphasizes human sinfulness as the salient distinction between Stoic and Pauline conceptions of personality, see Rudolf Bultmann, *Primitive Christianity in Its Contemporary Setting*, tr. R. H. Fuller (New York: Meridian Books, 1956), pp. 143-144.
be imaginary. This is one way of understanding the Stoa's indifference to slavery. On the nominal level the Stoa does liberate slaves, but a real liberation and a new beginning for one's fellow cosmic "citizens" was not possible. Hence the lack of interest in the matter. Only with the establishment of a community, the church, is the re-positioning of life able to recur. It is such a re-positioning that we will see articulated in Paul's letter to Philemon.

The negativity with which Philo and Epictetus assert real freedom against the tyrant is accompanied by sparse, but solid evidence that these thinkers who embraced the Stoic paradox did have a memory of what freedom had meant in the earlier period when it first emerged in history.

Philo's "memory" can be found in his profuse praise of the Palestinian Essene community with which he was contemporary. Despite this contemporaneity, we are dealing here in the domain of memory because Philo chooses this community above all others in the world at his time to illustrate the concrete meaning of freedom. Such a selection must be instructed by a memory of an earlier pattern of human order which remained visible amongst the Essenes. Philo tells us that the Essenes are a devout, rural people; some farm and others practise crafts; they are not acquisitive beyond life's necessities and thus they are content; they have nothing to do with the making or use of armaments, nor will they become involved in commerce; they seriously study the divinely in-

30 Philo, 75-87.
spired laws of their fathers; they are lovers of God, virtue, and man, and this love is reflected in practise; they hold all things in common, including dwellings, clothing and wages, and they have public meals; they care for the sick and elderly.

Not a single slave is to be found among them, but all are free, exchanging services with each other, and they denounce the owners of slaves, not merely for their injustice in outraging the law of equality, but also for their impiety in annulling the statute of Nature, who motherlike has born and reared all men alike, and created them genuine brothers, not in mere name, but in very reality, though this kinship has been put to confusion by the triumph of malignant covetousness, which has wrought estrangement instead of affinity and enmity instead of friendship.31

It would be hard to find a more blunt denunciation of slavery at any time. Philo's appreciation of the Essenes' anti-slave position is informed by both his Jewish and his Greek memory. As a Jew, he looks back to the liberation and Exodus of Israel from Egypt, and as a recipient of Greek culture, he cannot but remember the Solonic rectification and its influence beyond Athens in Greek antiquity. We should note the reasons which Philo gives for the attainment of this high degree of freedom by the Essenes. He says, "Such are the athletes of virtue produced by a philosophy free from the pedantry of Greek wordiness, a philosophy which sets its pupils to practise themselves in laudable actions, by which the liberty which can never be enslaved is firmly established."32

The memory of free community practise, as exemplified by the Essenes, has made it possible for Philo to perceive, at

31 Philo, Every Good Man Is Free, 79.
32 Philo, Every Good Man Is Free, 88.
least for the moment, the disparity between words and reality. The Essenes are good and they are free, but not only because of an interior disposition; their freedom is concrete to the point that it has become absolutely opposed to the practise of slavery. They occupy a living space in which the name "freedom" has become real. This space is no cosmopolis; instead, it is a God-community.

In one discourse, Epictetus also shows memory of the real and concrete integration of life in the time before. This discourse is a spirited diatribe against sceptics and Epicureans. Epictetus detects a nihilism at the base of these doctrines, and he is especially concerned about their effects upon the young. This is most interesting because the intensity of Epictetus' desire to refute the sceptic leads him, for the duration of this discourse, completely away from the hard dualism of mind and body and into a concrete monism of self and community. Epictetus asserts nothing less than the reality of reality. In this, he forsakes all paradox, all convolution of meaning. He speaks like one who opposes the scepticism and nominalism of modern science because of its anomic implication to human life. Epictetus imagines that he is a slave to a sceptic. The master demands:

"Give me gruel here." I would fill a dish with vinegar sauce and bring it to him.
"Did I not ask for gruel?"
Yes, master, this is gruel.
"Is not this vinegar sauce?"
How is it more that than gruel?
"Take it and smell, take it and taste."

Epictetus, Discourses, II, XX.
How can you know if the senses play us false? If I had three or four fellow slaves who shared my mind I should give him such a dressing that he would hang himself, or change his opinion. Such men trifle with us; they take advantage of all the gifts of nature, while in theory they do away with them.34

In his mockery of Epicurus, the Stoic paradox about freedom disappears in a defense of the more common understanding of antiquity about freedom, slavery, the city.

Bravo, philosopher! Stick to your task, persuade our young men, that we may have more to agree with you and share your views. These, no doubt, are the arguments which have brought well-governed cities to greatness, these are the arguments which made Lacedaemon, these are the convictions which Lycurgus wrought into the Spartans by his laws and training: that slavery is no more shameful than noble, and freedom no more noble than shameful! For these beliefs no doubt those who died at Thermopylae died!35

The arguments which are mentioned here are standard Epicurean fare: atheism, repudiation of the natural sociability of mankind, hedonism. What seems most revealing about Epictetus' response to these arguments is that he does not refute them philosophically. Instead, he echoes Herodotus in pointing out that the men of Greece would not have died to stop the Persians had their lives held no more meaning for them than oriental tyranny or Epicurean dogma is able to offer. The anomic vision of the world is always available, and with the acceleration of world historicity, as in imperial antiquity, it becomes proportionately more available. But this view, with its argumentative distortion of commonly apprehended meanings, is unable to support an integrated human life.

34 Epictetus, *Discourses*, II, XX, 327-328.
35 Epictetus, *Discourses*, II, XX, 327.
We can only wonder if Epictetus ever understood that the Stoic nominalization of freedom is similarly argumentative, similarly at odds with the real, archaic understanding of freedom. A part of the implication of the Stoic paradox must be that "slavery is no more shameful than noble, and freedom no more noble than shameful!"

In both Philo and Epictetus there is a basic confusion. There is a frail memory of what freedom had meant in the time of its emergence in history. There is an opposition to tyranny. But concomitantly there is a detachment of the name "freedom" from free circumstance. This detachment distorts freedom. It elevates it as a symbol which no longer symbolizes a substantive power, and thus risks both idolatry and a consequent sublimation of opposition. The dissociation of the symbol from its referent life circumstance occurs in a historical world which has lost vital connection with its past. For the inhabitants of such a world, there is no firm, historical past with traditions and institutions which can anchor a present and assure a future by providing a positive orientation to the real affairs of life. Furthermore, there is but a muted and intellectual memory of the pre-historic content and power which created and organized the world, the community, the human self. For the Stoa, "Zeus" is only a metaphor. The divine name means logos or world reason, of which the individual subjective will is a small part. When the pre-historic reality has been thus intellectualized, one participates in this transformed prehistory, not primarily by
acting in history, but by detaching the soul from history. Such a detached soul does perform in history, but it does so from a somber concern for duty, and not from a free givenness in the goods of life. Dutiful behavior is not wholly free. It is a calculated response to the manifest need for ethical conduct as the necessary condition for human survival. As such, it is pragmatic, dictated by an almost physical necessity. Duty does not partake of the free, world-creative spontaneity which characterizes human practise in its most enduring presentations.

The detached soul is able to do its duty because the Stoa has given it a "free will." It is this very dogmatic assertion that is the source of confusion for the Stoa and for later philosophy as well. The Stoic doctrine of free will plucks some imaginary, composite human out of his home, his community, his climate, and places him against the immediate backdrop of the whole universe and asserts: This person is free. In so doing, this doctrine forges a hard distinction between "man" and "economic man" or "political man." Whatever may be the "philosophic" merits of such abstract speculation about freedom understood as an independent will, history shows that freedom appeared and became meaningful in material and symbolic reality in the finite space of a living community. In Greece, the name "free" referred to concrete realities in the household and city. We infer thus that the primary meaning of the term is a political meaning. The Stoic memory of this older freedom shows us that the political meaning of freedom has not been lost, but rather that its primacy
has been lost. This memory, along with the dutiful commitment to ethical conduct, instructs the Stoa's opposition to tyranny. But the ascendancy of freedom of will over political freedom in the Stoic hierarchy of interests makes the Stoa impotent to pose a real, political alternative to the prevailing evil. In the Stoic treatment of freedom then there is no complete structure of freedom. Two rudiments of the structure are present, at least in a formal sense. There are the real negativity toward the tyrant, and the world reason which performs as the pre-historic ordering principle for history. The positive ingredient, the victory of the positive power within the soul over the forces of concupiscence and destruction, is absent. The free impetus to recreate, to re-position life, is absent. An ideally determined duty is advocated in place of freedom.

In the Christian New Testament we find a fuller appreciation of freedom than the Stoa can show. The letters of Paul treat freedom in a way that is reminiscent of Herodotus; they contrast two opposed life patterns, the free and the unfree. The Fourth Evangelist articulates a structure of freedom which points the modern consciousness of freedom to its origins in Mediterranean antiquity.

3. The Structure of Freedom in the New Testament

Freedom is first an experience which occurs within history as the positioning, or placing, or making to stand of certain persons in a special way. Later, "freedom" occurs as a name which expresses in language the way in which those
who have experienced freedom have come to stand in historical reality. As we have seen in the discussion of the Stoic paradox, the use of names is hazardous because names can become symbols which are dissociated from the primary experience out of which they grew. In the earliest understandings about freedom in both Israel and Greece there is in fact no noun in those languages which would translate as "freedom," or even as "freeman." At the early period, the experience which we comprehend by the name, "freedom," was articulated negatively by reference to the existential misfortune of the slave. Homer tells us that a slave has only half the powers and esteem of a man. Only later did the predicate "free" appear in reference to the man who is not a slave. By the time that the freedom vocabulary reaches the Stoa, it is no longer not being a slave that is the trait of the free person, but rather being wise or good is the trait of the free person. Secondary aspects of the free person have replaced the primary aspect because of the erosive process of historical forgetting.

The primary experiential instance of freedom as a notable property of a people in history occurs in Egypt with the liberation of the People of Yahweh from the power of Pharaoh. A similar event occurs in Greece with the Solonic rectification. Both involve a repositioning of life, a "positive freedom" as it were. These events in history are great events. They are great in the sense that they convey to us a feeling of large-
ness and of power which accompanies something that is pri-
mary and enduring. The symbols of freedom which we find in
the Christian New Testament give us access to these earlier
events that have been so decisive for European history. The
New Testament is able to do this, not because it is a divine
book, and not mainly because it is a recipient of the cul-
tures of Moses and Solon. The New Testament symbols are
able to make the primary experience of political freedom
open to us for two other reasons. One is that the New Tes-
tament canon took form in a world in which the vocabulary of
freedom was developed and conventional. But second, and of
crucial importance, is that the New Testament was written in
response to a great event. That event was the work of Jesus.
The ministry of repentance, forgiveness and healing, of
atonement, was a great event. Considered as a whole, it
amounted to a repositioning of life. It was a primary event
which Europe has understood as the beginning of a new time.
It can hardly be surprising that Paul and the author who is
known to us as John would comprehend this great event in
terms of freedom.

The New Testament symbolic structure of freedom is not
important to this study in a "cultural" sense. That is to
say, we do not imagine that New Testament freedom is nothing
besides a concept whose meaning obtains from a mixing of Hel-
lenistic ideas and terms with a Hebraic-Christian heritage.
If it were only such a mixture, it could be reduced to its
"cultural" ingredients, and in this way afford access to the
earlier experiences of freedom. The New Testament is unable
to do this. Bultmann has shown that the Pauline understanding of freedom is very different from the mature Greek understanding, and also that Paul's understanding of the Old Testament itself is a theological interpretation rather than an historically faithful representation. This means that there is novelty in the New Testament's teaching about freedom, and thus, that from a "cultural" point of view, the New Testament compounds ingredients from East and West and makes of them something new. It is of such novelties that culture consists, for the term "culture" becomes meaningful when contrast between differing patterns of life is intended. The New Testament surpasses an old culture and begins a new one, and its teaching about freedom is a part of the new culture. We behold the old culture of freedom, for example, when Antigone acts freely as she decides within herself to obey the higher law. We see the new when Saul of Tarsus becomes free as he is changed to Paul on the road to Damascus. The difference between the two understandings about freedom is immense, and each typifies the attitude of its respective culture.

A study which seeks the origins of freedom in Mediterranean antiquity will not be concerned with the New Testament position on freedom unless that teaching serves in some way


to make these origins intelligible to us. The New Testament does indeed serve this purpose, but not by giving us clues to the thought peculiarities of people who had lived earlier. If all of the old Greek texts and the Old Testament had been lost, the information which the New Testament affords would not make a reliable historical reconstruction of Greek or Israelite culture possible. The New Testament can shed some direct historical light on the earlier cultures, but this light is dim and it is focused with too great specificity. The New Testament helps us to comprehend the origins of freedom, not in respect of attitudes, such as that of Antigone, which are culturally peculiar, but rather in respect of realities which are general. Our interest in the New Testament freedom teaching is directed thus at a level which is before culture and below culture. When we ask, what is freedom?, this is a little like asking, what is a house? We do not reply by saying that it is a building made of stones which are joined by mortar, but rather we say that it is a dwelling constructed from available materials which serves certain general purposes. To assay what it is, we look to its original functions, and then to its later deviations which are contingent upon cultural peculiarity.

Although one would prefer a less pretentious word, it is an archetypal understanding of freedom that the New Testament is able to offer, because the New Testament shows freedom at a time of beginnings, just as do the earlier episodes which are the main interest of this study. By "archetype" we mean that a certain kind of event in history is productive of free-
dom, much as a birth is productive of joy and a death of sorrow. When, as in the ministry of Jesus, historical life is turned from its false direction to its true orient, the presence and will of the Father, the reality of freedom will be incipient in this turning. One who has turned is no longer a slave, no longer a half-person. One is that which his Creator has intended that he be, and his being thus makes him free within the community which shares the true orientation. This turning is a turning away from history, from one's slave past in which the world is divided and fallen. It is a turning toward one's true identity, the self who one would be, the self who dwells in concord before history with the Creator. Finally, it is a turning back to history, but to a new and heightened history which is more beingful than one's former history.

This process of turning evinces the structure of freedom which lies below culture. Antigone turns herself away from the false alternative of compliance with the king's decree. Saul of Tarsus is turned by God from a false ambition. But despite the agency by which the turning comes, both turn, and this is freedom. In both there is a before and an after, an old and a new, a negation and a position.

Along with Seneca and Epictetus, the Apostle Paul inhabited the troubled, early period of the Roman Empire. But Paul differed from these Stoic luminaries in that he did not consider himself a citizen of the universe, or a philosopher
for the universe, but rather as a minister to the Christian church. Paul's writings, a collection of letters to Christian congregations, became canonical as letters to the entire church. We are not directly concerned with the theology of these letters, or about the development of Paul's attitude as he began to anticipate a prolonged wait for the return of Christ. We are interested specifically in the freedom message of these letters.

The letters of Paul address problems which had arisen in Christian congregations. These problems included both doctrinal and practical matters. As Paul advises about how the congregations are to resolve these oftentimes schismatic problems, there appears a common motif of exhortation which runs throughout his letters. It can be digested as follows: "Remember always, you are no longer the persons who you once were; your old condition is a thing of the past. Through the work of the Spirit, you--both as individuals and as a corporate body--have been given a new life in Christ Jesus. Live not your old life but your new life." Paul understood his own biography in terms of such a contrast between old and new, past and present. In order to exemplify for his audience just what this contrast means, Paul uses a number of images. The image which is of concern to us is the contrast between the slave and the free person. One's former condition, the condition before he came into the church of Christ, was that of a slave. His latter condition in the

39 See especially Galatians 4 and Romans 6.
church is that of a free person. If one does not live freely by spontaneously practising the virtues of love and forbearance, then he regresses to the old condition. He is re-enslaved.

There are five senses in which Paul uses the term, "slave" (doulos). Four of these usages are closely related, and their meanings overlap; the fifth is independent. We need to dispense first with this fifth meaning. Paul says that Christians are "slaves of righteousness" and "slaves of God." This use of "slave" is not related to the other uses of the term, and its implication is troublesome. The usage is troublesome not because it reduces the Christian to a condition of servile bondage before a despot-god. This is not what Paul or the Old Testament means when they use the term thus. It is troublesome because it is an atavism in Paul's thought. This preacher who so zealously developed the distinction between law and gospel, and by consequence, between Old Testament and New, failed in this passage from Romans to advance beyond the Old Testament symbolization of the divine-human relationship. For this reason, the Fourth Evangelist explicitly repudiates this Old Testament and Pauline understanding of the believer's relationship to God.

The four other usages of "slave" deal with the life of the person before he has come to have righteousness through

---

40 Romans 6.18 and 22.

faith. In our old selves, we were "enslaved to sin." The child of the household, as a person before maturity and mastery, is "no better than a slave." Such children "were slaves to the elemental spirits of the universe" (stochieia). Finally, those who persist in Jewish legalism, the covenant from Mount Sinai, are the children of Hagar, and "she is in slavery with her children." These four uses of "slave" can be comprehended within two categories. One of these is general, and the other cultural. That is, when Paul speaks of slavery to sin, and of the slave-like condition of the child, he is discussing a general human predicament. One who sins does other than he truly would do, had he the power to be the greater self whom his soul projects for him. Thus, he is like the child who awaits maturity, the age of power over one's own life. When Paul associates slavery with the elemental spirits and with the covenant from Sinai, he is dealing in materials drawn from the cultures of early Gnosticism and Judaism. The elemental spirits are the Gnostic archons. They enslave the self by impeding the advance of the self to reunion with God. In this statement then, Paul suggests that the congregation at Antioch had at some time fallen under the Gnostic influence, as well as the Judaizing

42 Romans 6.6.
43 Galatians 4.1.
44 Galatians 4.3.
45 Galatians 4.25.
46 Bultmann, Primitive Christianity, p. 190.
influence. The association of the covenant of Sinai with the enslavement of Hagar is an irony, a deliberate blasphemy against the principles of first century Jewish legalism. It means that to seek salvation in law, which was given on Sinai, is to move away from freedom, into the domain of slavery.

Paul's statements about slavery begin to reveal, by a series of negations, what freedom is. Freedom is not wrongdoing; it is not personal immaturity; it is not astral or chthonian superstition; it is not even persistent obedience to law. This last understanding is especially important, for it shows that Paul's grasp of the matter is truly primal. Paul's understanding is more basic than even the understanding of Herodotus, who was the world's first great celebrant of freedom. Both Herodotus and Pericles after him believed freedom to occur in accordance with lawfulness, understood in terms of constitutionalism. Paul, who is nearer to a great event than they, realizes that this is not the case. Freedom

---


The first extant uninflected usage of eleutheria occurs in conjunction with this "constitutional fallacy." It is found in Pindar, I Pythian, 61-62. There the poet associates freedom with the laws of a well founded city. As we will observe in chapter five, Solon avoided this fallacy some two generations before Pindar, identifying freedom as a consequence of divine justice, not law.

It is not the task of this study to address in detail the complex question of freedom and law, for that question does not arise during the period of origins, or to an appreciable extent, even in the classical period. The question becomes important in Roman times with the rise of a legalistic political outlook. A historian of the natural law tradition writes of Ulpian's view, "that the jus gentium falls short of natural law and that in its provisions regulating slavery it was contrary to the law of nature, 'for by the law of nature all men were born free.'" (Paul E. Sigmund,
occurs as the consequence of an eruption of the divine into history. Rules of law and lawful conduct are but a remote echo of this divine epiphany. The immediate consequence is free righteousness. "For freedom Christ has set us free; stand fast therefore, and do not submit again to a yoke of slavery. Now I, Paul, say to you that if you receive circumcision, Christ will be of no advantage to you." For the Judaism from which Paul has departed, circumcision is the sign of dedication to the law. For gentiles to be circumcised is to be re-enslaved; gentile Christians must "stand fast" in their freedom and avoid submission to law. The meaning of this standing fast does not proceed to the observance of established rules. Instead, it implies the conduct of life according to the ever-enduring inspiration of love.

Paul's understanding of freedom shows us that in its primary presentation, freedom is antinomian. When the divine vision is still vivid, righteous conduct pours forth, not as calculated obedience—duty—but as spontaneous affection.

48 Galatians 5.1-2.
49 I Corinthians 13.8-13.
To a consciousness so permeated by love, even heartfelt devotion to law—such as that of the Pharisees—is not perceived as freedom, but as slavery. Only when the vision becomes remote and hardened does freedom become associated with obedience to hallowed rules and precepts.

Despite the vibrance of Paul's exultation in Christian freedom, there is a serious question about the relevance of his understanding of freedom in this discussion. If Christ has freed the faithful from slavery to sin, childish powerlessness, Gnostic demons and sumptuary law, how does this understanding of slavery and freedom differ from the Stoic understanding? More specifically, is not this view of freedom nominal and personal in the same way that Stoic freedom is nominal? Does it not simply repeat the Hellenistic fallacy of confusing personal goodness and some species of subjective certitude with real freedom? Does it not therefore forget what freedom had meant at the time of its emergence in earlier antiquity? In truth, each of these questions must be answered affirmatively, but the affirmation is most highly conditional. Pauline freedom is metaphorical, just as is the freedom of the Stoic paradox, to the extent that it does not entail as a necessary condition the release of slaves from actual, legal slavery. But there are realizations present in Paul's understanding which point in the direction of real freedom. These realizations concern Paul's view of the human personality and his teaching about the proper form of relationships within the Christian church.
We recall that for the Stoa, the human personality is not a divided and dynamic melange of powers, but that instead it is a solitary structure which consents to the events of life. It is thus definitionally free, since the will is a mechanism of consent. Paul's understanding of the personality is completely different from this. It is suggestive of the older, Platonic view, in which the contending forces within the person compete for supremacy. Consider the following passages:

For I know that nothing good dwells within me, that is, in my flesh. I can will what is right, but I cannot do it. For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do. Now if I do what I do not want, it is no longer I that do it, but the sin which dwells within me.

For those who live according to the flesh set their minds on the things of the flesh, but those who live according to the spirit set their minds on the things of the spirit.50

This personality is not definitionally free. Instead, it is susceptible of either freedom or bondage. That is to say, it can become free, different, more whole than it was before. Through the help of the Spirit, the Pauline personality negates a dead past and posits a living future. This Pauline future is not informed by Hellenic wisdom, which makes consent a process of higher consciousness, but by faith, hope, and love, which make a real repositioning of life possible. For Paul, this repositioning becomes visible in the Christian church. The church then is the vessel of real freedom in a world which is subject to Caesar.

---

50 Romans 7.18-20 and 8.5.
It is not within the power of the apostle to bring an end to slavery in the empire, nor his desire to do so. The empire is not of concern to Paul, for beside the church, an eschatological community of those who have come to share in God's redemptive act, the empire has only a utilitarian importance. Within this church, however, the status arrangements of the secular world are to be disregarded. Paul has advised the church that Christ has set its members free. Therefore he says: "There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus." Toward the end of his ministry, the apostle again commands:

Here there cannot be Greek and Jew, circumcised and uncircumcised, barbarian, Scythian, slave, free man, but Christ is all, and in all. Put on then, as God's chosen ones, holy and beloved, compassion, kindness, lowliness, meekness, and patience, forbearing one another and, if one has a complaint against another, forgiving each other; as the Lord has forgiven you, so you must also forgive. And above all these put on love, which binds everything together in perfect harmony.52

It is this unifying love, emanating from Christ, which makes of the church a community of the free. As the subsequent chapters will explain, this unifying and liberating love has as its analogue the unifying sonship of Israel at the time of the Exodus and the unifying reverence for divine justice in the Aeschylean drama.

Paul's sincerity in this conviction that unity in Christ puts an end to the distinction between free and slave

51 Galatians 3.28.

52 Colossians 3.11-14.
is attested by the survival of a very personal letter of Paul to one Philemon, in whose house the church at Colossae met. Philemon's slave, Onesimus, had run away and had somehow become acquainted with Paul in Rome. There he accepted Christianity, and for a time served the apostle during his imprisonment. The letter to Philemon concerns Paul's return of Onesimus to his master. Nowhere in the letter does Paul direct that Philemon should manumit the slave; legal title is insignificant to him. Instead of manumission, Paul speaks to Philemon of brotherhood.

Perhaps this is why he was parted from you for a while, that you might have him back forever, no longer as a slave but more than a slave, as a beloved brother, especially to me but how much more to you, both in the flesh and in the Lord. So if you consider me your partner, receive him as you would receive me. If he has wronged you at all, or owes you anything, charge that to my account. I, Paul, write this with my own hand, I will repay it—to say nothing of your owing me even your own self. Yes, brother, I want some benefit [onai'men]* from you in the Lord. Refresh my heart in Christ.53

The letter to Philemon is of central importance to us, for it indicates the reason why New Testament freedom may be called real, while the Stoic interest in freedom is nominal. Both Epictetus and Paul shrink from attacking slavery as a legal institution, but Paul goes much further than Epictetus in that he does nonetheless attack it at a more basic, pre-legal level. Within the household of Philemon, within the church at Colossae, Onesimus is no longer slave, but is instead beloved brother. To infer from this that he is free

53 Philemon, 15-20. *This is a play on the name "Onesimus," which means "useful" or "beneficial."
is almost a redundancy. This Onesimus is entirely different from a slave who, possessing wisdom and virtue, is mentally free. If such a slave really knows himself as a free person, this means that his self-knowledge has become solely an internally generated knowledge, and thus that he has ceased to experience communion with his fellow humans who know him not as free, but as slave. It means at last that he has cut away the primary trait which gives him humanity, the ability to enter into communion with his fellows. The Stoic defense of suicide bears implications beyond the physical domain; it reaches into the life of the soul as well. None of this is the case however with Paul's "child," Onesimus. In the church, the community which for him is salient, Onesimus will be known as beloved brother. His self-knowledge will be informed by his community's identification, and for this reason he will be no longer slave, but free. With this freedom in the community comes virtue, and perhaps wisdom as well. Moral improvement and moral freedom are consubstantial in the structure of freedom. This structure of freedom becomes intelligible for us as a conceptual schema in the Fourth Gospel of the New Testament.

The Fourth Evangelist, along with Paul, understands human freedom to be a consequence of the ministry of Jesus. Paul's letters and the Acts of the Apostles provide a sum of information about Paul which is adequate to the recon-
struction of a portrait of the man and his work. Unlike Paul, very little is known about the Fourth Evangelist. His biography of Jesus establishes him as one of the most influential masters of antiquity, but this same biography is the sole source of reliable information about its author. Because the Fourth Gospel is a biography of Jesus, and not of its own author, it suggests questions about its author and his purposes without providing certain answers to these questions. Here are some of the questions which the Fourth Gospel suggests: Is the *logos* which is discussed in the prologue related closely to the various forms of *logos* which appear in the narrative body of the gospel? Has the author of the gospel taken over a gospel about John the Baptist, converting it to a gospel about Jesus? Is the author a Christian Gnostic whose work has been subjected to Catholic redaction, or is he a Catholic whose work has been corrupted with a Gnostic overlay? Does the author anticipate a return of Jesus, or does he embrace the position known as "realized eschatology"? Is it possible that the Fourth Gospel could have been written earlier than the letters of Paul and the Synoptic gospels, or does the intense hostility toward Judaism establish with certainty its place amongst the latest writings in the New Testament? Is the author of the Fourth Gospel the author of the three epistles which church tradition ascribes to John?

These are serious questions, and the answers which are forthcoming in response to them determine our understanding
of the intention of the Fourth Evangelist. And although the specific concern of this study is the Fourth Gospel's freedom message, it is necessary to have some general idea of the Fourth Evangelist's broader purpose in writing about Christ. The questions which have been posed about this book testify to its complexity and to its interior mystery. If anyone is to be able to get this book to speak to him in a cogent way, he must first venture some minimal set of assumptions about it.

This study will proceed on the basis of these assumptions: The Fourth Gospel is not fundamentally heretical. That is to say, first, it is not preponderantly an allegory about a celestial figure whom its author calls logos-light-Son-Christ, who opposes the archon(s) who govern the world. Instead, it is primarily a response to the ministry in Palestine of the same historical Jesus who is the main character of the Synoptic gospels. Second, the gospel is primarily orthodox and Biblical, and only secondarily Gnostic. This means that we would attach great weight to the following passage:

For God so loved the world that he gave his only Son, that whoever believes in him should not perish but have eternal life. For God sent the Son into the world, not to condemn the world, but that the world might be saved through him.54

We would find less importance in the following:

The true light that enlightens every man was coming into the world. He was in the world, and the world

54John 3.16-17.
was made through him, yet the world knew [ἐγνώ] him not.\(^{55}\)

The former passage reflects the orthodox position that Jesus was the Christ, the anointed Son of God who had been sent to save the world—i.e., created existence in time—from its own sins. The Iranian symbolism of the latter passage suggests the Gnostic belief that created existence in time is inherently ignorant and thus, irredeemably evil.

That we perform such a ranking of themes is absolutely necessary. If the Fourth Gospel is primarily Gnostic, then it follows that its treatment of freedom will amount to an

\(^{55}\)John 1.9-10. Why did the world not know the light? Possibly because the world, which this evangelist suggests (John 12.31) has had the devil for its ruler (archōn), was incapable of seeing the light; possibly because the logos—light came from the Father in disguise so as to avoid interference from the archon(s) during his descent. This book does not answer such questions. Why then does it employ with such great frequency this indisputably Gnostic imagery and terminology? Bultmann's famous argument that post-Pauline Christianity appropriated a full blown Gnostic redeemer myth to articulate the life of Jesus cannot be accepted here. The existence of such a developed myth, prior to the beginning of Christianity, remains speculative; moreover, Bultmann's own excellent explanation of the gross differences between Christianity and Gnosticism tends to weaken the plausibility of the Gnostic redeemer thesis. Professors Colwell and Titus suggest a more tenable answer. They point out that although there are inflections of gnōsis scattered abundantly throughout the text, never is gnōsis used in its uninflected form. This would seem to indicate a sort of homeopathy; i.e., the Fourth Evangelist couches a gospel whose main drift is Catholic within a Gnostic form. In this way it would be possible to combat the patent heresy of Christian Gnosticism by use of a Gnostic Christian instrument which is essentially orthodox. This is manifestly the reason why the epistle known as I John employs Gnostic terminology throughout. See Ernest Cadman Colwell and Eric Lane Titus, The Gospel of the Spirit: A Study of the Fourth Gospel (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), pp. 155-157. See also Grant, Gnosticism and Early Christianity, pp. 175-177, and Bultmann, Primitive Christianity, pp. 196 ff.
oriental escape from the damnable world, accomplished through knowledge of secrets which are available to a small, elect group. If, instead, it is Catholic, drawing its main inspiration from the Old Testament whose God is the good Creator-Father, then its freedom will have to do with a life in this world which is animated by belief or faith in the Son whom God has sent into the world as an act of love. To say that we make these assumptions about the book is to say no more than that we understand this book to say what Christianity understood it to say from the defeat of Gnosticism until the rise of the higher criticism. The orthodox understanding of the Fourth Gospel makes its freedom message illuminate the original occurrences of freedom in Mediterranean antiquity. The Gnostic interpretation leads not to freedom as an historical reality, but to an extra-historical bliss.

Our third assumption is that in the Fourth Gospel the dominant theme is participation in the life of God through belief in Jesus, the Son of God. Those who believe in the Son will come to know the Father, and to share in his timeless glory. This theme is the Fourth Evangelist's analogue to the motif of the old and the new in the writing of Paul. Those who so participate are given "eternal life," and "eternal life" in the Fourth Gospel means much the same thing as "Kingdom of God" in the Synoptic gospels. The following passage expresses this participatory concern:

When Jesus had spoken these words, he lifted up his eyes to heaven and said, "Father, the hour has come;

glorify thy Son that the Son may glorify thee, since thou hast given him power over all flesh, to give eternal life to all whom thou hast given him. And this is eternal life, that they know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent. 57

Although the Fourth Evangelist does not speak of the "church," it is clear that he understands this participation to happen in the church. This church is an organic entity in which human severality is submerged through consecration in truth. As a consecrate unity, the church is distinguishable from the world into which it is sent. 58 To say that believers have eternal life is to say that human participation in the eternal life of God is a prehistoric participation since it does not have historic time as its limit. Instead, eternal life limits and transforms historical existence. Historic individuation is attenuated as human existence is subsumed within the timeless truth of God's being. As we have recognized earlier, it is this subsumption of individuation and strife which puts an end to the selfish exploitativeness and cruelty which makes slavery the consequence of history. The Fourth Evangelist is less a preacher of ethics than even Paul. In his consciousness, the antinomian strain is pure. The Fourth Gospel does not even discuss the law. 59 Those who believe in the Son have unity and life because they receive and reflect the love of God. 60 It is within the con-

57 John 17.1-3.
58 John 17.18-21.
59 An understanding of the Pauline treatment of law is suggested in John 1.17; this does not however become a major topic in the Fourth Gospel.
60 John 15.4-17.
text of this unifying, divine love that the symbol of the free disciple becomes intelligible for us.

Participation in the eternal life of the Father through knowledge of the Son is the main theme of the Fourth Gospel. Freedom is a minor consideration which contributes to the Fourth Evangelist's exposition of participation. The effort of this book would not be greatly impaired had the short pericope which discusses freedom not been transmitted to us. But if that were the case, our knowledge of freedom would remain incomplete. The Fourth Evangelist uses the word "free" in such a way as to identify for us the place of freedom in human reality and in the being of all. Although this author writes after the possibility of political community has been lost for the world, his understanding of freedom and its participatory implication makes it possible for us to understand the primary events which made freedom a concern for Europe. It is not too much to aver that beneath the Fourth Gospel's freedom pericope, there can be discerned a "structure of freedom" whose terms will be present wherever freedom is experienced in history.

The Fourth Gospel speaks as follows about freedom:

Jesus then said to the Jews who had believed in him, "If you continue in my word [logō], you are truly my disciples, and you will know the truth, and the truth will make you free." They answered him, "We are descendants of Abraham, and have never been in bondage to anyone. How is it that you say, 'You will be made free'?"

Jesus answered them, "Truly, truly, I say to you, everyone who commits [poiōn] sin is a slave to sin. The slave does not continue in the house for ever; the
son continues for ever. So if the Son makes you free, you will be free indeed [ontós]." 61

Before we examine this passage with respect to its structure, it is necessary to comment on the vocabulary which constitutes the structure. Three terms require attention. In English, these are "free," "indeed," and "word."

In the Fourth Gospel, "free" has the same quasi-metaphorical sense that is has for Paul; it is a condition of not sinning. But beneath this meaning, the Fourth Evangelist displays, through his own comment on the imagery, the basic understanding of antiquity about the matter. The slave is not free, and the free person is not slave. This is because the free person has a permanent tenure in the household. The slave can be separated from the household with no affront to law or convention. The implication is clearly that the slave is less a person than the free for this reason. There is then no hint of the Stoic paradox in this text's use of "slave" and "free."

The word which both the King James and Revised Standard Version translators have curiously rendered, "indeed," is of vital importance in understanding this text. The term gives the whole passage its orient. The text says, "ontós free you will be." This ontós has nothing to do with deeds, and it is not simply a random expletive. The Fourth Evangelist uses words consideredly, as is shown by the play on the word "son"; Jesus, the Son of the Father, is associated by impli-

61 John 8.31-36.
cation with Isaac, the son of Abraham, within the "household," i.e., Israel. οντός is an adverb made from the participle on. An exact English equivalent would be "beingly," or more loosely, "really." The true sense of this passage is, "If then the son freed you, you will be free to partake of a genuine reality." This one word then tells us what the entire passage is about. It is about being, and freedom relates to being. There is the true being of "my word." There is the false being of "making [poiōn] sin." Freedom attaches to the former. This is not to suggest that the Fourth Evangelist is a Platonist, for he is not. There is of course a parallel between the two, but it obtains only because two men who wrote in a language generally the same apprehended a higher reality which inevitably accuses of profanity and falsehood the lower reality of historical existence.

Participation in genuine reality involves that "you continue in my word [logō]." This usage necessarily suggests the broader question about the meaning of logos in the Fourth Gospel. In the passage considered here, is the logos in which one is to continue the same as the world-creative logos of the prologue? We do not know, for the author does not tell us. One thing seems certain; that is that if in this freedom discussion the author intended nothing more than the English noun "word" conveys, he probably would have used hrēma instead of logos. 62 Freedom is contingent upon one's

62 This is the usage in John 3.34: "For he whom God has sent utters the words [hrēmata] of god . . ."
continuing in the logos, but the text does not explain this.
In order to understand the sense of this passage, we need to examine the several meanings of logos itself. Professor Goodenough, who objects to its translation as "word," identifies three meanings in the Hellenistic period.

Logos means primarily the formulation and expression of thought in speech, but from this it took on a variety of associated meanings. For example, it could mean the formula by which a thing is constituted, like a formula in chemistry; so Aristotle most commonly used it. It could mean a phrase or speech of almost any kind or length, even an oration, but never a single word. And it could be turned back upon the process by which utterance was formulated in thought, and so come to mean reason. In this sense study of logos as reason is logic, the science of formulation of thought.63

In each of these meanings the function which logos performs is similar. The logos of speech is an instrument of ordering and unifying, and therefore it does have a creative aspect, since for the ancient consciousness creation was more an affair of ordering substance than of making it from nothing.

By the time the Fourth Evangelist speaks of logos, it has been an important term for centuries. It was introduced in reflective thought by Heraclitus in the sixth century B.C., and the basic, Heraclitean understanding remained with the term despite its later appropriation by contending schools. For Heraclitus, logos was the "unifying formula," the "proportionate arrangement" of things within a world which appears to contain only polarity and flow; beyond that, it was also an "actual constituent of things," much like the primary

element, fire. Heidegger's thoughtful language conveys amply the meaning of this actual constituency of the logos. The Heraclitean logos is "the original collecting collectedness which is in itself permanently dominant." Heraclitus' interest in the logos is not that of a disinterested physicist; his purpose in discovering the logos is to make his fellows aware of it, for it is relevant to the conduct of their lives. Its unifying work is instructive to mankind, and the fragments of Heraclitus convey a negative judgment of those who will not heed its instruction. For example: "Therefore it is necessary to follow the common; but although the Logos is common the many live as though they had a private understanding." In this concern about the heedlessness of the many whom he has informed about the logos, Heraclitus is not essentially different from the Fourth Evangelist five or six centuries later.

The purpose of this mention of the seminal, Heraclitean meaning of logos is to explain that the logos of the freedom pericope is not necessarily Platonic, Stoic, Philonic, or even Johannine (in the sense in which logos is used in the prologue of the gospel). Instead, it is simply the logos, about which the author believed that no more need be said,


66 Kirk and Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers, Fragment 198.
except that it is of the Son. The great understandings are always simple, and perhaps a little nebulous. At their best, they are stated in the picture language of metaphor. "I am the vine, you are the branches." What is the vine to the branches if not their logos? The participatory organicism of this symbol of the grape, the fig, the olive plant shows us what it means to "continue" in the logos. It is an affair of life and being itself. Another figuration of the logos is the door. "I am the door; if any one enters by me, he will be saved . . ." The passage through the door is a passage from history to prehistory, from polarity to the unity which undergirds polarity, from individual moribundity to life eternal. One who passes through the door is able to participate in the logos; he becomes one with the logos in the same sense that branches are one with the vine. The logos then is the realissimum; it imparts to life knowledge of truth and thus, being.

We need to observe finally that in this text there is a parallel between continuing in the logos and continuing in

67 John 15.5.
68 John 10.9.

The door, the gate, the narrow passage constitute an archetype which connotes transcendence of fallen, variegated, polar existence. One goes between the two sides so as to enter into that which is not two, and hence, many, but one. For example, in the proem of Parmenides' "Way of Truth," the poet is taken through gates and doors. After his passage, the goddess reveals to him the One. For an extensive discussion of this symbol which draws upon many literatures, see Joseph Campbell, The Hero with a Thousand Faces (New York: World Publishing Co., 1956), Chapter I, part 5, and Chapter II, part 1.
the household. This is not simply a verbal happenstance. As the subsequent chapter will explain, the Presence of Yahweh is for Israel the salient reality which gives human existence its meaning and purpose. As such, this Presence is generally equivalent to the emergent experience of Being in Greece. The Heraclitean *logos* is one configuration of Being. In the Penteteuch, the Presence first became manifest in the household of Abram. There is then an intimate symbolic correspondence between continuing in the *logos* and continuing in the household, for both symbols connote participation in a reality which is radically distinguishable from profane existence.

The great breakthrough of the Fourth Gospel is that it comprehends the *logos* of the Son not only as the realissimum, the core power of being, but as the power of liberation as well. It is because of this new insight that the Fourth Gospel is able to instruct us about the structure of the reality in which freedom first appeared in Mediterranean antiquity. In the history of the cultures which became constitutive of Europe, the deepening experience of being was accompanied by both a material and an affective increment in freedom. In the historical development of this freedom, there is a practical term which embodies the beingful reality and stands between it and freedom. That term is justice. The divine will is that justice be done, and freedom is a consequence. The Fourth Evangelist has by-passed the intervening practical term, and in so doing, shows freedom as the direct conse-
quence of being. Justice is present here by implication only. Continuing in the **logos** by avoiding sin is the practical righteousness for which the truth which frees is the cognitive correspondent.

In eliciting the structure of freedom in the Fourth Gospel, we employ the terminology which Kant used in his analysis of freedom. That is, the morally uninformed condition of mankind in which man acts from self-love in seeking private happiness is a "pathological" condition, an affair of the "lower desires."\(^{70}\) This pathological condition corresponds to the New Testament idea of sin. Human independence of the pathological condition is "freedom in the negative sense," or negative freedom, since it involves the negation of the lower desires. Conformity with "pure, practical reason," the Kantian analogue of the **logos**, is "freedom in the positive sense," or positive freedom.\(^{71}\) We use this Kantian terminology because it is both familiar and meaningful. This is not to imply however that the Fourth Evangelist was proto-Kantian. It is to say only that the formal rudiments of the modern understanding of freedom have come together for the first time in the freedom pericope of the Fourth Gospel.

The structure of freedom then has three distinguishable component elements. First is the affirmation of a present

\(^{70}\)Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Practical Reason*, III, Theorem II, Remark I.

\(^{71}\)Kant, VIII, Theorem IV.
in which the pathological condition of humanity is ascendant; this is a condition of sickness and suffering, a condition of hopelessness and existential negativity. In both material and metaphorical senses, it is the slave condition. In regard to both it is a slave condition because it is a condition of powerlessness. The slave is powerless to obtain manumission, and thus he comprehends his own being as that of one who is blemished, who as a person is intrinsically inferior. Likewise the slave keeper is powerless to manumit and raise the slave to the mark of full humanity because he is himself the slave of a self-love which denies to him the power to regard the slave as neighbor, brother, friend. The Fourth Evangelist acknowledges this negative present with the symbol of sin which embraces slavery. "Truly, truly I say to you, everyone who commits [ποιόν = making] sin is a slave to sin. The slave does not continue in the house for ever . . ." The verb here conveys the implication of an erection, a creation, of an anti-reality in which slavery, not freedom, is the mode of participation. This false reality of slavery is necessarily impermanent. It leads to destruction, to non-being. The slave cannot continue in the house (of Abram) because it is in that house that God has established his Presence. The slave cannot remain there because his presence is a false, pathological presence which threatens to subvert the divine Presence and to negate its purposes. To avoid this, in Genesis, the slave is cast out into the wilderness. But the true seed of the Fourth Evan-
gelist's message is not Genesis with its banishment of the slave; instead, it is the liberation of Exodus. In the subsequent chapters we will see that the texts which deal with the liberation of the slave nation, Israel, and with the debt slaves of Athens begin with an acknowledgment of the pathology—the existential negativity of a society which is fallen into slavery.

The second element of the structure of freedom involves movement. The movement is away from slavery and its impetus is a real, divine power which has not been affected by the negativity of the slave present. In the texts which we will consider, it is clear that neither Moses nor Solon has been contaminated by the slave experience; they are thus suited to be agents for the divine mandate of liberation. In the Fourth Gospel, this divine agent is the Son. "So if the Son makes you free, you will be free indeed [ontós]." This movement of liberation is a negative freedom. The Son is a part of the household, and thus he holds the power of liberation. He has the power to negate the negativity of slave existence. This negative movement of liberation is necessarily an ascendant movement. It raises the freed to the high level of real being: "ontós free you will be." The liberation thus terminates an old, historical present, and broaches a new present in which history is mediated.

The ontós of the movement of negation points to the positive theme of discipleship in the logos with which the pericope began. This mediated present is the condition of
discipleship with the collecting power which attenuates the selfish, destructive inclination which is constitutive of slavery. Discipleship in the creative, unifying power repositions life; discipleship responds with free affirmation to that which is divine, and thus, most real. Discipleship is positive freedom itself. The lives of those who are enmeshed in slavery are finite, moribund. The new life of participation in the ordering power is an eternal life.

In the Fourth Gospel, those who have become positioned as disciples of the Son are called friends. "You are my friends if you do what I command you. No longer do I call you servants [doulos], for the servant [doulos] does not know what his master is doing; but I have called you friends, for all that I have heard from my Father I have made known to you." If this symbol of friends of the Son resembles the Kantian symbol of the Kingdom of Ends, that should not be surprising. Such an understanding is implicit in the idea of positive freedom. Those who participate in the beingful reality are themselves more real than those whose lives are victim of the pathological condition.

The Fourth Evangelist shared with the later Stoic a caesar-ridden political reality which made a legal repositioning of life impossible. Thus his freedom teaching shares with the Stoic teaching an intensely spiritual character. But like the letters of Paul, the Fourth Gospel is a book to guide the church. In the church are the disciples and they

are free in respect of their discipleship. Unlike the Stoic teaching, the themes that the Fourth Evangelist employs in his teaching about freedom make it possible to adduce a symbolic structure of freedom whose components illumine the interpenetration of divine power and human need which are attendant upon the seminal instances of liberation. Finally, the historical content of the freedom pericope is instructive concerning the time and place into which one who seeks the origins of freedom in Europe must inquire. It is necessary to look to the book of Genesis to learn the position of both the son and the slave in the household of Abram.
III. REDEMPTIVE LIBERATION IN THE OLD TESTAMENT

The Exodus of Israel from Egypt was more than a migration of a congeries of coreligionists from the Nile valley out to the desert. The Bible historians treat it as the liberation of a people from the abuse and degradation of slavery. Their understanding that Yahweh, the God of the Bible, delivered his chosen people from slavery has made that event the symbolic foundation of the European concern for freedom.\(^1\) Human freedom first received divine sanction with the Exodus.

For that reason, the Exodus is the central interest of this chapter. We approach the Exodus symbolism through a retrograde movement. Our first area of focus is the late story of creation, with its picture of man as the most estimable of the Creator's achievements. This man of the poet's vision directs attention to history, with its real first man, Abram. That historical man suffers confusion and sad-

\(^1\)To say that the Exodus is the symbolic foundation of the European concern for freedom is not to suggest that it is the historical basis for the formal, philosophic statements about freedom. The direct ancestors of Western philosophy are the philosophic movements of Greek and Roman antiquity, and the philosophy of freedom is their progeny. The phrase, "European concern for freedom" is deliberately ambiguous; "concern" is more inclusive than "philosophy." Freedom is an enduring concern, not only for philosophers but for European peoples generally. This concern begins with the Exodus of Israel and is perpetuated wherever Bible culture persists. It is true, moreover, that the Exodus is related by both form and meaning to the historical events which made a formal philosophy of freedom possible. These events are the Solonic liberation and the defeat of Persia. Inasmuch as this is a real relationship, the Exodus is related even to the philosophy of freedom, not so much as grandparent, but more as great uncle.
ness because of the slave presence within his household. The symbolism of slavery in the Abram saga opens then onto the sorrow of Israel when that people is enslaved in Egypt. The Exodus as formative event for both Israel and Europe occasions three meditations. First involves the methodological problem suggested by the revelation of the divine name; second is the property of world creation which is inherent in divine liberation; third is Moses as prototype of free humanity.

The chapter which follows discusses the prophets of the eighth century. It was not simply the Exodus which taught Europe about freedom, but more especially it was the prophets' comprehension of the Exodus that has made the event permanently important. There are two opposed understandings about the prophets. One is that the prophets were radical innovators, and the other is that the prophets were radical rememberers. We follow the latter position. The differentiated vocabulary of the prophets remembers the meaning of the early events and compact utterances. To say that European humanity is free is to say that it is recipient of the Exodus, and more, that it is participant in the prophetic memory of that beginning of freedom.

In the Old Testament, liberation obtains as redemption from bondage. Yahweh redeems his people because bondage is repugnant to two attributes which are proper to his divine presence. These are his justice and his faithful love. Both of these interests are inchoate in the Exodus from Egypt, and the prophetic memory makes of the Exodus an ongo-
ing affair which commands that each do the justice that will result in freedom for the oppressed.

1. The Image of God

The most impressive confession of faith in the Old Testament is the chapter which stands at the beginning of that book. "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth." In this account, with each successive step in the creation, the narrator relates that God saw that the creation was good. We understand this as a confession of faith because it is the creation narrative of the Priestly Code (P), by far the latest of the documentary sources of the Pentateuch. This narrative did not take form during the exhilarating days of Israel's conquest of Canaan or the later dynastic monarchies. It was given expression much later, after the great catastrophes had befallen the chosen people, after the two kingdoms had been eaten away by military conquest and the people of Yahweh had been humiliated before the nations. Thus the historical setting of the Priestly

2 The Pentateuchal documentary sources in this chapter are taken from Walter Harrelson, Interpreting the Old Testament (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1964), pp. 487-492. The four Pentateuchal sources are dated as follows:

The Yahwist's historical epic (J), 1000-910 B.C.
The Elohist's historical epic (E), 900-750
The Deuteronomist writings (D) 750-586
The Priestly code (P), 586-538

creation is crucial to its meaning. This is not simply a Mediterranean cosmogony in which an anthropomorphic divinity subdues primal elements and so creates the world. Rather, the P creation is a statement of faith in the providential lordship of God in the world. To be sure, this is a cosmogony, but it is more than that alone; it is a creed as well. It confesses that in the ultimate reckoning of the totality of human experience, the world—and human life with it—is good by divine plan. Destruction, exile and captivity have served to deepen and to clarify the Priestly faith. These misfortunes have made such an ultimate reckoning of purpose both necessary and possible. The P author announces that in the ultimate reckoning for Israel, the fundamental goodness of the divine work will not be negated by human defection or historical calamity, for it is the work of the one God who has made the world, man, and history, in order to achieve his own good purpose.

It is appropriate that our Old Testament should begin as it does, for the Priestly account of the origin of things is given from the vantage point of maturity. The Priestly author is positioned so as to be able to survey events as they have unfolded in the past of the world, and thus to assaysay their meaning. Genesis 1 is in truth a prologue to the Bible. It is like a preface written for a late edition of a profound book; it compresses the content of the book so as to elicit its most permanently salient meaning. We are concerned with what this prologue has to say about man and his status in creation.
If we are to understand the Priestly creation narrative's message about man and his position in the world, it is first necessary to recognize that this narrative is not a myth. It is not simply that the discussion displays a more intense reflective and conceptual capability than that which would appear in a myth. The message itself is non-mythical. Mythical materials appear briefly, i.e., the pre-existent matter, the chaotic earth which was without form, void. But this matter is without its characteristic demonic power; it is noted without comment. Von Rad explains,

It is amazing to see how sharply little Israel demar­cated herself from an apparently overpowering environ­ment of cosmological and theogonic myths. Here the sub­ject is not a primeval mystery of procreation from which the divinity arose, nor of a 'creative' struggle of mythically personified powers from which the cosmos arose, but rather the one who is neither warrior nor procreator, who alone is worthy of the predicate, Cre­ator.3

The P author is no theologian. He knows nothing of a doc­trine of creation ex nihilo. But that later doctrine faith­fully expresses the greater substance of the Priestly narrative's intention. For P, the important event is the Cre­ator's work with the primal elements; to emphasize the old mythic materials would be to suggest competition between the Creator and his medium.

This understanding about the non-mythical quality of the P creation suggests that for P, and for the Bible to which the P creation is prologue, the temporal dimension which is

of concern to man and God is history. Indeed, the P creation is a narration of the events of the first week of world history. But for P, this history is not the domain of experiential misery which is set in contrast to the dream-like innocence of mythic prehistory. There is no flaming sword which separates mankind from Eden, no Pandora's box whose inhabitants become permanent evils in historical existence. Instead, P places the beatific and pacific content of life, which might in other accounts be reserved to pre-history, within the stream of history itself. God saw that the creation was good. This dictum, that the creation is presently and always a good creation, approaches the core reality to which the Old Testament is witness. This is not the whim of a chronic optimist; it is the profoundest expression of Israel's total experience, national destruction notwithstanding. Beyond disappointment and loss, historical existence is good because it is existence which takes place within the divine presence of the Creator. Historical existence is thus a hallowed existence. For this reason, Professor Irwin insisted that the modern theological conception of God as a being "wholly other" from man is foreign to the Old Testament. Only in historical circumstances which are wholly fallen, wholly profane, will God be wholly other from man. For the Priestly author, God is not wholly other from man. Instead, he is the world creator who has imparted to man his

---

own image. This is to say that in some sense, man is not other from, but same with, the Creator of all being.

The divine creation is depicted as an hierarchical undertaking of creation and ordering which is accomplished during a period of six days. The seventh day is hallowed by the Creator and set aside from the other days as a time for rest. Buber understood the inner beauty and compassion of the ancient institution of Sabbath. Just as our concern is with man's character as image, Buber's was with the converse interest, i.e., with God's character as leader. In respect of God's leadership and the institution of Sabbath, Buber wrote of the Sabbath passage,

... "for in six days YHVH made the heaven and the earth, and on the seventh day He rested and drew breath." The crass anthropomorphism binds together the deity and the tired, exhausted slave, and with words arousing the soul calls the attention of the free man's indolent heart to the slave; but at the same time it sets up before the community the loftiest sense of following the leader. Everyone that belongs to the essence of Israel --and the servants, the sojourners included, belong to it--shall be able to imitate YHVH without hindrance.5

This compassionate concern which produced the Sabbath is the veritable heart of the Bible message, and its contemplation would end speculation as to whether the Book of the Covenant is better or worse than other ancient legislative texts if reason prevailed in the world. Even Buber's treatment does not exhaust the matter. We recall Jesus' defense of healing on the Sabbath: "What man of you, if he has one sheep and it falls into a pit on the sabbath, will not lay hold of

it and lift it out?"\(^6\) Ostensibly, the meaning is that one will rightfully protect his property on the Sabbath, but that interpretation is wrong. One must see the sheep, its wool matted with dirt, bleating and thrashing in terror. That is why one will lift it out. The ancient code commands, "Six days shall you do your work, but on the seventh day you shall rest, that your ox and your ass may have rest, and the son of your bondmaid . . ."\(^7\) Not only slaves (or the countless workers from whom the secular world has withdrawn this protection), but even brutes are the beneficiaries of this God's compassionate command. The Sabbath is truly the day of God, not only for its later pietistic associations, but more importantly because it raises life above the plane of human necessity. To transcend necessity is to broach the threshold of freedom.

If in the hierarchy of days the day of God is ultimate, then the day of man is penultimate, for man was created on the day before God's day. Man is the blossom of creation; he has been preceded by the inanimate and then the animate creation. Man is the final wonder of the word by which God has spoken his will, for unlike his predecessors in creation, man is cast in the "image of God." To be created in the image of God is to be given a share in the being of God. The text of Genesis 1 understands God and man in a sort of partnership relationship, with God being the greater and man the

\(^6\)Matthew 12.11.

\(^7\)Exodus 23.12.
lesser partner. Their enterprise in creation is a joint en-
terprise; God instigates creation and man superintends the
divine accomplishment.

An appreciation of man's sharing in the "image" of God
is vital to an understanding of man as a character who is
capable of freedom. If Genesis 1 were in fact a myth, then
the "image of God" construction would lack value for an elu-
cidation of freedom or for any other concern, save for its
testimonial to man's persistent ability to create gods.
That is to say, if the account under consideration were a
myth, then for man to be created in the image of God would
mean that man recognized in himself the physical attributes
of some concrete form, some idol, which had been shapen in
an impenetrable antiquity, and which had from time immemorial
been worshipped as a god. Under those circumstances we would
be caught in a circular anthropomorphism. In truth there
would be no God, or else the true God would indeed be wholly
other from man. Man would be at last the image of man. But
just as the Old Testament breaks from the myth, it likewise
separates itself from the ambient world in which divinity
appears as image graven by the hand of man.

The experience of human freedom to which Europe became
heir occurs first as a human response to the command of the
God whose self-revelation is attested in the Old Testament.
The symbol of man as the image of God is the most elevated
strata of meaning which applies to understanding of man as a
potentially free being. The Priestly narrator tells us what
it means for man to be created in the image of God. As he
looks back across the expanse of a millenium, the narrator
captures the immensity of the Yahwist breakage of the old
forms: Man, the image of God, is the accomplishment of the
command of God's word. God has made man like God, that is,
with the power of command in the world. "Then God said, 'Let
us make man in our image, after our likeness; and let them
have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds
of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and
over every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth.'" 8

In that he has been created by God, man is given worth
in the totality of things; in the bestowal of "dominion,"
man is given possession and power in the world. Possession,
power and worth are the aspirations of man in historical ex­
istence. The philosopher Paul Ricoeur examines in depth
historical man's quest for honor, possession and power. Al­
though his remarks are not intended as Biblical exegesis,
they seem invaluable in cognizing the Priestly author's des­
ignation of man as a being made after God's image. Ricoeur
writes thus of man's quest for commanding power in history:

. . . although we only know these fundamental quests
empirically through their hideous and disfigured vis­
ages, in the form of greed and the passions of power
and vanity, we understand these passions in their es­
sence only as a perversion of . . . . We must say that
what we understand at first are the primordial modal­i­
ties of human desire which are constitutive with re­
spect to man's humanity; and it is only later that we
understand the 'passions' as departure, deviation, down­
fall, in relation to those primordial quests. 9

8Genesis 1.26.

9Paul Ricoeur, Fallible Man, tr. Charles Kelbley (Chi-
In light of this understanding about the constitutive modalities of man's humanity, we repeat, the Priestly author is not a dogmatic optimist, nor is he one who is uninformed about the "fall of man" with its attendant condition of human-historical evil. Indeed, the creation of man in the image of God not only bequeaths to man dominion, but it likewise imposes limits upon human action: "Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed; for God made man in his own image."¹⁰

This passage from the Priestly code, dear to those who find Biblical sanction for capital punishment, bears a latent implication which is far more important than the overt, juridical decree concerning the punishment of murders. That is to say, it tells us the nature of the dominion which man, the image of God, is to enjoy in the world. It is a dominion over the earth and its non-human residents. But because man is the image of God, God is the sovereign of man. For one man to kill another is a trespass of the divine domain, and this requires not so much a simple retribution for murder as an elimination from the community of man of the one who has committed the greatest sacrilege, the defilement and destruction of God's own image. The Priestly author writes after the end of the long monarchial spasm in which the singular dominion of God over man, his image, has been system-

¹⁰Genesis 9.6 ff.
atically and calculatedly subverted by men of worldly ambition. Yet this writer perceives clearly the inner sense of the old Yahwist confederacy of early Israel. There, man did not dominate man; instead, God claimed sole dominion over his own image.\footnote{Professor Mendenhall argues that the true importance of the Bible for all of history can be understood only in the light of the formation of Israel at the beginning of the Iron Age from the ruins of the Late Bronze Age in the Eastern Mediterranean region. In respect of this thesis, he concludes that Yahwism (the direct rule of the one God and the primacy of ethics over power and economics) arose as a response to the failure of divinized kingship in the Late Bronze Age to fulfil human need. This historical thesis is consistent with Mendenhall's philosophic view that the Bible of early Yahwism, the prophets, and Jesus, places an absolute priority on the thing known to moderns as "religion," and implies by consequence an absolute judgment against power politics. See George E. Mendenhall, The Tenth Generation: The Origins of the Biblical Tradition (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1973), pp. 223-226.}

This great author then is a connecting figure. His symbol of the image of God comprehends amply both the early Israelite experience of direct rule by Yahweh and the new preaching of the Kingdom which was to come later. Both the seminal utterance, "Israel is my first born son" and "... the Kingdom of God is in the midst of you" are intelligible to the Priestly symbol of the image of God.\footnote{Exodus 4.22 and Luke 17.21.}

The symbol of man as God's image, responding directly to the divine command, explains then why the Priestly creation cannot be a theogony. Its purpose is not to provide cosmic support for a human king who acts as a divine analogue. Rather, it is a confession of faith in the continuing lordship of God for all the world. The Priestly creed...
is that beneath the gross and visible human propensity to evil which has brought Israel and the nations to destruction, there resides a real nucleus of human purpose and human capability which is a divine gift. The Priestly Code with its "and God saw that it was good" informs us that in the first and final figuration of the world, the dominion and honor which man seeks in history are available by divine command and that ultimately they are sanctid; they have a source and a purpose beyond the oftentimes squalid conditions in which they are sought and won. The Priestly anthropology thus casts a divine imprimatur upon man as an active character in history. In this approval of man's dominion over the world of which God has predicated "good" inheres the nascent idea of human freedom.

The Priestly symbol of man as the image of God prefaces the Old Testament record with the assertion that in the experience which is recorded there, man shares in the creative stature of God. This study draws from this symbolization the inference that the Old Testament comprehends man as potentially free. This inference however is not without difficulty. In his discussion of the Pauline treatment of freedom in the New Testament, Bultmann stresses that the Old Testament is completely lacking in a conception of freedom, and for this reason, that the New Testament takes the concept from Greece, via the Hellenistic vocabulary that was current in the New Testament period. It is true that one of the

13Bultmann, Primitive Christianity, p. 186. See also
puzzling problems of the Old Testament is the absence of reflection on the matter of human freedom. This is puzzling because the narrative imagery of the Old Testament shows with consistency a portrait of mankind whose existence has been lent direction and dignity by divine sanction. This is the case from the beginning with regard to the chosen people, and at a later time, the divine concern broadens to include the nations. That mankind is invested with practical discretion and with dignity is basic to our understanding of freedom. That the Old Testament is devoid of a single concept to communicate this meaning does not entail therefore that freedom as a pattern of experience is missing from the Old Testament record. With the aid of the express concept which comes to us first from Greek reflection, we are able to identify a most ponderable body of materials in the Old Testament which involves human freedom in an integral manner.

The most elemental, and thus, the most memorable episode in the Old Testament which involves human freedom is the Exodus of Israel from Egypt and the subsequent formation of the Covenant. This is the great event in the Old Testament, and it is the main interest of this chapter. It is a truly archetypal situation which is productive of freedom. But in order to clarify the difficulty which obtains as a result of the absence of a "freedom" concept in the Old Testament, it is desirable at this point to indicate how several Old Tes-

tament understandings about human life and its correct order entail the reality which we know as freedom. These include the position of man and society in relation to the Law, and the "rights" of persons which place limitations upon political authority.

When the Priestly author reflects on the experience of Israel and the purpose of the creation, he comprehends man's position in creation as that of the image of God. This symbol means many things, but in the experience of Israel, it must mean primarily that man is the recipient of divine command. There are a number of commands in the Old Testament, beginning with Yahweh's command to Abram. For the nation, the most enduring form of the divine command is the Law of God. With reference to the Law of God, the experience of Israel is not essentially different from the experience of Greece with the law of the city.\(^{14}\) In both instances, law is the defining link, the constitutive tie which compasses the aggregation and makes of it a unity. But in its unifying purpose, the Law of God and the customary law of the city are not at all akin to primitive taboos which enclose life within an euroboric circle and so conceal consciousness within

\(^{14}\) See Walter Eichrodt, *Man in the Old Testament*, tr. K. and R. Gregor Smith (London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1951), pp. 9-17. It is necessary to explain here that we do not mean by Law of God the same thing that "the law" meant in Hellenistic-Roman Judaism or the New Testament. We are speaking of the very ancient contents of the Book of the Covenant, Exodus 20-23 E. This Law of God is not the handbook of a religion, but the constitution of a theopolitical community whose allegiance was to the God, its direct and constitutional sovereign.
a collective pattern of imagination and response to events. Rather, from the time of the Book of the Covenant, men are individually responsible before the Law for their behavior.\textsuperscript{15} Individual accountability for action rather than collective responsibility of family or clan is basic to an understanding of man as capable of freedom. This Law of God moreover has an overtly liberating function. Professor Eichrodt writes of the Law's "Thou Shalt" that it is experienced "not as a heavy yoke, but as a necessary and blessed form of life, as liberation from chaotic self-destruction."\textsuperscript{16} For man to share in the image of God entails that his existence be creative in the profoundest way, that his life shun chaos for the greater sake of order.

For Israel, the command of God instructs man, the image of God. But the command which instructs man and so elevates him to participation in the life of God is a command which proceeds from a structure which has at once divine and human components. This structure is the Covenant. It binds man to allegiance and obedience to the nation's God, and likewise its God binds himself to faithfulness to his chosen people. This experience of God as a sort of "heavenly constitutional monarch" exerts a permanent influence on the whole life pattern of the Israelite nation and thus sets them apart

\textsuperscript{15}For prophetic development of individual accountability, see Jeremiah 31.29 and Ezekiel 18.2-4. Concerning the Aeschylean parallel to this Biblical attitude about responsibility, see Hadas, \textit{Hellenistic Culture}, p. 132.

\textsuperscript{16}Eichrodt, \textit{Man in the Old Testament}, p. 17.
from neighboring peoples. Beginning with Moses, the commands of God are delivered by the early and later prophets. The prophet is no surrogate deity; he is the medium by which the divine command is promulgated. For this reason the commanding relationship of God to the people is direct. Because of this direct connection of God and the nation, monarchy was always something of an alien institution in Israel.

Unlike surrounding oriental monarchies, the king is himself limited by both divine command and the constitutional conventions of the Israelite nation. If Israel's God is limited by the Covenant, the structure of command, so also must the arbitrary puissance of kings be hemmed in. With the Deuteronomist reform, these limitations are ultimately detailed in written form late in the monarchial period. From this design of direct relationship of the people to Yahweh, and the consequent reservations attaching to monarchial authority, it follows that the people enjoy in some degree a divinely countenanced "right" to "life, liberty and property." While this language, taken from British constitutional experience and natural rights theory can be misleading because of its blurring of historical contexts, it is not excessive insofar

17 This divine constitutionalism contributes to a further aspect of the uniqueness of Bible culture which embraces both the earlier Yahwism and the later Judaism, i.e., the orientation to history rather than nature. See Salo Wittmayer Baron, A Social and Religious History of the Jews, I (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952), 48 passim.

18 See Hosea 9.15.

as it indicates the intensity of popular feeling and prophetic utterance. The plain historical fact is that in addition to individual accountability for conduct before the Law of God, it was commonly considered to be right that the chosen people be free from the arbitrary exercise of authority. That this is the case is made certain by the intensity of prophetic reaction to the abusive use of authority. The case of Naboth's vineyard is the most memorable such controversy.

Then the word of the Lord [YHWH] came to Elijah the Tishbite, saying, "Arise, go down to meet Ahab king of Israel, who is in Samaria; behold, he is in the vineyard of Naboth, where he has gone to take possession. And you shall say to him, 'Thus says the Lord, "Have you killed, and also taken possession?"' And you shall say to him, 'Thus says the Lord: "In the place where dogs licked up the blood of Naboth shall dogs lick your own blood."' "

In this limitation upon royal authority in deference to the

20 In the strict sense, there are no "rights" in Israel; there are only obligations. There are however the obligations of an holy people, i.e., a people who have been separated from others, and hallowed down to the last and least by a direct covenant with the holy God. This distributed holiness "... meant that the value of a person was not a function of his particular role in society. It furnished everyone with a basis for self-respect, a self-valuation which seems to be necessary for personal freedom and integrity." Mendenhall, The Tenth Generation, p. 207.

21 I Kings 21.17-19. While there is a limited similarity, it must be observed that the position of Elijah to the house of Omri is not fully analogous to that of John Locke to the Stuart monarchy. Lockean rights inhere in the "natural" endowment of the human person. The "rights" of Israel obtain between God, an overlord, and the several elements of the nation who hold property as fiefs from God. Thus, Ahab is not simply murderer and thief, culpable before human convention for "crimes against humanity." More significantly he is the violator of a covenant between God and his chosen people, of whom Naboth is here the representative member.
"rights" of the people of God there inhere both the manifest experience of freedom and at least in a latent fashion, of human equality as well.

The Priestly author who symbolizes human life as being in the image of God writes at the end of Israel's existence as an independent political entity. His symbol comprehends a great range of experience enacted within the presence of the God of Israel. The writer who stands at the end looks back over the whole to the beginnings. In the beginning of Israel's experience the symbol of man as the image of God applies to that first man who became recipient of the divine command and promise, to Abram. We must examine the saga of Abram with respect to its symbols of freedom and slavery.

2. The Disgrace of Slavery

The slave histories contain passages like the following:

A Neo-Babylonian document relates a characteristic and common occurrence. A man gave his pregnant slave as security for one-third of a shekel of silver. When he failed to redeem her, the creditor sold her with her baby for twenty shekels, making a profit of nineteen and two-thirds shekels of silver.  

The historian's report of this mortgage foreclosure employs the same verbal forms that our newspapers might use to describe something so ordinary as a modern corporation's passage into receivership. But this report does not affect us as an ordinary thing affects us; instead, we are affected with revulsion and sorrow—and rightly so—for we learn that

a woman and an unborn child have been shuffled about over the earth with no regard for justice. And yet this trans-
action which strikes us as so extraordinary is a very ordi-
nary event in our human past, and for this reason it belongs

to us in a remote but permanent way. It appears monstrous

to us because we are separated from it by a definite series
of events and utterances which define it for us as monstrous.
It is defined as monstrous whenever the general connected-

ness of all humanity has become transparent through the in-
tervening haze of class, caste, and tribe.

The advent of this transparency can be dated with rel-
ative precision. In regard of its position concerning the
absolute separation of the divine from the monstrous, the
Bible message achieves total completion as early as the
eighth century, "in the days of Uzziah king of Judah and in
the days of Jeroboam the son of Joash, king of Israel . . .". The electric utterances of Amos, chapters one and two, are
the great dividing line in the moral history of the world:
"The Lord roars from Zion." The God of Israel is no paro-

chial divinity, no merely national God. He is the lord of
mankind who will punish all of the cruelties, all of the in-
justices which men heap upon men. The core issue of the
Amos prophecy is not "man's inhumanity to man." That vul-

garism is a latterday dilution of the prophetic message, for
the transparency of human connectedness is contingent upon
the appreciation of the oneness of God. The prophet pro-
nounces a judgment rather upon man's indivinity to man. The
Priestly symbol of man—all mankind, not only Israel—in the image of God is a positive development grounded upon this prophetic judgment against human monstrosity.

For an inquiry into the Mediterranean origins of the European concern for freedom, Amos is the end of the beginning. His prophecy articulates the position toward which Yahwism had been moving from the first. Just as the prophetic outcry against monstrosity in human conduct completes the Bible position, the Abram saga of Genesis begins it. In the Abram saga, we behold the initial attitude about the slave. It is not a disposition of sympathy or generosity to one who has suffered misfortune; instead, it is more a sentiment of fear and loathing toward that which is base. The Yahwist author who commits the Abram saga to writing understands that in some futuristic sense "by you [Abram] all the families of the earth will bless themselves," but he cannot determine any way in which that blessing might apply to the slave figures within the immediate household of Abram.23 They are not blessed but threatening figures, and both the J and E authors view them with a degree of hostility. Slavery in the house of Abram is a disgrace unto Israel. This disgrace in the biography of the patriarch is not suppressed, for J and E, the world's first historians, were honest historians; they reported events as they were known to them. It was their understanding that both freedom and slavery were resident in the household—nay, the person—of Abram.

23Genesis 12.3.
and that the God of the Bible cast his weight on the side of freedom.

If one reads the Bible with an interest in its teaching about the rightful ordering of human relationships, it will appear that after the patriarchal histories, much of the Bible message is concerned with the removal of the disgrace of the servile and the humble, and with their rehabilitation as persons worthy of divine and human esteem. With the beatitudes of the New Testament, this attitude becomes a permanent reproach to the exploiters and the power seekers of European civilization. For this magnanimity to become manifest, however, it was first necessary to delineate clearly between the spheres of the great and the humble; only when that had been accomplished could the humble be raised up into the light. The Abram saga undertakes just this delineation.

The Yahwist (J) narrator begins his biography of Abram in Genesis 12. According to the development of world events as given in the J text, Abram must be considered not only the ancestor of Israel, the people of Yahweh, but like Adam he is in a sense the universal first man. That is, Abram is the first "normal" man of the kind we know ourselves to be. Abram appears in the J document immediately after the dispersal of the postdiluvian mankind who had congregated at the tower of Babel. The dispersal of the Babel congregation marks the end of the heroic pre-peoples and their age. With Abram's appearance in the J document, a reasonably settled
life is indicated; men pay attention to the mundane affairs of economy and survival while displaying concern also for the more ultimate purpose of life in a "normal" world which is characterized by the finitude of existence. The later Elohist (E) story of the life of Abram imputes "spiritual" meaning of majestic breadth to the encounters of Abram with his God; the most notable of these is the story of Abram's near sacrifice of Isaac at God's command. While the spiritually momentous encounters of Abram in E serve to deepen the God-consciousness of Yahwism, Judaism and Christianity, they tend initially to obscure the more commonplace existence of the J document's man, Abram, with the God who has extended his providence to the man. The following is characteristic of the relationship of Yahweh with Abram in J: "Now the Lord [YHWH] said to Abram, Go . . . ." "So Abram went as the Lord had told him . . . ."

Like the P document the Deuteronomist source (D) is late. It dates from the period after Israel's end and the decline of Judah relative to the power of her neighbors. De-

24Genesis 22.15-18. The old tradition which the Elohist has received is given a spiritual interpretation in this story. In its original form, the story is aetiologi- cal; i.e., it explains how the substitution of animal sac­rifice for child sacrifice came about. Although this theme is identifiable in the present Biblical account, that is hardly the reason why the E document includes it. There it witnesses to the intensity of Abram's faith and the provid­ential grace of Abram's God. In respect of the story's bearing on the man-God relationship, Buber treats the story as an explication of the early prophetic teaching about sac­rifice. That is, the intention which underlies sacrifice is important, while the actual article of sacrifice is not. See Noth, History of Pentateuchal Traditions, pp. 114-115. Buber, Prophetic Faith, pp. 91-92.
spite this, it contains certain materials of high antiquity. Among these materials are several creedal statements which articulate the history of God's people and the meaning of that history in terms of the purpose of the theopolitical community. These creeds are of significance for us because they indicate in compact form the materials toward which our attention should be drawn in an effort to understand the implications to freedom of the Abram saga. One of these creeds follows:

... We were Pharaoh's slaves in Egypt, and the Lord brought us out of Egypt with a mighty hand; and the Lord showed signs and wonders, great and grievous, against Egypt and against Pharaoh and all his household, before our eyes; and he brought us out from there, that he might bring us in and give us the land which he swore to give to our fathers. And the Lord commanded us to do all these statutes, to fear the Lord our God, for our good always, that he might preserve us alive, as at this day. 25

"We were slaves." The creed begins with this admission of existential disgrace. The urgency of freedom in the New Testament, and in Europe, has as its impetus this experience of the chosen people of Yahweh. The importance of the slave experience of the chosen people cannot be understated in its bearing upon the theology and anthropology of the Old or the New Testament. It is by no means an accidental concatenation in the life of symbols that our emphasis upon freedom as the integral value in the Christian age has come to us primarily via the Bible, rather than through classical

25 Deuteronomy 6.21-14. See Von Rad, Genesis, pp. 13-15 for a discussion of the significance of the creeds. For creeds similar to the one above, see Deuteronomy 26.5-9 and Joshua 24.2-13.
philosophy. Philosophy may explicate the idea of freedom with greater clarity than does the Old Testament, but the archaic experience which funded Greek thought was not acquainted with national slavery as the basal condition of personal or civilizational identity. Rather, Aristotle could say, "Hellenes do not like to call Hellenes slaves, but confine the term to barbarians." To be sure, Pohlenz is correct when he explains that freedom in Greek thought is instructed by the presence of slavery in the community, but there is no common reservoir of experience which would prompt a Greek to confess, "We were slaves." They were not. Zeus the Liberator prevented that. The liberation performed by Yahweh was not prophylactic as was that of Zeus at Marathon; it was remedial and redemptive. Because of the historical reality of slavery for Israel, the slave image occurs repeatedly as the symbol of negativity in being. "The slave does not continue in the house forever" of the Fourth Gospel is the best example of this employment of the slave symbol.

Beyond the recollection of the enslavement, the mention of the land promised to the fathers in the creed serves to introduce the figure of Abram. Our concern with Abram involves the promise and its relationship to slavery and to freedom. The creedal confession, "and he brought us out from there, that he might bring us in and give us the land which he swore to give our fathers," refers back to the be-

26 *Politics*, 1255a24.
27 Pohlenz, *Freedom in Greek Life and Thought*, pp. 3 ff.
ginning of the J biography of Abram in Genesis 12. We have observed the primal character of Abram's manhood in respect of its existential dynamics; but Abram is a primal figure in a more important, a more essentially human and universal way. The first historians viewed Abram as the first normal man to hear and to heed the voice of the true God. J tells us that Abram had ancestors, but they are thoroughly insignificant; it was Abram who received the divine word.

Now the Lord [YHWH] said to Abram, "Go from your country and your kindred and your father's house to the land that I will show you. And I will make of you a great nation, and I will bless you, and make your name great, so that you will be a blessing. I will bless those who bless you, and him who curses you I will curse; and by you all the families of the earth will bless themselves."

So Abram went, as the Lord had told him . . . 28

The first notable consideration about this introductory speech of Yahweh is its futuristic inclination. There is nothing conspicuously wrong with Abram, yet his life is to be modified in a momentous way. Promises of greatness are given. If Abram is to enrich our knowledge of freedom, then we must attempt to reconstruct the character of this Abram who hears the command and the promise. The command and promise themselves can amount to little if we do not recognize the human situation in which they occurred as a radical incision. Abram's existence is not wrong; the text suggests in no way that he is given in evil, nor does it suggest that he is in any need. Why then should Abram, a nomad, receive land, or why should this man become the father of a nation,

28Genesis 12.1-4a.
or what is there about him which would convey a universal blessing? There is nothing about the man Abram which would answer any of these questions, for he is quite ordinary. Indeed, the several texts recording his deceit over the marital status of his wife and travelling companion, Sarah, show him to be something of a "pragmatist." Clearly, Abram is not a slave, but he is nevertheless to be "liberated" from his present circumstances by the God who has spoken to him. He is not to be liberated from sin, and certainly not from "non-being," but from commonplace finite existence. While Abram's erstwhile existence is hardly characterized by negativity in the volitional sense of sin which is present to the mature and robust moral consciousness, it is none the less negative. Abram's negativity is like the lazy and formless negativity of the cave dwellers in Republic VII. Abram is ordinary man who has not yet been awakened to his status as a being who dwells within the clear, bright luminescence of God's command and promise. So God's call to this Abram is in truth an act of divine liberation. Yahweh frees Abram from the delusion that this place, this family, this national grouping is definitive of anything which a person should value ultimately. The positivity of this liberation is given in its futuristic presentation; the things which will be made to happen are contingent upon the divine volition, and the passage to this completion consists in obedience to the divine command; only the command is in the present: "Go." The command is the connective link between that other Abram as
he was in passive negativity—in unfreedom—and the Abram who becomes free to participate in God's promise of being. Abram's obedience makes him free; it re-positions his life. Although the word "freedom" is unfamiliar to the Yahwist, the formal pattern of the narrative in Genesis 12 is the earliest articulation of the structure of freedom.

It is necessary that we comprehend these parameters of Abram's erstwhile negative existence with his country, his kindred, his father's house, for the "old Abram" who can be found within and beneath the story of the J document is much like the "old man" of Pauline theology. He is not yet--only now--becoming a free man in the presence of the true God. The old Abram's negative existence and his response to Yahweh's positive command and promise serve moreover to associate the father of the chosen people in the paradigmatic plight of that people, i.e., in the negativity of slave existence, in divine liberation, in freedom before God. The divine command that God's people get up and leave the land of Egypt is adumbrated in Yahweh's command that their father Abram leave the negatively supporting environs of his youth.

Now Abram is a freeman in the conventional sense of being in bondage to none, and in the sense just explained, i.e., of having been positioned in the esteem of his God. Yet Abram is a normal man, and his life does not go untouched by slavery. Slavery penetrates Abram's life in a most intricate way, a way which intertwines slavery in the material sense with slavery in its metaphysical dress as an influence which
corrupts the soul. Abram's life will be finally saddened by its slave affection; he will lose his dear son Ishmael, for Ishmael is the child of a slave woman, and therefore he is unfit to remain in the house of Abram. But why had Ishmael to leave? To our ancestors the answer was obvious: slavery is disgrace. The J and E authors' mutual revulsion for the young Ishmael and for his mother is apparent in the text. The slave lineage of Abram's eldest son surely suggests to them the slave existence of Israel in Egypt, and both narrators take care to demonstrate that the slave existence of Abram's issue in Egypt was not inherent in the nature of his people. The people's patriarchal heritage was not slave but free. Both texts (E less harshly than J) take satisfaction in the exit of Hagar and her son.

The slave condition is a disgrace—a defilement of the exterior person which convinces the beholder that the servile condition is inherent in character—that the slave is slavish. The slave is not fully a person; he shares in the appearance of the freeman, but the circumstantial blemish is imputed to his soul. Thus he is by nature an inferior, half-human type. Historical materialism expedites our appreciation of the negative evaluation which attaches to the slave with its understanding that the primal alienation of man from the world occurs—not in respect of a deficit of spiritual autonomy—but in respect of man's world-building labor. The world which the slave erects is not a world for him; it is the world for others, a world in which the slave is at
once an alien and yet a despised and embarrassing necessity. The alien status of the slave is the source of the disgrace and the evidence of the impediment within the soul of the slave. Concerning the blemished condition of the slave as person, it matters none whether we have reference to gang slavery with its cruelty or to household slavery with its genteel condescension. In the language of Arendt, the slave embodies the "privation" of life—its confinement away from the sphere of public objectification in durable works. In the language which the study has employed, the slave is the visible incarnation of negativity in being. He is a creature evocative of both our pity and our hatred, for in the slave we witness that half-person who we might have been in less fortunate circumstances, and indeed that soiled and

This is not to suggest that there are no important differences between these two forms of slavery. Indeed, Mendelsohn has explained that the distinction between household slavery which employs only a few slaves and the massive use of slaves in latifundia and mining is a distinction between class and caste. In the ancient Near East, slavery tended to follow the pattern of household service, and thence, status assignment on the basis of class. (See Mendelsohn, Slavery in the Ancient Near East, pp. 42 and 121 f.) The slave themes in the Genesis saga of Abram seem entirely consistent with this Near Eastern model. Thus there is no suggestion that Ishmael, the son of a slave woman and a free-man, is viewed as a slave. In keeping with typical class stratification practices, he accedes to a higher social rung than that occupied by his slave parent. By way of contrast, the Exodus narrative of the employment of Hebrew slaves in public works seems to indicate a caste arrangement reminiscent of European employment of Negroes in the Americas. With either the class or the caste pattern of slavery, the slave is inferior, a blemished type. In the former, there are devices for removing the blemish in exceptional circumstances.

servile creature who in part we be. The symbolism of slavery as a moral failure of the internal character has as its experiential root the privation, the visible baseness, of the one whose external person is the property of another.

In the Abram saga the bi-level theme of slavery as an external condition, threatening to taint the internal accord of God and his chosen man occurs first in the J text.

But Abram said, "O Lord God [YHWH Elohim], what wilt thou give me, for I continue childless, and the heir of my house is Eliezer of Damascus?" And Abram said, "Behold, thou hast given me no offspring; and a slave born in my house will be my heir." And behold, the word of the Lord came to him, "This man shall not be your heir; your own son shall be your heir." \(^{31}\)

Von Rad remarks that the sagas of the Hexateuch differ from those of all other religious traditions in that they make no effort to cloak the human failings of the principal characters. \(^{32}\) This short splice of J within the E narrative of Genesis 15 is a parade instance of this trait of the Bible histories. The "old Abram" surfaces shamelessly in this passage; in recession is Yahweh's free man, trusting his God to make good the promise of nationhood. Abram reduces himself to the slavishness of negativity; he despairs of Yahweh's ability or willingness to fulfil his promise. The slavishness of his behavior is given substance in the possibility that a real slave will become heir to his household. Had the God of Abram--El Shaddai, or whomever--been a God without mercy, forbearance and ambition, he could have per-

\(^{31}\)Genesis 15.2-5.

\(^{32}\)Von Rad, Genesis, p. 34.
mitted Abram's fears to be realized with complete justice. Abram's slavish deportment, his blasphemous mistrust, merited an equally slavish denouement which would accord with the established legal custom; Abram's manservant would have become his heir, and that would be the end of the matter.

But God will not have it that way; he has called Abram to be his, and he will use Abram to achieve his purpose in history. Thus God answers that a slave will not be the heir, and that the heir will be Abram's own son. To affirm the solemnity with which God's promise is given, the E text of Genesis 15.7-11 describes a primitive covenant ritual which God performed in the presence of Abram. Abram's positivity unto his God is restored; J says, "... he believed the Lord [YHWH], and he reckoned it to him as righteousness." Again Abram is a free man in the esteem of his God; his household is spared the disgrace of slave receivership.

Although the J text uses the name Yahweh (YHWH = LORD) from its beginning in Genesis, chapter two, as the name of the God of Adam, Noah, and the patriarchs, this usage is probably inaccurate historically. Both E (Exodus 3.15) and P (Exodus 6.2-3) indicate that the name "YHWH" was not known before the sojourn of Israel in Egypt, and that the God of the patriarchs was known by another name(s). "El Shaddai" is the name by which the P text designates the God of the fathers.

Von Rad explains the legal situation of the time which has prompted Abram's fears. He writes, "... in the so-called Nuzi texts (fifteenth century B.C., east of the Tigris) there are several contracts, according to which in the event of childlessness slaves were adopted; their duty was to give the testator a proper burial." Genesis, p. 178. See also Mendelsohn's discussion of adoption practices, Slavery in the Ancient Near East, pp. 20-22 and 58.

Genesis 15.6.
The dialectic of freedom and slavery in the Abram saga is only begun in this descent and restoration of Abram in Genesis 15. True to the fashion which will become characteristic of the chosen people in the history which is to be, Abram and his household will descend even deeper into the disgrace and defilement of slave existence; the entire future will be jeopardized, and the cleansing of the household will be a painful and ugly affair. J and E give separate accounts of Hagar and her son, and we shall observe both.

In the blasphemous doubt of his utterance in Genesis 15, Abram has adumbrated his later complete descent into the slavish behavior which gives the lie to his existence before God as a free creature and partner; the form and content of Abram's misgivings—slavishness and slavery—likewise foreshadow the post-patriarchal enslavement of the chosen people in Egypt. The J text tells the story of this descent and misfortune. In this text, no sooner has Abram's belief been reckoned as righteousness than the following episode occurs.

Now Sarai, Abram's wife, bore him no children. She had an Egyptian maid whose name was Hagar; and Sarai said to Abram, "Behold now, the Lord [YHWH] has prevented me from bearing children; go in to my maid; it may be that I shall obtain children by her." And Abram hearkened to the voice of Sarai. (So after Abram had dwelt ten years in the land of Canaan, Sarai, Abram's wife, took Hagar the Egyptian her maid, and gave her to Abram her husband as a wife.) And he went in to Hagar, and she conceived; and when she saw that she had conceived, she looked with contempt upon her mistress. And Sarai said to Abram, "May the wrong done to me be on

36Genesis 16.1-2 and 4-14. Genesis 16.3 is an insertion from the P document.
you! I gave my maid to your embrace, and when she saw that she had conceived, she looked on me with contempt. May the Lord judge between you and me!" But Abram said to Sarai, "Behold, your maid is in your power; do to her as you please." Then Sarai dealt harshly with her, and she fled from her.

In the ancient Near East, legal custom provided that a barren wife could provide a legitimate heir to the household if she would bring to her husband her personal maidservant. The maidservant would bear the child of the husband upon the wife's knees, and the child could thus be considered the wife's own. It was in this way that Sarah contrived to provide her unhappy husband with an heir. The story is brief, but it is not difficult to imagine the details which are missing. The aging Abram appears here, not as his God's free man displaying mastery over household and world, but rather as a pawn caught up in the intrigues of the women in his household. Sarah is considerably less impressed with the God and his promises than is Abram, and this episode shows her as a more complete "pragmatist" than ever her husband has been. She is a temptress; her husband has recently been restored to righteousness, and she now rekindles his doubts, reinforces his latent negativity toward the God and his command and promise. In Sarah's design, Abram, who has previously feared that a slave unrelated to himself will be his heir, is now to enter into carnal relations with a slave, and of this slave, to beget a son who will become

37Von Rad, Genesis, p. 186.
38See Genesis 18 J.
heir to him. Abram, God's chosen man, appears in this story as the most slavish of all the lot; like the mute Adam of Genesis 3, Abram stupidly does as the woman has told him. Like a slave, Abram has permitted hegemony over his life and his household to pass to another, to the conniving Sarah. As this other dominates, Abram is reduced to moral and political vacancy. When he goes in to the slave woman, to Hagar, he has become as thoroughly slavish as she, and Ishmael, the child of their union—the "son according to the flesh"—is ironically not even made of an act which bears the savor of lustful delight. The boy's parents behave simply as brood animals who fulfill the projections of their keeper.

But the plan redounds on the schemer who has minted it. The slave woman Hagar is not one to neglect the main chance; it is she after all who carries the master's child, and not the mistress of the household. She makes known to Sarah her intention to keep the master's child as her own, and quite possibly, to usurp the aging female's favored position as wife. 39 A sordid family row follows—more appropriate in

39 This potential difficulty is inherent in a servant-concubine situation, and social stability requires that it be forbidden. Thus the Hammurabi Code requires branding as the punishment for a presumptuous servant-concubine:

When a seignior married a hierodule and she gave a female slave to her husband and she has then borne children, if later that female slave has claimed equality with her mistress because she bore children, her mistress may not sell her; she may mark her with the slave-mark and count her among the slaves.

Zola than in the patriarchal history of Israel—and the befuddled Abram, bereft of divine guidance, can find counsel in none other than the perfidious wife who is herself the cause of the trouble. Sarah hastens to dismiss her rival, and the hapless slave woman departs into the wilderness carrying Abram's unborn child.

It seems as if the blemish upon the soul of this slave woman has spread like a germ throughout Abram's household, infecting all of the principals, draining them of the capacity for free action. Sarah is tempted by the presence of one within her home whose labor—whose body—whose progeny cannot be her own because she is in bondage. In the sequence which derives, almost by design, from this initial perception on the part of Sarah, we behold the truth of the understanding that slavery enslaves the slaver as well as the slave. Sarah's temptation to employ the body of her maidservant for a function of which her own is incapable leads her to tempt her husband to improve upon the promise of his God, to get an heir by a slave woman rather than his wife. In his complicity in this scheme, Abram renounces the free righteousness which was his in belief, and he deliberately sullies the projected lineage of his household, his nation and the God's, by getting it through concourse with a slave. Had Abram succeeded in this rebellious plan, his nation would have been suited aetiollogically to the slavery in Egypt; there would have been no grounds for God to rescue a blemished people; their enslavement would have
occurred as fulfilment of an inherent propensity rather than as the wicked reversal of a preordained destiny.

The episode concludes in the J text with Hagar's escape into the wilderness, her encounter with Yahweh, who advises her to return and submit to her mistress, and Yahweh's prophecy regarding the child who has yet to be born. Of this forecast we will have more to say.

The E account of this same affair is given as follows:

And the child grew, and was weaned: and Abraham made a great feast on the day that Isaac was weaned. But Sarah saw the son of Hagar the Egyptian whom she had borne to Abraham, playing with her son Isaac. So she said to Abraham, "Cast out this slave woman with her son; for the son of this slave woman shall not be heir with my son Isaac." And the thing was very displeasing to Abraham on account of his son. But God [Elohim] said to Abraham, "Be not displeased because of the lad and because of your slave woman; whatever Sarah says to you, do as she tells you, for through Isaac shall your descendants be named. And I will make a nation of the son of the slave woman also, because he is your offspring." So Abraham rose early in the morning, and took bread and a skin of water, and gave it to Hagar, putting it on her shoulder, along with the child, and sent her away. And she departed, and wandered in the wilderness of Beersheba.40

The E story is quite different from that in J, a fact which explains its preservation in a book which favors the J history. Here Ishmael is a lad—his age is uncertain—and Isaac the son of Sarah a toddler. In the E document the trouble in the household occurs not because of conflict amongst the women, but directly because of Ishmael's presence. One must infer from the account that Ishmael has been legitimized according to the custom, and that he is consid-

40Genesis 21.8-14.
ered the elder son of Abram, the established heir of the household.

As in the J story the peripetia is forced by Sarah's jealous outrage. The old female looks upon the son of the slave, a son whom her husband loves dearly, and she perceives that the presence of this son jeopardizes the future of her own child within the household. In this account, however, Abram is prepared to resist the shrewish meddling of his wife. Suddenly Sarah gains a powerful ally whose weight in the matter is decisive; God instructs Abram to follow the counsel of his wife. The E account of the expulsion of Ishmael thus suggests a problem which is missing in J. That is, when E casts God as the ally of the faithless Sarah, he necessarily implicates the God of Abram as accomplice in the selfish scheming of the woman. There are two possible explanations for this ostensibly un-divine coalition of interests. One is the theological explanation that the divine plan employs human baseness to achieve its ends. This explanation is plausible for this episode, since the Pentateuch is not unfamiliar with instances in which human chicanery and straying figure as lesser moments within a divine project. But such a theological explanation cannot be exhaustive. On a more elemental level it must be acknowledged that the alliance of Sarah and the God of Abram against the pitiable son of the slave woman bespeaks a period in the Yahwist faith before the time when "the great in height will be
brought low."⁴¹ There is an inexpiable disgrace which clings to the son of the slave woman. Thus, both Sarah and the God of Abram fear the presence of Ishmael, and both are concerned for the future of the young Isaac. The free child in this story is not merely the son of Sarah; in truth, Isaac is the God's child, given through Sarah in her senescence to be a blessing unto all the earth. In this story from E, Sarah fears that a child other than her own may become heir in the household of her husband, but God is concerned to shelter the future which he has begun in Abram from the blemish of slave corruption. It seems certain that this is how the Elohist understood the matter; the enslavement of Israel in Egypt came as perversion rather than fulfilment, and God reversed that perversion in his act of deliverance. The elevation of Isaac over Ishmael in the Abram saga establishes that freedom before God is the destined condition of Abram and his nation.

With regard to the divine promise in both J and E to make a nation of Ishmael, there is no symbolic substance. This promise is simply an aetiological statement which explains the origin of the Ishmaelite people.

The future of the free son Isaac is well known. He became the father of Israel, whom the historians identify as the father of the tribes of Yahweh's chosen nation. Through the free son Isaac, the God of Abram carried out his saving history. But with Ishmael, the son of the slave,

⁴¹Isaiah 10.33.
there is not the most meager hint of future positivity; instead this son is destined to wrath. J tells his fate: "He shall be a wild ass of a man, his hand against every man and every man's hand against him; and he shall dwell over against all his kinsmen." The mother a slave, the son a brigand.

With the narrative of Isaac and Ishmael, we observe a separation of the divine from the demonic as discernible provinces of human reality. In respect of this separation, it is important that the demonic, the unjust, the profane, proceed from that which is unfree. Contrariwise, the divine, the just, the redemptive follow from the free. This connection which appears symbolically in the Isaac-Ishmael narrative becomes developed for Israel and for Christianity through prophecy. In Greece the same mature understanding will appear with drama and philosophy. In both cultures, there is a discrete, historical event which facilitates the reflective development of the early, compact symbolism. For Israel, this event is the Exodus.

3. The Exodus

As is the case with almost every concern in ancient history, the Exodus of the Hebrews from Egypt has occasioned profuse scholarly attention and debate. Its cause, its time, its size, indeed its actual occurrence, are controversial. \(^{43}\)

*\(^{42}\)\textit{Genesis} 16.22.*

\(^{43}\)For a moderating treatment of the events of the Exodus which does justice to the several reasonable possibilities, see Adolphe Lods, \textit{Israel from Its Beginnings to the Middle*
Such questions of historical facticity are of marginal importance to this study. Of greater moment is the record as it stands, for the record shows us how the Bible historians understood the Exodus, and it is their understanding of this event which has proved decisive for the accumulated history to which our own generation is heir. Professor Snaith cautions against a too keen interest in origins because of that interest's detriment to a complete understanding of the Bible and its unique contents. He writes:

We ought never to have permitted our evolutionary zeal to make us forget that lesson which Aristotle himself taught—namely, that the subsequent stages of growth are at least as important for the understanding of the nature of an organism as are its beginnings. It is the oak that shall be which makes the acorn what it is, and not the acorn the oak.44

This spirit of attending to ends instructs our examination of the freedom content of the Exodus. The Exodus as we read of it is such an end; it is the finished work of the historians and the Redactor, all of whom understood the Exodus to have been an event of divine liberation. In the text as it stands there are three themes which must be examined in turn in order to elicit this episode's character as the most fundamental pylon of European freedom. These themes are (1) revealed divinity, (2) world creation, and (3) the person of Moses. The first of these themes suggests the problem of

---

method, while the two latter address the content of the Exo-
dus as a congeries of symbols and events which amount to an
enduring structure of freedom.

Revealed Divinity

In the E text of Exodus 3.14-15, the divine name is
revealed in two statements from the burning bush. The RSV
translates this passage as follows:

God [Elohim] said to Moses, "I AM WHO I AM [Ehyeh Aser
Ehyeh]." And he said, "Say this to the people of Is-
rael, 'I AM [Ehyeh] has sent me to you.'" God said
also to Moses, "Say this to the people of Israel, 'The
Lord [YHWH], the God of your fathers, the God of Abra-
ham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, has sent
me to you': this is my name for ever, and thus I am
to be remembered throughout all generations."

The second of these names of God is the tetragrammaton
(YHWH), the standard usage of the Yahwist for the deity who
is the central power within his narrative. This is the tet-
gragrammaton's first appearance in E. The first rendition
of the divine name is peculiar to the Elohist. It is a
dense and mysterious utterance, Ehyeh Aser Ehyeh. There are
several translations of the name, and all of them are sup-
ported by evidence and argumentation. This study adopts
Buber's rendition: I AM PRESENT. 45

45 Various translations of the divine name are given in
Harrelson, Interpreting the Old Testament, pp. 78-79. In
addition to the sense of "being there" or "being present"
which we have employed, other translations include: "I am
who I am," "I will be what I will be," "I cause to be what I
cause to be," "I cause to be what is, what occurs," and "I
am who I am." The last is preferred by Harrelson.

Noth advocates the standard "I am who I am." The phi-
lological speculation which underlies his preference is
worth considering. Noth writes, "The giving of the name
The revelation of the divine name, and with this name, of divinity itself, poses a problem for the serious reader of the Exodus narrative. The birth of human freedom follows upon this self-revelation of the God, but we are hardly prepared by experience to embrace the reality from which free-

follows in vv. 14 f., first and foremost through the mysterious sentence ehyeh aser ehyeh, 'I am who I am' from which the catchword ehyeh 'I am' is taken as the name of the God who appeared to Moses. This name unmistakably hints at the divine name Yahweh in so far as the Israelite ear could immediately understand the transition from ehyeh to yahweh merely as a transition from the first to the third person, so that the name Yahweh would be understood to mean 'he is.' Verse 15 explicitly puts forward this connection by inserting the name Yahweh for the ehyeh of v. 14." (Martin Noth, Exodus: A Commentary [Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1962], p. 43.) Noth's translation and its philological foundation is significant because of its latent ontologizing tendency. Buber's emphasis on divine presence as the form of relationship between God and Israel rejects this ontologizing possibility of the name. This study follows Buber—not for philological reasons, for they are beyond its competence—but because Buber's translation best elicits the historical character of the divine reality in the Old Testament. (See Exodus 3.12 E in support of Buber's position.)

This is not to say that this project's orientation is to reject ontology as a creditable figuration of the divine; certainly this project has had recourse to ontology in its effort to discern a "structure of freedom" in the Bible. It is necessary to affirm however that ontology is a thought dimension which we bring from philosophy to revelation. In the Old Testament revelation, there is no "being" in the pure, ontic sense. The Old Testament is simply too down to earth for such a construction to occur. It is we who ontologize the Old Testament revelation when we recognize in it symbolic structures which parallel those of philosophy. Such recognition is synthetic; that it goes beyond simple elucidation of the text must be acknowledged. Buber's rendition of the name has no interest in such synthesis; Buber's concern was to uncover as much truth as possible about the historical Moses and his experience. For this reason, we accept the historical and theological reliability of Buber's rendition of the divine name. When, in I and Thou, Buber explicates his relational category of the Present in terms of "being," it is clear that this "being" which is central to Buber's philosophy has nothing in common with being
The problem then is one involving reality itself; the erotic human center strains to apprehend the great and primary reality whose force makes life intelligible, but our own degenerate reality interposes itself—a genuine, historical veil of Maya—making the true reality dim and for the most part unreal. Thus, if we put the question, What's in a name?, this I AM PRESENT can open little of its content to us, perhaps none at all. The Presence into which Moses and Israel were drawn is of a wholly different sort from the presence of our own experience.

When we attempt to assay the presence which gives texture to modern experience, we can hardly distinguish its component parts as discrete and individual counters; instead there is the blur. All around are even surfaces machined to

as to on, or with such terms as physis, ousia, phainō, histēmi, which express the Greek experience of being. Of these latter, Heidegger has written, "Limit and end are that wherewith the essent [das Seiend] begins to be." (Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 60.) Contrast the following verse from Buber: "So long as the heaven of Thou is spread out over me the winds of causality cower at my heels, and the whirlpool of fate stays its course." Greek ontology—which grew from natural philosophy—emphasizes the sanctity of causality and of fate in the sense of achieved ends, i.e., stasis. The Hebrew sense of Yahweh's dynamic being there as person is actually a supra-ontic comprehension of reality. See I and Thou, pp. 9-13 and 51.

Buber's translation moreover is not without critical evidence on its side. The only similar usage of the ehyeh in the Old Testament is Hosea 1.9: "And the Lord said, 'Call his name Not my people, for you are not my people and I am not ehyeh for you.'" (The RSV translates this ehyeh as "your God.") In this usage, Buber's "being present" makes sense, whereas Noth's usage, "I am," is less than satisfactory. See Martin Buber, Moses: The Revelation and the Covenant (New York: Harper and Row, 1958), pp. 52-53. See also Buber, Prophetic Faith, pp. 26-29.
standard tolerances, Euclidean abstractions become firm and animate and, in one sense, real. If one were to hold still for a time so as to stop the blur and make it static, the blur would be a collage made up of these even surfaces, imposed one upon the other in infinite regress. Our homes, offices, factories, roads, even our clothing, all share in this quality of forced evenness. This collage is itself the cumulative presence which is the setting for modern existence. It is a totalitarian presence, for within this blur of even surfaces there is no power which can truly stand forth as an entity wholly distinct from the geometric blur which is the ubiquitous presence for human existence from birth to death. Were we to utter a parallel formulation from our own experience to the name which is revealed in the E document, we could say only, "It is present." The "it" character of the setting which is present for the modern imagination obscures, almost hopelessly, our apperception of the world as it is.

For Moses there were no geometric abstractions forced to be real, but there was the craggy surface of Horeb, the firmament, the sky, the sun, the white clump bunchings of the sheep which he tended. When Moses approached the burning bush he was prepared to hear and to see.

There are no theophanies in the world of lines and corners, for this world blocks out the great and true realities which have bestowed meaning on existence. This world conduces to an apperception at once limited and misleading.
Rather than the great and true, this world apprehends the banal and false, for when historical process becomes greatly accelerated, true origins are deprecated and ideology supplants reality as the ground for thought and action. In antiquity, such movements as sophism and gnosticism anticipate in turn the banality and the falsehood of modern ideology. For modern man, the banal form of ideology is scientism which "corrects" apperception in Protagorean fashion by truncating the range of reality to which the human eros may fasten itself. The patently false form of ideology is the gradient taken by post-Puritan chiliasm in both its libertine and despotic arrangements. These two forms of ideology, the banal and the false, converge most obviously in the teaching of Auguste Comte. That teaching has become the logos of our world, the world of collage and blur. Our recognition of its tenets will help to identify the difficulty which the burning bush and the revelation of the name pose for us.

Comte interpreted history according to the well known law of the three stages. Humanity has progressed from the theological to the metaphysical to the positive stage, in which empiricism and mechanism couple so as to end the pathetic character of human existence in history. The the-

46 See Theaetetus, 166-168, for the first recorded articulation of the "enlightened" world view.

ory of the positive stage entails a program for the present as well as a description of past movement. In the positive stage the extirpation of meaning by thought leaders is a benevolence which contributes to human happiness. The positivist movement's ongoing excision of the content of the substantive verb thus approaches the intent and achievement which characterized the frontal lobotomy in its heyday: happiness need no longer come by the hard Aristotelian method of reflecting, building and balancing. Instead, happiness can be had by lightening the load with which a culture rich in symbols of meaning has burdened and so animated erotic humanity in former generations. That this disburdenment quiets human eroticism, that it subjects culture to euthanasia, that it conceals history from sight and feeling, are considerations of no consequence to those who are at peace with the false and banal world of even surfaces.

It is necessary that we acknowledge the danger of such a peace, for all of us who people this world must participate to some degree in its misleading peace. If we are unable to set a critical distance between our own consciousness and the symbolic vacancy which facilitates the prevailing peace, then the real things can never become even partially intelligible and present to us. One of the sustaining objects of the European eros has been the goal of freedom with justice. Many generations have understood this to be a real goal. But we cannot understand it as real unless we will accept the reality of the historical record. His-
tory as it is recorded teaches that God revealed his name to Moses from the burning bush and that history's first great liberation followed in consequence upon this revelation. Our own historical identities begin with this liberation. But the positivist method dictates that the theophany must be an exercise in the fantasy life of the child-like first stage, or that it is only an heuristic event in the progressive maturation of the human intellect.

This study has adopted as its most basic attitude that history is the fallen domain where human severality engenders strife, injustice, slavery. The free act punctuates history and elevates it by revealing the wholeness which is the underlying, eternal reality of all. By this standard, ideology constitutes the most thoroughgoing servitude possible because it separates itself in principle from the inner unity--the true logos--which frees. The ideologue thus is lost in history like a man in the heavy shadows who cannot see the sun's movement from east to west. The self-revelation of Yahweh at the burning bush is an act of divine freedom which in turn made a free human response possible. This theophany then coupled to historical existence a new dimension, the dimension of the sacred. Israel is the mother of freedom in the world because its experience as the chosen people established that historical existence would be reconciled with sacred being. Thus for Israel, there could be sacred history. No longer were the sacred and the historical antinomous dominions. Elsewhere in Near East, these
spheres had been kept apart, with sacred places, times and events separated from the historical conduct of life. For Israel, however, Yahweh was an unrelenting Presence who prompted the response of free righteousness.48

In the modern world where abstractions are made concrete, this Presence is not within the range of customary experience, especially the experience of the intellect. Intellectualism is consumed by history for it lacks any abiding sense of the beginning and of the ultimate finitude and falsehood of history. If men, caught deep in the passages of history, are to know, they must first believe. The Anselmian motto is the only formula which can assure understanding. It is not so much that one should believe in God, or in burning bushes and the like. Before an acquaintance with those is possible, one must believe in reality, unseen but residually present in all culture. From this belief in reality follows the apperception of the unreal as other from the real, the transcendent as other from the permanent, the many as other from the one, the servile as other from the free. If belief cannot heal the inherent malady of historical mankind's divided apperception, it can at the least correct its focus by heightening its selectivity. With the positivist rubric which continues to be the world-dominant pat-

48 This, of course, was the prophetic notion of life in pre-monarchial Israel, whose historical validity modern scholarship has tended to discount as an idyllic vision of the golden age. The great value of Professor Mendenhall's book, The Tenth Generation, is that he argues on the basis of the most recent evidence that the prophetic view was correct.
tern for the interpretation of experience, there is no felt need for rescue from the blurred and spiritless presence of the "it." The I AM PRESENT revealed to Moses becomes at best a poem, at worst a fraud. If the Presence is false, so also is freedom and all knowledge about it. In that event, our attachment to freedom is sentimental and thus, uncertain.

The ensuing discussion of the Exodus from Egypt will examine certain materials from the text of Exodus, chapters 1-14. This passage contains an account of the enslavement of Israel in Egypt, God's call to Moses, Moses' directive to the Pharaoh, the plagues, the Passover, the Exodus from Egypt, and finally, the destruction of the army of Egypt in the sea. In order to elicit the paradigmatic value of the liberation performed in the Exodus, it might seem desirable to terminate the discussion with a consideration of the giving of the Law at Sinai, the holy mountain of God. This study has decided against this course for two reasons. The first is that the connection of the giving of the Law and the Exodus of Israel from Egypt is more probably the result of later redaction than of actual historical events. The two episodes are initially unconnected, being happenings which affected different constituent groups in the Israelite confederacy. The second is that while the Sinai pericope

49 The initial separation of these events is indicated by the absence of any mention of the Law in the early creeds of Deuteronomy 6.21-24, 25.5-9, and Joshua 24.2-13. See
furnishes a pleasing denouement to the events of the Exodus, it is not integral to the paradigmatic meaning of that affair. The narrative of Exodus 1-14 is sufficient to establish the significance of the events which occurred, without requiring further reference to any later developments. In that narrative, the removal of Israel from Egypt is sought in order that the people of Yahweh may serve their God away from the Pharaonic domain. There is no suggestion that the purpose involves a dispensation of law. When we recall the pure Pauline consciousness of freedom, we are reminded that in its initial, exuberant moment, the free vision is wholly antinomian. Only when the vision of spontaneous beinghood begins to grow dim does a set of rules become necessary in order to preserve in tact as much of the great epiphany as is possible. Hence the persistent symbolism of the divine origin of the laws, both in Israel and in Greece. In truth, the laws are divine only as means to the participation in a reality which is intrinsically foreign to law. The Bible has more to teach us about the origin of freedom than does Greece, for in both the Old and New Testaments, we find episodes in which the holy, antinomian moment of freedom is arrested and preserved for us. The divine liberation text of Exodus is the first and greatest of these.

In this text two themes will illumine the divine lib-

eration. These themes may be designated as follows: (1) the spectacle of world creation, and (2) Moses the liberator. By way of introduction to these themes, it will be necessary to recognize the centrality of the structure of freedom within the paradigmatic narrative of Exodus 1-14.

Liberation as World Creation

The tripartite structure of freedom achieves maximum clarity in the teaching of John 8. This structure includes the avowal of the negativity of slave existence, the negation of negativity through divine liberation, the repositioning of existence as participation in the life of God. Such a repositioning elevates existence to the high level of being. This is to say then that a liberation is nothing less than a creation. Presence supplants vacancy; being supplants non-being. When the liberation involves a whole city, a whole nation, it achieves the force of world creation. The world is new and good for those who have become free.

Although the Exodus does not display the conceptual refinement of John 8, the several elements of the structure of freedom occur unmistakably throughout the passage which we have indicated as our field of reference. Yahweh acknowledges the misery of the slaves; he frees the slaves; he repositions Israelite life as an enduring directedness toward the divine Presence. Half a millenium later a rather similar pattern emerges in the thought and work of Solon. The Exodus text is rich in its symbolization of the experience of slavery and liberation, for the Redactor has included
substantial portions of J, E, and P so as to present the fullest possible account of the events and their meaning.

Chapter three of Exodus contains both the J and E statements of God's recognition of the disgrace and suffering of the people in Egyptian enslavement. In J, Yahweh says,

I have seen the affliction of my people who are in Egypt, and have heard their cry because of their task-masters; I know their sufferings, and I have come down to deliver them out of the hand of the Egyptians, and to bring them up out of that land to a good and broad land, a land flowing with milk and honey . . .

In E, God says to Moses:

And now, behold, the cry of the people of Israel has come to me, and I have seen the oppression with which the Egyptians oppress them. Come, I will send you to Pharaoh that you may bring forth my people, the sons of Israel, out of Egypt.

Both of these dicta convey divine awareness of the negativity of slave existence. The divine word is then a vocation of the first element of the structure of freedom. This God has revealed himself to Moses as the God of the patriarchs, and as such, he is concerned that the promise to the fathers of Israel has reached a terminus—not in fulfilment of free nationhood—but in the enslavement of the people whom he has promised to exalt. Thus, both of the texts reveal Yahweh's intention to liberate his people through a concrete historical act; he will negate the negativity of his people's slave existence. In this obtains the second, dynamic moment in the structure of freedom.

50Exodus 3.7-8.

51Exodus 3.9-10.
For a political science which attempts to comprehend the witness of archaic experience to the meaning of slavery and freedom, it is vitally important that the expression of concern over the enslavement of the people Israel occurs not in the mouth of man but of God. One ought not read the Exodus without bearing in mind the callousness which modernity has brought to the issue of human exploitation through the writing of Nietzsche, Calhoun, and the capitalist and fascist ideologues. For man to lament his own condition as slave is an exercise in egoism, and it is easy to see how this can be construed as a function of the human meanness which writing of that genre imputes to the majority of mankind. But for God to decry the enslavement of a people is a fundamentally different proposition; before God, the enslavement appears as a political deviation from the plan of creation, and therefore it ultimately becomes a divine project to reverse the negativity of existence, first for the chosen people Israel, and then for all mankind through a positive act of liberation and redemption. The image of God will not be a slave. Upon this stipulation, human freedom can no longer be understood as one of several alternative types of political organization. Freedom is not merely the ascendant trait of life in "free" countries where the ownership of people is forbidden and random behavior is tolerated. Freedom before God becomes anthropocosmic in its implication. The Exodus liberation links human freedom to the divine purpose underlying all creation. It follows then that in poli-
ties where freedom is obstructed by the ruling directorate, or in polities where freedom is misused by the populace, there obtains a visible lacuna between existence and being. Such polities are turned toward destruction rather than creation, toward death instead of life. Egypt was such a polity.

The third element of the structure of freedom, the step of positive participation in the truth of divine being, is the purpose, the final cause, of God's act of liberation. It is this purpose which brings the God of Israel into conflict with the very constitution of the Egyptian regime. The conflict involves the rupture of the old constitution and the establishment of a new order. This epic subjugation of the old and unjust before the new and righteous likens the Exodus to a world creation. In the amalgamative JE text of Exodus 5, the positive purpose of the liberation is figured in the intended feast to Yahweh in the wilderness; the world creation conflict is adumbrated in Pharaoh's reply to the proposal of Israel's retreat and worship.

Afterward Moses and Aaron went to the Pharaoh and said, "Thus says the Lord [YHWH], the God [Elohim] of Israel, 'Let my people go, that they may hold a feast to me in the wilderness.'" But Pharaoh said, "Who is the Lord, that I should heed his voice and let Israel go? I do not know the Lord, and moreover I will not let Israel go."

Concerning the similarities between the Exodus and various articles of creation literature, see Harrelson, Interpreting the Old Testament, pp. 80 ff.

Exodus 5.1-2.
The projected feast in the wilderness in this passage parallels in both form and content the Johannine "continuance in the logos" and "true discipleship." That is to say, liberation, the act which makes free, is teleological in a divine sense; it does not occur on mere humanitarian grounds. There would be no reason in Yahweh's plan to liberate this people from Pharaonic service if there were no higher service intended for the people. The worship festival in the wilderness symbolizes the alternate course which lies in the future for the people Israel; as such, it adumbrates the salvation in the desert and the fulfilment of the promise first given to Abram, i.e., the promise of nationhood and land. On a paradigmatic level, the formation of the Covenant and the giving of the Law is wholly consistent with the worship festival, and it is for exactly that reason that the sources maintain that the giving of the Law was the historical denouement of the whole liberation. It was their understanding that the new constitution supplanted the old. The liberation thus has a transcendent bearing; it involves the restoration of divine sonship for the people of Yahweh through popular obedience to divine command.

It is possible to infer from the passages dealing with the feast in the wilderness a trick to deceive the Pharaoh into letting the people slip away from their stations and tasks. This explanation is not satisfying. The feast to Yahweh must be held out of the boundaries of Egypt because Egypt is contaminated with the presence of a counter deity,
the Pharaoh himself. The depth of this conflict begins to emerge with Pharaoh's own reply to the command of Yahweh which Moses has conveyed. The Pharaoh responds—loosely—"Who is this Yahweh that I should obey him . . . ?" Apparently this reply displays the same sneering cynicism which Stalin exhibited in his famous query as to how many divisions are at the disposal of the pope, and inasmuch as both were slave masters of renown, it is kindred with that later question. But the Pharaoh's response is more straightforward than that of Stalin for he is not only the king of Egypt but its god as well. He knows of no other deity whose authority should countermand his own. Nor is he—a god—likely to be convinced otherwise by entreaties and threats. It is for this reason that the last of the Biblical exercises in world creation ensues. The sequence of events which begins in Exodus 5.2 with the Pharaoh's refusal to heed the command of Yahweh includes the several plagues and achieves completion with the destruction of the army of Egypt in the sea.

The "world creation" of Exodus 5-14 is generically different from the P creation account of Genesis 1, and the J creation account of Genesis 2. It has greater similarity to the "creation" stories of the flood and of the appearance of Abram after the dispersal of the Babel community, but it is different from these also. The two statements of creation in the first two chapters of Genesis deal primarily in the creation of the world and man in time; moreover, the manifest theme in these accounts is God's creation of world reality
out of a pre-existent emptiness, an emptiness which parallels the primal chaos of other literatures. The "creations" following upon the flood and upon the Babel dispersion have nothing to do with the establishment of time. In these, time is given and constant; novelty occurs pursuant to God's destructive acts because these world-destructive acts serve to introduce new epochs within time and hence, recreations of the world. Pre-historic time is thus divided epochally through great destructions and recreations amongst the heroic pre-peoples. But the Exodus account of world creation is fundamentally different from these epochal destruction-creation events in that it does not consist of but another "occasion" by which time can be divided. Rather, it is world creation by which the saving history of Yahweh begins with the assembling of Israel as a free people, responsible before its God. In the great upheavals of the Exodus, history becomes differentiated from time, reckoned in terms of creation-destruction cycles.

There may be objection to the employment of the term "world creation" in description of the events of the Exodus. This objection can be maintained only if it is held that "world" means physical reality. The "world," as the symbol occurs in philosophy in reference to the ambient reality which is synthesized for consciousness by a subjective, historical humanity, is a world erected upon the suppressed ruins of an archaic, unfree, pre-individuated, unconscious world. Inasmuch as the Exodus destroyed that world, to in-
troduce in its place a world of new celestial, political and psychic configurations, the Exodus amounts to a world creation. The Old Testament documentary sources (all of whom labored without the instruction of Hegel and Jung), are superlatively cognizant of the division which the Exodus imposed in the existence of man upon the earth. For them, the Exodus created a world in which man lived in free service to the God who had sanctified history with his saving Presence. Godliness in history is pre-figured in Abram's removal from the existence of his land, his kindred, his father's house; in the Exodus, patriarchal history is reenacted as national history through the escape of Israel from the encompassing greyness of its slave existence in Egypt. The Exodus drama must thus be understood as world creation, for there could be no world which serves as object for consciousness had the liberation of Israel from Egyptian slavery not occurred. In the old world, men and gods are jointly integral with the natural world as pattern; hence the impossibility of subjectivity; hence magic in place of action. The preternatural God of the new world is free; he is not the exponent of pattern, but the creator of action.  

54 Snaith explains that in the Hebrew language there is no verb which conveys "being" in the static sense that is possible in the Greek language. Instead, there is only "becoming" (hayah). (Hence Buber's rendition of ehyeh as "being there"—i.e., as a continually self-manifesting presence. The consonantal pattern of the words is the same, vowels being at the linguist's option.) From this understanding Snaith develops one of the distinctive ideas with which his study is concerned. The God of Israel (or later, the Holy One of Israel) couples in his character the semitic traits of an EL (the greatest of gods) who is holy (qodosh) in the
into partnership with this God is mankind which is recreated for action. The new mankind which is emergent from the Exodus is mankind become capable of subjectivity, of consciousness, of freedom within the Presence of the author of free action. The Exodus of Israel from Egypt is nothing less than the creation of the free world of history.

The Exodus is world creation in the symbolic and mythical sense also. That is to say, the character of the events by which the liberation of the chosen people was won is clearly suggestive of the ancient Near Eastern mythical encounters by which the primordial chaos is subdued and world order is installed. We must hasten to add, again, that the Exodus is different from these in that it creates the world as history, in contrast to the myths in which the world is created as a repetitive cycle of decay and renewal. Despite this basic difference, the Exodus displays a motif which is common to the theogonic myth. Like Marduk in the East and

sense of R. Otto's "the Numinous," with the relentless sense of action which is conveyed in the Hebrew version of the verb substantive, hayah. (See Snaith, Distinctive Ideas of the Old Testament, pp. 47-48.) It is this peculiar juxtaposition in the character of Yahweh of an awful holiness with a worldview in which stasis is incomprehensible that has given to Europe history as we know it, i.e., as real movement in which action is never merely efficient, but is itself an expression of, or deviation from, the real content which undergirds all. When history expresses this real content, we say that it is free. It is for this reason that the intense political monism of both the historians and prophets is absolutely at odds with the monism of recent totalitarianism. Totalitarianism seeks rest in a return to the unconscious world of magic and bull sacrifice. The Bible quite literally has no understanding of rest. In action there is freedom, while in stasis there is the spurious perfection of universal bondage.
Zeus in the West, Yahweh accomplishes an incremental defeat of the older generation of deity which has lost the power of order and has become itself the agent of chaos. In the Exodus struggle, Yahweh becomes the new ordering deity and Pharaoh the dragon, the monster-god who dominates the world of the dead. The triumph of Yahweh over Egypt is the triumph of history over death. Egypt left great tombs, while Israel and its daughter faiths live on as sacred history into the modern age. The Exodus creation directed Egypt and the ancient Near East to death and Israel to life.

Life is the end of creation, and creation involves the replacement of nothing with something, of disorder with order, of injustice with justice. The nothing, the disorderly, the unjust, are symbolic expressions of the residual, life destroying evil which is pushed into abeyance by the world-creative act. In the later Bible consciousness, this evil reality is personified by the devil, a personage who is absolutely other from Yahweh, the one true God. In the pre-Biblical symbolizations of the world-creative struggle against the demonic reality, the monotheistic principle is partially or wholly absent. In this situation, the struggle occurs between older gods who have exchanged their divinity for demonism and new gods who have taken up the task of instituting and policing divine order. The Exodus struggle is of this sort, for it is a combat to the death between Yahweh, the righteous God of Israel, and Pharaoh, the slave-master god of Egypt. The theopolitical boundary of the Exodus then
is not monotheism but henotheism. It is important that the god character of the Pharaoh be recognized, for if it is not, the larger significance of the Exodus will evade our understanding. We will be unable to perceive the Exodus as the creation of a veritably new world of justice and freedom.

The challenge of the new deity to the old is given in the declaration: "Thus says the Lord [YHWH] ..." and it

55Henotheism is the worship of one god without denial of the existence of others, and there are suggestions in the Old Testament that until quite late, henotheism was the form of godliness amongst the chosen people. Irwin argued that Amos was the first monotheist, and the internal evidence of the Amos prophecy supports the claim that Amos was very near to that position, even though he does not say so directly. (See Irwin, "The Hebrews," p. 227.) Professor Albright believed that the historical Moses was a monotheist, but he went on to stipulate that there was no need for Israel to deny the existence of gods other than Yahweh; it was necessary only to deny their power. (See William Foxwell Albright, From Stone Age to Christianity: Monotheism and the Historical Process, 2nd ed. [Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1957], pp. 271 and 327-328.) Lods offers the most complete overview of the matter in his argument that monotheism becomes doctrinal only with the climactic prophecy of Deutero-Isaiah. This doctrinization of Yahweh's sole hegemony, Lods explains, is anticipated in the express teaching of Amos, and is implicit in compact form in the early documents from the Mosaic age. (See Adolphe Lods, The Prophets and the Rise of Judaism, tr. S. H. Hooke [London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1937], p. 60.) In any event, if consistent monotheism is imputed to the earlier Bible text, the greater contest of the prophet Elijah with the priests of the Canaanite Baal (I Kings 18) cannot make much sense. The issue here is not the existence of the Baal, but of his power.

In connection with this question of henotheism and monotheism, it should be recognized that gnosticism in both its authentic historical form and in the modernist analogue which Voegelin identified embraces a retreat from monotheism back to henotheism. Thus the gnostic supercession of Yahweh (or Ialdabaoth) by Christ, and analogously, the supercession of the metaphysician by the sociologist, of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat, and so on. In no instance is the reality
is accepted by the Pharaoh in his reply, "Who is the Lord that I should heed his voice . . . ?" Upon the rejoinder, there ensues a series of divinely initiated natural catastrophes which are of world-destructive proportions. By the plagues, Yahweh destroys the Egyptian order step by step, rendering life within the Pharaonic theopolity so hateful that at last the god-king, driven by desperation at the death of the first-born of all Egypt, acquiesces in the will of Yahweh and releases Israel to serve its God. For his part, the Pharaoh has attempted to retain his sovereignty, agreeing to release Israel in order to obtain relief from the plagues, and with the cessation of each plague, reneging on his word. In the P document, Pharaoh's duplicity is indeed part of the divine plan of Yahweh; Yahweh will "multiply" his signs and wonders through hardening the heart of the king, thereby heightening the effect of the demonstration of his superiority to the god-king. Although JE does not go so far in rationalizing this theme, the same implication is present in the text.

... Thus says the Lord [YHWH], the God of the Hebrews, "Let my people go, that they may serve me. For this time I will send all my plagues upon your heart, and upon your servants and your people, that you may know that there is none like me in all the earth. For by now I could have put forth my hand and struck you and your people with pestilence, and you would have been cut off from the earth; but for this purpose have I let you live, to show you my power, so that my name may be

of the hated divinity or its analogue denied, but only its power.

56Exodus 7.3-5.
declared throughout all the earth. You are still exalting yourself against my people and will not let them go . . ."57

In creating Israel as the new People of the world, Yahweh has proceeded slowly in humbling the moribund world of divinized monarchs, astral deities, magic, and human enslavement before chthonian spirits. There is one final encounter with the Pharaoh after the Exodus from Egypt; the king again attempts to assert hegemony over God's people, and he is destroyed along with the Egyptian army, which the Bible historians understood to be the primary symbol of the negative power of political domination. With the destruction of the god-king and his armed might the divine liberation of Israel is complete. Israel is no longer to serve the Pharaoh in bondage; Israel is to serve Yahweh in freedom, for before Yahweh Israel is not a subject people; instead, Israel is the son of God.

The sonship relation between the people and their God is the cardinal achievement of the world creation accomplished in the Exodus. The theme of divine sonship for Israel illumines both the future history of Yahweh and his people and the past of the now decadent Egyptian theopolity. From the vantage point of divine command, the purpose of the Exodus has been for Israel to serve its God away from the Egyptian Pharaonic contamination, but from the vantage point of divine dispensation of grace unto that people who is to serve, sonship is the gift which is to be bestowed upon the

57Exodus 9.13-17.
issue of God's first man, Abram. The positivity of Yahweh's approach to Israel in bondage is formally the same as the positivity of Yahweh's approach to Abram in the environment of his youth. It consists of a command and a promise. The command is given in the "serve me" and God's promise concerning the future history is adumbrated in the "Israel is my son." Even before Moses had approached the king demanding release of Israel, Yahweh has said, "And you shall say to Pharaoh, 'Thus says the Lord, Israel is my first-born son, and I say to you, "Let my son go that he may serve me"; if you refuse to let him go, behold, I will slay your first-born son.'"58 The symbol of divine sonship for Israel thus has a double ramification. It is the Exodus equivalent of the blessed nationhood promised to Abram upon his departure from the land of his youth. Within the setting of Pharaonic Egypt, the symbol suggests a spiritual treason against the established order. Voegelin was the first to recognize the extent and the depth of this treason within the decadent world which antedated the world of sacred history. He writes:

The conflict between the Yahwist experience and the pharaonic order is brought on a formula as simple as it is perfect. We remember the Pyramid Text in which the Pharaoh is greeted by the gods:

This is my son, my first born;

and we find now opposed to it in [Exodus] 4.22 the new formula:

My son, my first-born, is Israel.59

58Exodus 4.22-23. See also Hosea 11.1.

59Eric Voegelin, Order and History, I (Baton Rouge:
The great events which we have recognized as being world-destructive and world-creative are here developed in the fullest degree. A massive substitution has occurred; no longer is only one amongst men the son of the gods; with Yahweh's liberating action in history, an entire people has been elected to sonship.

It is commonly understood that the European interest in constitutionalism was instructed by the republican experiences of classical antiquity. But the Exodus creation-liberation event was no less important to constitutionalism than classical republicanism, for the demotion of an arbitrary king from divine to mortal status, coupled with the elevation of an entire people from the status of slaves to sons of God is a distributed bestowal of esteem which culminates in uniform rules, duties, and rights. This is the conclusion which the historian E transmitted to Europe through the inclusion of the Book of the Covenant within his Exodus narrative.

Sonship for Israel is the teleological aspect of the Exodus drama of world creation; that is to say, election of the people Israel to sonship is the purpose of the projected service to God in the wilderness; the command has substance only in relation to the promise. The connection of service with sonship establishes the second sense in which the elec-
tion has cast light upon the liberation; the people has exchanged masters. Yahweh has become suzerain and Israel has become vassal.\textsuperscript{60} The relationship of suzerain to vassal is hardly akin to the relationship of owner to slave, for the former is a constitutional arrangement and the latter is not. But Israel's service to its creator-liberator is constitutional in a more profound sense than the language of feudal organization can show. The provision of divine sonship qualifies the nature of the service; a life in service to the father-God is essentially different from a life worn fine in service to the Pharaoh, or even to a good human overlord. Service of son to father is service rendered in an atmosphere of mutual love and duty; it is a morally developmental service, a service which is propadeutic unto free selfhood for the person and independent nationhood for the collective. The service of a chattel to its keeper is exploitative and morally destructive; it is service which finally wearies the soul, drying to nothing the latent seed from which the free, legislative self might otherwise grow. Sonship in service to God is the core anthropological symbolism of the Bible; more certainly than any other of that book's contents, it establishes freedom as the destined condition of man before God. The God of Israel is the true God

\textsuperscript{60}See Mendenhall, The Tenth Generation, pp. 14-15. Mendenhall explains that suzerainty agreements of this region and period frequently use the father-son terminology. Mendenhall points out also that the father-son relationship continues to be the dominant theme of divine-human relationship in the Bible until the writing of the Fourth Evangelist in John 15.14-15: "You are my friends . . ."
for just that reason: Within his Presence, mankind participated more consciously in the truth of being than had been the case before the election of Israel to sonship. The Fourth Evangelist later synthesized these participatory symbols of son and servant in the New Testament symbol of positivity in being: the free disciple. A community of these persons is the end of creation.

It is possible now to contemplate the several symbols which we have considered of man in free positivity before God. In the order of their appearance in the Bible sources they include the portrait symbol of Abram who in the J narrative quits his surroundings in response to the command and promise of his God; next is the free son, Isaac; then comes the plural son of God who in the Exodus is freed from Pharaonic slavery to serve the true God in the wilderness; after this is the image of God in the P creation whose properties in the esteem of God are possession, power and worth; last is the disciple of the Fourth Gospel whose freedom is derivative from participation in the truth of the mediatory logos. In the New Testament disciple symbol, the overt identification of freedom as the condition of positivity before God has led our analysis to develop freedom as the latent intention of positivity in the earlier symbols. In so doing we have not imputed to the text a construction which it will not support. In the slave difficulty of Abram, in the Is-
raelite liberation from slavery, in the divine commission to man, the image of God, the meaning is unmistakable: the slave condition is fraught with existential negativity, while freedom within God's Presence is a condition charged with ontic positivity. The underside of each of these symbols of free humanity is the slave condition. Both are possibilities, and either may be manifested in the person and in the greater affiliation which is the extension of personhood.

In respect of these opposing gradients of the human character, several observations follow. First is that the capacities which reside within the human character are likewise the projectible capacities for order in the world external to self. In Republic VIII Plato has shown that the order of the soul is constitutive of public order. By this understanding, the conclusion follows that an aggregation comprised of free and positive characters will be a community which is pledged to live its collective existence in free service to positive ends. An inspection of the symbols of the prophetic critique and of free political life in Athens will illustrate this public aspect of freedom as positivity in being.

The second consideration pertains more directly to the Biblical symbols which have been examined. We should recognize that from the portrait symbol of Abram to the concept symbol of the disciple, we are dealing in pre-Augustinian materials. None of our narrators is acquainted with a doctrine of original sin. While original sin, Augustine's
"blemished nature," gathers in summary form so much of the truth of archaic symbolism, it does so in such a fashion as to harden that experience and to empty it of the dynamic tension in which it is natively couched. After Augustine, the primary propensity of man is to slavery, to negativity, to sin. This conceptual turn occurred mainly because Augustine wedded sin to pride. To Augustine, the inherent negativity of man lies in that man conceives himself to be a source of being and order, and in so conceiving himself, man erects himself as a power in competition with the God who has created him. Except for the Adam story, there is little in the historical portion of the Old Testament to support the anthropology which makes original sin the primary fact of life for man. The Abram saga is more representative of the Bible portrait of man than is the Adam story.

It is important that in *City of God*, Book XXXI, chapter 3, Augustine bases the argument of original sin on the historicity of Adam and his transgression. Once the mythical character of this episode has become transparent, it becomes impossible to maintain the doctrine in its traditional form. No longer can all be held to be guilty because of descent from corrupted ancestors. On the paradigmatic level, however, Augustine's reading cannot be gainsaid. Eve's receptivity to the serpent's invitation to know all things does indicate pride, human over-stepping of boundaries and competition with divinity. If pride is the generic type of negativity within which all other negativity may be gathered, then the advocates of original sin as a trait of human nature are correct. The preponderant teaching of the Bible will not support such an anthropology though. There is an irreconcilable variance between the fallen mankind of Genesis 3 and the "image of God" in Genesis 1, and to imagine that with Adam's fall, man has lost the divine image is simply to apply a cosmetic screen which cannot be effective in the post-Wellhausean world. P is much later than J, and it is clear that he did not agree with J about the salient property of human nature. J has preserved for us a Biblicized version...
story. In the character of Abram there dwells a range of possibilities which extends from the slavishness of despair to free trust in God's promise and free obedience to God's command. Negativity in the Abram story does not grow from a prideful design; it grows rather from mistrust, from straying, from forgetting. It is the behavior of a wayward son, not the conspiracy of a would-be god. Only by means of the most assiduous intellectualization of the facts can it become possible to impute pride to Abram. It may be true that prideful hubris against God and man becomes an audible dissonance in later times, after the beginning of the monarchies and the vertically stratified societies which were their adjunct. But in the early historical period the characters are too naive, too insufficient in depth, for them to be capable of a genuinely Pelagian pride. Even of the Pharaoh, the hated god-king, P finds it necessary to tell us that God hardened his heart. Apparently there would have been a more muted conflict had he been left to his own resources.

While it is true that the most patent negativity of which man is capable is pride, it is important to recognize that the Biblical symbols which this study has examined do not exhibit that dress. It is likewise necessary to observe that in respect of these various symbols—negativity, slav-
ishness, sin—are not the sole, or even the primary gradients of the human character. The case is quite the contrary; free positivity before God is the condition of desire and destiny. The descent to slavery occurs as a function of human impotence, but not as the design of a maliced nature. To be sure, free positivity is not realized in a world-immanent frame of activity; in each instance it is God the Savior who makes free and thus draws nearer to completion the nature which God the Creator has intended for man. In an objective assessment, liberation from slavery is a divine action by which man is saved from a negative condition for which he is not ultimately responsible. In the Bible, slavery to Egypt or slavery to sin is a happening which ensnares man from without, and so corrupts the essentially free and positive character that man is. The inherency of negativity in the human character as radical evil is the consequence of man's own affective avowal of responsibility for his slave condition: "I have sinned." In that confession the person claims volitional involvement in the circumstances of his negativity and thus involves his own volitional center in the restoration of positivity. Inasmuch as the "I" partakes of a more generalized human nature and condition, the "I" who confesses sin imputes the slave condition not only to the particular self, but to the broader humanity of which the "I" is one particular instance. It is at this affective point of the avowal of personal culpability for sin that the Augustian claim of inherency becomes viable,
Mankind, according to the symbolic configurations which we have beheld, can follow one of two opposing paths. Man is destined for free partnership in the venture of divine creation; his nature as person is open to the universe as being. But this same nature is vulnerable to closure and to impotence. In this dual proclivity can be found both man as he is and the fallen character who he has become. This fallen character, the slave, is the person to whose hapless condition God bears witness, who is liberated by God, and who is elevated to a new creaturehood which participates in the world-creative process itself. In order of ascending antiquity, this liberated character is the disciple, the image, the son of God.

From Voegelin we have learned that "To establish a government is an essay in world creation." But the Exodus

The following excerpts from Paul Ricoeur explain this more fully:

... even if evil came to man from another source which contaminates him, this other source would still be accessible to us only through its relation to us, only through the state of temptation, aberration, or blindness whereby we would be affected. In all hypotheses, evil manifests itself in man's humanity.

The choice of the center of perspective is already the declaration of a freedom which admits its responsibility, which vows to look upon evil as evil committed, and avows its responsibility to see that it is not committed. It is this avowal that links evil to man, not merely as its place of manifestation, but as its author.

Fallible Man, pp. xxiv-xxv.

Voegelin, Order and History, I, 16.
of Israel from Egypt teaches something more than this. That is, a creation is likewise a liberation, for it frees man to be the self who he really is. In its initial impulse, every revolution is such a creation, for the revolutionary intention is to rectify and to free. This intention is given in the very attempt to reposition life on a new and higher level than that which went before.

Moses

The transferral of divine sonship from the Pharaoh to Israel through Yahweh's act of liberation suggests Hegel's consideration that while in imperial China, only one was free, in modern Europe, all are free. Hegel was unprepared to admit that long before his age the freedom of a whole people had been accomplished in completion, for such an admission would have upset the developmental thesis which Hegel advanced. Hence the rather unfriendly treatment of Israel in The Philosophy of History. It is true that the freedom of Israel pursuant to the Exodus was not character-

64 Consider the following accusation against Israel:

We observe among this people a severe religious ceremonial, expressing a relation to pure Thought. The individual as concrete does not become free, because the Absolute itself is not comprehended as concrete Spirit; since Spirit still appears posited as non-spiritual—destitute of its proper characteristics. It is true that subjective feeling is manifest—the pure heart, repentance, devotion; but the particular concrete individuality has not become objective to itself in the Absolute.

ized by highly differentiated individuality; that development would occur first in Greece. Freedom for Israel within the divine Presence bestowed both moral and ontic power upon the chosen people, as a whole, in a way unprecedented in history. Israelite freedom did not encourage the sort of resplendent individuality which culminated in athletic prowess, aesthetic virtuosity, and in science. But if these achievements of Greece are considered to constitute the greater virtue, they must be taken along with the terrible underside of Greek humanism, i.e., the preordained verdict of form and fate which propels the human project to gory destruction.\textsuperscript{65} There is nothing like this in Israel, for within the Presence, redemption is the enduring response to repentance for both the individual and the nation. This abiding belief in the possibility of a real turning away from death toward life is the most concrete showing of the reality of freedom in Israel. The forum for redemption, for change which makes life abundant, is the nation. This pattern holds from the Exodus to the return of the Remnant. Unlike the more extreme manifestations of freedom in Greece, the Israelite hope began and remained as group freedom, real-

\textsuperscript{65}Thus Collingwood identifies not Herodotus, but Thucydides with his "substantialism" as the historian who most faithfully follows the anti-historical bias of Greek culture. See R. G. Collingwood, \textit{Idea of History}, pp. 29 ff.
ized in response to, or reaction against, the affairs of the
nation. Only in the vision of Aeschylus would Greece ap­
proach this high mark of Israelite freedom.

To say that the freedom of the Israelite nation is
group freedom is to say that the God who gives the nation
identity is the force who supports action. Thus, when great
individuals appear—and by great individuals we do not mean
kings—it is not because ambition has driven them into prom­
inence. From Abram through the later prophets, great men
become great in obedience—sometimes reluctant obedience—to
divine command. According to our text, Moses, the liberator
and legislator, was such a man.

Moses and Pharaoh—and to a much lesser extent Aaron—
are the only significant human characters in the portion of
the Exodus narrative which we have discussed. Our concern
here is not to explore in detail the historical person and
doings of Moses. The so-called "fossil text" of Exodus 5.3
and 5.5-19 J suggests the possibility that the most basic
strata of the Exodus tradition is pre-Mosaic, and that the
centrality of Moses in the received text is the result of
later synthesis with other Moses traditions. Whatever the
case may be with the history of the Exodus narrative, in a
paradigmatic sense the Moses of the Exodus text develops our
understanding of divine liberation and human freedom as a
condition of positivity before God and the world. Like Abram

66 See Noth, History of Pentateuchal Traditions, pp. 70-
71 and 156 ff.
in Genesis, Moses is God's man. Like Abram, Moses is of the type, first man; he resembles those figures whom the Greeks would call archōn. That is to say, Moses is the first clearly discernible human who is emergent in the world creation of Exodus. As first man, Moses is suited to partnership with the Creator and to leadership of the chosen people. Moses is prototypical of free humanity, and if we are to comprehend the meaning of freedom in its original showing, we must attend to this model figure.

The concern for Moses as both product and agent of liberation is necessitated by this project's interest in the modernist misunderstanding and frequent deprecation of cultural origins. This is serious, especially where the interests of a whole order of life are concerned. A man who believes that he began in Naples, when in fact he began in Rome, will believe that he has come to Rome when he arrives in Venice. That man will drown. In the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche contrived a colorful explanation for the origin of morality, uniformly binding on all men. In brief, morality is held to be the product of a mean and sinister conspiracy by which conniving slaves infect masters with their own congenital weakness and thereby subvert the innocent, pre-moral hegemony of masters over the world. By and large, it is as if geese should persuade swans that it is evil for the latter to be masters of the pond, and so reduce swans to the

67 See especially Genealogy of Morals, aphorism 7, and Beyond Good and Evil, aphorism 195.
ignominious stature of geese. In Nietzsche's view, the contagion of moral conscience was such that the world was perverted and its former grandeur was lost. On a factual level, the historicity of Nietzsche's thesis is dubious, and an inspection of the character of Moses, the liberator, shows that on a paradigmatic level it is completely false. Nietzsche could not come to the truth of transcendence, and thus he rendered himself incapable of understanding the real truth which attaches to the liberation of the slaves. The Exodus text depicts a Moses who, after his ordination as liberator, displayed none of the meanness, the hatefulness, the duplicitousness which Nietzsche imputed to the slave mentality. Instead, our text shows Moses as a fairly simple man, not entirely unlike Nietzsche imagined the primeval masters to have been. He obeyed the God who had spoken to him from the burning bush, going before the king (the first prophet to do so), bearing the authority of God's word, displaying no regard for personal safety or worldly fortune. His only fear was that people would not listen to him.

The origins of Moses in the JE text of Exodus 2 are legendary: Moses was born into the priestly tribe of Levi; he was placed in a basket by the river's shore, where the daughter of the Pharaoh discovered him and took him to be her son. Exodus 2.10 gives a Hebrew etymology of the name "Moses," but the Old Testament scholars agree that the etymology is mistaken. The name "Moses" is an Egyptian name, and it is possible that the historical Moses was born an
Egyptian. Why then the legendary account of the nativity and upbringing of Moses? Buber explains the legend in terms of Moses' function as liberator. The legend of Moses' Levite parenthood provides an organic connection of Moses with the slave people Israel, but the account of his exposure and royal adoption spares Moses the experience of enslavement. This is important, for one who had been a slave would have been unsuited by origin to become the human agent of divine liberation. The Exodus treatment of the origin of Moses in the Old Testament is formally similar to the virgin birth of Christ in the New Testament. The Exodus legend of the nativity of Moses thus attests to the blemish of slavery in much the same way as the Genesis account of the expulsion of Ishmael. That is to say, Ishmael—born of a slave—was unfit to become the ancestor of Yahweh's holy nation; Moses, spared enslavement and rehabilitated from his slave nativity by a royal adoption, was by nature suited to become God's agent in the liberation. In all of this the text seems actually to anticipate the charge that a petty self-interest was clandestinely at work in the freeing of the slaves and the consequent formation of a morality binding on all. In both history and legend, Moses, the human by whose agency the freedom of the slaves was won, was never a slave; he was by experience a member of the master caste; he could not be the exponent of a "slave mentality." Exactly

68 See Noth, History of Pentateuchal Traditions, p. 159.
69 Buber, Moses, p. 35.
the same is true of Solon in Greece.

Despite the text's depiction of Moses as one who has been spared the blemish of slavery, the slave mentality is suggested in the didactic story about the young Moses' murder and flight.

One day, when Moses had grown up, he went out to his people and looked on their burdens; and he saw an Egyptian beating a Hebrew, one of his people. He looked this way and that, and seeing no one he killed the Egyptian and hid him in the sand. When he went out the next day, behold, two Hebrews were struggling together; and he said to the man that did the wrong, "Why do you strike your fellow?" He answered, "Who made you a prince and a judge over us? Do you mean to kill me as you killed the Egyptian?" Then Moses was afraid, and thought, "Surely the thing is known." When Pharaoh heard of it, he sought to kill Moses.70

In the European imagination, good government entails the coupling of constitutionalism with popular freedom. Europe learned to value this union from its discoverers, Israel and Greece. Good teachers are first students, and the episode narrated above is from the period of the teacher's own student passage. Moses, the teacher of Israel, learns the futility of ego-derivative solutions to the problem of injustice amongst men. It is altogether possible that this tale with a rather "Kantian" lesson is historically accurate. Moses murdered the Egyptian because the latter was abusing "one of his people." But the rectification of human injustice by an act of human injustice is not productive of justice. Instead, it marks Moses as a murderer in the esteem of the slave people and renders him impotent to become a

70Exodus 2.11-15.
moral force amongst them. Moses becomes a common fugitive from the established justice of the land.

The account of Moses' crime, his failure as a judge amongst men, his flight from prosecution, has much to teach about the slave mentality and the morality attendant upon it. If the aspiration to end injustice amongst men consists in nothing more than a design to elevate one's own status in the world—or the status of one's kindred—through devices such as crime, deceit, connivance, the project is necessarily aborted in its beginning, for it serves only to compound the extant injustice, working a net increment in the suffering and guilt of mankind. The author of this text understands the reality known to us as transcendence, and he proceeds to illustrate its centrality in Yahweh's saving act of justice, the liberation of his people from slavery. The great historian J displays no sympathy for Moses and for his crime done in stealth. J will not acquiesce in slave morality—a morality borne of mere resentment of even "humanist" altruism; he will have nothing to do with the overturning of the master caste by means of demonic descent. It is significant moreover that the criminal figure in this account is Moses himself; the failure and disgrace which accrue to Moses in this murder are vital to the education of God's chosen liberator. If a slave mentality of the sort described by Nietzsche had been operative here, the text would certainly suppress Moses' loss of influence amongst his kindred. It might even lionize Moses for his bravura pose in
this episode. That it shrinks from doing so conveys the condemnatory attitude of Yahwism toward slavish solutions to the misfortunes of the slave.

From one point of view, the murder which Moses committed is a function of the slave morality for it bespeaks selfish rebellion against those who exercise mastery. But from another perspective, it is the expression of an incipient will to mastery, rather similar to the murderous acts of those who articulate themselves as the Folk or the People. The Yahwist will acquiesce in neither of these opposed designs, for both lead to murder. At the very base of the Bible, before the Decalogue with its statutory "Thou shalt not kill," stands the principle that human life—Egyptian or otherwise—must be inviolate, and that the homicide estranges himself from the human community. The existence of one human community is thus axiomatic in the Bible, and the ultimate implication of this axiom is egalitarian. Neither service nor mastery can be countenanced if their intensity is such as to deny the common humanity of all. It is for this reason that the caste society which Solomon created evoked the curse of the prophets. A society which is so structured as to deny the common humanity of its inhabitants must likewise repudiate divine authority, for in such a society the dominant element will itself exercise unconditional authority over the lesser. The Biblical insistence upon the ultimate equality of mankind before God has nothing

71 See Genesis 4.8-16, 34.25-31, 49.5-7.
to do then with a slave morality; it has rather to do with the prevention of apostasy, and consequentially, of murder. The Bible is opposed to a morality skewed to the interests of masters or of slaves; right is prior, and material considerations are posterior. The Moses whom we see in this text is a man who is forced to reckon with this priority of right. He learns that even a reformer cannot kill with impunity. The murder and its consequences for Moses of disgrace, fear, and flight, serve to extricate Moses from the slave morality, and thus to prepare him for the task of liberation to which he will be appointed.

Finally we must reckon with the portrait of Moses that appears in the text of Exodus 4.1. Here are the key passages:

Then Moses answered, "But behold, they will not believe me or listen to my voice, for they will say 'The Lord [YHWH] did not appear to you.'"

But Moses said to the Lord, "Oh my Lord, I am not eloquent, either heretofore or since thou hast spoken to thy servant; but I am slow of speech and of tongue."

But he said, "Oh, my Lord, send, I pray, some other person."

So Moses took his wife and his sons and set them on an ass, and went back to the land of Egypt; and in his hand Moses took the rod of God.\textsuperscript{72}

This Moses after the escape from Egypt is no enthusiast, no abolitionist. For him the sweetness of family life in Midian is satisfying, and he prefers to remain dormant rather than enter into struggle with the god-king of Egypt.

\textsuperscript{72}Exodus 4.1, 10, 13, 20.
In the understanding of J, the Exodus is not the work of man but of God. It could not be the work of man because for man existential negativity is at once the source of satisfaction and paralysis. For Moses the retirement in Midian, and for Israel the security of Pharaonic servitude with its flesh-pots appear to be life as it truly is and as it was intended to be. The dim satisfaction of this life is suggestive of the settled and vacant negativity of Abram in the land of his kindred. Unlike Abram, Moses is loath to go, and Yahweh must command, cajole, and finally offer concessions before Moses will obey. Does this seem undivine of Yahweh? It seems so only if we think of divinity as being somehow vainly royal. Before Yahweh is king he is creator. Before he creates Israel, he creates its liberator. He takes this backward Moses, and in the language of Buber, makes of him a "person."73

None of this accords with the Nietzschean format by which slaves initiate the thoughts and deeds which weaken their masters' rule. In the Exodus, it is man who is passive and recalcitrant, and God who is the motor of activity. It could hardly be otherwise, for right order within the world is the function of creation and creation is divine. With Moses, with the Pharaoh, with Israel itself, the events

73 Buber explains the dialogue between Yahweh and Jeremiah in respect to personhood. (Prophetic Faith, pp. 164-165.) In the dialogue, God becomes person and so makes man person also. This person has the power to carry the word. This formation of a person takes place also in the J story of Moses.
of the Exodus detail the liberating redemption of the cre-
ator God in establishing this people as the center of the
new history of man. The divine liberation and re-creation
of man is accomplished in spite of man himself.

The understanding that man must be overcome was no
stranger to the Exodus historians. Their biography of Moses,
the leader of the people, shows just how the overcoming of
man takes place. Its residual feature is not power but ser-
vice; Moses serves Yahweh as he serves the people. The sev-
eral terms which imply freedom--servant, disciple, friend of
God--bespeak a disposition of the person which is not coiled
up and bound within its own purposes. When human life be-
comes so isolated, freedom ends. With the end of freedom
through selfish isolation came the beginning of the pro-
phetic critique.
IV. PROPHETIC FREEDOM

This study has undertaken the almost embarassing task of arguing that the root origins of European freedom are to be found in the formative event of a culture which had no clearly articulated concept of freedom. For this reason, awareness of the history of freedom tends to stop short in Greece, where *eleutheria* translates into Latin as *libertas*, and into the North European languages as a series of nouns built upon the stem *freii*. That freedom in some fashion associates man with divinity we know from Greece. Zeus is Liberator; Zeus is also Savior. The connection of the two figurations is insunderable. The agent who saves from domination by enemies is likewise the agent who makes free.¹

In the testament of Israel, it is true, there is no clear symbolization of Yahweh as Liberator. There is however a moving symbolism which has as its heart the conviction that Yahweh is Redeemer and thus, Savior. This symbolization appears in its consummate form in the prophecy of the nameless author who is known to us as Deutero Isaiah. Like the Priestly author, Deutero Isaiah has beheld the fullness of human catastrophe and despair. For this writer, the time of threat and vengeance is past. His message of repair comes suddenly in the Isaiah text, like rain which ends the long drought.

Comfort, comfort my people, says your God. Speak tenderly to Jerusalem, and cry to her that her warfare is ended, that her iniquity is pardoned, that she has received from the Lord's hand double for all her sins.\(^2\)

This passage establishes the tenor of the whole text which taught Israel to recognize Yahweh as Redeemer. The message of Deutero Isaiah is unmistakably a message of freedom. It is this because the term *gaol* ("redeemer"--"avenger") is not an heavenly concept which Deutero Isaiah has minted to convey a "religious" notion. Instead, it is a noun which is vital in the culture of its origin. The *gaol* is a senior member of the family whose function is to keep mortgaged property from leaving the family and, above all, to redeem family members who have fallen into bondservitude.\(^3\) It seems obvious then that the symbolization of Yahweh as Redeemer in Deutero Isaiah brings us near in thought not only to the Exodus, but also to the historical reality of Athens in the time of Solon. That is to say, in Deutero Isaiah, we comprehend yet another moment in the origin of freedom. It is the moment when received history has become transparent.

Deutero Isaiah wrote in the late sixth century, after the end of his nation's history as an independent political entity; his message is synthetic in the same sense as is the writing of those who became prominent in Athens after its defeat. Deutero Isaiah is the high spire of the prophetic church; all below moves determinedly to the high message of

\(^2\)Isaiah 40.1-2.

\(^3\)Buber, *Prophetic Faith*, p. 207.
redemption, of comfort out of bondage. The four corners of his foundation are those eighth century ecstatics who are the first "writing" prophets: Amos, Hosea, Micah, Isaiah. These are utterly unshakable men for they are totally taken in the cause of their God. They are simple men, and direct; even in the seizure of vision their discourse employs the images of daily human experience. Of the four, three have the dirt of the field beneath their nails. More even than Parmenides and Heraclitus, these prophets are the hewers of European mankind. They make European humanity capable of freedom because they impart to Europe an accusatory conscience. These prophets direct man to an awful depth in their attack upon cult and ritual, for concomitant with this attack is an unconditional demand for rectitude of intention. Thus, while the act is not insignificant, it is subordinate to intent. In the pure prophetic understanding there is no set of sutras which, by inculcating right habit, can somehow work right mindedness. There is instead what amounts to a demand for pure freedom—a freedom to decide rightly.⁴

With the prophets, the Bible's freedom content has become overtly political, for the prophets cross at will the line which delineates the authoritative allocation of values from the society which is at once the matrix and recipient of authority. The prophetic perception of the disparity be-

⁴Thus, Buber sees the prophetic mentality at work even in the Adam narrative. Adam has the power to decide; this is a given, beyond question. The sole question is: How will he decide? (See Prophetic Faith, p. 103.)
tween act and intention is indeed awakened by political affairs. Buber sagaciously calls attention to the dedicatory address of Solomon.⁵ The king's fulsome claims of reverence for Yahweh are a screen of piety which conceals the infinite concupiscence of the tyrant, a lust whose consequence in history is always heartbreak, famine, death—non-being. The king's hypocritical speech is symptomatic of the general state of affairs which will prevail in the monarchial centuries and against which Yahweh will direct his prophets to rise and speak truly. Monarchial misfeasance, alliances of questionable value, social and economic imbalance, the impropriety and cruelty of the agricultural cults, these are wrong actions which the popular mentality believes can be compensatorily balanced and cancelled by a certain kind of right action, i.e., by sacrifice to the Yahweh whom Solomon has promulgated as a heavenly deity. This is the delusion of high antiquity which the prophets strip away.⁶ Action, whether correct or incorrect, is the derivative concern. The disposition of the heart is of commanding importance. If the heart is open to Yahweh, then no question about action will remain. It is for this reason that these prophets, most notably Isaiah, opposed alliance politics. The prophetic conviction is not hostility to foreign alliances per se. It is rather that the king attempts to do the impossi-


⁶Concerning the radical uniqueness of the prophetic rejection of sacrifice, see Lods, Prophets and the Rise of Judaism, p. 68.
ble, i.e., to find a middle ground that will embrace with satisfaction both the sacred and the profane. In any such effort, profane actions are bound to prevail over wistfully sacred sentiments.

1. The Prophetic Memory of Unity

In our attempt to comprehend the greatest possible domain in which freedom can have meaning, we have adopted the Platonic understanding that the slippage of man into slavery occurs through a process of historical forgetting. If the initial, pre-historic figuration of reality consists in a perfect unity of God, man and the world, then the secondary, historical reality obtains in a forgetful shattering of this real unity. From the New Testament paradigm of the Neighbor, we have adduced that freedom happens as a restorative incursion into the brokenness of history of the divine unity which undergirds history. It is just this latent--sometimes manifest--possibility that has made Europe the arena of freedom.

The prophetic struggle lends figure and substance to this mental schematization, for the pattern of events in the post-Solomonic centuries amounts to a deliberate forgetting of the initial oneness of Yahweh with his chosen people. Consequent upon this forgetting come the specific maladies against which the prophets complain: the chasm between rich and poor, the oppression of the poor, the cult of the baals, the baalization of Yahwism, the reduction of "orthodox" Yahwism to a religion, power politics and its apologetic ac-
complice, court prophecy. Above all else then, the prophetic preaching of the disparity between act and intention is a call to end forgetfulness, a call to remember: "Did you bring to me sacrifices and offerings the forty years in the wilderness, O house of Israel?"7 Couched within this rhetorical question is an injunction that Israel remember who it has been and so discover who it truly is. It is a call to remember a time when divine intention instructed human intention and thus shaped the course of human practise. The prophets are able to arouse memory because they claim to be spokesmen for Yahweh, and thus to be the real authorities within the human culture of which Yahweh is author. Veritably, they are the nation's memory. Buber wrote:

The exposition of the prophets is not a basic action but a reaction to the fact that the people and kings did not in their lives and deeds realize the goal implicit in the nature of the kingdom. The prophecy of the early writing prophets, of Amos and Hosea, marks the maturity of the protest. It is not a beginning; it remembers the beginning and pleads with the generation concerning what was intended there.8

If we are to understand the prophetic contribution to freedom, their claim must be taken at face value. To deny

7Amos 5.25.
8Prophetic Faith, p. 67. Of the literature which this study has consulted, Buber's work on prophecy is entirely the most perspicacious in its grasp of the subject. There is a simple reason for this. The faith of the prophets was likewise Buber's faith; both accepted uncritically the reality of culture. Thus both were able to apply critical talent in the area of true need, i.e., to declare where, in a world suffused with pretense, the real, living pulse of culture is to be found. From Buber then we have learned to hear the prophets as the authentic spokesmen of a real memory, the memory of divine liberation. To lack faith in this
the cultural authenticity of the writing prophets and to imagine that they are an entirely novel phenomenon is not only to repudiate their own self-understanding, it is also to reject the contiguity of culture itself. Doubtlessly the writing prophets temper and sharpen the nouns and narratives which constitute the Israelite memory, but in this their work is more clarification than innovation. What the prophets must clarify is the true nature of the relationship of Yahweh to his people. It is for this reason that they find instruction in a special kind of "pre-history," i.e., in their own national past before the fall into monarchical deviation.

The prophets are the guardians of the true Bible culture, the culture of Yahweh in union with his people. They are the enemies of received history, for that history has fragmented life. Under the monarchy life has been cleft in a number of ways. Divinity is divided, with Yahweh becoming a Near Eastern cosmic deity and the king a reigning deity, not unlike the Pharaoh. The nation itself is divided into separate kingdoms with antagonistic monarchies. Society is stratified according to the conventional arrangement of a court-centered elite which preys upon the hard working poor. Worst of all, there is a pronounced separation of secular life from institutionalized religion. The loss of the sa-

matter is to treat the prophets as "basic action," as "beginning." Such an historical empiricism is incapable of synthesizing a cogent vision of history.
credited character which attaches to all endeavor is to be seen most prominently in the conduct of politics. There, expediency supplants inspiration. Into this pathetic situation the prophets inject, in differing ways, the principle of unity. The writing prophets no less than Heraclitus understood the first principle of order: that unity must be ascendant within diversity for the preservation of life in the world.

Probably the most directly comprehensible teaching of this unity can be found in the symbol which Hosea employs. Yahweh is husband; Israel is wife. This is a symbol of peculiarly wide ramification, for it comprehends both heathen and Biblical experience, and for that reason, it was perfectly suited to the purpose of Hosea's ministry. Snaith detects a missionary cleverness in this symbol of Hosea. What better way was there to subvert the old time religion of fertility rites and cult prostitution than to substitute Yahweh for the Canaanite deities as the sower of semen and guarantor of harvest? An apt symbol means many things at once, and this no doubt is one use of the Hoseanic symbol. Beyond this specific meaning which obtains from the immediate conditions of the symbol's employment, there are implications of more permanent importance. Below the agricultural pas-

9See especially Isaiah 7.1-12.
10Hosea 2.16-23.
sage of human concern, the enduring significance of the husband-wife symbolism is the implication of unity. In conjugal union the partners overcome the division and polarity of temporal existence and approach in some sense the timeless unity of being, whole unto itself. Above the level of fertility interests the husband-wife symbolism suggests the permanent loving-faithfulness (chesed) of the marriage partners for one another. This love surpasses sexual interests and at last transcends them entirely. Only this burning and pure love would prompt a husband to buy a wife from the brothel and take her to his home. Hosea teaches that it is through such divine love that Yahweh seeks reunion with Israel. Is redemption from service in the brothel essentially different from redemption from bondservitude? Both forms are disgraceful and demeaning, and from both, release can only be edifying. In the symbolism of Hosea, we behold already in the eighth century the complete pattern of prophetic freedom: unity of man achieved through reunion with God. The return from Egypt, from the brothel, from Babylon, all are events of divine liberation.

Liberation is divine, intrinsically and emphatically. This understanding is basic in both Israel and Greece, the cultures which have made freedom a possibility for us. Whenever anyone, anywhere achieves the release of the unfortunate and so opens to the unfortunate the possibility of fuller participation in the real goods of life, a divine action has been accomplished. The liberator partakes of the
world-creative intent and power of God himself. Because of this circumstance which attaches to liberation it is understandable that those who are its exponents are permitted a more complete vision of divinity and its purposes than are the general run of mankind. Thus, the ecstatic vision of the prophet corresponds to the revelation of the name at the burning bush. With the revelation of the name, Yahweh's singular Presence as God of Israel is promulgated. In the cosmopolitan environment of the writing prophets, a related development is necessary. In Amos there is a burgeoning monotheism of rebuke and command which terminates in the doctrinal monotheism of Deutero Isaiah.\(^2\) The introduction of monotheism is the most radical of the changes performed by the writing prophets, and is perhaps the only prophetic effort which could qualify as an absolute innovation. Even here though the path is made straight for monotheism by the peculiar terms of Israel's henotheistic past; the God who has been Present for Israel is not like the other gods. When the diplomatic exigencies of two small nations and eventual foreign exile present overwhelming danger to the special relationship of Israel to the God who has been Present with Israel, then it is necessary for prophecy to draw upon the fund of meaning which has been implicit in the special terms of Israel's henotheistic heritage. There is one God, Yahweh, the maker and mover of all, to whom all peoples are accountable. Israel is his instrument in the world, his

\(^2\)See Amos, chapters 1, 2, and 9. Isaiah, chapter 45.
special servant.

Our interest here is no more with the development of theology than with the social psychology of Hebrew marriage. Monotheism is introduced in the prophetic message for one reason. It is a term which commands an end to the fragmentation of existential endeavor and of ultimate allegiances. The oneness of God, even when it is rudimentarily understood, imposes at least a tendentious unity upon mankind, for it clarifies the legitimate province of human intention and thus proscribes the most blatantly destructive kinds of action. One who has internalized the oneness of God would suffer bad conscience if he carried into exile a whole people (one should recall Himmler's plans for the Dutch and the sort of Wagnerian national theology which encouraged such planning); if he ripped open pregnant women so as to increase his territory; if he sold poor people so as to buy new shoes.\(^{13}\) He would suffer bad conscience if he conspired at night to take another's land in the morning; if he were a judge who took a bribe; if he attempted to placate God by sacrificing his first-born child to him.\(^{14}\) With those who protest that bad conscience is not enough, one can agree. Bad conscience is the primal positive force however, and in the twentieth century we have lost monotheism, and seemingly, bad conscience with it. The prophetic arrival at monotheism is in a sense a metaphysical breakthrough, but as such, it

\(^{13}\)Amos 1.6, 1.13, 2.6.

\(^{14}\)Micah 2.2, 3.11, 6.6-8.
is hardly a heavenly affair, for metaphysics—theistic or otherwise—is the science of putting into order even the least particle of the universe. When all has been so ordered, no longer can it be said that there are particles; all things belong to some more cogent whole. To belong is to be obligated, and from obligation springs conscience.

The metaphysical understanding that God is one is a formal understanding, not peculiar to Israel. Of itself, this understanding implies a formal imperative which tends to proscribe the most destructive kinds of practise, and thus, it constitutes a beginning of freedom in both person and polity. Proscriptive conscience is the impetus to negative freedom, for it decrees that we must not abuse and enslave others at will, for all are the people of the one God. This much is given in the form of monotheism itself. Monotheism, however, is but the barest scaffold for the prophetic vision of God. The Yahweh who is revealed in the prophets is no mere Stoic deity. He is a personality with a real content which bears directly on the issue of freedom.

2. The Holy Righteousness of Yahweh

The initial figure amongst the eighth century prophets is Amos of Tekoa. Amos teaches that justice is integral to the nature of God. But there is something incomplete about the vision of Amos, a missing term which one feels is somehow present, but remains unarticulated. There is something which the prophet has experienced which has made him fearless and absolutely certain of his task. If formal prophecy
had stopped with Amos, readers would be forced to puzzle over the hidden, half-spoken character of Amos' God who roars like a fearsome lion. If this had been the case, then it would be hard for scholarship to establish in just what sense the justice of Yahweh differs from the Dike of Zeus. It would be clear that there is a profound difference, for the Olympian pantheon was inadequate to the strains imposed by Greek culture; hence the beginnings of natural science, not in Israel, but in Greece. Yahweh remained ample to the needs of Israel, but the Tekoan peasant with his vision of Yahweh's righteous justice does not tell us why.

Isaiah of Jerusalem reveals to his audience the term which oriented the prophetic experience from its beginning in Moses to its resumption in Amos. God is holy.

In the year that King Uzziah died I saw the Lord [adonai] sitting upon a throne, high and lifted up; and his train filled the temple. Above him stood the seraphim; each had six wings: with two he covered his face, and with two he covered his feet, and with two he flew. And one called to another and said: "Holy, holy, holy is the Lord [YHWH] of hosts; the whole earth is full of his glory." And the foundations of the thresholds shook at the voice of him who called, and the house was filled with smoke. And I said: "Woe is me! For I am lost; for I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips; for my eyes have seen the King, the Lord of hosts!"

Then flew one of the seraphim to me, having in his hand a burning coal which he had taken with tongs from the altar. And he touched my mouth, and said: "Behold, this has touched your lips; your guilt is taken away, and your sin forgiven." And I heard the voice of the Lord saying, "Whom shall I send, and who will go for us?" Then I said, "Here I am! Send me." Monotheism is but the hull of this prophetic vision of God.

\textsuperscript{15} Isaiah 6.1-8.
The overpowering holiness of Yahweh is such that there can be none other like him.

Early in the twentieth century, Professor Rudolf Otto published a revolutionary work in the study of religion. Its English title is The Idea of the Holy. The methodology which Otto employed was Kantian. The holy thing-in-itself, which Otto called the numen, is "wholly other" from man, ultimately unknowable, as itself. Otto proceeded in Kantian fashion to categorize the typical modes of human response to the holy. This response to the holy thing outside the self ranges, argued Otto, from a kind of frenetic terror, such as the terror evoked by Pan, to the sacred, ethically charged vision of Isaiah. Thus, the experience of holiness undergoes development. Otto wrote:

The venerable religion of Moses marks the beginning of a process which from that point onward proceeds with ever increasing momentum, by which "the numinous" is throughout rationalized and moralized, i.e., charged with ethical import, until it becomes "the holy" in the fullest sense of the word. The culmination of the process is found in the Prophets and the Gospels. And it is in this that the special nobility of the religion revealed to us by the Bible is to be found, which, when the stage represented by the deutero-Isaiah is reached, justifies its claim to be a universal world-religion. Here is to be found its manifest superiority over, e.g., Islam, in which Allah is mere "numen", and is in fact precisely Yahweh in his pre-Mosaic form and upon a larger scale.16

One hopes not to disparage the genius of a great and creative scholar in speculating that Otto's Kantian methodology contributed to a fundamental error. Not the Bible, but the

enlightened, empiricist critique of knowledge provoked Kant's agnosticism concerning exterior reality as it is in itself. In the Old Testament, it is given to some at least to have knowledge of God, and Isaiah of Jerusalem is one of this number. To be sure, this knowledge is communicated symbolically, but the symbols connect (not separate) those who behold them to the reality of deity in itself. We digress upon this matter so as to offer the consideration that the presence of the holy ought not be imputed to all experiences in which the presentiment of an incorporeal substance—a numen—causes a "creature feeling" of quaking and apprehension in the subject.\textsuperscript{17} Most certainly, holiness is much besides ethics, is greater than ethics, but is not infinitely beyond or before ethics. The predicates "good" and "just" stick with the true God, along with the more substantive predicate "holy." Such local demons as Pan are indeed numinous, but they are not holy. It is impossible to affirm this however on the strength of a set of Kantian assumptions. Faith in God is the \textit{real} bridge between subjectivity and the intelligibles, just as is "animal faith" between subjectivity and nature.

Professor N. H. Snaith's careful linguistic study of the major terms of the prophetic vocabulary corrects Otto's position. Snaith is not a philosopher, as was Otto, but an

\textsuperscript{17} Without mentioning Otto by name, Buber wrote thus about Otto's methodological assumption and its consequences: ". . . the absolute relation (which gathers up into reality all those that are relative, and is no more a part, as these are, but is the whole that completes and unifies them all),"
historian. Snaith does not deny that the holy (qodesh) underwent development, for indeed, the term's development within the eighth century alone was momentous. "Holy" means more in Isaiah than in Amos. Snaith insists however that Otto was misled in his supposition that the holy could ever be pre-ethical, since even in its pre-Israelite, Semitic formation, a thing which is qodesh had danger and taboo associated with it. Coexistent with these was the embryonic experience of sin. As Otto understood, the full ethical implication of holiness was articulated for the first time in Isaiah's account of his vision in the temple. When Isaiah apprehends the awful holiness of God, he experiences a kind of dizzying revulsion for himself and for his people. At the instant in which this bottomless lacuna between divinity and humanity becomes apparent, God's justice becomes subsumed within his greater holiness. We are not yet ready however to inquire about this justice, for the symbolic contents of Isaiah's vision of Yahweh's holiness have direct implications to our interest in prophetic freedom.

If freedom is a human concern, then we must attend to the dominant human symbol in the vision of Isaiah. This is the figure of the unclean lips. Again, it is important that a symbol carries multiple implications. Biblical symbols

---

in being reduced to the status of an isolated and limited feeling, is made into a relative psychological matter." (I and Thou, p. 81.)

18Snaith, Distinctive Ideas, pp. 31-32.
often have both historical provenance and poetic ramification. Hosea's personal experience with a wayward wife enlarges symbolically as the experience of Yahweh with Israel. On the level of poetic representation, the unclean lips amounts to a truly primitive fear of defilement which is revenant in the disorder called Lady Macbeth trauma, in which feelings of guilt are expressed as concern about impurity. Ricoeur has in mind the call of Isaiah when he writes of this symbolism,

> The representation of defilement dwells in the half-light of a quasi-physical infection that points toward a quasi-moral unworthiness. This ambiguity is not expressed conceptually, but is experienced intentionally in the very quality of the half-physical, half-ethical fear that clings to the representation of the impure.¹⁹

Stripped of its historical implication then, Isaiah employs this primitive symbolism so as to contrast the grotesquely physical--and thus most visibly corruptible--property of man against the pristine holiness of God. Isaiah and his society are the bearers of "infection," and in this infection lies the conviction of guiltiness before the holy. The purification by burning is a decidedly moral and political event of liberation. In the woeful avowal of negativity, in the liberatory cleansing, in the repositioning of Isaiah as prophet, the entire structure of freedom is evident. After this cleansing, Isaiah is free to be a prophet. The vision has emptied all confusion from the domain of intention; of one mind with his God, Isaiah is himself a participant in

holiness. Thus he is able to act. It is this same freedom to act which Isaiah attempts to impart to Ahaz at the reservoir. The king resists. He has not experienced himself as the receptacle of infection. Thus he is satisfied with his own entirely pragmatic decision.²⁰

From Samuel through Jeremiah, the monarchy is the precipitating fixture within the prophetic milieu. The king is the focal point of the society, its incarnate representation. Because he is both mirror and mover of society, the prophet addresses himself to the problem of the king. Because the prophet is himself representative, not of society in its synchronous fixity, but of its God and its history, the prophet finds himself placed in opposition to the king. This is no less the case with Isaiah than with his predecessors. Yet, Isaiah is no republican; his is a loyal opposition. His vision of the divine regime is monarchial: "... my eyes have seen the King, Yahweh of hosts." The vision of Isaiah's call suggests a picture of total reality which in its didactic intent is similar to that adduced by Plato in the discussion of the divided line; true reality stands against its spurious analogue.²¹ Isaiah's comprehension of the great division is expressed not in mathematical but in political terms. This is made clear by Buber's brilliant insight into the structure of the narrative and of the specific histori-

²⁰Isaiah 7.12.

²¹Republic 510 passim.
cal derivation of the symbol, unclean lips.\textsuperscript{22} Isaiah's account of his call is the product of reflection, written many years after its occurrence. It begins not with the vision of Yahweh's awful holiness, but with the mention of King Uzziah's death.

\textit{Uzziah died a leper!}\textsuperscript{23}

Here then we behold the prophetic division of the world. On the one side of the canvas we see the king, representative of profane human endeavor, disfigured, dying. The flesh rots upon his frame as still he draws breath. Above all else we witness the corruption of his lips, the human part with which he vocalizes allegiance and desire. The representative of society is the symbol of moribundity itself, the end consequence of all confusion and false directedness. Opposed to the putrescent king is Yahweh, God of the nation, holy. The structure of the account itself amounts then to a compact expression of the prophetic alternative: Unclean-ness or holiness? Death or life? Bondage or freedom? The presence of the leprous king in Isaiah's own account of his initiatory vision implicates not just one, but all of society--and eventually, all the world--in the profanity which is infinitely offensive to the one God. The infinite offense of itself awakens consciousness to the infinite demand, a demand which subjects both personal conduct and political authority to an exhaustive ethical critique.

\textsuperscript{22}Prophetic Faith, p. 126-128.

\textsuperscript{23}II Kings 15. II Chronicles 26.
For Israel, the infinite holiness of Yahweh is the source of ethics. This understanding leaves open however the question of the weight which should be assigned to prophetic ethics. Ricoeur explains ethics as "... the slackening of an impulse that is fundamentally hyperethical." The vision of Isaiah shows that the hyperethical moment is the moment in which consciousness is seized with the holiness of God. When Ricoeur speaks of ethics as a "slackening" he has in mind especially the onset of Judaism as a religion which reverences the "finite command" of the ethical codes as the embodiment of the prophetic "infinite demand." Ricoeur comprehends Bible ethics pursuant to the early prophetic message as "slackening," as "finite command" for reasons that are only remotely acquainted with the initial prophetic revelation of the ethical demands. That is to say, Ricoeur is a philosophical exponent of the Pauline anthropology which puts "the law" along with the psyche and the flesh on the side of death. Justification presumably draws up the "slackness" which has been the consequence of legal ethics; it makes one wholly righteous before God.

We enter this thicket of Christian paradox reluctantly, for it introduces a note of complication amidst meanings that are simple. Ricoeur's claim that ethics is the slackening of a hyperethical impulse is a half truth, but a very important one, for it is the quintessential expression of

24 Symbolism of Evil, p. 55.
25 Symbolism of Evil, Part I, Chapter 3, Section 4.
the Christian understanding of the Old Testament. In terms of that view, the appearance of the Christ is the new moment of holy tension before which "the law" must be consigned in disgrace to the stature of a propadeutic means. This Christian understanding of "the law" is correct. "The law" of the Judaism to which Paul had belonged is a slackening of the prophetic infinite demand. But considerations which equate prophetic ethics with "the law" embrace only the posterior half of the truth about prophetic ethics.

The slackening of the vision of holiness which issues in codified ordinances ("the law") about conduct is clearly a descendant movement. The chronology of eighth century prophetic declaration reveals something quite different which likewise involves ethics. That is that the ethical concern is also present as the prophetic consciousness ascends to the vision of God's holiness. In the clear, high air of the eighth century, the central ethical-political term arrives not in a moment of slackening, but in the moment that the prophetic awareness tensions itself in preparation for the vision of God as holy. Isaiah makes both Amos and Hosea intelligible for us; God's righteousness and his loving-faithfulness are aspects of his being that are inherent in his holiness. But no less do Amos and Hosea make Isaiah possible. The terms "righteousness" and "loving-faithfulness" intervene on both the ascendant and the descendant sides of holiness. The holiness of Yahweh has a

26Galatians 3.24.
content that is known before its own articulation as holiness!

The episode at the burning bush is the formative event in which the divine righteousness and faithfulness appear unseparated in union with the spectral holiness of the jealous God. The prophets of the eighth century sort out the ingredient qualities of this divinity and they first identify not holiness, but the intervening terms righteous justice and loving-faithfulness. These are ethical terms, and they are not the product of a slackening; only the codes represent slackening. These terms are real, resident qualities of the divine nature which commend it to human nature as guide. In both their ascendant and descendant movements, these intervening terms make ethics a possibility, for they translate holiness into the human vocabulary, and thus make its practical realization possible in some limited measure.

That the prophets themselves provided this translation is sufficient evidence that they sought not only a total commitment to Yahweh, but also an incremental improvement in the conduct of life. The finite command was related to the infinite demand, not as antithesis, but as consequent. To imagine that the infinity of demand in the prophets and the Sermon on the Mount has only a soteriological value is an intellectualist reduction to which protestantism is especially inclined. 27 One can go to eschatological salvation...
directly from creature-guilt borne of one's own existential profanity without ever stopping on the way to repent of one's specific injustice or deficit of mercy toward one's fellows. This approach can and does serve the needs of individual religiosity. The eighth century prophets however care neither for eschatological salvation nor for religion nor for individuals as such. Theirs is a global critique of the intent—the whole disposition toward worldly existence—of two national societies. It is because of this socio-political concern that the prophetic message is rife with specific charges about actions which have shown imperfect intent. Even Amos, the fiercest of the eighth century prophets and the most bleakly condemnatory, "operationalizes" the grounds of his complaint. He recites the prevailing injustices and condemns the society which perpetuates them. Implicit in this condemnation is an exhortation to repent and to change, to replace human injustice with divine

the spontaneous response of those who are saved. In the world of experience, it is necessary to maintain directly the divine decree of righteousness without intervening mysteries which becloud the pragmatic domain. Thus it was necessary for Bonhoeffer to address his fellow German protestants in terms more prophetic than "Christian" in order to help them decide (in 1937!) what to do about Nazism. Experience in the United States is similarly instructive. The Joe McCarthy aberration (not to mention the Watergate ordeal) was viewed less critically by Biblicist protestants than others. The conclusion is warranted that persons who have a firm grasp on the doctrine of salvation by grace often view justice in the world as more an option than obligation. In terms of the eighth century "Bible," that assumption, not "the law," is the way to bondage and death. (See Dietrich Bonhoeffer, The Cost of Discipleship, tr. R. H. Fuller [New York: Macmillan Co., 1963], especially chapter 1, "Costly Grace.")
justice. The demand is ethical to be sure, but taken wholly or specifically, it is not the result of slackening. To treat it in that fashion is to make of Amos a Pharisee, subject not to his God, but to "the law." Paul's entirely correct rejection of "the law" has nothing to do with the ethical demand to which Amos gave utterance.

In truth Paul was somewhat more like the prophets than like himself! Beyond the theology of "the law" and its inadequacy to justification are Paul's frequent and plain pastoral communications to his congregations. These communications are the same as the directives of the writing prophets. Their source is the vision of God and their form is the infinite demand made human as finite command. Most prominent is the repeated exhortation that Christians practise agapē; this is no different from Hosea's teaching of the divine chesed which is binding on man. Just as the monotheism

28 Von Rad, whose prosaic inquiry into these matters knows nothing of an "infinite demand," sheds some light on the prophets' ethical accusations. He writes of Amos' remonstrances: "This is . . . the first occasion when 'law' in the proper sense of the term was preached." Von Rad goes on to stipulate that he does not mean that Amos was a legalist; rather, he was the first person to take the Book of the Covenant at face value. While there are many (including Amos) who will disagree with this statement's tacit argument about the life of early Israel, the statement helps to clarify our immediate problem. Each of the prophets believed that his utterances were consonant with national tradition. Central to that tradition was the belief that ethics was an ineluctable element in the nature of the nation's God, as that nature had been revealed in the great days of the nation's formative past. This is why (except for Isaiah who works from the David-Zion tradition) the eighth century prophets point to the Exodus, sojourn, and conquest of Canaan as the ground for their own visions of God and world. See Gerhard Von Rad, The Message of the Prophets, tr. D. M. G. Stalker (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 148 ff.
of the writing prophets, the Pauline dialectic of law and grace is the formal structure which supports the real, living content of the pastoral decree.

Tsedagah is the prophetic term which is translated as God's righteousness. Tsedagah is used in close connection with mishpat, an intimately related, but more juridical concept. English translations render the former as "righteousness" and the latter as "justice." It should be borne in mind that this is justice with a view to the settlement of a specific controversy. For this reason, the King James Version's occasional translation of mishpat as "judgement" is more nearly adequate than the RSV's consistent "justice." A bribed judge would render a faulty judgement, and so transgress God's broader demand for tsedagah—righteousness or justice—in the world. The Septuagint, a production from the Hellenistic period, translated tsedagah as dikaiosynē. Hence, the intimate association in the European mind of the Biblical and Greek concerns for righteousness. Hence also the confusion and controversy in the early Christian church as to whether its teaching should favor the forms of the Old Testament or of classical Greece. We must speculate here that a more authentic translation would have used simply dikē, for dikaiosynē connotes the reflective exploration of


the initial symbol, and its systematization as a virtue. The dikē of Hesiod and Solon is nearer in usage to the tsedagah of the eighth century than is the dikaiosynē of Plato or Aristotle. Whatever the merits of this thought, the passion for Yahweh's tsedagah which pervades the prophecy of Amos brings us nigh to one of the cardinal points which this study must repeat in each separate context about the origins of freedom in Mediterranean antiquity.

Justice is inevitably divine, and freedom is inevitably contingent upon justice. Put differently, in the original comprehension of the formative truth of Europe, justice-righteousness is a divine impulse which touches mankind. Its by-product is freedom. We are able to verify this claim as regards both Israel and Greece, the true and permanent homelands. In neither of these homelands is there a liberal imagination at work during the period of origins. In respect of both, the mentality expressed in "liberty and jus-

It may be objected that in John 8, our paradigmatic teaching about the structure of freedom, freedom is contingent upon logos, not justice. For the most part, the difference is specious. Logos is a term from the metaphysical sphere, while justice comes from the language of political and personal ethics. In their respective domains, their purpose is similar; both are principles of harmonious ordering. That is why the statesman, whose immediate concern is justice, must have orthos logos, upright reason, a sort of epistemic hold upon the true metaphysical realities.

In respect of the syncretistic sense in which it is used here, "divine" also requires explanation. "Divine" may be predicated of Yahweh or of Zeus, as a generic property common to both. There is of course a profound difference between the two. The divinity of Zeus exhausts itself in ethics, while for Yahweh, ethics is part of a greater holiness. The absence of such an holiness in Greek divinity is the cause of the poignant search of Aeschylus for foundations of order.
tice for all" is wrong. It reverses priorities, suggesting that the liberated individual somehow finds within his own self a reservoir of justice. The record of the ancients, a testament compiled before the onset of intellectualism, teaches that man learns justice from the divine paradigm, and that one consequence of his learning is freedom. In both Amos and Hesiod, there is a consuming concern for justice. Neither speaks of freedom. When we "discover" freedom in their utterances, it is because we have learned the word from later teachers. The imputation of freedom to their meanings is no falsification, but it is useful only to the extent that it clarifies for us the full effect of justice and of the importance of the divinity whose being warrants justice. The testimony of the ancients cuts freedom to its proper size and in so doing enhances its value for us. Upon hearing the ancient witness, we are able to recognize freedom as a lesser, but nonetheless real, character in the drama of the divine ministry to man. A small thing which is real is worth more than a large thing which is unreal. We will examine Amos with a view to such recognition.

This consideration of the eighth century prophets follows the discussion of the Exodus because the implications of the Exodus to the European freedom consciousness are not complete without reflection upon the prophetic understanding of the formative event. In the prophets, the righteous justice of Yahweh becomes the dominant principle of correct order in society. Its complement is Yahweh's loving-faithful-
ness, which he expects his chosen people to exhibit in their dealings with one another. Together or separately, there are clearly unifying and ordering configurations of the One which must be ascendant over the severality of persons and things in history if life is to continue. Their presence attenuates the ravage of history; when they are practised, life becomes good. This metaphysical insight into the underlying terms of worldly existence is discernible in the prophets no less certainly than in Heraclitus and Parmenides. Symbolism is in part the property of culture, but truth is transcendent of culture.

The most basic form of the prophetic alternative is the injunction: Choose life or death. Beyond this, the entire prophetic effort can be seen as an attempt to influence the hearer to choose life. In service to this end, both revelation and history are used in support of the prophetic argument. Amos draws upon his revelation and his knowledge of history when he utters the prescription which expresses his central interest:

I hate, I despise your feasts, and I take no delight in your solemn assemblies.
Even though you offer me your burnt offerings and cereal offerings, I will not accept them, and the peace offerings of your fatted beasts I will not look upon.
Take away from me the noise of your songs; to the melody of your harps I will not listen.

32See especially Micah 6.8.
33See Amos, chapter 5.
34Amos 5.21-24.
We must note how the content of Amos' revelation, Yahweh's righteous justice, coalesces with the prophet's understanding of national history. The question which follows immediately upon the passage above makes this plain: "Did you bring to me sacrifices and offerings the forty years in the wilderness, O house of Israel?" The rhetorical question about the sojourn in the wilderness must be associated with the beginning of the prophet's address to the people of Israel:

Hear this word that the Lord [YHWH] has spoken against you, O people of Israel, against the whole family which I brought up out of the land of Egypt: "You only have I known of all the families of the earth; therefore I will punish you for all your iniquities."

By now the essentials of Amos' view are in place. Let us put it in simple prose: "You people have turned me, Yahweh, into an oriental, astral god with your cultic rituals. You even confuse me with other gods. I oppose this because it causes you to forget my true nature. I am the God of righteousness who demands that you, my people, deal justly with one another. Your ancestors, whom I led from Egypt and governed in the wilderness, knew that I was the God of righteousness, but you have gone away from me and have forgotten this. Your forgetfulness will bring punishment and death upon you." In this account, we have added only one conclusion that is not already given in the texts, i.e., that the

35 Amos 5.15.
36 Amos 3.1-2. See also 2.10.
God of the Exodus and wilderness sojourn was also the God of righteous justice. Why does Amos not say this for us? This study concludes that the association was axiomatic for Amos; as the bearer of the national memory, the prophet remembers that Yahweh led Israel from Egypt because he was righteous.\(^{37}\)

To conclude differently would be to imagine that Yahweh had been an itinerant god who was roving in search of a people, a house, a fragrant and noisy cult, all the things which bestow status upon a god. Amos' contrary understanding expands the basic thesis of this study: The Exodus, which made Israel free, was an exercise in divine righteousness which had existential justice as its goal. The "Serve me as my son" which constituted the positive moment in the Exodus narrative is now seen to have meant, "Serve me in righteousness by doing justice amongst yourselves."

The intricate questions of Bible criticism are beyond this study's competence. It does seem however that there is little intricacy involved in this matter. The J document was written before the onset of formal prophecy, and unlike the E, is without appreciable prophetic influence. It says,

> Then the Lord [YHWH] said, "I have seen the affliction of my people who are in Egypt, and have heard their cry because of their taskmasters; I know their sufferings, and I have come down to deliver them out of the hand of the Egyptians, and to bring them up out of that land to a good and broad land, a land flowing with milk and honey . . ."\(^{38}\)

\(^{37}\)Isaiah makes this explicit in the Song of the Vineyard, 5.1-7.

\(^{38}\)Exodus 3.7-8a.
To be sure, neither the words for righteousness nor loving-faithfulness are to be found in this text, but the intent which the prophets will later verbalize is wholly and abundantly here. Amos builds weightily upon received foundations and proves their strength to support the increased strain. Above all others, it is Amos who first shows us the complete meaning of liberation in service to Yahweh. Its intent is justice in the world.

There can be no mistake about this, for the range of concerns to which Amos applies the righteous justice of God corresponds exactly to the concern expressed by Yahweh in the passage from the J document:

Seek the Lord and live, lest he break out like fire in the house of Joseph, and devour it, with none to quench it for Bethel,
0 you who turn justice to wormwood, and cast down righteousness to the earth!39

How does one go about turning justice bitter and casting down righteousness? The answer comes shortly in the prophet's commentary on his own imprudence. We recall the "affliction" and the "suffering" in the J account of life in Egypt.

They hate him who reproves in the gate, and they abhor him who speaks the truth.
Therefore because you trample upon the poor and take from him exactions of wheat, you have built houses of hewn stone, but you shall not dwell in them; you have planted pleasant vineyards, but you shall not drink their wine.
For I know how many are your transgressions, and how great are your sins—you who afflict the righteous, who take a bribe, and turn aside the needy in the gate.

39 Amos 5.6-7.
Therefore he who is prudent will keep silent in such a time; for it is an evil time.\textsuperscript{40} The verbs which animate this prophet's metaphors have a peculiar impact in the picture of the negativity they convey. The diseased lips of the human king and his society have their parallel in the picture of the trampling upon (not setting upright, in place), in taking away (not creating something which was not there before), in afflicting (not healing), in turning aside (not bringing within). These are verbs which capture the damnable hurt of history which has lost its way in a process of shattering and profanation. To the shattered history of Israel, Amos opposes as restorative his knowledge that the very nature of Yahweh is his righteousness. Implicit in the prophet's discourse is the understanding that this righteousness is an ethical property which is funded by the divine power of world creativity. It is this source which makes justice the one effective foe against the destructive inclination of human history.

On the practical level of interest, freedom is the upshot of the Amos prophecy as surely as it is the consequence of the Exodus. This conclusion holds not only concerning the loftier view of freedom as the repositioning of life toward true and enduring ends, but even more prominently in the negative, common-sense understanding of the term. Shepherds and peasants, the indentured, men and women defenseless against military conquest, beggars, recipients of un-

\textsuperscript{40} Amos 5.10-13.
fair justice—in one word, the oppressed—these are the population of the prophet's vision. We must see them in their setting. The land is seldom fertile; rain is seldom sufficient; mineral wealth is negligible. Despite these circumstances, the powerless ones who toil and sweat in the midday heat are used to support not only a fat native elite, but to provide the materials for the tributes which flow to the surrounding great powers as the price of protection. It is not surprising that their Yahwism is corrupted.

The dictum, "Israel is my son" cannot have meaning in these circumstances. The injustice of the prevailing allocation of values amounts to a design of unfreedom as well. For the many who are its victims, life is no better in the prophetic present than for the Israelite slave in the Egyptian past. The prophecy of God's righteousness which demands human justice is inevitably a prophecy of freedom against servitude.41

In the modern world, first laissez faire liberalism, and then with greater emphasis, socialism, have asserted the primacy of economic freedom over other species of free endeavor. The reasoning which underlies this economic primacy is quite simple. A person can be touched and eventually

41 It was no accident that Martin Luther King, Jr., drew the basic symbolism for his 1963 speech at the Washington Monument from the prophecy of Amos. The speech advocated the replacement of injustice with justice, and ended with the lines from the spiritual: "Free at last! Free at last! Thank God Almighty, we are free at last!" Freedom follows justice as corollary. See Annals of America, volume 18, selection 30.
dominated through external influence over the nutritive means of existence more easily and more completely than through influence of any other sort. The righteousness teaching of the prophets confirms this understanding about economic primacy. The unfree poor, ground into the earth by the exponents of an evil allocation of wealth and power, are the prophets' continual concern. The freedom of free political participation is a luxury to which Israel does not aspire, and to which Athens attains only at long last, after passing through a state of economic rectification. Prophetic freedom is not arrested at the economic plane, however, for the free individual conscience—a pre-requisite to political freedom—is one accomplishment of the prophetic ministry. We will discuss this later. Where the prophetic demand for righteous judgment is rendered in the eighth century, however, the hardship—the unfreedom—of the oppressed is the critical issue which provokes the prophet to fling Yahweh's righteousness against man's injustice.

The full implication of this prophetic teaching is then that justice makes freedom, and for this reason, justice is of special importance to the downtrodden. But how are we to understand this association? Should we suppose, with Nietzsche, that the likes of the shepherd Amos and the farmer Hesiod have conspired to establish an exalted principle whose true purpose is to legitimize the hatred of slave for master? There is no absolute proof against this supposition, although a careful inspection of the historical events and symbols in
the actual genealogy of morals does tend to weaken the thesis. The Nietzschean claim, along with the corresponding Marxian analysis which makes of symbols of authority an ideological production, must be rejected because both reduce to gibberish the whole vocabulary of human order. If we begin with the basic alternative, life or death, it is certain that the option for life necessitates the rejection of positions which impute an ultimate meaninglessness to the enduring concerns of life. Understanding of the liberation content of justice is enlarged more by attention to the real and lively meanings of history and language than to the intellectual facility of the nineteenth century.

Professor Eichrodt is thinking not only of righteousness but of the whole prophetic message when he explains the prophetic concern for the poor and downtrodden in historical terms. Those who have grown rich and powerful under the monarchy through the employment of violent and unscrupulous means have set themselves apart from the covenant. The poor have not done so. For that reason, the latter are participants in the nation's real history. Eichrodt is speaking of these persons in this passage.

It is they who are exalted as the real core of the divine community, above those who live in thoughtless riches and enjoyment of every kind, and are made the heirs of the promised divine glory. It is therefore with these that the higher spiritual and moral life of community with God reaches its full reality, while those who are richly blessed with all life's goods have in reality lost their life.42

42Eichrodt, Man in the Old Testament, p. 48.
What seems most notable about this analysis is that its author employs the prophetic symbol, life. The rich have lost their life, but the poor have retained theirs. This prophetic symbol of life is more than a metaphor, since it draws together the covenant and the farming and herding heritage of the nation in the egalitarian days of the confederacy. The rural folk are the direct supporters of life. Of the four eighth century prophets, three are recruited from the rural poor. It is amongst these groups that both the nutritive life and the spiritual life of the nation have been preserved. Appropriately, Isaiah, the synthesizer, is a Jerusalemite man of affairs. But his contribution in no way detracts from the teaching of the poor men from the countryside. Instead, he uses their symbols as a reproach from within against the moribund pragmatism of the metropolis elite. Isaiah the urbanite, naked and barefoot for three years, cannot be unacquainted with the nakedness of the poor. For him as for the others, the poor are the vessels of God's special concern.

Professor Snaith's assiduous linguistic inquiry illumines even further the association between God's righteousness and the servile. Snaith found that etymologically, tsedaqah is not associated with words that mean strict justice. Rather, the Aramaic and Urdu equivalents of the term

43 See Isaiah 20.2-3.
convey benevolence and mercy.45 Upon this understanding, the prophetic application of God's righteousness to the plight of the helpless is kindred to the teaching of the loving-faithfulness of God whose overt consequence is divine mercy. The overlapping of these prophetic concepts brings into the light a quality which is implicit in the greater righteousness which is the tutor of human justice. This understanding of justice—derived from the classical period—is an intellectualized fixture which sets justice over against mercy. Perhaps this is a result of Plato's paradigmatic depiction of justice (dikaiosynē) through the model of a human society which is so organized as to be in no need of mercy. This analysis was not mistaken, but it was misleading. Justice, excerpted from its historical ramifications, is not unlike the "pure" tones produced by modern electronic musical instruments, tones made without the accompanying vibrations which mechanical production always generates. There is error in this way of comprehending either the infinite righteousness or the finite justice, for in the societies of human experience, the concern for justice and the need for mercy are coemergent from the actuality of historical evil. The symbolism of justice is ascendant over that of mercy because the just act is inherently also the merciful act; the former subsumes the latter. This is so because the victims of injustice are powerless to rectify the situation in which

they are victim. When authority acts with a view toward justice, mercy obtains as well as freedom. This understanding is given in the historical criticism of the prophets and it achieves historical concretion in the Solonic reform in Athens. Jaeger's discussion of the linguistic properties of dikē lead to a similar observation. While the etymology of dikē is unclear, its early usage came to have the implication of rectification of the condition of the poor who are oppressed by the rich. It would be hard not to find mercy along with this understanding of justice. One must remember that in Israel and in Greece we are considering the course of action which will be right according to the divine will. Divinity wills justice, and that is to say, it opposes the injustice of divided, exploitative human history. In this opposition to injustice obtains the merciful concern of the prophets for the poor, as well as their teaching of liberation.

None of this is to imply that all the terms of the prophetic vocabulary mean the same. They do not. It is simply to explain that when we enter the early, pre-intellectual domain of human awareness, there is a fluidity of meanings which will not permit precise edging and cornering. In the prophets, holiness became the governing symbol for righteousness, with mercy unto freedom as a practical consequence for those who have been wronged by the corrupt rulers of society.

Below the strata of these interpenetrating concept symbols of immanent holiness, righteous justice, loving-faithfulness, lies the great, undifferentiated picture of history and futurity.

The utterances of Micah are the most conceptually naive of the prophetic statements from the eighth century. Their picturesque compactness conveys the essence of the prophetic complaint and of the vision of divine completion which is anticipated as restorative. The following is the orienting vision of Micah; it appears in the text following a recitation of grievances which amount to charges of injustice and apostasy which merit the punishment of Yahweh. Opposed to human evil and the divine wrath which it has earned are the prospects of Yahweh's gathering and leadership.

I will surely gather all of you, O Jacob, I will gather the remnant of Israel; I will set them together like a sheep in a fold, like a flock in its pasture, a noisy multitude of men.

He who opens the breach will go up before them; they will break through and pass the gate, going out by it. Their king will pass on before them, the Lord [YHWH] at their head.47

This imagery of Yahweh as pastor to the robust, active, moving flock is the pure and perfect expression of prophetic organicism. It is in no need of the great concept symbols of the eighth century, for the picture of divine leadership obviates the need for mention of Yahweh's specific excellences. The picture shows these along with the human response. In place of brigandage paved over with the rubric of estab-

lishment justice, in place of the mortal falsehood of human religiosity is the gathering of mankind, its re-creation as a "flock" which follows the leadership of Yahweh.

3. Freedom and Individuation

Our modern idea of freedom entails the understanding that where freedom is present, the individual will be distinguishable from society. In its British form, this absolute distinction of the individual is viewed as one of the major goals of political endeavor. Like whole justice or teleological happiness in a time before, individual liberty is the end of human existence in the double sense of being the result of historical progression and the cause of future progress. This doctrine was put forward most emphatically in John Stuart Mill's essay On Liberty. The continental approach has been more moderate. Rousseau, Kant and Hegel believed that the individual should be liberated from ignorance, poverty, and the caprice of the tyrant. This ambition is accompanied however by the sure knowledge that the individual--as such--has only a relative value. This is why the term "positive freedom" comes from the continent. For liberation of the individual from servility of any sort to have lasting importance, individual life must be reintegrated on a higher plane with the Reason which is conversant with the wholeness of being.

The implication of the prophets to freedom is more consonant with the continental understanding than with the
British. This is so because freedom, the unspoken term, is dependant upon and subordinate to the spoken terms, righteousness, loving-faithfulness, holiness. In each of these, the configuration of wholeness is ascendant over individuality. Individual freedom is part and parcel of the prophetic experience, but it is a freedom which always looks toward the moment of its own overcoming. The hope of the prophets is for that absolute, unconditional freedom which annuls the individuality of human isolation.

As we have observed, individual liberty is almost totally absent in the liberation narrative of the Exodus. One could explain this absence in one of two ways. The most obvious explanation would be the one which is most frequently employed in modern intellection to explain the several conditions of mankind as they occur at various times, i.e., the theory of development. According to notions about development, the absence of individual freedom in the Exodus would obtain as the result of a traditional pattern of life in which the norms of the community are of sufficient power to prevent the full articulation of the individual. In keeping with this view then, the social and political variegation of the later monarchial societies would represent an advance to a higher level of development, as would the appearance of

48There is no possibility of accommodating prophetic freedom to empirical liberalism, even on the grounds that liberalism, like prophecy, is desirous to supervise action so as to guarantee good social order. Intent, not action, is basic to both. Liberalism advocates absolute freedom of thought. Prophecy teaches that only certain "thoughts," not others, are admissible.
the prophetic "ideology." Such an application might indeed suffice to explain the actual development—the increasing complexity—of Israelite society, considered in terms of sheer mechanics. To adopt this view with respect to our concern, freedom, would lead to a fascinating conclusion, i.e., that the prophets were a function of a developmental situation, much as Franklin Roosevelt's innovative presidency was the function of a developing economic and social situation. Indeed, that conclusion has a certain specious truthfulness to it, for it is the development of material conditions which has provoked the prophetic outburst. According to this schematization, we would be able to recognize the prophets as the first of a type—harbingers of a great tradition of individualism.

Such an explanation of prophetic freedom is not without its own elegance, but it is wrong for it misses the point of the entire history of which the prophets are spokesmen. It refuses to consider the meaning of the Exodus as that meaning is recorded in J, E, and P, and it likewise refuses to grant the authenticity of the prophets' own self-understanding. It is possible that the prophets were themselves the world's first developmental theorists, but they differed from the developmental theorists of the Christian age in one

49If the Little Brown Series in Comparative Politics were to prepare a volume dealing with pre-exilic Israel and Judah, the above would constitute a precis of the approach used. See Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), chapter 3.
central respect. They did not imagine that their own place and time had the character of an accomplished end. Their understanding was entirely contrary to such an assumption, for the development to which the prophets were witness was a degenerative development. The high point of culture had been the Exodus and sojourn, and their own time was a time, not of fulfillment, but of perversion. This prophetic understanding of historical development thus explains the absence of individual freedom in the Exodus episode. "I am Present." "Israel is my son." These are the dominant symbols of the Exodus, and they are symbols of liberation. They are symbols which overcome the severalness—the individual partition—of the human aggregation, and so make of it a purposive community. In the Exodus then we behold the consummate symbolism of human organization. As the consummate form, the Exodus paradigm corresponds to the real, abiding, unifying freedom that is the ethos of such concepts as "general will" and "kingdom of ends." The prophets understand it as a time when divine will and human impulse are coupled in harmony.

In our contemporary English language, compound nouns like "personal liberty" and "individual freedom" are common. These are words of camouflage in that they hide from critical inspection a truth about existence that is deeper than the superficial truth which they reveal. "Individual freedom" is the expression of a culture which tends to equate individuality with freedom. It is a misleading expression be-
cause it diverts attention from the fact that in the total of human experience, individuality and freedom do not often come together. This is apparent in the most mundane circumstances: Should we say of the contemporary peasant who is separated from the village to find himself of a sudden in Stuttgart or Bogata that he is a free individual? There can be no doubt that he has become an individual, but if we are willing to predicate "free" of this lost character, then we are likewise willing to throw the entire content of the word out upon the swirling waters of historical directionlessness. If a history of individuality is ever undertaken, it will doubtlessly devote more space to the uprooted people than to "individual freedom."

This problem of forced individuality and its implications to the realm of moral concern was an immediate interest of the prophets. Isaiah threatens: "Woe to those who join house to house, who add field to field, until there is no more room, and you are made to dwell alone in the midst of the land."50 He is talking about the expropriation of the peasantry. Not freedom, but aloneness, is the consequence of this species of individuality. The eighth century prophets make it clear that they are inhabitants of an age of individualism. The individuated appetites of the elite are fulfilled at the expense of the many. This causes a disruption of national life which severs people from the organicism of family and community, reducing them to the indi-

50Isaiah 5.8.
viduality of the debt slave or the loneliness of the beggar.
Bible history is no different from "secular" history in this regard. Slavery to appetite is the most prominent fact about the individuation of humanity. Before the machine age, this servitude of the powerful to desire issued inevitably into a physical servitude for the powerless.

Despite its too frequent use, "individual freedom" is not meaningless; the prophets are the first of its limited number of practitioners. The prophets show us just how individual freedom is distinguishable from the individuality of domination, or its symbiotic companion, the individuality of bondage. There is a transcript of the first encounter in which this true individual freedom showed itself in the eighth century. Amaziah is the chief priest at Bethel, the central shrine of the northern kingdom's cult.

And Amaziah said to Amos, "O seer, go, flee away to the land of Judah, and eat bread there, and prophesy there; but never again prophesy at Bethel, for it is the king's sanctuary and it is a temple of the kingdom."

Then Amos answered Amaziah, "I am no prophet, nor a prophet's son; but I am a herdsman, and a dresser of sycamore trees, and the Lord [YHWH] took me from following the flock, and the Lord said to me, 'Go, prophesy to my people Israel.'"51

The speech of Amaziah has the following meaning: "Be a sensible man, Amos, like the rest of us. Go back home to Judah and put your obvious ecstatic gifts on the marketplace where they will bring you a material reward." To this suggestion Amos replies, "I am no prophet." With this denial, Amos

51Amos 7.12-15.
sets himself apart from the ambitious individuality of the age. His denial means that he is not a court prophet who will lend a veneer of religious legitimacy to power politics and social injustice. Instead, he is the agent of Yahweh, who is implacably opposed to the whole set of institutions with which the priest has bidden Amos to associate himself. In this exchange we behold two essentially opposed patterns of individuality. The one is the individuality which has as its purpose the eating of bread. The other is that which has as its guiding impulse the knowledge that its practitioner has been taken by a power that is greater and nobler than himself. It is to the latter and rarer of these kinds of individuality that we may without hesitation attach the name "freedom," for along with its audible negativity against the injustice of present conduct there dwells in silence the seed of positivity toward the future. This seed is the decision against death, for life.

Have we drawn the lines between the individuality of servitude and the individuality of freedom so sharply as to exclude that middle range within person and polity where these propensities come together in contest and accommodation? Quite possibly we have overstated the case, denying to the conventional "individual freedom" a worth which is its due. It is important though that if we have been wrong, it is because the prophets have made us wrong. There can be no doubt

52 Cf. Hosea 2.5, where the eating of bread is a reward for harlotry.
that the prophets are the authors of a great tradition of free individuality which places allegiance to higher authority above concerns about material reward or even material danger. To some degree, this prophetic allegiance is manifest in the daily life of countries which permit free individuality. But in the instant that we recognize this pioneering aspect of the prophetic movement, we must acknowledge that from the perspective of prophetic intention, this is the unintended—the almost shameful—consequence of prophetic endeavor. Sociology would call it a "latent function" of the prophetic ministry. On prophetic terms, the establishment of a line of individuals who must go on through history, opposing right against wrong, is evidence of failure. The prophets failed to restore human life to the condition of wholeness that had been its property in the season of planting.53 From this failure of the total project grew individual freedom as the realization of partial success. Wherever the truly free person is to be found, there is also found the prophetic memory along with the prophetic projection of the future with its imperative verb: "Turn!" "Turn around and find your destiny in your own beginnings of oneness with

53 This is not to suggest that the extreme vision of pastoral happiness which is especially prominent in Micah is the only form of eighth century prophetic hope and expectation. We believe however that this is its definitive form. We do not understand this vision as an eschaton. That noun comes from a culture which reckoned time in terms of the world cycle. These prophets had no acquaintance with an "end of the age." They wanted to restore beginnings, not to accomplish an end.
This ultimate failure of the prophetic quest was inherent in the form of the movement itself. The ascendancy of individuality over the sought organicism can be identified in three separate regards. The first and most obvious of these has to do with the personal prominence of the prophets themselves. Like Abram, they are called out of the community, away from familiar circumstances, called to be individuals in witness against society. In this latter respect they are essentially different from Abram, for he is called with a view to formation, while the prophets are called for the purpose of reformation. Abram is before the Yahwist community, its benign (and harmless) ancestor, while the prophets are against the established norms of the post-Yahwist society, and thus in one regard its enemy. The writing prophets are in fact more like Moses than Abram. They stand out as individuals against the corruption of divinized monarchy and against the human society which is passively acquiescent in its error. This is possibly the reason for the silence about Moses in the eighth century prophets.\footnote{Micah 6.3, whose authorship is uncertain, is the only direct reference to Moses in the eighth century prophets. Hosea 12.13 seems to refer to Moses.}

\footnote{We have argued in chapter one that this is the universal form of the ethical inclination in history, i.e., a liberative recovery of the divine-human unity which precedes all severality and strife. What is unique about the prophetic employment of this form is that the prophets could cite a real, historical past as the sacred ground for future history. They did not, as did Plato, find it necessary to rescue fallen history through the "remembrance" of a mythical pre-history as the sacred ground for history.}
terms of the ultimate intent of the prophetic endeavor—the restoration of the nation to the leadership of Yahweh—the individual prominence of Moses in the liberation event is no less an embarrassment than the individual prominence of the prophets in the reformation. The visibility of the men who are its bearers detracts from the content of the message and the God who is its author. It is also possible that the Exodus tradition with which these prophets were familiar knew nothing about Moses. In either case, the same conclusion is warranted. The prophets wanted to direct attention to the authority of Yahweh, for they saw that authority as the cause of the liberative-formative event. Their own individual prominence as representatives of authority became enduringly important in a way that they neither foresaw nor desired.

There is a second sense in which the prophets encouraged a burgeoning individuality. The individual freedom of the prophets was necessarily contagious. Eichrodt writes that the prophet "asks of the individual a conscious decision against the constraint of the collective will and against the pressure of a cultural development encouraged by the whole external situation." Here again the writer's choice

56 Concerning the problem of the Moses tradition, see Noth, History of Pentateuchal Traditions, pp. 156-174.

57 Eichrodt, Man in the Old Testament, p. 21. We should report that Eichrodt tends to understand the general direction of the Old Testament as a movement toward morally responsible individualism, not entirely different in intent and result from the similar developments in Greece. For this
of words is revealing. The prophetic preaching cannot but sensitize its audience to a new and deepened apperception. The new consciousness is required to synthesize an "external situation," and with it no doubt to become awakened to one's own personal disposition as a critical, internal power set against all externality. Here we behold the same hiatus which we have identified as the dichotomy of act and intention. Whenever the owl of Minerva takes flight, the hour of dusk is at hand, if not for a whole culture, then at least for the individuals within it to whom life has become reflective. The flight causes the dusk no less than the dusk the flight. This awakening of the individual consciousness cannot but lessen the possibility of achieving the righteous and free community which the prophets hoped to revitalize.

There is an insoluble antinomy at the bottom of freedom in history. The individual form and the global content are

reason, the nearly Jungian sound of his language is no accident; he is interested in a kind of psychic individuation which liberates from the collective unconscious. (See especially pp. 9-10.) While it is certain that the Bible is at odds with the collective unconscious because of its heathen contents, we cannot share in Eichrodt's thesis, especially as concerns the prophets of the eighth century. Eichrodt believes that the result of prophetic ministry--a personal responsibility of Antigonian proportions--is consonant with the intent. This conclusion ignores the express political hope of the prophets, i.e., the restoration of an organic community of equals responsible both individually and severally before the commanding Presence of Yahweh. In seeking an end to individualism, the prophets succeed only in educating it, a partial success. Von Rad also comments on the novelty of the prophets' display of free, individual personhood, but his commentary likewise fails to consider the antagonism between this personhood and the prophetic idea of salvation, Von Rad's special interest. See **Message of the Prophets**, pp. 56-57, and 146-147.
locked in mutual opposition. This would not be the case were it possible for human society to become Amos or Hosea or Micah writ large. If this were a possibility, then in the same socio-political vessel the total individual arousal in response to the divine Presence could coexist with the subsumption of the individual within the wholeness of the God community. If this were possible, then the individual articulation of each, though entirely real, would matter as little to each as it mattered to these prophets. None of this was the case, however, for unlike the prophets, the bulk of the community were not ecstatics, nor could they be. To the prophet, whose individual distinction to us perceivers is his most immediate mark, this individuality is opaque, for he is taken by his God. (One must contemplate Isaiah's nakedness, month after month, on the streets of Jerusalem, or Hosea the cuckold, redeeming his wife, oblivious to the gaze of the village folk.) The hearer of prophecy is different from the prophet. The message stirs him, not first in his affective depth, but in his cognitive height. He synthesizes an "external situation."

For this bewildering array of prophetic accusations against the familiar present to be taken seriously, it must first be understood; reflection must learn to separate intention from the act in which it is couched, and then to weigh each against the prophetic precept of righteousness. Only upon this accomplishment can the affective powers of accusation and repentance become productive unto a turning.
One of the saddest of existence is that the free individual must also be in some measure an intellectual individual, standing at some critical remove from the spontaneous pulse of life's events. This is not what the prophets hoped for, but this is the better kind of creature whom the prophets gave to Europe. It is this harmonization of mind and heart that has made history tolerable.¹⁸

The third event in the unfolding of free individuality as part of the prophetic effort has to do specifically with the character and work of Isaiah. With the other prophets of the eighth century, the ecstatic seizure has a sudden, volcanic quality. It is to be assumed, for example, that when his message had been delivered, Amos crossed back over the border and resumed herding at Tekoa. With Isaiah, however, free, canonical prophecy became a lifetime career no less than false, court prophecy. As the ecstatic moment became elongated, the prophet's presence became almost an institution, resented, but also feared by the established authorities. It is a "loyal opposition" of a curious sort, for it remains loyal and non-violent despite its disagreement with the authorities over the very terms of the constitution. In this respect, Isaianic prophecy is like a government in exile; it is loyal to homeland and people while

¹⁸It is universally recognized (excepting fundamentalism) that the Deuteronomist movement is the first attempt at political implementation of a program inspired by prophetic protest. This is prototypical of the limited, intellectual appropriation of an initially ecstatic and infinite project.
it looks upon the present leadership as a corrupting, leprous influence.

The institutional nature of Isaiah's tenure as prophet was finalized when Isaiah assembled around himself a group of disciples. Lods regarded Isaiah's formation of a school as one of the great events of Old Testament history. He believed that this event "marks the religious emancipation of the individual, whose destiny no longer coincided entirely with that of the group." Again we must complain that this statement, although entirely true in the descriptive sense, is insensitive to the tragedy which underlies Isaiah's perceived need to gather disciples. The establishment of a group of individuals in ongoing opposition to monarchial authority is the foremost emblem of the prophet's reckoning of his own failure. The constitution would not be amended in Isaiah's lifetime, and thus he must not permit his true inspiration to be darkened in a world shot through with folly. He must "emancipate" a certain number of individuals who will comprise a permanent opposition. This group will carry the true past into the uncertain future: "Bind up the testimony, seal the teaching among my disciples."

This communication of the teaching to an intimate group did indeed amount to an emancipation of individuals. Lods spoke of this as a "religious" emancipation, and so it be-

59See Isaiah 8.2 and 8.16.

60Lods, Prophets and the Rise of Judaism, p. 102.
came. If one believes that the rise of Judaism is a great event in history, then such a religious emancipation was an event of positive value. It is certain that the rise of Judaism—or any other religion—could stir no enthusiasm in the early prophetic consciousness. These prophets were opposed to religion, for when the rise of religion occurs (the dedicatory speech of Solomon marks such an event) life has admitted the separability of the sacred from the secular. Then piety, the propitiatory act, is offered in faulty compensation for the absence of divine influence in all the affairs of human life. That the prophets, God's representatives, should deprecate religion may seem strange in a world whose highest self-articulation occurs in the disciplinary fragmentation of theology, economics, politics, history, and so on. This schematization of the world in thought is the consequence of social pluralism, and it is the advent of such a pluralism which admits the working of the detached conscience whose appearance Lods heralds. But

61 The prophetic opposition to religion is the source of Jesus' disagreement with the established Judaism of his time. One of the misfortunes of history is that the Pharisees were not insensitive to the hazards of cleaving life into divine and secular domains which have no connection. Jesus and his followers believed however that they had failed to accomplish their own intended goal of integration because their means to its accomplishment were essentially formal and thus bereft of real, divine content. These means amounted to a religion. Paul's letter to Philemon is instructive concerning the tension between religion and whole godliness in Christianity. His expectation that Philemon would heed his counsel concerning Onesimus is evidence that in the church at Colossae, religion had been extensively overcome. This overcoming was the hope of the prophets before Paul.
pluralism was not the goal of the prophetic quest; the prophetic imagination is "totalitarian." For the writing prophets human life ought to unfold as an undivided totality within the total vessel of Yahweh's holy, righteous, faithful Presence.

The individual freedom of Isaiah and his followers is an accommodation of form—a pragmatic concession to the world of power politics—accepted so as to preserve the content of a vision whose full realization would accomplish the transfiguration of the form itself. Indeed, such a transfiguration was the consequence of the young Isaiah's vision of Yahweh in the temple. To say that Isaiah became transfigured does not mean that he became a "holy man" in the sense of one who is able to suppress sensible reality or bodily function and thus attenuate the illusion of temporal existence. It means instead that Isaiah the son of Amoz was lost to him; when he left the temple he could no longer communicate with that former particular self, a personal entity with habits and tropisms which in sum constituted a singular human identity. To understand the prophet then as a towering individual opposed to the king, another individual, is utterly wrong. The real format for such encounters is the being of God in ministry against the non-being of man. The wholeness of divinity, not conspicuous human particularity, is the unseen content of the prophet's visible freedom. Wherever in history the free individual has appeared, the ultimate intention of his quest is the dissolution of his
own formal identity, and that of all the world, into the wholeness that is being itself.

We end where we began. Deutero Isaiah is the product of the Isaianic movement. His prophecy of redemptive liberation is given at the time of the great Persian expansion in the Eastern Mediterranean which swept away the decentralized parochialism of mid-antiquity. At the time of the Persian conquest, the remnant of Israel, and the second Isaiah with them, were captive in Babylon. The Persian triumph over Babylon will end the unrighteous rule of the idolaters, and thus Deutero Isaiah perceives Cyrus as the instrument of Yahweh's lordship over history. The prophet's glad shout of redemption is equally a liberative declaration with the "Let my people go, that they may serve me" of the Exodus. The Yahweh of this tiny, exiled people is revealed in his fulness as the holy creator of the universe and the commanding lord of all history. All gods beside him are idols, enformate fantasies of the human unconscious.⁶²

There is a strain of decadence in this great prophet's writing, for the high spire is the emblem of completion, the end of the dirty peasant toil which builds. There is a

⁶²Buber says that Deutero Isaiah's God is transcendent in the sense that his being becomes manifest beyond the limits of the human psyche; he is not a psychological production like the idols. Thus, human apprehension of his being is essentially different from acquaintance with the great idols. See Prophetic Faith, pp. 209 passim.
spiritualization of meanings, common to the later, reflective passage of antiquity, in which the immediate and concrete sources of joy or sorrow are poured into a synthetic term which dissolves the immediate circumstance within the mediate condition of its occurrence. No longer is bondage, exile, servitude the prominent configuration of existential negativity; instead it is the *sin* which has worked bondage. The identification of sin as the condition of bondage necessitates that redemption must first come as relief from sin. In this understanding, Deutero Isaiah anticipates the Fourth Evangelist's teaching that "liberation" is primarily the surcease of sin, a defective condition of being before God upon which existential misfortune is consequent. In context then, the terms "redemption" and "liberation" mean essentially the same. Both ascent and decay are present in equal measure in the discovery of this kind of association wherein the spiritual subsumes the practical. Decay because man has lost his direct and simplistic association with the world; ascent because man has come to have knowledge about the interior side of things.

Deutero Isaiah's subsumption of the material unfreedom of his people within their sin is no mere mental fabrication put forward in service to a religious end. Instead, it is an induction about the nature of historical process itself, an induction valid for all history: Calamity, disgrace, bondage are the inevitable consequences of sin, for sin is nothing besides the refusal to be free. It is the personal
and political refusal to will and to do the righteousness which is the sufficient condition of freedom and its absolute content. The very mundane consequence of this refusal is national catastrophe, exile and bondage. Corollary to this induction about the cause of unfreedom in history is the foundation principle of historical theism, i.e., that liberation and rectification are divine. In respect of this basic understanding, there is absolutely no "development" from J and E to Deutero Isaiah.

The moment of impetus in the structure of freedom is the divine avowal of existential misfortune, an avowal which is uttered with an intent toward the negation of misfortune. Passages which are built upon the structure of freedom are rife in Deutero Isaiah. The following is exemplary because it incorporates the major symbols which are prominent in this prophet's representation of reality. We recall that the prophecy begins with divine recognition of sorrow and a promise of comfort out of sorrow. The concrete meaning of this comfort is redemption and return, negation and position.

Remember these things, O Jacob, and Israel, for you are my servant; I formed you, you are my servant; O Israel, you will not be forgotten by me. I have swept away your transgressions like a cloud, and your sins like mist; return to me, for I have redeemed you. 63

The call to return is no longer an injunction; it is an invitation, the acceptance of which has been made possible by

63 Isaiah 44.21-22.
the clearing away of the impediments of a guilty past.

We need finally to inquire concerning the conditions of the return. The prophecy of Deutero Isaiah is eschatological, and it displays the variety which is proper to that genre. The symbolism of the following passage places the expected event in the context of the recent historical memory of Israel.

Get you up to a high mountain, O Zion, herald of good tidings; lift up your voice with strength, O Jerusalem, herald of good tidings, lift it up and fear not; say to the cities of Judah, "Behold your God!" 64

But suddenly in the next verse, the urban imagery disappears, revealing the old strata of memory, the fundamental form of the prophetic vision of life in completion.

Behold, the Lord God comes with might, and his arm rules for him; behold his reward is with him, and his recompense before him. He will feed his flock like a shepherd, he will gather the lambs in his arms, he will carry them in his bosom and gently lead those that are with young. 65

It is the symbolism of Exodus and sojourn, might and gentleness, liberation and election. Human life made whole in the Presence of God.

64 Isaiah 40.9.
65 Isaiah 40.10-11.
V. GREECE: THE BIRTH OF FREEDOM FROM
THE SPIRIT OF JUSTICE

1. The Freedom of Human Intermediacy

"Freedom" is a word which does not easily lend itself to precise definition because of the emotive value which clings to it. Freedom is a source of exultation for those who have it, and an object of desire for those who live without it. For children, "America is a free country" is often the earliest proposition about the political order of their native land, and to the extent that that order influences their lives, it is the most salient of all their understandings about their country. Athens is the ancestor of the free European peoples of the modern age, the world's first conscious claimant of freedom. The awareness of freedom as the definitive trait of Athens is articulated in a series of contrasts. Relative to Persia, Greece generally and Athens particularly is free; later, Athens is free relative to Sparta. But the claim that one's country is free does nothing to illumine the character of the freedom which is claimed.

We must break freedom down and render it in its separate moments if we are to understand the meaning of the Athenian claim to freedom. The task of definition was not incumbent upon this project as it dealt with the Exodus of Israel, for the Bible's own analytical standard, the struc-
ture of freedom in the Fourth Gospel undertook this conceptualization for us. It will become clear that this structure of freedom is likewise relevant to the Athenian experience of freedom, but by itself it is not sufficient to explain that experience. In Athenian experience, the conceptual schematics of the free life are seldom symbolized in any manner abstract from that life experience. Therefore the task of schematization falls the lot of this project. From the variety of freedoms which we behold in Greece, we infer the presence of typical patterns—moments—which make experiential freedom intelligible to us.

Athens enlarges and complicates the experience of freedom which has its origin in Israel. The structure of freedom which articulates the inner meaning of the Israelite experience of divine liberation establishes the outer boundaries of freedom. Athenian experience and self-articulation are likewise conversant with these outer boundaries, but in a sense the freedom of Athens improves upon the Biblical development of the issue, for Athens fills in the mid spaces which in the Exodus and the prophets are left blank. The life of Israel within the immediate Presence of the supra-worldly deity is a life lived in the realm of ultimacy; in such a life there is little or no middle ground, no reservation set apart for the random development of the strictly human impulses and abilities. With early Israel it is the divine element within man—as an aggregate universal—that is called into the Presence of Yahweh, and the lesser ele-
ments of the human constitution, the forces which work toward individuation, are consigned to inconsequentiality. Athens is quite different, for in that country it was man who was immediate. Man is immediate in the symbolic record of Greece because the Homeric pantheon is at once plural and thoroughly anthropomorphic. The basal layer of the Greek religious consciousness recognized and celebrated in the gods the same virtues and weaknesses which are frequent amongst mortals. To infer from this that the Greeks were irreligious is mistaken. It is true however that the imputation of ethics to the Olympian pantheon is a secondary, "subversive" development in Greek religion whose end result for Greece was the destruction of the Homeric pantheon in the period of enlightenment. But in the archaic period, for every Hesiod, steeped in devotion to righteous Zeus,

1Of this phenomenon which explains the essential difference between Israel and Greece, Voegelin writes, "The universal validity of transcendent truth, the universality of the one God over the one mankind, could be more easily disengaged from an individual's discovery of the existence of his psyche under the gods than from the Sinaitic revelation of a people's existence under God." (Order and History, II, 169.) The human psyche, as a power detached from the greater cosmos, is the proper arena of Greek freedom. Because of this detachment it was necessary for Solon the liberator to puzzle out the ways of Zeus. In Israel the case was opposite: Yahweh sought out Moses and made him liberator.

2The major thesis of Nilsson's study of Greek religion is that the anthropomorphism of the popular Homeric religion destined that religion to destruction once the urgencies of urban civilization made it necessary for the gods to become supporters of ethics. The later Greeks were asked to believe that the same gods who had practised deceitfulness, partisanship, and sexual promiscuity in the Homeric literature were now the upholders of rectitude and order. The
there must have been thousands like his brother Perses who could live quite successfully on an exclusively human plane, participating in cultic celebrations of the protective ancestor-gods, unconcerned about truly divine norms or sanctions. It is in this middle space occupied by Hesiod's brother Perses that freedom as a human way of life could first develop. Because of Athenian freedom's development in this middling, unsteady human zone, the thought leaders who articulated the life of Athens found it necessary to point beyond the merely human realm of existence toward a vision in which human life became endowed with an ennobled freedom, a freedom imbued with the divine spirit of Dikē, of Justice.

In Athens, four moments can be discerned in the life of freedom as a moral and political constellation. These are hierarchical, ascending from freedom of a lower type to freedom of the highest order. These are: 1. freedom from slavery, 2. freedom to live as one desires, 3. freedom of the self to decide amongst alternatives of varying moral magnitudes, 4. freedom to live in righteousness. The first and the last of these conform to the polarity within the Biblical structure of freedom. The two intermediate mo-


The following models show the difference between the schematization of freedom for Israel and that for Greece:
ments of freedom are the specifically human contribution of Greek experience, for they partake of neither the mute, less than human existence of the slave, nor of the divine, greater than human life of the wholly righteous. They are truly intermediate, for the middle range of freedom, in both its individual and political manifestations, constitutes a platform from which human existence may move toward the lower inclinations of tyranny and slavery or toward the higher destiny of divine completion.

Freedom from slavery is negative freedom, for it is freedom which negates a negative condition of existence in which life is sealed off from public objectification in speeches and works. Similar to freedom from slavery is freedom from tyranny, for the former consists in an economic relationship and the latter in a political relationship. The consequences of enslavement and tyranny are much the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Israel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>positive</td>
<td>4. whole righteousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>negative</td>
<td>2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. freedom from slavery</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Greece</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>positive</td>
<td>4. whole righteousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. freedom of moral decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>negative</td>
<td>2. freedom to gratify desire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. freedom from slavery</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the text will explain, the fourth moment is present in Greek awareness, but there is no expectation that it will be fully manifested in history.
same, moreover, since both of these conditions deny the autonomy of those who occupy the subordinate position. Liberation from slave bondage or tyrannical bondage inevitably establishes—within politically defined limits—the "right" of the principal to his life and its produce. It is for this reason that in concrete history and in the conceptual schematization which obtains from that history, freedom from slavery is the primary moment in the experience of freedom. If freedom is to happen, then somehow the understanding must occur that it is "right" for some persons to exist in a condition of non-bondage. The negation of the negative circumstances of the slave people Israel was the efficient circumstance of the formation of Israel as a theopolity. The same is true of Athens. The foundation of Athens as the mother of political communities was coincidental with the negation of the slave condition of the Athenians. Pursuant upon this negation, Athens became the city which Europe remembers as the ancestor of constitutional government and popular liberty.

In historical and conceptual terms the moment of freedom which follows upon the existential fact of not living in bondage is freedom to live as one pleases. It is natural that this broad condition of randomness should follow upon the initial moment of freedom from slavery or tyranny. This is the freedom of societies which are resident in the liberal zone of moral accomplishment, and if the "freedom" of this moment is for the better part specious, it is nonethe-
less exuberant. Herodotus wrote:

Thus did the Athenians increase in strength. And it is plain enough, not from this instance only, but from many everywhere, that freedom is an excellent thing; since even the Athenians, who, while they continued under the rule of tyrants, were not a whit more valiant than any of their neighbors, no sooner shook off the yoke than they became decidedly the first of all. These things show that, while undergoing oppression, they let themselves be beaten, since then they worked for a master; but so soon as they got their freedom, each man was eager to do the best he could for himself. So it fared now with the Athenians.4

This random freedom is intermediate; it occurs as man recognizes that he—not some other whom he serves—is himself fully human. This moment of freedom is preponderantly negative, for it springs from the circumstance of lacking external restraint; that is why so often it finds its terminus in a re-enslavement of human life. It was of a society imbued with the practise of this second moment in the career of freedom that Plato was thinking when he discussed the constitutional form, democracy:

All sorts and conditions of men, then, would arise in this polity more than in any other?
Of course.
Possibly, said I, this is the most beautiful of polities; as a garment of many colors, embroidered with all kinds of hues, so this, decked and diversified with every type of character, would appear the most beautiful, like boys and women when they see bright-colored things.5

Specifically, Plato is describing Athens. As is well known, his prognosis for the liberal society is gloomy. Liberty

5_Republic, 557c, tr. Paul Shorey.
leads to license, and eventually the licentious society opens onto tyranny, for Plato the rule of the devil upon the earth. It was this pessimistic faith, compounded by personal experience, that led Plato to look upon the random life as a cancer to be excised at a high cost. In his writing, Plato seems to have deliberately suppressed the obvious circumstance which coupled his life and work with that of Solon, Aeschylus and Socrates: all of them were free men of Athens. If random freedom for the many amounted to gratification of appetite at the expense of public order, it was no less an historical truth that for a portion of the community that same human freedom became teleological.

The random freedom of the second moment is mainly an affair of desire, of channelling the simpler inclinations and appetites in a manner which is pleasant to the self, without regard for measure and consequence amongst the behaviors which implement desire. The freedom of the second moment then exhibits no permanent contact with that fixture in man which is most divine, with the mind. It is for this reason that life in free countries tends to fixate at the generally negative second moment of freedom; the great bulk of mankind is not such that mind looms large as the dominant influence in behavior. All this is simply to say that left to its own devices, humanity will do as it pleases more usually than it will do what is right. The institutions of free countries encourage people to do as they please; they accommodate "interest" and facilitate "interest articulation."
Thus, as Aristotle understood, in a bi-polar society it is the interest of the rich to exploit the poor and the interest of the poor to expropriate the rich. Hence the alternative evils of oligarchy and democracy become tyranny. The random freedom of the second moment, as it occurs in both the individual and society, can be fully justified only on an hedonic basis. There is yet a further possibility for its justification, albeit a partial one. This is that a society which tolerates unimpeded exercise of preference amongst pre-rational, pre-moral desires is also a society which will countenance the deployment of the human personality as a moral arbiter. It is as if the former were an unimposing platform upon which the latter edifice may be built. To permit a discretionary range for nutritive impulse is likewise to give free play to the exertion of upright reason as a guiding light for the person, and in times of good fortune, for the polity as well.

This then is the third moment in the occurrence of freedom within Athens, and within later history as well. It grows from the second. The self which takes up the burden of true freedom is the self which orients its life in a direction of ontic positivity. This self is a minority figure amongst men, for it is the self in which the noetic mind is more fully awakened than in the general run of mankind. The self which is a moral arbiter is not untroubled, as is the primarily appetitive self, for it dwells in incessant awareness of the reality that right is, and to be a
recipient of this understanding entails a condition of internal warfare. For when the reality of the moral imperative has become apparent, then the ongoingness of the pre-moral, desiderative self becomes problematic to the self which strives to present itself as an integrated moral unity. The self-knowledge of the self as a power having free choice becomes fully manifest only at that instant when it has been grasped that the will is extensively a slave character, bent to its path by factors which lie beyond the powers of the volitional self. Curiously, it is Paul who conveys most lucidly this ultimate paradox of Greek knowledge of self and world. We return to this central passage from the Romans which we first considered in contrast to the Stoic view.

Now if I do what I do not want, I agree that the law is good. So then it is no longer I that do it, but sin which dwells within me. For I know that nothing good dwells within me, that is, in my flesh. I can will what is right, but I cannot do it. For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do. Now if I do what I do not want, it is no longer I that do it, but sin which dwells within me.

So I find it to be a law that when I want to do right, evil lies close at hand. For I delight in the law of God, in my inmost self, but I see in my members another law at war with the law of my mind [noos] and making me captive to the law of sin which dwells in my members.6

Paul's statement of the issue was intelligible to the Hellenized Jews whom this epistle addresses, for there are two "Greek" themes in this passage, in addition to the Jewish concern for the law with which they are synthesized. First is the avowal that the inmost self, the "I" of the "mind" is

6Romans 7.16-23.
free, that its volition is to rectitude. Second is the in-escapable reality of existence, that the total person is un-free, unrighteous, a doer of evil, despite contrary voli-
tion. This is the counter "self" of the sin which dwells in
bodily members, the passions of appetite. It is important
though that Paul does not quit the issue at this vulgar,
Orphic stage of analysis. The epistle continues:

For those who live according to the flesh set their
minds on the things of the flesh, but those who live
according to the Spirit set their minds on the things
of the Spirit. To set the mind on the flesh is death,
but to set the mind on the Spirit is life and peace.

The slave existence of the self is not, in the final analy-
sis of the matter, an affair which derives from man's con-
dition of having body. Body is but the matrix from which
the slave self may make its presence known. The unfreedom
of man--like his freedom--has its final locus in the core of
the self--in the set of the mind, in the disposition of the
heart. The anthropology of man as free/man as slave in
Romans 7 and 8 repeats in direct prose the same meaning of
Plato whose picture stories of the composition of the soul
first overcame the simplistic Orphic presentation of the
matter.  

In this third moment then the random freedom of the
second is brought low, for its speciousness is unmasked. It

7 Romans 8.5-6.

8 This seemingly arcane problem is of great importance
to a consideration of freedom, for if the Orphic-Gnostic un-
derstanding of evil is tolerated, then human freedom must be
understood as escape from life as we know it in historical
is a free existence only in the most physical sense; its practitioners are not the chattels of another. But in the ontic range which has become transparent for reason, the freedom of the second moment is a bitter sham; its freedom is external and corrupt. Men who imagine themselves to be free are in fact driven by taskmasters whose influence they do not even perceive. The political consequences of the eruption of the third moment in freedom are momentous, for they extend the warfare within the self beyond the self. It is enlarged as conflict within the polity. The self which has become privy to the moral range of possibility can no longer live in peace amongst those who, though imagining

existence. This, briefly, is the Orphic myth: Dionysos, the son of Zeus, was slain by the Titan monsters who devoured his limbs. Zeus managed to retrieve his heart, and then struck the Titans with lightning, burning them to powder. From their ashes mankind was formed. The material (bodily) part of man was evil because of its Titan content, yet because the Titans had eaten Dionysos, the soul was good. This contrived myth which lacks true archaic standing is the Greek source of the soul-body dualism which has plagued the Western imagination. The early Plato of the Phaedo period was heavily influenced by Orphism, and hence the optimism of Socrates as he drinks the hemlock which will separate soul from body and speed the former to its blessed afterlife. The orthodox tradition in Western letters—beginning with the mature Plato—has spurned this understanding of man and his experience of evil. In Republic, 439c-440a, and Phaedrus, 253c-254e, Plato moves the propensity to evil within the soul proper, along with the propensity to good. This has the advantage of making man, as man (not as animal), responsible for evil. Likewise it rescues the body, and with it material existence in history, from disgrace and desuetude. The implications to freedom are obvious.

themselves to be free, are in fact the victims of a bondage too subtle for them to detect. Once this realization occurs, the free self must act, and it must act politically. The free person must attempt through persuasion to heighten the vision of his fellow men, and, that failing, he may employ harsher means to save them from their own slavishness. The former alternative was the course of Solon and Aeschylus, and the latter was the hard portion of Plato who attempted to annul freedom as a fixture of life and thought.

The freedom of the third moment is resident in a dynamic tension, a conscious suspension between slavery and righteousness in which the self strives to manifest itself as a positive and worthy being. This freedom then exhibits the higher intermediacy through which man's humanity attempts to bridge the baser aspect of humanity itself, and so to terminate this very intermediacy which is the most salient fact of human life. It is this aspiration unto the terminus of the intermediate suspension that was known to the Greeks and to the New Testament as Hope. Hope is open to the ultimate, open to life as wholeness in being, and that hoped for condition of beatific completion is the fourth and final moment in freedom.

In the Bible, when Yahweh declares, "Israel is my son," when the Son declares, "You are my disciples," the predicate indicates that for at least some of the human characters in the Bible, the consummate moment of freedom has been attained through a dispensation of divine grace. In the symbolic ex-
perience of Athens, the fourth moment of human aspiration is seldom if ever realized in temporal existence, for there is nothing in the experience of Greece which is fully parallel to the grace of God as it occurs in the Bible. Rather, for Athens, the completion of freedom in a total positivity of living in the divine presence remains a goal of life which is apprehended and experienced across a paradigmatic distance. This is to say that freedom in the ultimate and positive sense is a characteristic which is fully developed only in the gods; man remains intermediate. Aeschylus expressed this perfectly: "For only Zeus is free." It is for this reason that the ways of the gods are objects of hope and concern among those men who partake of the higher intermediacy and so aspire to a freedom by agency of which human will is drawn nearer to the divine will. If the humanity of the human will were to collapse utterly, then the intermediacy of man would end and the residual volition would be either wholly demonic or wholly divine. It is the divine gradient of this possibility which is the fourth and

9Prometheus Bound, 50. To employ this passage in this fashion may appear to be facile, since in its context the passage is obviously ironic. In the Prometheus Bound an important theme is that Zeus is governed in some degree by necessity, so even his freedom is incomplete. But beyond its immediate, ironic application, the passage does express the true and direct thinking of Aeschylus, since the final play of the trilogy (it is almost universally believed) contains not only the liberation of Prometheus from his torment but also of Zeus from that fate which would produce his overthrow. Concomitant with this end to the threat to his rule is the accession of Zeus to the realm of pure divinity which wills that whole righteousness whose consequence is freedom.
final moment of freedom.

In its ultimate character then, freedom is transfigured so as to forfeit the arbitrary aspect of intent and struggle which has marked its earlier moments. In the fourth moment, there is no further need for arbitration in the selection of alternative courses, for there are no longer alternatives. The pastoral vision of Micah has shown us this much. The leadership of Yahweh is perceived to be sufficient; a human decision is no longer required. This resembles the condition known to modern understanding as "absolute unconditional freedom," i.e., a freedom in which self and world are so integrated that the struggle within the soul or within the polity occurs no longer. Greece did not share the idealist opinion that the absolute moment of freedom lay within the range of mortal experience. Indeed--save for the clue given by Aeschylus--this ultimate freedom was not known by the name "freedom." In the symbolic vocabulary of Greece, the condition of moral completion is understood to fall within the range of Dikē. Dikē is the perfect and unequivocal Justice of Zeus, and as such it is the supra-human freedom to do that which is right. Thus it is the divine characteristic which men behold across the distance which separates their imperfect order from the perfect order of the gods. Dikē, the ultimate and divine freedom, is a model for mortal men; it is a guide which enriches the intermediate condition of man, advising and warning the arbiter who dwells within the free, intermediate soul.
In Athens then, "freedom," as the noun is commonly employed, is not the consummate value. **Dikē**, the complete righteousness of Zeus, is the foundation upon which the imperishable values of humanity rest. **Dikē** is the tutor of man with his freedom. We need now to examine the utterances which articulate the experience of freedom and justice, and shape the dialectic of the two.

2. The **Dikē** of Hesiod

Hesiod is one of that very small number of men who gave to Europe its historical identity. Hesiod was a free Boetian peasant of the eighth century who wrote not much more than a generation after Homer. The world of Hesiod however is not really the same world as that of Homer, for while Homer wrote of the heroic, Mycenaean past as it was known to him, Hesiod addresses himself to the affairs of the present. The present for Hesiod is the end of the so-called Dark Age, the time before which the Dorian invaders had destroyed the old Mycenaean civilization and supplanted its order with a more primitive, northern pattern of organization. Thus Hesiod's present is as different from that of Achilles and Odysseus as is the present of Abram from that of Adam, Seth, and Noah. It is a real present whose concerns are intelligible to us as creatures of history. It is not a happy present, for overpopulation has made life a struggle against starvation. One can infer much from the change in diet. The Homeric population is accustomed to a diet of roast meat, while the
Hesiodian diet consists of vegetable products. This is a world then of dissatisfaction and unrest. Hesiod's own father had been an immigrant to Boetia, who, after failing at a maritime enterprise, had taken up farming on the stony soil of the mainland peninsula. It is in this world of existential precariousness that the light of divine justice begins to beam as the guiding beacon for human conduct.

To say that Hesiod is the father of justice is not to overstate the case, for the view of the world as an order which is in some way productive of right or just relationships is derivative from the inspiration of Hesiod. This is not to suggest that the theme of justice appears first in Hesiod; rather, Hesiod gives it its moral urgency. Jaeger explains of the Homeric justice relative to that of Hesiod,

. . . a vast distance separates these occasional traces of an ethical conception of the gods, and even the faith which governs the Odyssey, from the religious passion of Hesiod, the herald of justice. . . He borrows from Homer the content of his ideal of justice, and even some characteristic phrases to describe it. But the reformer's zeal with which he experiences its compelling force, and its predominant position in his conception of the rule of heaven and the meaning of man's life, these mark him out as the prophet of a new age, in which men are to build a better society, founded upon justice. 11


11 Jaeger, Paideia, I, 67.
Jaeger's comment that Hesiod "borrows from Homer the content of his ideal of justice" requires some examination, for the Homeric understanding of all normative affairs is adapted to the heroic, aristocratic societies of which he writes. Certain aspects of the Homeric view are tributaries to the new synthesis of Hesiod. Zeus is at the apex of the pantheon, and while he does not save the world from self-destruction in the *Iliad*, he alone amongst the gods remains neutral. It is this Zeus who becomes capable of true, impartial justice in the vision of Hesiod. Similarly in Homer, justice is understood to involve the correct treatment of others; above all else it is the opposite of outrageous and savage behavior.\(^{12}\) Thus the Cyclops, who are violent, lawless, inhospitable to strangers, and utterly without political institutions, are absolutely offensive to Homer, and Odysseus' blinding of the Cyclops is understood to be an act consistent with the vengeance of Zeus.\(^ {13}\) Perhaps the easiest way to express the qualitative difference which lies between Homer and Hesiod is to state that in Hesiod, unlike Homer, the fantastic does not command attention in and of itself. If monstrous beings, monstrous occurrences appear in Hesiod, the purpose is either proto-scientific or else to amplify some meaning which pertains directly to the moral sphere. Homer loves adventure and thus

---

\(^{12}\)See especially *Odyssey*, VI, 120.

\(^{13}\) *Odyssey*, IX, 478.
he finds the Cyclops intrinsically interesting; that a di-
dactic lesson obtains from the episode is of secondary im-
portance. For Hesiod, justice is a divine concern which
applies directly to mankind in its historical existence.
Thus, Homer can be exercised about the outrage of suitors
who roost for twenty years in the house of Telemachos,
courting a queen who may or may not be a widow, while
Hesiod, like Amos and Micah, is fearful of the outrage of
the bribed judge who will deprive an honest man of his prop-
erty. To say then, as Jaeger did, that the content of the
Hesiodian justice is borrowed from Homer, is not entirely
satisfactory. The content is the same inasmuch as in both
just action is correct, but there is a kind of correctness
which is proper to each. Professor Forrest does much to
clarify this. He writes that the adjective dikaios has an
earlier and a later meaning. The opposite of the earlier
use of the term is "wild" or "uncivilised," while the oppo-
site of the later meaning is "unjust" or "impious."14 In
this distinction drawn according to opposites can be seen
the great advance of Hesiod over Homer. The misbehavior of
the suitors is at bottom an aesthetic impropriety; they have
unpardonably bad manners. The misbehavior of a bribed judge
however is a moral offense against God himself. This real-
ization, not the former, is the source of historical order
as we know it.

14W. G. Forrest, The Emergence of Greek Democracy, 800-
Hesiod's vision is set forth in two great poems, the *Theogony* and the *Works and Days*. The *Theogony* offers Hesiod's account of the generations of the gods. It is not an "impartial history" however, for Hesiod writes from a biased point of view. He is a partisan who celebrates the triumph of the late, Olympian deities—Zeus and his generation—gods who are not culpable for the doing of "shameful things." The *Theogony* thus accounts for the separation of the demonic and the divine aspects of reality. Hesiod is the first Greek to whom Zeus is revealed as a fully moral god, and his ascendancy amongst the gods establishes for Hesiod the tenor of life as it ought to be conducted by men. The *Theogony* is Hesiod's statement on the reality of the divine, and the *Works and Days* extends Hesiod's analysis and exhortation into the province of mortal existence. It is with this domain that we are primarily concerned.

Scholarly study of the *Works and Days* is of course pre-eminently interested in understanding Hesiod's thought categories and their ramifications in later writing. To follow this approach at first however is to miss the symbolic richness of the existential situation which prompts the utterance of this peasant rhapsode. The first reality of the *Works and Days*—its instigator—is a base fellow with the name Perses. Perses is Hesiod's brother and the poem is addressed to him. Hesiod's address tells us a good deal about Perses early in the poem.
Perses, lay up these things in your heart [thumos], and do not let that Strife who delights in mischief hold your heart back from work, while you peep and peer and listen to the wrangles of the court-house. Little concern has he with quarrels and courts who has not a year's victuals laid up betimes, even that which the earth bears, Demeter's grain. When you have got plenty of that, you can raise disputes and strive to get another's goods. But you shall have no second chance to deal so again; nay, let us settle our dispute here with true judgment which is of Zeus and is perfect. For we had already divided our inheritance, but you seized the greater share and carried it off, greatly swelling the glory of our bribe-swallowing lords [basileas] who love to judge such a cause as this. Fools! They know not how much more the half is than the whole, nor what great advantage there is in mallow and asphodel.15

Hesiod addresses himself to a defect in Perses' heart, and in so doing, he identifies the heart as the arbiter of the self. Centuries later Plato will clarify this mediatory capacity of the Hesiodian heart (thumos) when he casts it as the third, spirited power within the soul which decides between the competing inclinations of reason and desire.16

The difficulty which stems from the disposition of Perses' heart is this: Rather than do honest work to ensure his livelihood, Perses has intrigued with the local barons so as to defraud Hesiod of his fair share of their father's estate. Now, after a period of profligate living, Perses is in need, and he threatens to go to court again so as to take that portion which had earlier gone to Hesiod. This aspect of the difficulty introduces the political motif in the Works


16Republic, 439e.
and Days, a theme that will undergo continual development in the political philosophy of Athens. "For we had already divided our inheritance, but you seized the greater share and carried it off, greatly swelling the glory of our bribe-swallowing lords . . ." The picture is familiar.

While it is easy to recognize that Hesiod, as the father of justice, is the first of a type of man—the just man—it should not escape our attention that Perses is likewise the first of a type. To be sure, Perses can hardly be the first unjust man, but it is rather likely that he is the first of one type of "free man." The picture that Hesiod draws with Perses at its center is familiar to us. But in the annals of mankind, Perses is proto-typical. Here, after all, is "ancient man"; or should one say, here at last is ancient man? In order to elucidate this novel aspect of Perses' character, let us observe what Perses is not. Perses desires fortune, but in order to get it, he does not appear before us as a hero or a demigod at war with others of this same sort. Nor is he a mortal who enjoys the special tutelage of some deity who uses tricks and charms to outwit some counter deity who has established a protectorate over his brother Hesiod. Nor does Perses seek out sorcerers who might by spell and incantation silence Hesiod, and so despoil him of his inheritance. Instead, Perses does what we would do if we were avariciously inclined; he schemes with corrupt officials. In a sense then, Perses is like Abram, and thus like us as well. He is an ordinary man in
historical existence. The prehistoric blessedness of humanity in union with divinity is opaque to him. To say that Perses is the instigator of the *Works and Days* is to say that Hesiod's great work was produced in response to the appearance of man in history. It cannot be put more simply. Perses knows that he is a man, only a man. He has come to terms with the fact of his human mediocrity, and in accepting this, he has put away all which appears to him to be pretense; for Perses there are no beautiful speeches, no weighty deeds, but only a graceless covetousness which if successful will assure comfort until the time of his death. This same Perses would be a coward in battle, and quite probably he is conventionally religious, making due propitiation to the gods to ensure their neutrality. But of the divine realm, he cares for nothing more than to avoid its disfavor.

To Hesiod, the appearance of man in the world is a source of emergency. If man is here to stay, then he must be educated. The disposition of his heart must have direction, else calamity impends. The appearance of Perses as the representative type of man in history prompts Hesiod to articulate the etiology of the evil condition of man which he beholds about him in the world. Thus, in the text of the *Works and Days*, the exhortation to Perses is followed immediately by two myths of the fall of man. The first of these is the story of Prometheus' theft of fire, his gift of it to man, and of Zeus's retaliation through the creation of Pandora and her jar. The second is the account of the five
consecutive races of men. In respect of our interest in Perses, we shall examine only the last two of the five ages in the anthropogony. The first three races of men, in order, are the gold, silver and bronze. The fifth and present race is of iron. The race of iron is preceded immediately by the fourth, the heroic race. The heroic race encompasses the mankind of the Homeric epics. Of this epoch, Hesiod says that the heroes are "noble, righteous, god-like, untouched by sorrow, happy." What is most significant about this list is that it is not offset by any counter-inventory of negative traits or circumstances. Clearly the heroic mankind bears only a remote connection to the mankind with which Hesiod is familiar. Its value to Hesiod obtains solely in that it affords a standard of contrast for his analysis of life in the world of familiar experience.

The existence with which Hesiod is familiar is the oftentimes hateful existence of the Iron Age. Of this age he reports:

Thereafter, would that I were not among the men of the fifth generation, but either had died before or been born afterwards. For now truly is a race of iron, and men never rest from labor and sorrow by day, and from perishing by night; and the gods shall lay sore trouble upon them. But, notwithstanding, even these shall have some good mingled with their evils. And Zeus will destroy this race of mortal men also when they come to have grey hair on the temples at their birth.\(^18\)

A list of specific evils of both a private and a public na-

\(^{17}\)Works and Days, 156-169b.

\(^{18}\)Works and Days, 174-182.
ture follows here. Then Hesiod concludes:

And then Aidos and Nemesis, with their sweet forms wrapped in white robes, will go from the wide-pathed earth and forsake mankind to join the company of the deathless gods: and bitter sorrows will be left for mortal men, and there will be no help against evil.19

This description and prognosis for the humanity of Hesiod's acquaintance is probably the most notable instance of the Hesiodian pessimism; one must add though that it is a moderate pessimism. The evidence that Hesiod's pessimism is not total consists in two aspects of his writing. The first is that with the triumph of Zeus in the Theogony the affairs of the gods are at last set aright. Surely this must suggest some possibility for improvement within the condition of mortals. The second is that the Works and Days is itself an exhortatory address. The parallel with the prophets of Israel is obvious: Children will be born aged; Aidos (Shame) and Nemesis (Indignation) will depart; Zeus will destroy this race, unless it changes the disposition of its heart! Like the fiber-thin thread of promise which runs through the envenomed words of Amos, this latter condition is the barely stated premise of the Works and Days. Its deliverance is the purpose of the whole address.

In his assessment of the generation to which he belongs, Hesiod posits a range of negative attributes which contrast with those of the earlier race of heroes. Labor is as necessary as it is onerous; domestic strife abounds; worthy men

19 Works and Days, 195-201.
are victimized by perjurers and violent usurpers; at last men are defenseless against evil. Again, however, Hesiod's view is moderated when he allows that "even these shall have some good mingled with their evils." The negative aspect, to be sure, is preponderant, but life is not completely bereft of positive content. In brief, Hesiod's picture of human existence in his world (and ours) is accurate. If we are to appreciate the authenticity of the Hesiodian iron race as a typical vision of historical existence, it is necessary that we refrain from imagining that we are not in the broadest sense participants in the same historical world as the inhabitants of eighth century Boetia. Amongst us, abuse, injustice, perjury, toilsome and unrewarding labor, though recessive, are enduring conditions of existence. Hesiod tells the truth of historical existence and ventilates the distress of the righteous soul in a timeless utterance.

Hesiod's expression of the negativity of present existence exhibits a formal correspondence to a similar attestation in the Exodus: "Then the Lord [YHWH] said, 'I have seen the affliction of my people who are in Egypt, and have heard their cry because of their taskmasters; I know their sufferings . . .'"20 The case is not fully the same however, for the miserable lot of Israel is the result of an external hegemony which has ensnared the people from without. Hesiod is grappling with an internal malady which has external con-

20Exodus 3.7 J.
sequences—with the intermediacy of a man whose heart turns to wickedness more readily than to righteousness. Greece is not Israel, nor is Zeus Yahweh. The old Yahwist creed understood that Yahweh saved Israel through the performance of "signs and wonders," but it seems clear in Hesiod's writing that the salvation of Zeus occurs only inasmuch as mortals will to regard him as paradigm. That the heart come to feel the paradigmatic immediacy of the Olympians is the intent of Hesiod's address. The primary audience of the poem is the unjust Perses, the intermediate figure for whose conversion Hesiod is concerned. Inasmuch as the poem exhibits the belief that man can be converted to the divine path, the Works and Days is an appeal to man in his freedom.

As was the case with Israel, we are looking at Greek culture at a time before the idea of freedom had been spoken aloud. Symbolic expression of values is tied to experience which in itself is valued, and is derivative from that experience. For this reason it is important that Jaeger concludes that the Boetia which Hesiod describes to us can be called a free society. The nobles monopolize political power, but the peasants have a life of their own, with extensive latitude in matters of personal conduct and economy. There is extensive freedom of speech, and there is nothing akin to serfdom or to helotry of the Laconian pattern. In addition to these considerations, it is most important that

21Jaeger, Paideia, I, 56.
in Hesiod's Boetia—in sharp contrast to Attica—land could be bought and sold easily. This means that there was real, commonplace individual freedom of a quite modern sort, for from this right to transfer property, the historian infers that the extended family has little power over the individual. Where the extended family is strong, land is not permitted to leave the family. By and large then, the pattern of Hesiod's existence is one which is recognizable as a free one to us whose vocabulary is familiar with the concept of freedom.

In Hesiod's portrait of Perses, we behold the first free man of whom there is record in Greece, and in that one sense at least, the first Greek. But does not freedom come to more than the biography of this empty Perses? Perhaps, but not necessarily. One meaning of the claim to be a free man in a free country must always be that one can undertake to do outrageous things without certainty of being apprehended and punished. Perses is a choice specimen, for he embodies no more of freedom than that which we have designated as the second moment of freedom; he is free from external restraint, free to live a life of utter randomness. The arbiter within has arrested his selective range at the quantitative level of appetite; Perses is a man who wants more. Hesiod's picture of Perses cannot be far from Plato's

22 E.g., see the advice in Works and Days, 335-340.

23 See Burn, The World of Hesiod, pp. 111-114. Not all scholars accept the idea that land could be sold anywhere in
mind when in Republic IV he models the tripartite composition of the soul with desire (epithumia) as its lowest structure. In Plato—as in Hesiod before him—the spectre of desire as the basal leaning of the human self issues into a comment on the political order as a potential curb to the rampant satisfaction of the quests of the quantitative self. For Hesiod though, the political aspect is less clearly pronounced than in Plato, for Hesiod has no concrete program for reform. His primary avenue of approach to the problem of human baseness is his appeal to the human heart, for in that central mediator of the self, he hopes to awaken a dormant receptivity to his "true words." Hesiod's approach then presupposes freedom as elemental to the human self and to the greater political community. Otherwise the exhortation would be without purpose.

The vital question concerns which kind of freedom that the self will display. Will it continue as the specious and deceptive freedom of quantitative inclination, or can it be heightened and broadened? Professor Solmsen, whose study looks ahead to Aeschylus, understandably comprehends the problem which Perses poses for thought in Aeschylean terms, i.e., in terms of freedom. Most significantly Solmsen connects the issue of human freedom in Hesiod to the beatific eighth century Greece. The fact is however that virtually the only evidence about life in the eighth century is that contained in the Works and Days. It assumes that land can be sold, and in numerous respects suggests a weak family structure.
vision of the Golden Age:

Man has a choice. Perses is free to choose between one course and the opposite. So are the judges who may either accept bribes from Perses or bring the lawsuit which is pending between him and Hesiod to a satisfactory end by handing down a just verdict. The road of ἑβρίς is open to man, but so is that of δίκη and if he chooses the honest course he will experience a happiness not quite identical with, but not much inferior to, that enjoyed by the men of the Golden Age.  

Solmsen wisely couples freedom and justice to happiness in his reading of Hesiod; eudaemonism is never missing from the Greek political consciousness, and Hesiod more than Homer is author of the principle. In Hesiod, the prediction that righteous conduct in the individual self and in the public domain will lead to happiness is a proposition that has freedom as its animus. But as we have seen, there are greater and lesser species of freedom. In his exhortation and prediction, Hesiod is in effect beseeching Perses and the judges to become free as he is free. And the freedom of Hesiod is of an elevated sort; it is truly the freedom of choice, the third moment in freedom. Basic to the Hesiodian faith is the belief that the freedom of the higher intermediacy is common to all mankind; within the hearts of some, it is a latent capacity, a potential being whose presence is not yet visible. In Hesiod though that which in others is latent is fully manifest. It is this maturity of the ability for free choice which qualifies Hesiod to speak while the others are qualified only to listen.

Like Perses, Hesiod also is in a sense the first Greek, albeit in a firmer and more permanent respect. For Hesiod is the first of his type of man of whom we have record. Both brothers share in the human primacy which occurs for Israel in the account of Abram. While Perses corresponds to Abram in his doubt, Hesiod represents that trusting Abram who dwells obediently in the command and promise of his God. Both are human—both exhibit the human property of intermediacy. The man Perses is more nearly animal, Hesiod more nearly divine. Hesiod is a man who wills to live rightly, knowing full well that he could do otherwise if only he chose. The historical dichotomy of Perses and Hesiod, and the types whom they represent, passes through the centuries of Greek experience and reflection. Aristotle explains most concisely the possibilities inherent in this dichotomy.

For man, when perfected, is the best of animals, but when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all; since armed injustice is the more dangerous, and he is equipped at birth with arms, meant to be used by intelligence and virtue, he is the most unholy and the most savage of animals, and the most full of lust and gluttony.²⁵

Hesiod's own decision to live by justice is the content of his freedom. Above all others in Greece, Athens is the recipient of Hesiodian culture, and in that state it is men who exhibit the moral freedom of this third moment whom Europe recognizes as direct ancestors of its own free institutions.

²⁵*Politics*, 1253a, 30.
To say that Hesiod, in respect of his power to choose righteousness, is free is to suggest that his character has become individuated and that he has thus made claim to an ethical detachment which enables him to speak to others from a superior stance. In following this inference, we meet difficulty in Voegelin's interpretation of Hesiod, for Voegelin advances a developmental thesis which denies Hesiod individuation, and by consequence, freedom as well. The difficulty derives from the following desperate utterance:

"now, therefore, may neither I myself be righteous among men, nor my son--for then it is a bad thing to be righteous--if indeed the unrighteous shall have the greater right. But I think that all-wise Zeus will not yet bring that to pass." 26 Voegelin comments:

This fear cannot yet be met by the resistance of a soul that has become conscious of its own life. The soul still is inextricably interwoven with the fabric of social and cosmic order; when the order becomes unrighteous, the soul must become unrighteous too, because life has no meaning beyond life within the order. Strictly speaking, the soul does not yet exist. The self-conscious resistance of a Xenophanes or Heraclitus was out of the question; and it took several centuries before the soul was sufficiently formed to become a source of order in opposition to society, as it did in the life and work of Plato. 27

In our effort to resolve this difficulty, we are without certain final information which would be decisive. We do not know if Hesiod's exhortations were successful; and if they were unsuccessful, we do not know if Hesiod and his son

26 Works and Days, 270-273.

became unrighteous. Thus we have only to draw on the text as it stands. In a technical sense, Voegelin cannot be gainsaid, for in Hesiod, there is no independent soul (psyche) as a discrete structure uniting man's intellectual and moral powers. But our study has shown that the reality of freedom is manifest before the symbol, eleutheria, comes forth to give the reality a name. Much the same seems to be the case with the "soul" of Hesiod. On another matter Voegelin overstates the case, for it is not until late that the living soul becomes completely extricated from the fabric of cosmic order. To speak of the fabric of social and cosmic order in the same breath is misleading, for Plato's claim to legitimacy rests on the understanding that his own soul bears the imprint of the cosmos, and that it is thereby funded with the power of resistance to unsatisfactory social circumstances. In this respect then, Plato is not fundamentally different from Hesiod; the centuries do not alter—or even "develop"—the most vital content of the self understanding. As the soul of Plato is inextricable from the mathematical cosmos, so the heart of Hesiod is inextricable from the order of the Olympians. The developmental question then is not one of the "growth" of independent resistance to social injustice; rather it is one of rationalization and clarification of the nature of a resistance which is robust in its youth. That which is great begins great. The affective rebellion of the heart in Hesiod opens ultimately into the articulation of the fully matured soul as the bearer of
rational resistance borne of the vision of true order. A Plato was impossible before the sophistic exploration of the possibilities of intellecction and discourse. But Hesiod, unlike Plato, was dependent on none before him. The true giants of culture are the peasants who, with handmade wooden plow, cut the first furrow straight and deep. No less than the eighth century prophets in their struggle against the compromised monarchy, the vision of Hesiod in his reproof of a predatory aristocracy is the cause of the first instance of moral freedom for which there is record in Europe.

Can we believe that Hesiod really intends to abandon righteousness if his exhortation goes unheeded? Is integration within the social fabric of irresistible importance to one who alone has discovered the true nature of Zeus, and who through his discovery has become free? This seems unlikely. The mandarin has difficulty in feeling with the peasant. The true sense of Hesiod's utterance is only this: "For all my righteousness I am but a man, and I can be crushed by abuse." There is no developmental problem here; instead there is an existential dilemma. Hesiod is a peasant, and if the courts deprive him of his property he will be without a livelihood. Hesiod tells us of no disciples whose aid might relieve him in penury. Nor is he an Elijah; though he knows the ways of Zeus, he has no direct contact with the god so as to receive comfort from the source of his allegiance. Hesiod indeed is free, but as we recognized in the discussion of those contemporaries of Hesiod, the
prophets of Israel, economic freedom is the primary freedom, itself supportive of the more spiritually laden freedom to choose righteousness. If Hesiod loses his farm, will he remain free to follow the way of justice, or will the exigencies of survival necessitate that he become a brigand? This is the question whose answer Hesiod cannot know. Though free, Hesiod is but a man, not an immortal deity, and his candor is such that he admits the fear that his righteousness might be destroyed, and with it, the person who he knows himself to be. Hesiod concludes the desperate utterance with a vocation of faith: "But I think that all-wise Zeus will not yet bring that to pass." This exalted Zeus, infinitely more divine than the Zeus of Homer, is the guardian of Hesiod's remaining the kind of man who he is, a kind whom we know as free man.

As consciousness of freedom grew in Greece, personal and social freedom could not be maintained without a regulative ideal which lent measure and substance to free life, and so made its continuance possible. This ideal is the fourth moment of freedom, the divine measure itself. For Hesiod, it is the complete dikē of Zeus. His hold on dikē enabled Hesiod to become a teacher of men. The implicit exhortation within all teaching is the invitation: "Heed my words, for I am better than you." And the source of this betterness is the content of teaching, the benefaction bestowed upon those whose business it is to learn. In Hesiod this content is Dikē, daughter of Zeus, and the influence of divine Dikē
upon the freedom of Athens is so decisive that we need to examine the major provisions of Hesiod's articulation of the term.\textsuperscript{28}

With regard to the Hesiodian understanding of "just" or "right," it is necessary to distinguish three characteristics. First is its place in the world, second is its place in the universe, and third is the nature of its consequences. By way of approach to these characteristics, we should consider that although Hesiod is the major progenitor of Athenian political philosophy, there is not yet in Hesiod's own writing a sharp delineation between the personal and political spheres; there is no "ethics," nor is there a "politics." The reason for this non-distribution is that in the time and place of Hesiod, the realm of the political has not yet become clearly visible. In the absence of open and public deliberation, the authoritative allocation of values is performed by a ruling nobility. Hence the plea for governmental justice is generically identical with the plea that Perses become just, for it is a plea to the person of the

\textsuperscript{28}In the Works and Days and also in the Theogony, Hesiod personifies a number of important forces in the world, both normative and physical, which were not personified in Homer, and which never achieved the anthropomorphic development of the Homeric, Olympian pantheon. One of these forces is dikē. When the term appears in this study as Dikē, the reference is to Hesiod's specific understanding about this common Greek word. Hesiod's audience was at best unsophisticated. (Two and a half centuries later, in Attica, Peisistratus dressed up a country girl as Athena, and when he brought her into Athens, the people knelt in worship.) For such an audience the representation of Dikē as a living deity must have helped Hesiod to communicate the enlarged meaning which he had discovered for this word.
ruler. To say that there is little suggestion of a "political philosophy" in Hesiod is to say then that Hesiod does not call into question the structure of government or the constitution of the community as more or less suitable vessels for the performance of right. His interest is only that the established order behave as it should, by right, behave. This simplistic approach is consistent with Hesiod's address to the heart.

Political philosophy is unmistakably incipient in Hesiod however, for while the Works and Days shrinks from any suggestion of constitutional reform, the Theogony deals with that very topic as it pertains to the divine realm. The Theogony details at length the proper structure of relationships amongst the gods, with righteous Zeus in clear command of the divine realm. With this accomplishment of Hesiod, it is but a short step to Athenian political philosophy, which, beginning with Solon, assays the proper structure for human relationships. In addition to the reform and purification of the pantheon, there is a further clue in Hesiod that a political philosophy is nigh. Burn calls attention to the uniqueness of the following in eighth century thought:

Alike with him who does wrong to a suppliant or a guest, or who goes up to his brother's bed and commits unnatural sin in lying with his wife, or who infatimately offends against fatherless children, or who abuses his old father at the cheerless threshold of old age and attacks him with harsh words, truly Zeus himself is angry, and at the last lays on him a heavy requittal for his evil doing.29

29Works and Days, 327-334. See Burn, World of Hesiod, p. 77.
As Burn explains, what is arresting about this thought is that it places wrongs done to suppliants and orphans on a plane equal to wrongs against members of one's family. The significance of this claim is that the universal justice of Zeus has overtaken the pre-moral piety of the family to its particular gods. Zeus will punish both types of wrong, without greater interest in either. In a peculiar Greek fashion, this understanding of Hesiod runs parallel to the universalism of the prophets. Zeus, like Yahweh, is the judge of all, and his justice is non-partisan. While this is not in itself political philosophy, it is a realization which was necessary for the beginning of overt political reflection. Most certainly Cleisthenes' radical reform of the family structure in Attica in the late sixth century would have been impossible had this awareness not taken hold at some earlier time.

The place of right in the world is in man's humanity.

But you, Perses, lay up these things within your heart and listen now to right, ceasing altogether to think of violence. For the son of Cronos has ordained this law for men, that fishes and beasts and winged fowls should devour one another, for right is not in them; but to mankind he gave right which proves far the best. For whoever knows the right and is ready to speak it, far-seeing Zeus gives him prosperity; but whoever deliberately lies in his witness and forswears himself, is left obscure thereafter. But the generation of man who swears truly is better thenceforward.30

The contents of this passage upon which we will concentrate

are the listening, the thinking, the two opposed uses of speech, and the relation of all these to justice. In the evil times in which Hesiod lived, it became necessary to explain that which to later generations has been obvious, i.e., that there is at least a latent qualitative difference between men and beasts. Men differ from the latter in that they are able in thought to mold the world as it ought to be, and then to communicate their knowledge of the world as it ought to be in speech so that their fellows may know right as well. Hesiod is the first to articulate the anthropology of man as a being who can discover right in thought and then make it understood in speech. It had become necessary to point up the obvious—that there is a difference in kind between men and predatory beasts—because the prevailing conditions of existence worked so as to conceal that difference in being. We are able to understand this circumstance as the meonic misuse of freedom. Free men, Perses and the magistrates, attempt to get the goods of life by behaving as predators.

In these circumstances the assertion of the obvious—that justice, and knowledge and speech of it, is the core power of human life—is itself a demonstration of the veracity of the claim, for the claim would not be rendered if circumstances did not contradict it. To inject this truth into the unjust circumstances which were Hesiod's lot is to set the divine vection of humanity against the bestial. One who does this brings danger upon himself by attacking the
legitimacy of the established unjust deployment of powers.

This is the position of Hesiod; while it might be more prudent for him to remain silent, or at any rate to confine his reprimand to Perses and leave the princes alone, Hesiod risks himself in defense of the obvious. The princes are like a savage beast.

And now I will tell a fable for princes who themselves understand. Thus said the hawk to the nightingale with speckled neck, while he carried her high up among the clouds, gripped fast in his talons, and she, pierced by his crooked talons, cried pitifully. To her he spoke disdainfully: "Miserable thing, why do you cry out? One far stronger than you now holds you fast, and you must go wherever I take you, songstress as you are. And if I please I will make my meal of you, or let you go. He is a fool who tries to withstand the stronger, for he does not get the mastery and suffers pain besides his shame." So said the swiftly flying hawk, the long-winged bird. 31

Surely the princes were unhappy with this revealing comparison; surely its utterance brought danger to Hesiod and his family. For Hesiod the risk of himself is worth the hazard, for as we have seen, he considers himself lost at any rate if right does not prevail. In these comments on the powers of humanity to know and speak justice, this great maker of culture appears with a nobility which surpasses even that of the prophets, for the prophets respond to the direct commission of Yahweh; for this, they are not alone. Hesiod is the free Greek person par excellence. He has not, like Amos, been "taken." Instead, it is his own tropism to the divine which instructs his allegiance to the justice of Zeus and his brave rebuke to the unjust rulers.

31 "Works and Days," 201-212.
The place of right in the world is in man's humanity, and the content of right appears in the correct discharge of inter-human relationships and in work. But in Hesiod, there is little of the much celebrated "Greek humanism," for right in the life of mankind obtains only by virtue of the permanent residence of Right in a supra-human domain. "And there is virgin Justice [Dikē], the daughter of Zeus, who is honoured and reverenced among the gods who dwell on Olympus . . ." 32 Hesiod's location of Justice near the summit of the Olympian pantheon is possibly the earliest exercise in the realist ontology of morals, for Right, the beloved daughter of Zeus, is herself the permanent and universal ground who by her cosmic stature as Right lends substantiality to all particular instances of right among men in historical existence. Only if men were themselves gods would the situation be otherwise. Only if men were immortal, never prone to error, would they be entities capable of generating within themselves the universal power which lends being to existence. Since man is not this character, since instead his character is particular and intermediate, ontologically suspended between the polarity of justice and injustice, and anthropologically enmeshed within both, he cannot be for himself the author of that most exalted human content which lies within him. Man is not author but participant. The Fourth Evangelist does not bid men to be the

32 Works and Days, 256-257.
logos, but to continue in it; nor does Hesiod expect Perses and the nobles to be Right, but to open their hearts to her and so become capable to do right. The substantive capacity of divinity to be Right is the ultimate, the ontic condition of freedom, and the participatory capacity of man to apprehend this right and to act accordingly is the penultimate moment in freedom—human intermediacy at its highest plane. The complete Right of the gods serves to instruct man in his freedom, making it a freedom which approaches ontic completion, rather than a freedom whose movement is pointless and bestial.

It is necessary to recite these elementary considerations because they are elemental in the writing of Hesiod. They make their first appearance in the world with his vision. In the experience of Athens as a free country, and as a model to later mankind, Hesiod's poetry is the anchor of the idea of human freedom which is instructed by divine righteousness. That idea is the crux of Solon and Aeschylus. The Hesiodian foundation of freedom with justice entails that human life is finite and intermediate. For this reason, Hesiod does not demand of Perses and the nobles that they become what they cannot be, to wit, the ontic structure for their own lives. More than any other period, the eighth century of Hesiod and Amos is the time of truth. The time of truth is the hypostatic moment in the definition of historical humanity, for it is the moment in which man begins as man, distinct from chthonian spirits, heroes, demigods.
At the time of truth, man understands himself simply as man; he is conscious of himself as a character undergoing birth, career, death. When this consciousness appears, then with it comes the truth of man as intermediate between heaven and earth, bearing the seed for justice and injustice, discovering the template for both within the self and the ultimate being of both in realms beyond the self. The "beyondness" of these capacities is the necessary condition which underlies the freedom of man, for he must exercise discretion as he attempts to objectify himself according to these patterns which are ultimately beyond him. This is the substance of Hesiod's understanding of self and world. Hesiod's true words attempt to obtain for man the best settlement possible, given the limits inherent in human historical existence. To attempt more, to make of man the source of his own justice, is to seek after a suspension of humanity itself. Hesiod's true words do not attempt to overcome man, but to guide him by grounding human justice within the perfect fabric of divine Justice.

The most comprehensively symbolic of Hesiod's several visions is the apocalypse of the two cities, the one devoted to justice and the other given in injustice. This is Hesiod's own version of the prophetic understanding that man must consciously choose between life and death. Of the former city we learn, "... they who give straight judgments to strangers and to the men of the land, and go not aside from what is just, their city flourishes and the
people prosper in it." This city has peace instead of war, food instead of famine, fecundity instead of barrenness. Of the unjust city, "... for those who practise violence and cruel deeds far-seeing Zeus, the son of Cronos, ordains a punishment. Often even a whole city suffers for a bad man who sins and devises presumptuous deeds." In order that this vision be understood for what it is, it is necessary to explain first that Hesiod is not—as may seem to be the case—promulgating a doctrine of Zeus as a god who intervenes in history on behalf of the righteous. In this passage, it is Zeus who brings good fortune, or ill, for the simple reason that the Greeks before the age of enlightenment attributed all important happenings to the gods. In accepting this customary view, Hesiod is not essentially different from Homer, except inasmuch as Zeus is the only god about whom Hesiod cares. It is important that this be understood, for the meaning which Hesiod intends here is almost mechanistic, not greatly different from Deutero Isaiah's understanding of sin as the comprehensive term which explains self-destruction in history. Hesiod's meaning here presages the principle of historical causality which will appear in Solon in wholly secular form: The city which lives righteously, seriously trying to do justice to all, makes its own happiness. The city which has no scruple about violence (hybris, the human outrage which accepts no moderating curbs) poisons its

33Works and Days, 225 ff.
own future and goes to destruction by its own hand.

The apocalypse of the two cities is the opportune point for this study to move from Hesiod to Solon. The vision of the two cities is prophetic, for it predicts the nature of the "Greek complaint" in the ensuing centuries. The horribly murderous class struggles of the poleis in the historical period came as a consequence of the organization of cities according to the second, unjust pattern. This did not happen in Athens because there arose in that city a statesman who gave "straight judgments to strangers and to the men of the land."

3. The Solonic Liberation

In the invocation to the Theogony, Hesiod establishes in the symbolic imagination of Greece the transcultural analogue of the good prince to the good god.

Whomsoever of heaven-nourished princes the daughters of great Zeus honor, and behold him at his birth, they pour sweet dew upon his tongue, and from his lips flow gracious words. All the people look towards him while he settles causes with true judgments; and he, speaking surely, would soon make wise end even of a great quarrel; for therefore are there princes wise in heart, because when the people are being misguided in their assembly, they set right the matter again with ease, persuading them with gentle words.

For it is through the Muses and far-shooting Apollo that there are singers and harpers upon the earth; but princes are of Zeus.34

The prince who is the mortal analogue of Zeus is given the capacity for "gracious words," "true judgments," with which

34Theogony, 81-90, 94-95.
to settle causes; this prince is "wise in heart," "persuading them with gentle words."

In this imagery of the good prince, we behold the seed of a concept which would flower some four centuries later in Plato's construction of the philosopher-ruler. But the late Platonic figure who has become a paradigm for the ruler would have been impossible had not the divinely endowed prince of Hesiod's vision become flesh at some point in history. Plato was an Athenian, and to be an Athenian involved the understanding that one's identity as an Athenian was derivative in the first instance from the life and work of Theseus in legend and of Solon in history. For all intents and purposes, Solon was the first Athenian, and he was likewise the sort of ruler whom Hesiod described in the invocation to the *Theogony*.

In the strictest sense, Solon was not a prince (*basileus*); rather, he was an archon, or first citizen, thus indicating a selective rather than hereditary basis for rulership. But the incipient difference between monarchial and republican forms in the Athenian sixth century makes little difference where the content of Solon's person and action is concerned. In all respects he conforms to Hesiod's picture of the divinely blessed prince. Indeed, it is through the statesmanship of Solon that Hesiod's "true words" receive their political induction, and so become the spiritual constitution of Athens. Our direct knowledge of Solon is through fragments of his poems that have been preserved
as quotations in various later Greek texts. Solmsen comments on the relationship of these fragments of Solon to the writing of Hesiod: "The relationship which Hesiod had established between hybris, wealth, the punishment of Zeus, and Ate had become canonical." To say that the Hesiodian ethos had become canonical is to say that it was a living corpus of ideas which could be put to use as a guide for action. That, indeed, was the character of Solon's work.

The history of Athens as a moral entity in history has its beginning in circumstances similar to those under which Israel began. That is, Athens before Solon was an unhappy country, ridden by social strife, beset with the enslavement of its own people. The history of Attica before Solon is extremely dim, for relative to Corinth or the Ionic Greek poleis it was an "underdeveloped country" which left little record. Less even is known about this country and its people than is known about Israel in Goshen. The absence of information serves only to goad on the historian's detective lust, and to sharpen his artistry. Of the historical reconstructions of the Attican situation at the time of Solon, the most ambitious and most complete is Woodhouse's study. For the purposes of our own interest in the symbols of liberation, we need go no farther with Woodhouse than to agree that the accounts of both Aristotle and Plutarch are confused due to inadequate information, and to learn that

35 Solmsen, Hesiod and Aeschylus, p. 109.
Aristotle's account safely warrants the following conclusions:

1. There was a dependent agricultural class called Hektemores.

2. The name had something to do with the conditions of service.

3. They were extremely bitter toward the rich, on whom they were dependent.

4. The primitive law of debt was operative, with default causing distraint of the person, his family and his possessions.³⁶

We will suppose also that Aristotle was wrong in identifying the Hektemores with the debtors sold into slavery, since the former were giving a share of their produce to the landlord, and thus would not have been sold by him to someone else. Whether the Hektemore gave one sixth or five sixths of his produce to the landlord, we do not know; the extremity of the bitterness to which all sources are witness commends the latter figure. We suppose that the Horoi, or ward stones, were emblematic of the erstwhile free family holdings which were at last under perpetual lien to a noble, and that the families which occupied these holdings were the Hektemore serfs. Whatever the exact truth may be about the Hektemores and the debtors, Glotz's inference about the general pattern

of events is certain. The time in which Solon appeared was a time which demanded a decision; would Athens be another Sparta, with the productive element in society a permanently servile caste, or would Athens be different? Solon decided for his country, against helotry, for freedom.

The history of Athens begins with Solon's accession to the archonship. After that, the need for supposition vanishes. We know that Solon abolished Hektemorage for all time, and that this was executed with such thoroughness that archaeology has never retrieved so much as one of the hated Horoi. It is possible that they were punished by burial at sea, just as a stone which falls upon a man and kills him would be punished under the primitive law of homicide. We know that Solon cancelled all debts that were outstanding when he took the archonship, thus sundering the usurious web through which the aristocrats held the people in fear and hunger. We know that Solon's law broke with custom and for-

37Glotz, Ancient Greece at Work, p. 84. See also Woodhouse, Solon the Liberator, pp. 56-57 and 160-161. Although in a general sense the association of hektemorage with helotry is legitimate, it should be qualified. While Sparta is one of the permanent scandals of Europe because of its inhuman institutions, it is also Europe's first constitutional state. Thus, no Spartan would agree with this association because in Laconia, the inferior caste was (believed to be) non-Dorian, and thus, non-Greek. No such distinction existed in Attica. The Spartiates were themselves Equals, and had become such through the constitutional program of a ruler whom they called Lycurgus. The Lycurgan reform in the seventh century paralleled the Solonic reform of the sixth century in that both attenuated the voraciousness of a ruling aristocracy. But, characteristically, the Spartan reform resulted from a military innovation, the advent of Hoplite infantry, while the Athenian reform was in equal proportions pragmatic and moral. See Forrest, Emergence of Greek Democracy, pp. 138. ff.
bade the making of loans secured upon the person. Unlike many other of the reforms, this was copied throughout Greece. We know also that Solon's liberation went beyond the range of economic freedom, for his popular court of appeals is the earliest of the famous Athenian participatory political bodies. Solon's performance as archon is one of the great miracles of history, for Solon understood what Greeks all the way to the Hellenistic period often failed to understand, i.e., that there must be unity within plurality for life to continue. The guiding term of Solonic unity is divine justice, and its consequence for Athens was freedom. Several centuries later we hear the familiar boast of Pericles, "In this land of ours there have always been the same people living from generation to generation up till now, and they, by their courage and their virtues, have handed it on to us, a free country." The claim that Athens is a free country was made good at a definite place and time. The setting was one in which civil war impended as a certainty. The early skirmishes had already been fought.

No one tells the story of Solon's career in Athens better than Solon himself. Thus, we have frequent recourse to the fragments. Here Solon tells of the negativity of existence in the polis for which he has become archon.

38 Westerman, Slave Systems of Greek and Roman Antiquity, pp. 4-5.

Lo, even now there cometh upon the whole city a plague which none may escape. The people have come quickly into degrading bondage; bondage rouseth from their sleep war and civil strife; and war destroyeth many in the beauty of their youth. As if she were the prey of foreign foes, our beloved city is rapidly wasted and consumed in those secret conspiracies which are the delight of dishonest men.

These are the evils which stalk at home. Meanwhile the poor and needy in great numbers are loaded with shameful bonds and sold into slavery in foreign lands . . . Thus public calamity cometh to the house of every individual, and a man is no longer safe within the gates of his own court, which refuse him their protection. It leapeth over the garden-wall, however high it be, and surely findeth him out, though he run and hide himself in the inmost corner of his chamber.40

The negativity of existence to which Solon bears witness here is a more complex matter than the slavery of Israel in Egypt. Israel is simply a subject people—an inferior caste—in a foreign land. Complexity enters the Israelite liberation drama only through the struggle of the transcendent God, Yahweh, against the god-king, the Pharaoh. The Athenian situation which Solon laments is the classic malady of the polis. The country has become bi-polar, the rich oppressing the poor, the poor resentful of the rich. Solon consistently blames the unhappy condition on the rich, and so disassociates himself from the aristocratic ethos of his own origin, for it is aristocratic greed which has led the country to the brink of civil war. In Solon's description of Athens, it seems as if the type of man whom Hesiod had

40Fragment XII, 17-29, in Ivan M. Linforth, Solon the Athenian (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1919). Unfortunately there is no consistent international notation for the fragments of Solon. This study follows the notation of the Linforth text and translation.
recognized in his brother Perses had finally become ascendant in all affairs, making injustice the norm for all life. The aristocrats had practised a systematic form of theft, and now the poor were prepared to repay theft with murder.

The negative circumstances which Solon describes are at once a function of inequitable economic organization and human callousness. This set of conditions is not unfamiliar to the twentieth century. In parts of the world the peasant lives from one generation to the next in the shadow of the money lender. Work as he will, he never gets out of debt, and his life is not really his own. The lesson which Herodotus drew so starkly is not hopelessly overdrawn; Greece was not Asia, and the institution of debt slavery came to be viewed in Athens as a perversion of right order. Slavery and starvation-level serfdom in Athens then were not the simple matter that slavery for Israel had been in Egypt, for in Athens enslavement of the people came as the last step in a series of movements that were considered to be intrinsically unjust. If Homer is the spokesman for the most basic layer of Greek imagination, then there was something decidedly un-Greek afoot in both Hesiod's Boetia and in pre-Solonic Athens. Odysseus, a chieftain, exerts a rule which is hardly constitutional, nor can his subjects be called free in an exact sense. Yet his rule is wholly paternalistic, and the swineherd Eumaios is bound to the master by a bond of true love. Odysseus would never wilfully despoil a subject for any act short of disloyalty. Thus, while dikē in Homer would not apply to a relationship so banal as that between lord and tenant, there is an unspoken understanding that the great man will deal fairly with inferiors, and further, that he will protect and sustain them in time of trouble.
to him the free condition of man—even if that condition were as yet unarticulated—is the normal condition of man, and any design which served to undo it is seen as malady, as "public calamity." Solon's symbol of an ill which leaps over the wall of one's courtyard and finds even the one who hides from it likens the moral condition of Athens to the physical condition of a city which is beset by the plague. This symbol is particularly telling, for only the rich creditor will have a high courtyard wall; the plague of injustice for which the oppressor is responsible will consume him as surely as it will the oppressed. The movement as Solon describes it is from greed to servitude to public ruin. This is the pattern of negativity in Athens.

In Athens as in Israel, the movement from slavery to freedom has its beginning in the articulation of the negativity of present existence. The present condition—the slave condition—is a fallen estate, a domain of misery which has been wrought by injustice. The opposite condition then will be a condition of positivity, of happiness, of freedom, and it will be the accomplishment of a righteous disposition. Liberation from slavery, according to the principle of right, is thus the beginning of Athens as a free moral order in history, just as was the case in Israel. In Athens the human bearer of this right is Solon, who was called to the leadership in an effort to avoid civil war. Solon is for Athens the same character as Moses for Israel. He is liberator, law giver, savior, and ancestor.
The comprehensive name for Solon's program is Seisachtheia, the shaking-off-of-burdens. Below is Solon's description of the several achievements of this program.

I removed the stones of her bondage which had been planted everywhere, and she who was slave before is now free. I brought back to their own divinely founded home many Athenians who justly or unjustly had been sold into slavery in foreign lands, and I brought back those whom destitution had driven into exile, and who, through wandering long abroad, no longer spoke the Attic tongue; and I restored to liberty those who had been degraded to slavery here in their own land and trembled at their masters' whims. These things I accomplished through arbitrary action, bringing force to the support of the dictates of justice, and I followed through to the end the course which I promised. On the other hand, I drafted laws, which show equal consideration for the upper and lower classes, and provide a fair administration of justice for every individual.\(^{42}\)

Before the full significance of this statement can be clear, it is necessary to pause and consider the avenues of historical inquiry which have led us to this statement.

\(^{42}\)IX, 5-20. Two phrases here require explanation.

1) "... she who was slave before is now free" refers to the land. The antecedent of "she" is Gē melaina, Black Earth. Since Attic law forbade that land leave the family, the aristocrats had "enslaved" the land of the demos through the legal ruse of Hektemorage. Thus they had its perpetual use without legal title to it. This liberation of the land is no less important than the liberation of the people because—as we have urged elsewhere—economic freedom is the primary, concrete freedom that the archaic witness identifies. (2) In the passage, "... many Athenians who justly or unjustly had been sold into slavery ...", the meaning is legal, not moral. That is, some had been sold according to the provisions of the old customary law, or perhaps according to the code of Dracon. Others had been sold illegally, possibly through kidnap or piracy. The distinction between legal or illegal passage into slavery is somewhat ambiguous, since the laws—until the time of Dracon in the generation before Solon—had been unwritten, and the magistrates were always aristocrats. Thus Solon's reform of the system of justice was intended to replace the aristocratic monopoly with a system which involved both classes in the administration of moderate written laws.
We began our historical search for symbols on the suggestion of the Fourth Evangelist that the abidance of the free son in the house complements the meaning of participatory continuance in the unifying logos. Thus, in chronological progression we have moved forward from the Yahwist's narrative of Abram and Exodus which incorporates materials from the second millennium. In the Abram narrative the distinction between the two sons showed that the son of the free mother is nearer to the positive range than is the son of the slave; in the Exodus narrative, we recognized a burgeoning spirit of divine righteousness in creative and liberative opposition to pharaonic oppression. In the eighth century, with the writing prophets and with Hesiod, we have seen that the human apprehension of divine righteousness is given explicit articulation in the Hebrew term *tsedaqah* and the Greek term *dike*. In both, the righteousness of God has a liberative character through its opposition to all manner of human exploitation. Now, in the early sixth century with Solon's description of the Disburdenment, we behold at last the fire which has been making the smoke. In this passage is the earliest articulation of the connection of freedom with justice, and it confirms the thesis which we have advanced. Freedom is derivative from justice. "... I restored to liberty those who had been degraded to slavery ... bringing force to the support of the dictates of justice."43 Indeed, when one draws near to the pulse of

43In the Greek text the association of freedom with
this issue as it throbs in the symbols of antiquity, it is almost too much to say that freedom is "derivative," for that construction assigns some independent importance to freedom. It is more true to say that in the primal literature of freedom, freedom is a modality of justice, never becoming fully separate from its parent force. That is why we wait so many centuries to hear the connection spoken aloud. When at last we do hear it, it is a practical administrator, not a poet or prophet, who makes explicit the implications of the justice which binds the community in peace as one, by freeing each to make a decent living and to enjoy the esteem which is the property of the free man. The beginning of Athenian history with Solon is also the beginning of freedom as an explicit concern of political order.

The Solonic liberation is the Greek parallel to the much earlier liberation of the Hebrews from the grasp of the Pharaoh. The former event, the Exodus, is like the acorn, the latter like the oak. The Exodus narrative bears compactly the imprint for justice and its consequence, freedom, while the Solonic reform displays visibly the inner intention of the earlier movement. While it is necessary to recognize the parallelism of occurrences at the beginning of both Athens and Israel, it is likewise necessary to point up the broad differences in the formative experiences of both

Justice is verbally closer than in our translation, with "freedom" in line fifteen and "justice" in line sixteen.
societies. Both are societies arrested in a condition of negativity; both are blemished because of slavery. For both, the liberation—the negation of negativity—is the beginning of a historical movement toward moral and political completion. The crucial difference concerns the nature of the impetus toward liberation and the manner of its completion. Voegelin has identified the generic difference between revelation and philosophy. At base, this means that for Israel, liberation, redemption, salvation obtains as the transcendent God reveals himself and becomes a powerful presence in the life of man. The historical stature of Moses derives from the fact of his being a vessel for the command of Yahweh. It is this underlying condition of the life of Israel which, as we have explained, tends to eclipse the mediatory aspect of man's humanity; for Israel, God is the mediator for man. This is seen best in the pastoral vision of Micah; Yahweh will lead Israel as a shepherd leads the flock. In Athens there was no such understanding, and thus the humanity of men could and did develop. Although Hesiod, in the invocation to the Theogony, claims inspiration by the Muses, and so exhibits a formal resemblance to Moses in Midian, the development of man as a mediatory self is apparent in the Works and Days. In the fragments of Solon, it is the dominant theme which shows through the text repeatedly. Solon is neither oracle nor bard; he is a philosopher—a loving friend of wisdom. And that is to say

44 Plato calls Solon philosopher in Phaedrus, 278c.
that Solon is man looking at once within and beyond himself in order to discover a sure orient for political action by which he may mediate the human misery which confronts him. This is not humanism. Humanism is the heterodox mode of Greek intellection, and its terminus is sophism, the denial of the possibility of real transcendence. Solon indeed is one of the fathers of the orthodox position. That God has not addressed Solon directly does not mean that the divine will is irrelevant to Solon. Quite the contrary. It means that in the absence of revelation, Solon is left with philosophy--with love of the wisdom which in its most elevated nature is divine. The discovery of wisdom, and with it, the correct measure, is the hard business of philosophy, and the strenuous discipline which this requires brings to maturity the human soul and accents the divine element within it. One brief fragment quoted by Clement of Alexandria reveals Solon's own struggle to learn of the divine plan for the world. "Difficult indeed is it to conceive the inscrutable measure of his wisdom, within which alone abideth the power to bring all things to fulfillment."\(^45\) This difficult task is philosophy itself.

Moses, the prophet, conveys the word of Yahweh to the Pharaoh, but Yahweh himself, through signs and wonders, works the liberation of Israel. Solon assays the situation

\(^{Cf.}\) Plutarch, *Solon*, II, 2.

\(^{45}\) XXXI.
from the vantage point of a human whose loyalty is to Zeus, and he determines that present existence is unjust. Upon this conclusion he deliberates the proper course which will rectify the civic misery which he beholds. Deliberation is followed by legislation, a course of action put forth in speech as public policy. The content of the legislation is basic in its rectificatory thrust. Debts are abolished; those who were enslaved are freed; exiles are recovered. The beginning of free political life in Athens is a good deal less dramatic than the foundation of the Israelite theopolity through divine liberation. Thus, there are commentators who admonish us that Solon was a "practical man," not a philosopher or idealist, even that he was a party politician.46 These are spurious distinctions, for praxis is that activity in history which builds unto permanence, and in so building, couples the reality of being to the mortal existence of necessity and survival. Philosophy is the tutor of this enduring practicality. The Solonic liberation establishes the polis as a moral entity whose permanent business is to guarantee social peace under conditions of justice with freedom. There is no "milk and honey" in or about Solonic Athens, but there is legislation forbidding the export of cereals so that the hungry may have bread. The proverb, "philosophy bakes no bread" has no support in the biography of Solon, for in his reform the ideal—"the inscrut-
table measure of his wisdom"—is understood to address such unphilosophic matters as hunger and exile. The Mosaic and Solonic episodes show that revelation and philosophy share a common interest in these concrete consequences of injustice.

It is clear in the fragments of Solon that the freedom of the people, though an indispensable condition of life in the well-ordered society, is not the primary goal of public life. Freedom emerges as more a means to the ends of peace, justice, and order. Solon is the statesman who oversees a variegated community.47 In such a community the harmonious balance of forces requires that freedom be present so that the several forces might contribute their due. But the ends for which freedom serves as the means are likewise the limiting conditions of freedom. For freedom to have positive import in the affairs of life, it cannot be random; it must have scope.

Aristotle quotes Solon:

"To the common people I have given such a measure of privilege as sufficeth them, neither robbing them of the rights they had, nor holding out the hope of greater ones; and I have taken equal thought for those who were possessed of power and who were looked up to because of their wealth, careful that they, too, should suffer no indignity. I have taken a stand which enables me to hold a stout shield over both groups, and I have allowed neither to triumph unjustly over the other."

In another passage he explains what he believes to be the right way of dealing with the people:

"The populace will follow its leaders best if it

47See Solon's description of the variety of endeavors and rewards, XL, 43-62.
is neither left too free nor subjected to too much restraint. For excess giveth birth to arrogance, when great prosperity attendeth upon men whose minds lack sober judgment."\(^48\)

In these dicta, Solon at least begins to approach the schematic elegance of the Fourth Evangelist's structure of freedom. If freedom in Solonic Athens does not culminate in conscious participation of all in Peace, Justice, Order (who in Hesiod are divine personages), and in the measure which is resident within this trinity, political life is nonetheless conducted with their presence in view.\(^49\) In the time of Solon these divine powers are present in the heart of Solon, and Solon is present in Athens as the legislator.\(^50\) By the time of Aeschylus, they have become distributed in society and the political community is ennobled as a result of the extension of the Solonic virtues. The content of Solon's soul is the beginning of Athens as it was to be for European history. In Athens at the time of Solon freedom is predominantly negative—freedom from bondage; freedom from abuse. Only in Solon himself has freedom become positive, opening the self to conscious participation in the correct measure.

\(^48\)VI and VII. Constitution of Athens, XII.

\(^49\)Solon's commitment to justice and order (eunomia) is stated in his great political elegy (Linforth, XII, 14 and 33). In adding peace (eirēne) to this list apropos of Solon, we follow Solmsen (Hesiod and Aeschylus, p. 123). Solmsen's inference is sound, for Solon's whole project is undertaken so as to avoid civil war—hence to secure peace.

\(^50\)See XII, 30. Solon's exhortation from the heart recalls Hesiod's exhortation to the heart.
From the work of Solon in Athens the conclusion follows that in any society which is not in that condition of divisive misery which spoils public and private life at once, the divine virtues of peace, justice, and order are at work, guiding human freedom. Their presence is hidden from the "hard nosed realist" who is a frequent commentator on political affairs. He sees only the rough and hard form in which the power behind public policy is bartered and dispensed, perceiving not the restraining excellences which prevent the self-destruction of the community. The frequent opacity of the redeeming virtues makes Solon doubly valuable to political science, for in his character and work, the otherwise indiscernible presences which save the community are preeminently visible.

At the time of Solon, Athens is not yet the free and excellent polity which is celebrated in the classical statement of Pericles. Solon is in microcosm the Athens which is to be; he is truly a seminal figure. Just as the excellences of peace, justice, and order are present in the soul of Solon, so also is the positive freedom which was to become the characteristic trait of the great Athenian age. As we have argued before, the content of the truth which is the guiding ethos of Greek life is already fully drawn in the prophetic utterances of Hesiod. Later development occurs in terms of the increasing sophistication of the form in which the truth is presented. In Hesiod, the truth about the life of the person and the community is rendered in a poetic--a
pre-intellectual--manner. By the time of Solon it has taken the vestments of philosophy, and that is to say that the truth has become a concern of the working intellect. The freedom of Solon is an Anselmian affair. Solon believes in the righteousness of Zeus so that he might have sure grounding for his intellectual scrutiny of the ways of mortals.

The Solonic breakthrough in the realm of the intellect is the discovery of causality in the course of human affairs. This discovery of Solon makes him the founder of the science of politics. The insight is given in the following statements:

The ruin of our state will never come by the doom of Zeus or through the will of the blessed and immortal gods; for Pallas Athena, valiant daughter of a valiant sire, is our stout-hearted guardian, and she holdeth over us her protective arms. It is the townsfolk themselves and their false-hearted leaders who would fain destroy our great city through wantonness and love of money. But they are destined to suffer sorely for their outrageous behavior. They know not how to hold in check their full-fed lust, or, content with the merriment the banquet affords, to take their pleasure soberly and in order.

These things my heart prompteth me to teach the Athenians, and to make them understand that lawlessness worketh more harm to the state than any other cause. But a law-abiding spirit createth order and harmony, and at the same time putteth chains upon evil-doers.

If ye have suffered the melancholy consequences of your own incompetence, do not attribute this evil fortune to the gods. Ye have yourselves raised these men to power over you, and have reduced yourselves by this course to a wretched state of servitude.51

51 XII, 1-8, 30-33. XIV, 1-4. These passages are from the later period of Solon's life, after he had left the archonship and the tyranny of Peisistratus had come to power with popular support. Solon's gloomy reaction to the suspension of constitutional government is understandable, but
Solon's advance over Hesiod occurs in two respects. First is his move to correct injustice by coupling a reform of the constitutional structure of the community with the Hesiodian type of appeal to the heart. Second is the maturation in understanding of the consequences of injustice. As we have observed, Hesiod announces the destructive consequences of unrighteous conduct for the whole city, but he maintains the archaic conception of divine agency as the efficient cause of the destruction. The Zeus of Solon however is acquitted of even the most meagre responsibility for political evil. For Solon the reward for injustice has become immanent; injustice upsets the fragile balance amongst men, and so contains within itself the poison which will soon afflict its practitioners.

Jaeger's comments on the parallel between Solon's observations and the development of Ionian physics do much to explain the importance of the innovation. Jaeger notes the understanding of Thales and Anaximander that there is lawful process in the natural universe.

Solon, like them, was impelled to demonstrate the existence of an immanent order in the course of nature and human life, and with it an inherent meaning and an essential norm in reality. He is clearly presupposing a law connecting cause and effect in nature, and expressly setting forth as a parallel to it the rule of law in the social order, when he says elsewhere "From the clouds come snow and hail, thunder follows the lightning, and by powerful men the city is brought low, his worst fears did not materialize. Pesistratus is usually included amongst the great statesmen of Athens, a man not unlike some of the better dictators in the developing world today."
and the demos in its ignorance comes into the power of a despot." 52

Jaeger goes on to speculate that Solon coupled his understanding of causal law, derived from physics, with historical observation, and through this process, became able to stay the otherwise inevitable doom. This assumption is entirely reasonable, since Attica was a backward country, and in the preceding century the cycle of exploitation of the poor, civil war, popular tyranny, violent and lawless rule had run its course in several Greek poleis in Europe and Asia. Thus, Solon's understanding of the causal process and his move to foil its progress is relevant to our concern with freedom. For Solon, the political science of causes issues into a policy science of remedies. If rampant avarice in the polis is seen to cause injustice, and injustice to cause civil war, then legislative remedies must be forthcoming which will curb avarice and its effects. If there is a political law that selfishness leads to destruction, then by implication there is a counter law that adherence to unselfish constitutional principle will cause peace and happiness. Solon discovered both causal processes, and he chose to follow the creative, life-enhancing pattern, and to reject the other.

This course of thought points us to Solon the statesman as the new paradigm for the free man. We saw that Hesiod exhibited the higher intermediacy of which human freedom is

capable in his address from a superior heart to those of baser heart. In this, Hesiod exhibited freedom to forego injustice in favor of divinely countenanced conduct; this may be called spiritual freedom. In keeping with the general shift in mode which occurs between Hesiod and Solon, we may identify the higher intermediacy as it manifests itself in Solon as intellectual freedom. The world of Hesiod is a picture world in which principle is embedded in concrete representative types, both immortal and mortal. The world of Solon is one which is well on the way toward breaking with mythic representation; it is becoming a discursive world in which thought assumes its prosaic form. The world of Aeschylus will show yet a further formal development, as the old picture teaching is taken up and manipulated by consciousness so as to render both meaning and lesson. In each of these formal developments, the freedom of man's higher intermediacy occurs in a novel form. In Solon it is freedom of thought.

For freedom to become political, it must be an intellectual freedom, for without employment of the deliberative resources of the mind, it would be impossible to reckon the course of action for political society. The intellectual freedom which Solon displays is at once a negative and a positive freedom. It is negative in that it indicates a detachment of the intellect and a disengagement of the ego from the routine circumstances which are the milieu for self. It is positive in that it requires action which participates
in a higher order of reality than the former routine. The record of Solon's career illumines the concrete meaning of these concepts. Solon was widely considered by his contemporaries to be a fool because he was free from the tyrant's ambition. He was free from that ambition because he embraced the ambition of the true statesman. Solon's self-extrication from the damning sequence of historical causes is a capital event in the history of political order, for it is the first event of this type. Solon is able to become political savior for the country by freeing himself from the selfish and ultimately destructive ambition that was pervasive in his class.

To be sure, Solon's intellectual freedom does not consist in the discovery of an Archimedean point; he is in the world—he is even "of" the world—but the world to which he has had recourse is the real world wherein lies the power to correct and reverse the mindless course of sensual reality when it is left to the mercy of material inclination. The real world is the free world wherein justice is the cord which binds all together in harmony. Solon's original breakthrough then is his ability to negate his routine circumstances through an effort of mind. This same mind which could negate the fallen world of present existence could likewise posit the new world of the future. The attachment to the future explains Solon's effort to constitutionalize the reform.

Aristotle tells us that Solon was chosen as archon by both parties after he had written an elegy "in which he does battle on behalf of each party against the other and acts as
mediator, and after this exhorts them jointly to stop the quarrel that prevailed between them. Solon's contemporaries—their still own partisans—recognized in Solon a quality which they found absent in themselves, a power to bring peace, justice, order. It is this positive power to make the world of experience better by deliberate imposition of divine form upon recalcitrant matter that we have identified as Solon's intellectual freedom. Solon's deliberation is followed by a constitutional revision, and that action establishes the political character of Solon's positive freedom.

In Solon the apperception of divine order inspires a concrete political program which serves to elevate the quality of life in the polis. In this aspect of Solon's character and work, there is a positive gain over the human intermediciaty as it appears in Hesiod. When freedom has become mental and political in the practical sense, the form of humanity itself has become enlarged. When this development has occurred, mankind has become reasonable. In Hesiod there is freely chosen righteousness without noetic reason, for arbitration is the work of the heart. As we have seen, the arbitration of the heart does not disappear in Solon; rather, it is supplemented by a mental capacity which apprehends the correct measure, and makes that divine measure a political standard. In developmental terms this accretion represents a great gain over the Hesiodian form of righteousness, for when the correct measure has ceased to be a concern which is

53 *Constitution of Athens*, V.
resident only in the sphere of feeling, it has become a more stable and more generally available fixture than before. With the appearance of mental freedom, the correct measure can be political; it can be public property, a boon for all, including those many who by themselves could never have partaken of the true measure without the guidance of political leadership. This implication of the political freedom of Solon becomes manifest in the drama of Aeschylus. As the content of Hesiod has become canonical for Solon, Solon has imposed upon that content the form of the working mind, of reason.

The Solonic synthesis of the heart's affective longing for righteousness with the mind which deliberates the constitutional measures necessary to attain right order results in the appearance of a new type of man, the statesman. Solon is the proto-typical statesman, and in his conduct we behold the fruition of a freedom which in Hesiod was suggested but not settled. This is positive freedom, expressed as positive resistance to evil. Hesiod, as we have seen, feared that the unrighteous setting for his life might corrupt him and his son, requiring that they choose unrighteousness in order to survive. In Solon there is no such doubt to dilute an otherwise steadfast commitment to righteousness. There seem to be two reasons for this. One is that Solon, unlike Hesiod, has become a creature of reason as well as devotion; as a self, he is thus better equipped to do battle with the forces of unrighteousness. The other, more powerful
reason is that unlike Hesiod, Solon has come to head the polity; as a person in the world his position is one of mastery. Hesiod is at the mercy of those who give judgments; in the instance of Solon, the tables have been turned. The reversal of roles which distinguishes the position of Solon from that of Hesiod is important, for it conditions the possibilities for injustice which inhere in each role. Injustice for Hesiod would have meant becoming as his brother Perses, a petty swindler; for Solon injustice would involve becoming a tyrant, a usurper on a grand scale, who employs a public trust in the service of his own fortune. The freedom to resist injustice is always primarily the power to resist the injustice which emanates from self. Power does not always corrupt; Plutarch wrote:

When he turned his back on the tyranny, many people ridiculed him in language whose tone he has preserved in the following lines, which he puts into the mouth of one of his critics:

"Solon is not gifted with wisdom and sagacity. God put good things into his hands, but he failed to grasp them. He cast his net and caught his fish, but, in his wonder and delight, he did not draw it in: both his courage and his wit were unequal to the occasion. If I could seize the power, acquire vast wealth, and be lord of Athens for but a single day, I would give my body to be flayed for a wineskin and consent to the annihilation of my race."54

This speech is the utterance of composite mankind in its fallen state of negative, random freedom. It is the secret confession of the many who, without power to forego unrighteousness, seek after positions of public trust. The appear-

54XXII, Plutarch, Solon, XIV, 5. See also Linforth, VIII and XI.
ance of a Solon is unsettling to this sort of political creature; in his consciousness the presence of the Solonic statesman signals a world-reversal, a great absurdity.

In the fourth century we hear the echo of the speech which Solon has attributed to his detractors. This is the speech of Callicles, another aspiring politico.

Callicles: Tell me, Chaerephon, is Socrates in earnest or joking?
Chaerephon: In my opinion, Callicles, he is in deadly earnest, but there is nothing like asking him.
Callicles: By heaven, that is just what I am anxious to do. Tell me, Socrates, are we to consider you serious now or jesting? For if you are serious and what you say is true, then surely the life of us mortals must be turned upside down and apparently we are everywhere doing the opposite of what we should.  

The political leader who exhibits the free righteousness of heart and mind appears as a jester, or as a turner upside down of life, to those who are without this positive freedom. The latter appearance is the more accurate, for this Solonic freedom to do right does involve world reversal; the opponents of Solon are participants in a negative and fallen world of theft and murder, while Solon and his issue are participants in a world that has been politically restored. As Plato has shown with the portrait of Callicles, there is little possibility for communication between the free and the unfree. The latter can be driven to silence because their position is philosophically untenable, but they cannot be persuaded. Their self-centered rapaciousness exceeds their concern for the permanent and universal realities of

55Gorgias, 481b, tr. W. D. Woodhead.
life. Although he builds upon the Solonic base, Plato goes beyond the received Greek rubric. The problems which Plato ventilates in the Callicles encounter lead him to construct a saviour polis which is permeated with the fourth moment of freedom, i.e., with wholly achieved righteousness. This Platonic "freedom" is not a recognizably human freedom because it has, like the freedom of the prophets, eclipsed the dynamic suspension of man as the intermediate character. But the Platonic course is not the course of Solon.

Solon is at once a lover of God and man. His great prayer begins with a plea, not for wisdom, or even for righteousness, but for prosperity gotten righteously. There is nothing in Solon of the later, paradoxical understanding of freedom which we have seen in the Stoic corruption of classical thought. Solon is the consummately practical philosopher; his vision is no less concrete than heavenly. He gives advice as to the interests and pursuits which are proper to man at the several stages of life. The commonplace joys and concerns of life are for him, like Hesiod, matters of importance. Solon believed that "holy Justice" is near to the world, observing, rewarding, punishing through the means of the causal arrangement that is immanent in nature and in history.

For Solon, the human search for possession, power and worth is a legitimate quest, and he showed by his example that when the human enterprise has debauched itself through

theft, abuse, vanity, that the good leader of men can set life again on the proper path. With Solon as with Hesiod, the exhortation to man to seek the correct measure as a guide to conduct is an attempt to ennoble human freedom, and thus to make it a positive freedom which looks beyond the self. Solon admonishes the rich,

Calm the eager tumult of your hearts. You have forced your way forward to a surfeit of good things. Confine your swelling thoughts within reasonable bounds. For we shall not comply with your present disposition, and you yourselves will not find it meet for your own interests.57

This suggests a society in which all will be free. The many will be free because authority will check the immoderate ambition of the rich, and the rich will themselves remain free because authority—through curbing them—protects their own permanent interests.

In such a society, political authority must balance the competing forces. The job of the balancer is done more completely if the balance of the parties can rest upon a more basic internal balance within the personal and trans-personal constituents of the society. Thus, "calm your hearts," "moderate your thoughts" mean "Learn; order your lives and vocations as I have ordered the polis." In relation to the issue of freedom, this Solonic advice suggests contrary visions of the nature of the free society. Will the free society be a contractual convenience in which freedom happens as a sort of muted anarchy, as in the old liberal view; or

57Iv.
will it be a diversified community in which different interests are pursued in organic subordination to a permanent commitment to right conduct and social justice? The latter alternative is the solution of Solon. We must remember that for Solon, justice is substantive and freedom is derivative. For this reason, Solon is more than a broker who balances the freedom of one interest against that of a competing interest. Solon's work shows us that balancing of this sort is basic to the statesman's craft, but it is only basic. The historical fact is that Athens did not erupt again in wholesale butchery until the Thirty—pupils not of Solon but of the sophists—took power with Spartan assistance. In the intervening two centuries, internal peace, justice, and extensive personal and political freedom were generally ascendant. The reason for this is hardly that Solon balanced the competing forces so masterfully that they stayed balanced until military disaster struck; indeed, the Solonic balance was undone during Solon's lifetime. Instead, the Solonic balance was no more than a protective shield which permitted the new spirit of constitutional justice to take hold in the hearts and minds of the Athenians.

In the lifetime of Solon, the new spirit of justice with freedom was but a fledgling force in the total mix of Athenian events. The new order was at first dependent upon the person of its author, in much the same way that the United States Constitution was dependent upon the person of Washington for popular legitimacy. The proof of the success
of Solon's attempt to constitutionalize the Hesiodian vision is not then to be found in the time of Solon. The testator of this success is god-like Aeschylus, of all Athenians most perfect, who related to his forebears in much the same way that Deutero Isaiah related to his predecessors. In his drama we witness the completion of the search for freedom with justice and the vision of its permanence. For a study which seeks to understand the origins of freedom in Mediterranean antiquity, Aeschylus is the end of the beginning.
VI. AESCHYLUS: A CONCLUSION

There is a twofold tie between Solon and Aeschylus. Not only does the content of the Aeschylean drama incorporate and enlarge the symbolic heritage of Hesiod and Solon, but that same drama is in a sense a memorial to the person of Solon. Along with the great mythical personages, the historical Solon is a prototype of the tragic hero.¹ Solon was called to power because he composed and acted out mini-dramas which addressed the public evil; when in power he strove mightily to lead the polis to the high plane of constitutional order; he died an ostensible failure during the Peisistratid suspension of the constitution. Solon thus provides both form and content for the tragic figures, especially for such a figure as King Pelasgus of the Suppliants. In the record left by Solon, we behold a freedom which is preponderantly negative, the freedom of liberation from bondage. Aeschylus is witness to the ultimate success of this liberative program, for in the extant plays he shows us twice a whole community which is freely given in the spirit of positive justice. It was the understanding of Aeschylus that the example of Solon had become generalized throughout the citizen body.

¹See Gerald F. Else, The Origin and Early Form of Greek Tragedy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 67-68. Else speculates that Thespis, the first tragedian and predecessor of Aeschylus, chose Solon as the model for the tragic hero.
The position of Aeschylus in Greece is equivalent to that of Deutero Isaiah in Israel as regards the emergent reality of freedom from justice. The uses of "free" in Aeschylus generally parallel in meaning the uses of "redeem" in Deutero Isaiah. Thus, with Aeschylus freedom is made permanent as the implication of divine justice. For both writers this understanding obtains as the result of a greater inquiry into the historical process and its known consequence of suffering, despair, and death. Despite the very significant differences between Israelite and Greek symbolism, there is a remarkable similarity between the understanding of history of Deutero Isaiah and that of Aeschylus. For both, received history has been the arena of death due to the unwillingness (Deutero Isaiah) or inability (Aeschylus) of mankind to turn away from injustice.

The major difference in symbolism lies in the divergent symbolizations of history itself. We have not considered this issue in the text, for a discussion there would tend to detract from the parallelism which the study demonstrates between Israel and Greece regarding the emergence of human freedom from the apperception of divine justice. Among others, Hadas has commented on the most telling linguistic difference between Hebrew and Greek. Hebrew has but two tenses, past and future, and thus, the whole structure of the Israelite imagination is inevitably historical. Greek has a complicated grammar with many tenses, but the aorist is the most salient expression of the Greek imagination. The aorist translates into English as simple past, and in daily communication it had that meaning. In literature however it conveys a sense of timeless present. The greater meaning of the sentence, "Xerxes' outrage destroyed him," is that Xerxes' outrage is always destroying him. Consider the contrast with "Abram believed Yahweh." While it is certain that J was able to recognize Abram as a universal type, the believer, his primary meaning here is that Abram was the ancestor who at a point in history entered into the covenant. Hadas writes, "The Greeks seem almost to have lacked a sense
division, bondage and murder to that justice which brings reunion and life. For both, there is conviction that human

of history; everything, whenever it happened, is conceived of as present." (Hellenistic Culture, p. 55.) This unhistorical mentality has not troubled us with Hesiod (whose Theogony does show a decided sense of history of an almost Israelite sort) or with Solon. But with Aeschylus it does present a problem of interpretation. Xerxes was a vivid memory to every adult Athenian, but only eight years after his defeat, Aeschylus cast him as a timeless figure, no different in any respect from the characters he took from legend. In the Prometheia we can conclude with most commentators that Zeus was bad then; he is good now; he will be good in the future; of dikē we can conclude that it meant retribution and now it means justice. These conclusions are right, but there is more to the matter, for Aeschylus never makes things that simple.

Aeschylus seems to imply that the new was present all along in the old, and that the old still lingers and threatens beneath the new. For example, in Eumenides (927 ff.) we are told that the name and even the disposition of the Furies has been changed, but Aeschylus makes it abundantly clear that distribution of rewards—often in the form of punishment—will continue to be proper to the nature of the Eumenides. Are they much different from the Odysseus about whom Auerbach observes that he returned home after twenty eventful years "exactly the same as he was when he left"? Aristotle's metaphysics, with its identification of formal cause and final cause is probably the clearest expression of this way of thinking, and the Zeus of Aeschylus sometimes seems like the God of Aristotle, i.e., not as an active will, but as grand superintendent of a fixed process. This same phenomenon makes political interpretation difficult; hence the views of accomplished scholars conflict starkly. Does Aeschylus take a position on specific historical events such as the reform of the Areopagus, or does the Areopagus appear only to represent some universal reality in a timeless present? The commentator must decide according to his own informed judgment, and regretfully, his own prejudices. We believe that a comprehensive study of this problem by one who is qualified to do it would show that Aeschylus believed in the possibility of real change which makes the past a definite past, but that the confines of received mental culture made it impossible for him to express this meaning unequivocally. We suspect further that these conflicting tendencies can be traced back to the influences of Hesiod and Homer respectively. See Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature, tr. Willard Trask (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1957), pp. 14-20.
devices alone will not alter the course of the existential project. Thus, in both, we observe the liberative intervention of divinity in the historical course of division and strife, and in both there is the promise of a future which will be better than the past.

It is appropriate for this study to end its search for the origins of freedom with Aeschylus, for that author confirms, more fully than any other, the thesis which was advocated in the beginning. We advanced the idea that history, unmediated, is the fallen domain of human existence; it is the domain of polarity, strife and bondage. We argued that freedom is concomitant with the penetration into that realm of the divine-human unity which lies before history or beyond history. The political name of this unity is justice, and those who are participants in justice are free. This understanding is the core of the Aeschylean teaching. For Aeschylus, as for Deutero Isaiah, history has become transparent unto liberation.

Our discussion of the Aeschylean treatment of history is divided into two ranges of analysis, the immediate and the mediate. This is to say, the seven remaining plays of Aeschylus address both the immediate historical circum-

3In the extant plays, Aeschylus does not use the category "before history" which is implicit in Hesiod's Golden Age or in Plato's Age of Cronos. Rather, Aeschylus' ground of the divine justice which liberates is Zeus who begins as a partisan, historical character, but who through suffering and learning rises beyond historical strife. This mature Zeus is transcendent divinity which holds the power to stop the curse, to recreate and restore.
stances of the century to which the generation of Aeschylus is the direct heir as well as the mediate, symbolic history of the legends. In the tragedies, these two types of history are necessarily juxtaposed, the immediate upon the mediate, but we find it helpful to distinguish between these factual and symbolic, immediate and mediate levels of historical concern.

1. Tyranny

Justice is productive unto the overcoming of division and cruelty in history. For Hesiod and Solon, the concrete terms of this division were the strife between aristocracy and commons within the polis. As we have seen, Solon legislated justly and so liberated the people from the economic outrage of unjust masters. By the time that Aeschylus wrote, the terms of historical division had changed. The unjust division against which Aeschylus inveighs is the political polarity between tyrant and polis. In three plays we observe Aeschylus' understanding of the pattern of tyranny. These are the *Prometheus Bound*, the *Persians*, and the *Libation Bearers*. It is necessary to caution that Aeschylean symbolism is extremely dense at times, and that we look to these symbols only as they enlighten us as to Aeschylus' understanding of the immediate historical problem, tyranny.  

Podlecki comments that the Peisistratid tyranny ended when Aeschylus was a youth, and thus that Aeschylus' personal experience embraced the transition from tyranny to constitutional democracy. (Podlecki refers to the demise of Hippias, the evil son of Peisistratus, who had been a good
For the purposes indicated here, the *Prometheus Bound* is considered as an allegory which describes how a tyranny is formed and what happens after a tyrant comes to power. It is based on the Hesiodian story of the conflict between Zeus and Prometheus. Early in the play, Zeus is identified as tyrant.\(^5\) This is a serious charge. *Tyrannis* is an Asian word which appears in Greek in the mid-seventh century, referring at first to Gyges, the Lydian courtier who murdered the king and then took as his own both kingdom and queen. By the time of Aeschylus the term is decidedly pejorative; its use connotes an accusation that the ruler has come to power by violent and outrageous means.\(^6\) Zeus had taken power by subjugating his father, relegating him to Tartarus where he could no longer threaten. Prometheus had sided with Zeus in the struggle for power, but when Zeus gained power he had Prometheus chained to a rock in a distant place because, "This is a sickness rooted and inherent in the nature of a tyranny: that he who holds it does not trust

ruler.) Podlecki observes also that the *Prometheus Bound* is the first document which brings together in one text the several complaints about tyranny that were current in other fifth century sources. He further notes that many of the characteristics of tyranny which were treated systematically in Aristotle's *Politics V* are traits which were first collated in *Prometheus Bound*. See Anthony J. Podlecki, *The Political Background of Aeschylean Tragedy* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1968), pp. 118-122.

\(^5\)220-230.

\(^6\)See Forrest, *Emergence of Greek Democracy*, pp. 78-83.
his friends." In this play Prometheus is a sympathetic character, and when he claims that he is made to suffer unjustly (ekdika), we can believe that this is the position of Aeschylus regarding all who are subject to tyrants. The link of injustice to unfreedom, and conversely, of justice to freedom, first made explicit in Solon, is a prominent feature of Aeschylean thought. Prometheus is in bondage because of the tyrant's sentence, and the chorus hopes that he may be freed. Still, the bondage of Prometheus is not slavery; that distinction is reserved for those who serve the tyrant obediently and in whom the tyrant places trust. Prometheus identifies his own lot as misfortune, but Hermes, faithful messenger of Zeus, is a slave (latris). In summary then, the Prometheus Bound illustrates that in a tyranny, the ruler comes to power by irregular means, that he rules unjustly, and that in consequence of his injustice, all who inhabit the domain are in one way or another unfree.

In another play, the Persians, Aeschylus examines the character of the tyrant and the consequences of his rule. Technically, Xerxes is not a tyrant; he is the legitimate king of Persia who acceded to the throne upon his father's

8See 1093.
9260-340.
10966-967.
natural death. But except for this, his barbarian vanity shows the nature of his rule to be tyrannical. Xerxes, a man, is worshipped as a god, a practise as repellent to the Greeks as to the Israelites.\footnote{See 150-160.} The subjects of Xerxes are no different from draft animals; they can be harnessed and driven at the will of the king. Xerxes' most prominent trait is his arrogance which leads to outrage, his total lack of forbearance.\footnote{See 808.} This outrageous mien of Xerxes extends beyond the range of mortal affairs into crime against nature. He sought "To check the sacred waters of the Hellespont by chains, just as if it were a slave."\footnote{745-746, tr. Seth G. Benardete.} This wholly immoderate disposition of person which inspired the construction of the pontoon bridge is also the same force which will lead eventually to the tyrant's downfall.\footnote{739-752.} Darius credits his son's defeat to the will of the gods, but it is plain that this analysis borrows upon the Solonic understanding of causality. One who is governed by outrage strains his resources and abilities, and in time the project born of such a strain is destined to collapse. The gods here are guarantors of the causal order. Finally the Persians documents what no Athenian needed to be told: Xerxes' outrageous ambition resulted in death for many thousands of his countrymen and allies. From this play then we intuit a
tacit recognition of the identity of slavery with death and of freedom with life.

The third drama which addresses the immediate historical issue of the tyrant is the *Libation Bearers*. In this play Aeschylus examines one pragmatic solution to the problem posed by the tyrant. The tyrant here is the violent usurper Aegisthus. The chorus, even the tyrant's niece, proclaim themselves to be slave (*doulos*) because of the tyranny.\(^{15}\) There is much talk of right throughout this play, including prayers to Zeus pleading that right be done. The conviction of all is that blood for blood is right.\(^{16}\) At last the hero Orestes appears and slays the tyrant along with his mother, the tyrant's murderous female consort. After the tyrannicide the following exchange occurs:

Orestes:

To all men of Argos in the time to come I say they shall be witness, how these evil things were done. I go, an outcast wanderer from this land, and leave behind, in life, in death, the name of what I did.

Chorus:

No, what you did was well done. Do not therefore bind your mouth to foul speech. Keep no evil on your lips. You liberated all the Argive city when you lopped the heads of these two snakes with one clean stroke.\(^{17}\)

As far as this chorus can see, the end of the tyrant is the end of the trouble. This is a purely negative liberation

\(^{15}\)77 and 135.

\(^{16}\)355 passim.

\(^{17}\)1040-1047, tr. Richmond Lattimore.
however, a matter which the short sighted chorus cannot comprehend. The negativity of Orestes' act is complete, and it will not open onto a repositioning of life because it involved the commission of a particularly offensive kind of murder, a matricide. Even as the chorus absolves Orestes of guilt the Furies descend upon the matricide to meet out horrible retribution. The chorus cannot see the Furies, and it imagines that Orestes is simply over-wrought with anxiety about the recent events, but again, imperfect vision is the source of their misunderstanding. Their psychological explanation is wrong. To Orestes, and to Aeschylus his mover, the Furies are the entirely real consequence of Orestes' act, and their presence belies the notion that true right or justice can obtain from an exchange of blood for blood. The chorus' claim that Orestes' killing of the tyrants is right springs from a conventional and partisan understanding of right. But for Aeschylus, the discoverer of the whole righteousness of God, the view of the chorus is inadequate and ultimately false.

With the appearance of the Furies, our analysis must quit the domain of immediate history with its pragmatic measures aimed at mollification of the human predicament. Their arrival at the moment of triumph over the tyrant displays the Aeschylean conviction that the true solutions do not lie

18 Our understanding that Orestes is really guilty, even though he acts in obedience to Apollo, finds support in Jaeger, Paidiea, I, 257-258. Jaeger views Orestes as the point of collision between two opposed efforts to uphold
within the pragmatic range of thought and deed. The Furies, along with the Persuasion which will ultimately tame them, are resident in the mediate history whose elucidation is the guiding aim of Aeschylean tragedy.

2. The Liberative Suspension of Fate

The symbols of mediate history with which Aeschylus deals are the various fate stories which appear in Homer and in the lesser collections. We observed earlier that the Iliad presents a picture of humanity that is lost in history. Polarity and strife have eclipsed the light of human unity and of the virtues which proceed from that sacred and perfect condition of life. Death, not life, is the inexorable pattern of the Iliad. This same Greek pessimism is ventilated in two legends which appear in the Odyssey; it is not too much to say that they symbolize the orthodox Greek view of man in history, an orthodoxy against which Hesiod is the first rebel. These are the stories of the accursed houses of Laius and Atreus. Even more than the story of the Trojan war, these are historical legends because their courses embrace more than one generation. Aeschylus dealt with these cycles respectively in the trilogy of which the Seven Against Thebes is the survivor and in the Oresteian trilogy. We recall in Hesiod the apocalypse of the two cities, the one just and happy, the other unjust and doomed. A similar

divine justice. With his absolution these opposed understandings are reconciled.
but diachronous contrast obtains when we set the **Seven** against the **Oresteia**. The **Seven** is a story of history which is unmediated by the spirit of divine Justice, while the **Oresteia** is a story about divine liberation from the helplessness of historical division and destruction.

The **Seven Against Thebes** is the last play in a trilogy dealing with the Oedipus cycle. The play itself contains only a part of the whole story, i.e., the assault of the seven champions from Argos, the defeat of the invaders, the death of Eteocles and Polynoeices, and the refusal of Antigone to obey the law of the city.¹⁹

To appreciate the full meaning of Aeschylus' handling of this material, it is necessary that we consider what has happened before the beginning of the extant drama. Laius, king of Thebes, laments his childlessness and consults the Delphic oracle about the matter. He is told that any child born to him through his wife, Jocaste, would be his murderer. Despite the oracle's warning, Laius begat a child. Upon the birth of Oedipus, Laius exposed the child, hoping to avert fulfilment of the prophecy. Oedipus was rescued however, and was adopted by the royal couple of Corinth. When he had grown up, the oracle told him that he was fated to murder his father and marry his mother. In the hope of avoiding this, Oedipus quit Corinth forever and journeyed toward Thebes. On the way, he met King Laius, argued with him, and killed

¹⁹This final encounter which introduces Antigone and Ismene is a later interpolation into the text.
him. On reaching Thebes, he rid the city of the Sphinx, and for this he was made king. He married the widowed queen, Jocaste, who bore him Eteocles, Polyneices, Ismene, and Antigone. While he was king, famine struck the land. Delphi revealed that the famine would end only if the murderer of Laius were exiled. Oedipus, who did not know that the man he had killed was Laius, placed a curse upon the unknown homicide, and decreed his exile. Also, the two sons of Oedipus behaved toward their father with extreme insolence, so he placed a curse on them. In time, Tiresias revealed the whole truth about Oedipus. Upon this Jocaste committed suicide and Oedipus blinded himself and went into exile. Thus the two accursed sons became heir to the kingship. They agreed to rule the land in alternate years, with Eteocles to rule for the first year, while Polyneices resided in Argos. At the end of the year, Eteocles repudiated the agreement, and thus Polyneices marched on Thebes in alliance with the seven Argive champions.\(^{20}\)

\(^{20}\)This agreement between Eteocles and Polyneices to share the kingship is basic to this study's treatment of the Seven. We must observe however that since the two earlier plays in the trilogy are lost, our understanding that Aeschylus subscribed to this tradition is speculative. Our assumption is warranted by the fact that the agreement between the brothers is part of the dominant tradition of the Oedipus story. (See Robert Graves, *The Greek Myths*, II, 15-16.) There is a lesser tradition that Polyneices agreed to give up his claim to the kingship, and later reneged and made war in an attempt to become king. Gilbert Murray believed that Aeschylus subscribed to the dominant tradition because in the Seven Aeschylus permits Polyneices to claim díkē, while Eteocles makes no such explicit claim. See Gilbert Murray, *Aeschylus: The Creator of Tragedy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940), p. 132.
The pattern thus is one of historical division and subsequent strife and injustice. The division of male against female opens onto the generational division of son against father in the case of Oedipus and Laius, and of father against son in the case of Oedipus and his heirs. The curse upon the royal house of Thebes reverberates down through the history of that land, eventually endangering the country itself in the fratricidal war of Eteocles and Polyneices. The curse is emblematic of the unfreedom of the members of the royal household, and both the king and the citizen body fear that the consequences of the curse will involve slavery for the country. This treatment of the legend is mediate history. That is to say, it is poetically heightened common sense, expressing the meaning that whenever the political leadership is itself unable to act freely due to human limitation so hardened as to constitute a curse, then the common future becomes fraught with injustice and bondage. It may be true that the country is spared the fate of slavery to Argive conquerors because Eteocles bows heroically to the dictate of the curse and so saves the city by engaging in combat with his brother so that both are killed. This

21 Kitto rejected this interpretation of the play, arguing that the significance of Eteocles is exhausted in "Man's relation to God, fate, the Universe." (See H. D. F. Kitto, Greek Tragedy: A Literary Study, 3rd ed. [New York: Barnes and

exercise in soteriology however tells more about the confines of the Laius legend in which the death or exile of the king saves Thebes than about the true understanding of Aeschylus, for the discussion which precedes the death of Eteocles suggests a saving alternative course which Eteocles refuses to explore.

But what then is the cause of the trouble in king and city? To conclude that it is the curse is not the ultimate solution of Aeschylus. Tragedy was a device for public education, and Aeschylus attempted to teach his fellow citizens what it means to be accursed. The curse in the drama of Aeschylus is like sin in Deutero Isaiah; it is the refusal to be free. It is persistence in the partial, one-sided, self-centered apperception of reality which causes the self to field a project that proceeds without regard to the universal measure whose power it is to bring harmony to all things. In the Seven this becomes clear when we examine the brothers' respective positions relative to complete justice, and the attitude of Eteocles to the curse.

Much of the play is devoted to description of the decorations on the shields of the seven champions. Most are decorated with fearsome monsters, and their purpose is to arouse terror in the enemy. The seventh champion, Polyneices

Noble, Inc., 1961], pp. 45, 49-50.) It seems that if Aeschylus had intended the death of Eteocles to be understood as a saving sacrifice for the city, the chorus would say something to that effect in its lament. It does not.
himself, bears a shield which is wholly different from the others.

He bears a new-made, rounded shield
and a twofold device contrived thereon;
a woman leading modestly a man
conducts him, pictured as a warrior,
rought all in gold. She claims she is Justice,
and the inscription reads: I will bring him home
and he shall have his city and shall walk
in his ancestral house.23

After hearing this Eteocles responds that the cause of
Polyneices is bereft of justice, implying thus that his own
position is completely just. We know, as did the Athenian
audience, that neither aspirant to the throne has a legiti-
mate claim to a monopoly of justice, for each is given in
some way to injustice. The cause of Polyneices is just be-
cause he is an heir to the kingship and has agreed with his
joint heir, Eteocles, to share that position. But his cause
is unjust because it is clear that if he defeats Eteocles,
his government will be overshadowed—probably dominated—by
his Argive ally, King Adrastus. In this event the country
will be reduced to bondage. Contrariwise the cause of
Eteocles is patently unjust because he has broken his agree-
ment with his brother, and in his disregard for this con-
tract, he displays something of the tyrant. But since he
protects the city from the almost barbaric designs of the
invaders with whom Polyneices is in league, Eteocles is a
participant in justice. The full situation shows then that
each brother has a partial claim to justice, but that the

23642-648, tr. David Grene.
cause of each is darkened by the refusal to reckon with its own companion injustice. Were the two brothers to think and act in true respect for justice, even at this late stage a reconciliation might be possible. This does not happen.

When he learns of Polyneices' assault on the seventh gate, Eteocles changes from king to hero. He accepts—nay—he invites the curse to run its course. The dialogue of Eteocles with the chorus in lines 672-719 is the thematic heart of this drama, for they ventilate the opposition of the old, fated, unfree view of history with the newer, moral view for which divinity has become a positive force in the rectification of conflict and in the erasure of accursed fate. The chorus urges Eteocles to avoid direct combat with Polyneices, explaining to him that his resolve to do so is the result of a terrible passion. To Eteocles however, that fratricidal--suicidal--passion is itself the product of the gods' demand that the curse be fulfilled. The following exchange capsulizes the impasse between the two positions:

Chorus:

Bitter-biting indeed
is the passion that urges you
to accomplish manslaying,
bitter in fruit, where the blood to be shed is unlawful.

Eteocles:

Yes, for the hateful black
curse of my father loved
sits on my dry and tearless eyes
and tells me first of gain and then of death.

Chorus:

Resist its urging: coward
you shall not be called
if you rule your life well.
Forth from your house the black-robed Fury
shall go, when from your hands
the Gods shall receive a sacrifice.

Eteocles:

We are already past the care of Gods.
For them our death is the admirable offering.
Why then delay, fawning upon our doom?24

The hero's great moment is the moment of doom, and for this
the whole vocabulary of which freedom is a part is incompre-
hensible to him. If freedom is affiliated with life and
bondage with death, then the sort of character whom this
obdurate Eteocles personifies is more a bondman than free-
man.

There is a mystery about the Seven Against Thebes. At
first it seems that this drama is poorly organized, that its
contrary thematic positions are unresolved. In this dis-
order however lies the play's true virtue. We must under-
stand that its author did not know himself as an exponent of
"Greek culture," that instead he recognized himself as the
teacher of Athens. If Athens were to persist in the Solonic
way of justice and freedom, then the old, heroic mentality
must be tempered with the newer truth of divine Justice which
is able to relieve mortal existence in history of its ac-
cursed character.25 It is for this reason that Aeschylus

24693-704.

25Solmsen understands these contrary strains to be an
expression of Aeschylus' belief that the developed city of
the fifth century was able to withstand the curse, but the
family was still prone to hereditary evil. (See Hesiod and
exposes the hero Eteocles as one who is victim to a passion which makes it impossible for him to rule his life well. The refusal of Eteocles to remove himself from the power of the curse is, for Aeschylus, the substance of the curse itself. The author bows to tradition in making the salvation of the country coincidental with the hero's resignation to the curse, but that which has gone before must have left the careful observer with the impression that the country might have stood in no need of salvation had its two kings chosen to act differently.

The paradigm of mediate history then which emerges from the Seven is accursed history, wherein each succeeding generation is helpless to forsake the foibles of its predecessor. The ignorance and malaise which are proper to this mediate pattern are the underlying cause of the immediate political evil, in Aeschylus' time the outrage of the tyrant. Nine years after the Seven, with the production of the Oresteia, Aeschylus dramatized a new paradigm for mediate history which broke entirely from the solution of salvation

*Aeschylus, pp. 218-219*. This is so because urban life permits a higher degree of individuation than does the life of the extended family in the countryside. If the children of Atreus can be distinguished in thought as beings separate from Atreus himself, why then should one whom Atreus has wronged put a curse on innocent children? Hadas also believes that Aeschylus attempts to teach individual responsibility, and he cites a prophetic parallel. Jeremiah 32.29 says, "In those days they shall say no more, the fathers have eaten a sour grape, and the children's teeth are set on edge. But every one shall die for his own iniquity: every man that eateth the sour grapes, his teeth shall be set on edge." See Hadas, *Hellenistic Culture*, p. 132.
through heroic doom. The Oresteia approaches as nearly as could a gentile symbolism the tidings of Deutero Isaiah, "Comfort, comfort my people, says your God." In the Oresteia, Aeschylus banishes accursed history to an irretrievable past, and teaches his audience to look to the future and to life. The symbolism of this trilogy amounts to the spiritual charter for a free people.

As we have recognized, the immediate problem of the tyrant is the central issue of the Libation Bearers. That drama is the middle work in the Oresteian trilogy. It is preceded by the Agamemnon and it is followed by the Eumenides. With regard to the mediate history to which Aeschylus is narrator, the tyranny of Aegisthus and Clytemnestra and the descent of the Furies upon Orestes are all the consequences of a curse similar to the curse upon the house of Laius. The accursed ancestor in this cycle is Atreus, and the curse upon his house is complete, bathing each member so deeply in an historically rooted guilt as to deny any claim to right or to free conduct. The tradition is that the ancient Mycenaean king Pelops had two sons, Atreus and Thyestes. The brothers quarreled over the throne, and Atreus succeeded in expelling Thyestes. Later, Thyestes returned to the court of Atreus with his children, all of them suppliants. Atreus pretended to forgive Thyestes and prepared a feast in his honor. The main dish at this feast was made from the flesh of Thyestes' children. When Thyestes discovered what he had been eating he cursed the house of
Atreus and fled with his surviving son, Aegisthus. Atreus had two sons, Agamemnon, who married Clytemnestra, and Menelaus, who married Helen. Clytemnestra bore Iphigenia, Electra, and Orestes. Upon the violation of Helen, Agamemnon sought to make war against Troy, but the winds were such that the fleet could not sail. To remedy this, Agamemnon sacrificed Iphigenia to Artemis and then set sail for the protracted war with Troy.

The *Agamemnon* begins shortly before the return of Agamemnon from Troy. The main event in the play is the murder of Agamemnon by his wife, Clytemnestra, with the collaboration of Agamemnon's hereditary enemy, Aegisthus. Clytemnestra's excuse for slaying her husband is that he had sacrificed their daughter. We can believe that this—along with hatred, lust, and ambition—was her motive, the "efficient cause" of the king's murder, but the larger significance of the event is not lost on Aegisthus.

Now I can say once more that the high gods look down on mortal crimes to vindicate the right at last, now that I see this man—sweet sight—before me here sprawled in the tangling nets of fury,* to atone the calculated evil of his father's hand.

The death of Agamemnon has fulfilled the will of those exalted gods whose function it is to enforce curses, the

---

261521-1529.

271578-1582, tr. Richmond Lattimore. *"nets of fury" = *peplois Erinyôn;* the translation misleads here. Aeschylus is identifying which of the high gods he means. A direct translation is, "nets of the Furies."
Furies. When, after Orestes of the next generation has slain this couple of murderous tyrants, no mortals remain in the household who might act as efficient instruments of the curse in striking Orestes, himself the grandson of Atreus. The Furies must descend and deal with the accursed directly.

With the Eumenides, the final play of the trilogy, the action is at a point parallel to that of the Seven Against Thebes. It is the time of the third generation, and by the received laws of mediate history, Orestes should be made to bear the consequences of the curse. In this drama Aeschylus has shifted the setting to Athens so that he may abolish the curse upon the house of Atreus through founding the constitutional machinery of Athens. This is to say then that with the same effort the author of the Eumenides resolves both the immediate historical problem of the tyrant and the mediate historical evil of helplessness before the curse. The mediate evil is ended through divine intervention in history; the curse is cancelled. It is not cancelled simply by heavenly fiat, but by a practical, constitutional assembly, guided by divine right, which has both will and authority to

Both individual volition and the fated pattern of curse figure integrally in the murderous cycle of the Oresteia, and it is impossible to say which of the two is preponderant. Each has its own standing. One commentator explains this by citing a New Testament parallel. The betrayal of Jesus by Judas, as well as the denial by Peter are both foretold, and both are essential to the pattern of events. Yet the gospels hold Judas and Peter fully responsible for their conduct. Likewise Aeschylus holds the children of Pelops responsible. See N. G. L. Hammond, "Personal Freedom and Its Limitations in the Oresteia," in McCall, Aeschylus, pp. 92-94.
mediate the human experience of evil in history. This constitutional court is created by divine decree. The meaning of Aeschylus thus is that true government is divine; it raises human history above the gradient of strife, curse and doom, and guides it to justice and to life.

In the *Eumenides* there are three matters which require closer observation. These are the presence of Athena, the transformation of the Furies, and the charge to the Athenian council.

Athena is the commanding deity in the *Eumenides*, but she is not the only one. Actually there are two genuses of deity in the play, and we believe that we are able to discern within one of these a further division as to species. The deities in the *Eumenides* are the Furies, Apollo, and Athena. The Furies belong to the old—one should say, the oldest—generation of deity. They are not even Titans, gods proper. They are the daughters of Night who is herself sprung direct from the primal Chaos.\(^{29}\) That is to say they are among the most elemental forces of nature, representatives of natural law in its most primitive dress. We shall have occasion shortly to observe how Gilbert Murray applied the Anaximander fragment to the events of the *Eumenides*. The Furies, goddesses of retribution, are the personification of the basic natural reality with which the fragment deals. We should imagine the food chain of the wild in which the hare takes the life of the grass, the young wolf the life of

\(^{29}\textit{Theogony}, 120 \text{ ff.}\)
the hare, and the opossum and vulture await the end of the old wolf who lies in the grass, rattling with pneumonia. The Furies are attendant upon each transaction in this process. Each pays retribution in time for his own prior voraciousness, and in this there is the obvious justice of reaping where one has sown. When this nutritive pattern of balance becomes the governing law in human affairs, then each act of justice carries with itself, in dialectical fashion, its antithesis, opening the way for new vengeance. This is because of its partial character; justice for one amounts to injustice to another, and injustice cries out for retribution. The Furies personify the cosmic force which propels all life—humanity included—to this pattern of predation.

Next come the Olympians, Apollo and Athena. Both speak for Zeus. Both are figurations of Zeus. Apollo resembles the young Zeus, the Zeus of old, the intractable tyrant about whom Aeschylus informs us in the Prometheus Bound. Athena represents the maturity of the Father. She is the truly divine Zeus who had learned and restored in the Unbinding of Prometheus.

This tri-level schema of divinity in the Eumenides is coupled with a dual meaning of the term dikē. In the earlier portions of this study, our attention was to the Hesiodian concept of dikē, whose meaning corresponds generally to the prophetic tsedaqah. This meaning is present in

30614 f. and 735 f.
Aeschylus; indeed, it is ascendant. But dikē, in various forms, is also one of the commonest terms of the Oresteia. In the mouth of most speakers, it has a conventional, non-Hesiodian-Platonic meaning. It means not the whole righteousness which rectifies and cures the human evil, but the simple and unpromising rectification of blood for blood. The justice of the predator fallen to the scavenger is the commonplace justice, both for Apollo, who orders the tyrannicide and matricide, and for the Furies, who attempt to punish it.31 One suspects that it is also the notion of justice to which many of Aeschylus' fellow Athenians subscribed. Opposed to this is the righteousness of divine Zeus whose daughter Athena brings the murder cycle to its end and persuades the Furies to accept the new, divine understanding of dikē.32

31 Kitto has carefully documented the complicity of Zeus in each fateful act of Agamemnon which leads the king at last to his death in retribution for the killing of Iphigenia and also for the horrible bloodshed at Troy. (Greek Tragedy, III, 1.) No different from Zeus's complicity in Agamemnon's retribution for the violation of Helen is Apollo's guidance of Orestes in his retribution for the murder of his father. That the act will bring down the Furies upon his client seems to be of less concern to Apollo than his interest in vengeance. Both young Zeus who takes retribution against wicked Cronos and Apollo who orders retribution against tyrant Aegisthus are in accord with the Furies' understanding of dikē. In function, they are furies in these pursuits. Solmsen also has recognized the close connection of Zeus, Apollo, and the Furies in the Oresteia. He reports: "In some passages the Erinyes are actually thought of as included in the dispensation of Zeus." (Hesiod and Aeschylus, pp. 186-187.)

32 We may model these relationships as follows:
For a discussion which is concerned with Aeschylus' teaching about the mediate, symbolic history of Greece, the transformation of the Furies which occurs in the Eumenides is so momentous that if this play had been lost, we would know almost nothing about the hope which prompted Aeschylus to instruct his countrymen. The Furies' job is to wreak

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generation:</th>
<th>Deity:</th>
<th>Dikē:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>pre-Olympian</td>
<td>Furies</td>
<td>retributive justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olympian</td>
<td>Zeus-Apollo</td>
<td>retributive justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olympian</td>
<td>Zeus-Athena</td>
<td>civic righteousness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We believe that in this play Athena represents the higher, Hesiodian-Solonic understanding of dikē. Yet the vocabulary which Aeschylus gives to Athena is strangely bare of dikē. Athena asks rhetorically if anyone who fears nothing can be righteous (699); since she is advising that citizens be fearful, this seems to be a fear which will produce political justice. Elsewhere, in her exhortation to the Furies (881 f.) adherence to Persuasion is coupled to considerations about dikē. In this passage, dikē does seem to mean positive righteousness which overcomes particular interests. But on the other hand, the higher conception of dikē is not at work in Athena's reasons for her stand in favor of Orestes (734 f.). She accepts completely Apollo's utterly partisan, anti-feminist defense of Orestes. After this, however, Apollo seems to slip out through the back door; whatever he has stood for in this play is not even worth a polite farewell.

Kitto comments on line 461 of the Libation Bearers: "'Ares (Violence) will confront Ares; Dike will confront Dike.' But if Dike conflicts with Dike (as presently Olympians conflict with Erinyes), the universe is chaotic, and Dike cannot yet be 'Justice.'" (Greek Tragedy, p. 82). This conflict of opposing views of right is what Athena ends in the Eumenides, and thus, the whole justice which restores life is present more by example than by word in her painstaking effort to halt the curse, to calm and transform the Furies, to reconcile them with Olympians and the Athenian mortals who entertain a vision of justice which supersedes mindless retribution. This is manifestly the case if we decide to see in the encounter an attempt to persuade the
punishment upon evildoers, especially those who are guilty of blood crime. They are the enforcers of curses. In this play they are intent on visiting the curse upon Orestes because he is heir of Atreus and because he has slain his mother. In the Eumenides, Athena presides over the court which tries Orestes. He is prosecuted by the Furies and defended by Apollo. The jury is made up of Athenian mortals and they divide evenly on the question of whether Orestes should be punished. Athena, here representing Zeus, breaks the tie in favor of Orestes.

It seems most important that nowhere in the drama is Orestes actually acquitted of the matricide, as a known killer who pleads self-defense might be acquitted by a jury. Rather, it is decided that Orestes will not be punished. The outcome is more like a full pardon than an acquittal. The court, with Athena's supervision, simply agrees to stop the curse; it will go no farther. Athena announces: "The man before us has escaped the charge of blood." Literally: "The man has escaped blood justice (aimatos diken)."

... old families of Athens to accept the new, democratic order without recourse to violence.

33 Murray also understood the verdict on Orestes to be a pardon sent from Zeus. He related this to the greater problem of theodicy posed in the Prometheus Bound. That play, in which Zeus is tyrant, suggested the theology of the evil god which became so prominent in the gnostic movements of later antiquity. But unlike the gnostics, Aeschylus did not propose escape from the world as it is experienced. Rather, the God, Zeus himself, learned through suffering, and in so learning, became Savior to the world. See Gilbert Murray, Aeschylus: The Creator of Tragedy, chapter III.

34752.
This language does not mean that he is acquitted of crime. It means instead that Orestes will not be made to pay the penalty for murder. In keeping with the spirit of the play, the jury's function here is more political than narrowly judicial. The court decides, as might an American governor in similar circumstances, that the greater cause of justice will not be served by enforcing the law. Thus, the guilty is pardoned; his guilt is ignored, not repudiated. Aeschylus underlines the seriousness of Orestes' act by having an even half of the members of the court vote for conviction. Coincidental with the pardon of Orestes is Athena's successful persuasion of the terrible Furies. They will no longer be Furies, but Good Spirits, Eumenides, to the Athenian polis.

In these events, Aeschylus teaches his Athenian audience a double lesson about mediate history. Orestes, as mortal, represents guilty Atreus, and the Furies represent the whole pre-Olympian pantheon of shame and cruelty whose doings Hesiod witnessed. Both Atrean mankind and hostile deity are put into an impotent past. Aeschylus has decreed a radical division in the mediate history of Greece which affects both men and gods. With Athena's establishment of the machinery of constitutional justice, the process of history has changed. No longer are curse and blind fate to dominate the destiny of man. Guilt is cancelled and can no longer dictate the future. The understanding of Aeschylus in these matters is equivalent to commensurate teachings of Deutero Isaiah and of Paul. For Paul, the law convicts and
leads to death, but the new, good tidings open the future to life and freedom. Thus Murray writes, "Not Aigisthos, not Clytemnnestra, not Orestes; but the Law, however we phrase it, by whatever instrument it works, is the true and inevitable slayer." And what is the Law? Murray found its adequate expression in the Anaximander fragment: "All things pay atonement to one another for their injustice according to the rule of time." This use of the Anaximander fragment is most perspicacious, for it, better than any other statement, encompasses the whole range of thought, word, and deed against which Aeschylus and his predecessors asserted the creative and restorative nature of Zeus. Upon the Aeschylean pardon of Orestes and the transformation of the Furies, it is possible to say of Athens as well as Jerusalem "that her warfare is ended, that her iniquity is pardoned," that she has received "double for all her sins." 

35Murray, Aeschylus, p. 199. Much the same lesson obtains from Podlecki's examination of the immediate political implications of the Oresteia. In the Agamemnon there is a dialectic between dikē in the higher sense and the same term's plural forms which connote legal justice. Of the cause of the Trojan war, Podlecki writes, "Agamemnon and his brother are the prosecutors, the 'extractors of justice.' But this is justice of a very primitive kind, the mere satisfaction of claims for what is due, raw retribution at its lowest level. In general, it can be said that the principals in the drama never rise above this minimal conception." The Eumenides, by contrast, teaches that the way to life and freedom follows from the divine, supra-legal orientation to righteousness which puts into the background the bloody spiral which is provoked by the application of mere law. See Podlecki, Political Background of Aeschylean Tragedy, chapter V. The above quotation is from page 70.

36Isaiah 40.2.
The judgment of the court upon Orestes—like the straight judgments which the prophets of Israel demanded and which Solon in Athens dispensed—is begotten of a devotion to justice which is at once liberative and merciful. In the Eumenides then, Aeschylus has in fact provided a foundation in the reflective, mediate symbolism from which Greece drew instruction for the earlier rectification and liberation performed by Solon. Solonic practice is parent to Aeschylean theory. Royal Orestes, no less than the meanest hektemore, has been victim of a miserable domination whose alteration is quite beyond his power. That he is absolved of matricide, and indeed, of all the guilt of which Atreus was author, is a merciful disburdenment. In this Aeschylean symbolism mercy and the negative moment of freedom can be seen as one and the same event. The spirit of justice inspires the merciful attitude from which liberation follows as the practical consequence. The liberation of Orestes gains potency in the repositioning of life unto a future which is distinct from the tyrannical and guilty past. This

37 This understanding of the condition of Orestes before the court's pardon as one of bondage is supported well by the text. Early in the text, before they leave Delphi, the Furies declare: "Let him hide under the ground, he shall never go free./ Cursed suppliant, he shall feel against his head/ another murderer rising out of the same seed." (174-177) To be accursed is to be unfree. Aeschylus is the earliest author of whom this writer is aware to use the vocabulary of freedom in the metaphorical sense of moral achievement and moral failure. (See also 225 and 340.) This metaphor has been most meaningful to the European imagination, but it is likewise hazardous since it is the embryo of the paradoxical understanding of freedom which estranges real meaning from material reality.
repositioning will occur according to practical, constitutional devices which permanently embody the spirit of divine justice.

In the *Eumenides*, the positive future is alive and at work in the present resolution of the plight of Orestes. Aeschylus chooses for his constitutional tribunal a fabulous version of the Areopagus. He chooses the Areopagus because it has the force of antiquity, but in the *Eumenides* it is a modernized council in which membership has become possible for all citizens, not only for the old families.38 The con-

38 Interpretations of the Areopagus passage are wonderful in their variety, ranging from "Aeschylus was conservative" to "Aeschylus was radical." These opinions are based on educated guesses, and sometimes show the political sympathies of their advocates. Our own opinion is that Aeschylus did not use his productions to deliver coded propaganda messages in favor of any particular party. We believe rather that Aeschylus continued the work of Solon, attempting to get the competing parties to subordinate their particular interests to the higher Justice. If this assumption is correct, then the primary significance of the Areopagus is that it symbolizes constitutional justice as corrective against the justice of the feud. This primary significance does not exhaust other possibilities.

Not long before the production of the *Oresteia*, the radical (democratic) group had reduced the powers of the Areopagus, an aristocratic body, leaving it jurisdiction in homicide and blasphemy cases. Besides this, Ephialtes, the radical leader, had been murdered. It seems to us that in the *Eumenides*, Aeschylus' emphasis on the remaining homicide jurisdiction serves to shore up the status of this oldest Athenian body. It seems also that Aeschylus is presenting a democratized picture of the Areopagus, but of this we cannot be certain. Athena says (487), "I will pick the finest [ta beltata = the best] of my citizens." The lexicon is of some help here, but it is not decisive. The term in question is the superlative of agathos, the standard word for "good." The question is, does this term mean "best" in the aristocratic sense of a class that is able to define its culture as best, or does it mean "best" in the sense of moral sensitivity and practical achievement? We believe that it means the latter. It has a clearly aristocratic meaning only in
stitutional tribunal is a gift to the Athenians from the patron goddess Athena. Her dedicatory address contains this advice:

No anarchy, no rule of a single master. Thus I advise my citizens to govern and to grace, and not to cast fear utterly from your city. What man who fears nothing at all is ever righteous? Such be your just terrors, and you may deserve and have salvation for your citadel, your land's defence, such as is nowhere else found among men, neither among the Scythians, nor the land that Pelops held. I establish this tribunal. It shall be untouched by money-making, grave but quick to wrath, watchful to protect those who sleep, a sentry on the land.

These words I have unreeled are for my citizens, advice into the future. All must stand upright now, take each man his ballot in his hand, think on his oath, and make his judgment.

The contrast between the land of Pelops and Athens sets the tenor of Athena's counsel. It is from the land of Pelops that the difficulty which is the theme of the Oresteia derives. There, King Atreus acted without fear, and we behold the consequences. "Fear" here is a form of deima which conveys the idea of great terror. Atreus in the land of

Xenophon, long after Aeschylus. Before Aeschylus, it appears only in Homer, and there, only in the comparative. In Suppliants, 1054, it means best in a pragmatic sense, and in Agamemnon, 378, a difficult passage, it appears in a context which is moral, threatening the dikē of punishment against those who ignore the Dikē of moderation. Aeschylus puts into his Areopagus the best people who can be found, and these of course will be the ones who heed most steadfastly Athena's injunction. The radical leaning of this support for open government, based on merit, is balanced however by the command against venality (704-705). It is hard to see this as anything but a complaint against the innovation of paid juries. See entry under belteros in Henry George Lindell and Robert Scotts, A Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1968).

39696-710.
Pelops differed from Solon in the land of Athens in that he had no fear. He had no fearful respect for the gods to whom homicide is offensive, but more importantly, he had no terror about the consequences of his own conduct. Thus he perpetrated both murder and cannibalism. The comparison of Solon to Atreus is apt here, for Solon conducted his career in daily terror of the consequences of the shedding of Athenian blood. The lesson of Aeschylus is that a country which would avoid the curse must live in abiding terror of accursed, outrageous behavior. It is this terror which sensitizes the person and the greater polity to the life-assuring authority of transcendent justice: "What man who fears nothing at all is ever righteous?" In a country which practises this fear which is productive of justice, there will be, in the modern phrase, "ordered liberty." "No anarchy, no rule of single master [δεσποτēs]." In such a country it will be possible for the citizenry to stand upright and to make the kinds of decisions that are necessary to assure salvation from the accursed current of historical guilt.

3. Conclusion

The Oresteian trilogy is Aeschylus' surviving masterpiece. It is the story of the political mediation of the evils of tyranny and helplessness. The ascendant power of this liberative mediation is divine justice. When it is appropriated for human guidance man obtains release from fated tyranny and tyrannical fate. We conclude this study of the origins of freedom with the discussion of Aeschylean
freedom because in the *Eumenides*, and more completely in the *Suppliants*, appear all of the meanings, save one, which we have identified as being integral to freedom as it first appeared in Mediterranean antiquity. These meanings are:

1. Freedom is a modality of divine-human unity, understood theoretically as *logos* and practically as justice. 
2. Freedom appears within a structured reality, involving negation and position relative to the principle of unity. 
3. In its pristine showing, freedom is antinomian. 
4. Freedom is primarily economic. (Aeschylean drama does not include this meaning.) 
5. Freedom is complete only when there is universal participation in political authority. With the appearance at last of this understanding the period of origins has reached completion in the writing of Aeschylus. Political freedom is the great oak to which the liberation of the slave is seed.

We shall offer concluding observations about each of these meanings presently, but before that, it is necessary to summarize the contents of the *Suppliants*. The *Suppliants* is simple in plot and generally undramatic. The fifty daughters of Danaeus have fled, with their father, from Egypt to Argos, where they appear as suppliants seeking protection. They have fled from an ill-mannered group of cousins who want to marry them. Under Egyptian law, the claims of the cousins are valid, and the maidens should have accepted the projected marriages. The daughters fasten themselves at Argos to the statues of the gods and refuse to
move. This presents a great difficulty for King Pelasgus and his countrymen. The cousins are in pursuit, and if the city accepts the Danaeds as suppliants, it places itself in danger of attack. For the city of accept the Danaeds moreover makes it an accomplice to the lawlessness of the maidens' refusal. But to turn them over to their hated cousins would involve injustice to strangers (who are of Argive descent) and sacrilege against the gods, since the maidens cling to the statues and threaten to hang themselves from those same statues if the city refuses protection. Obviously there is no neat solution to the difficulty, for neither side of the dispute is wholly right. The cousins are violent and loathsome, and the Danaeds are lawless and immoderate in their contempt for marriage. At length, king and citizen decide to offer asylum to the maidens. After this, a herald from the cousins arrives and behaves menacingly. Pelasgus rebuffs him and the play ends shortly. The latter two components of this trilogy are lost. Their contents are known in part, but are unimportant here. What commends this rather inert production for our summary treatment of freedom in its time of origin is not the action, of which there is little, but the more subtle materials within it. It is a drama about how a king and his subjects make a difficult decision. The king, in announcing the decision to the Egyptian herald, refers to himself as the "tongue of freedom's voice."
Our first conclusion about the meaning of freedom is that freedom is a modality of divine-human unity, understood theoretically as logos and practically as justice. Corollary to this is the observation that justice or right is authoritative, and this authority mandates unity. In the Eumenides Athena is justice personified and her counsel is an authoritative force in the lifting of the curse. Her character in this drama emphasizes the divine and creative aspect that is present in all true statesmanship. Her analogue in Israel is the prophet who bears the authority of the nation's God. In the Suppliants, Aeschylus' figure of King Pelasgus brings this meaning nearer to direct human experience. The central passage in this entire drama is that employing the famous metaphor of the diver.

We need profound, preserving care, that plunges
Like a diver deep in troubled seas,
Keen and unblurred his eye, to make the end
Without disaster for us and for the city . . .

The king is the diver who descends into the fear-inspiring nature of Zeus, and by this descent becomes vested with decisive authority. But how is freedom involved in this? By the most commonplace understanding, both Athena and Pelasgus, as just authorities, are free. But Aeschylus understands freedom to be resident in both the gradients of leadership and response. In the Eumenides and again in the Suppliants, the key term is "persuasion." The Suppliants is most instructive in this regard. Even in the hour of grave public

41 407-410, tr. Seth G. Benardete.
danger, the king explicitly refuses to dictate to the people; instead he persuades them to do that which is right. Consent to the sovereign's rightful advice makes all participants in sovereignty and thus in freedom.

Consent to rightful authority has a unifying effect. It unites humanity with divinity by reconciling human impulse with the divine will. It unites man with man by replacing pragmatic severality with the pure practicality of purpose which transcends particular ambition. In these two Aeschylean dramas there are two symbols of this unity. In the Suppliants the vision of Aeschylus approaches the monistic organicism of Micah's vision of Yahweh's pastoral leadership. The people's vote to protect the maidens was swift and unanimous. It seems that there was no discussion, but that all were moved spontaneously by the king's persuasion. The corresponding picture in the Eumenides suggests the more complicated "Athenian" pattern of unity which Pericles would celebrate. There the vote on Orestes' guilt was tied, but there is nonetheless a theme here of human unity which is stronger than diversity. The diversity on the issue at hand is mitigated by the underlying unity which is symbolized by public allegiance to the common forum, an allegiance which makes it possible for dissenting groups to accept unwelcome decisions without recourse to violence. It is this second, pluralistic pattern of underlying unity which has

42 365-401 and 615.
43 605-624 and 940.
become the mode of free European nations in the modern period.

The second meaning of freedom, i.e., that it is a structured reality involving negation and position, follows closely upon the former understanding about freedom and authority. We recognized this structure of freedom first in the Fourth Evangelist's freedom pericope and we have seen its underlying presence in all of the archaic materials to which that teaching points. In Aeschylus the structure of freedom is most explicit in the story of Orestes in the Eumenides. Orestes is a victim of negative circumstances, the curse upon the Atreid family. At the advice of Apollo he flies to Athens where Athena and the court negate the curse. Upon this liberative negation, the life of Orestes takes a new position. He returns to his homeland where he will be king. With the end of the murderous curse Orestes and the family which he represents are positioned unto life. In respect of the structure of freedom a second inference may be drawn from the Eumenides. This is that the negative moment of freedom which pervaded the work of Solon had by the time of Aeschylus been productive of a free and positive commitment to justice which was shared throughout the polis. We must remember that the Athens about which Aeschylus wrote was the country which had stood with iron determination against the vast might of Persia. It is impossible that Athens could have done this at the time when Solon became

\[44754-761.\]
archon. The persuasive authority of Solon and the tragedians had taught the Athenians how to be free.

The third meaning attaching to freedom is that in its pristine showing, freedom is antinomian. The inaccessibility of law to freedom was proclaimed explicitly in Paul's letter to the Galatians, and was exemplified in the earlier prophetic opposition to the kings who were law incarnate. The connection of freedom with lawful conduct is a later event which is born of the belief that the laws are an ample embodiment of the divine will. Aeschylus, who is still in the period of origins, refuses to embrace this mistaken accommodation. In both the *Eumenides* and the *Suppliants*, the liberative activity is conducted in response to a right which is at odds with law. In the *Suppliants* the Danaeds are in violation of the established law of their native land, but Pelasgus and his subjects join the Danaeds in viewing that law as an instrument of bondage. The antinomian strain is even more prominent in the *Eumenides*. Orestes is a matricide, and one symbolic meaning of the Furies is that they are representative of the legal penalty for such a crime. The law is suspended, however, not because Athena and the court do not take blood crime seriously, but because in this instance the greater cause of justice is better served by suspension of the law. The fundamentally antinomian character of justice and freedom survives in the modern age in such activities as nonviolent civil disobedience, and perhaps even in certain lawless acts of governmental officials. The
obvious danger posed by lawlessness provokes the attempt to identify freedom with lawfulness, but this idea is at odds with the ancient witness.

The fourth meaning of freedom is that freedom is primarily an economic affair, with moral and political freedom as secondary devolutions. We began our search for the origins of freedom with attention to the statements from the Hellenistic and early Roman periods of late antiquity. Although the Stoic and New Testament materials all exhibited a strongly spiritual understanding of freedom, we found in the Fourth Gospel, with its comment about the son who does not continue in the house forever a double clue as to where we should begin our inquiry into the ancient materials and as to what we should attend in this search. From the household of Abram to the polis of Solon, it has been clear that the primary experience of unfreedom consists in an economic relationship in which one person is bound in service to another. The Exodus narratives, the prophets, Hesiod, and Solon have indicated that economic measures which serve to despoil those who are vulnerable to arbitrary authority constitute an unrighteousness which is offensive to God himself. It follows that freedom is primarily the right of a person to his own body and its produce. That is to say, it is primarily an economic affair.

It seems strange that Aeschylus, who in other respects gathers together the early meanings of freedom, is completely
silent about this most basic reality of freedom. It is possible that this aspect of freedom received treatment in the Aeschylean plays which did not survive. This is not very likely, however, for with regard to this economic aspect of freedom, the historical reality of Aeschylus and the writer's own consciousness were beyond the period of origins. The reforms of Solon, Peisistratus, and Cleisthenes, as well as the rapid expansion of manufacture and trade in Athens, had taken the sharp edge off the economic issue. For the Athenian majority, economic freedom had been achieved due to the thought and action of earlier generations of liberators. It is for this reason that we find in Aeschylus an understanding which is almost completely absent from his predecessors, i.e., that freedom should be explicitly political.

Aeschylus ends our search for the origins of freedom because those origins are complete when the political implication of liberation and the repositioning of life is made explicit. Thus, from Aeschylus we learn the fifth and final meaning of freedom, that freedom is complete only when there is universal participation in political authority. The political possibility of freedom is implicit in the four prior meanings, and by the time of Aeschylus, Athenian political experience has begun to manifest this universal involvement of free citizens. Thus, what we find in Aeschylus on this subject is not an original idea, but rather reflection on extant reality. Corollary to the appearance of political
freedom is the understanding that "free" may be predicated on the deciding person, for participatory political institutions presuppose the power of moral arbitration and pragmatic reckoning in the constituent body.

In both the Suppliants and the Eumenides, we find that important decisions are made by the citizen body. In neither drama is the primarily economic nature of political decisions acknowledged; Aeschylus does not tell us that political freedom and participatory institutions are a means of protecting the economic freedom of the commons. Instead, Aeschylus shuns the pragmatic in favor of the practical. Economic pragmatism in politics simply balances one finite historical force against another; pure practicality looks beyond the evanescent possibilities available in history. The moral commitment of the polis to justice will enhance the destiny of the community more certainly than the resolution of particular issues of partisan interest. It seems certain that Aeschylus drew this lesson about moral commitment and civic survival from the Athenian determination not to bow to Persia at any cost. That determination was instructed by a universal, "profound, preserving care, that plunges like a diver deep in troubled seas." Both of the dramas which show us free political participation are set in crisis situations.

Commitment to divine justice as the measure for human existence in history began with one man, with Hesiod. Aeschylus believed that in his time and country, that commit-
ment had become general. But neither the Athenians nor Aeschylus were "idealists," in the sense in which that term is often employed. Rather, the ideal of justice was resident in the Athenian populace; thus they were capable of freedom in determining the course of public action. In his attention to the political freedom of the popular assemblies in the Suppliants and the Eumenides, Aeschylus highlights two characteristics of this freedom which are of commanding importance. First is that the people respond positively to leadership, a matter which we have discussed earlier. Aeschylus equates popular freedom with democracy, but it is certain that Aeschylean democracy is essentially different from the degenerate democracy of which we learn in Plato and Aristotle. Aeschylean democracy consists in careful response to careful guidance. It is government by popular consent, not the frenzied autism in which freedom loops back upon itself. The second characteristic of universal political freedom which Aeschylus emphasizes is the heavy and per-

45See especially Suppliants, 698-699: "May the people who strengthen [kratunei] the city protect its dignity as well." This word usage, as well as the insistence on popular consultation in decision making, gives the Suppliants its reputation as a democratic production. A considerable body of scholarly opinion understands this drama as Aeschylus' expression of gratitude and praise to democratic Argos for its receiving Themistocles as suppliant after his ostracism from Athens, since Argos incurred the enmity of Sparta by this act. Beyond this is the implication that democratic and just Argos should be the peninsular ally of Athens rather than aristocratic Sparta. Since the early 1950's it has been generally accepted that the Suppliants was produced in 463. Athens formed an alliance with Argos in 461. It is possible that Aeschylus influenced this important shift which cemented its democratic institutions. The evidence
ilous burden that this freedom imposes upon the citizenry. They are responsible for their joint destiny in a dangerous and uncertain world, and the saving alternative is that they decide justly. In the *Suppliants* the decision to protect the Danaeds is a decision which the populace makes, knowing full well that the Egyptian cousins will make war against the country while the Danaeds cannot. For the Argive assembly, fear of Zeus is more compelling than fear of violent barbarians. In the *Eumenides* the Athenian court decides in favor of Orestes before Athena has persuaded the Furies to become Eumenides. Apollo, the advocate of Orestes, has made no threats against the country should the court rule against his client, but the Furies have promised dire punishment if the court refuses to convict. Despite the inauspicious circumstances, Aeschylus seems to tell us that at least half of the people of his native land will choose the right alternative, and that those who so choose may count on the blessing of God to see the project through.

In the letter to Philemon, the promise to Abram, the leadership of Moses, the injunction of the prophets, the true words of Hesiod, the legislation of Solon, and the drama of Aeschylus we have seen the reality of freedom. It is a reality which unites the spiritual and material provinces of human existence, imparting to concrete human existence in

*supporting this hypothesis is presented in lucid detail in Podlecki, Political Background of Aeschylean Tragedy, chapter IV.*
history a share in life eternal. The reality of freedom cannot be present in an atmosphere corrupted with injustice; in that circumstance, only the name will persist. We consider again the comment of Philo on the passage from Euripides, for it bespeaks a danger which is no less relevant to our own time than to Hellenistic Alexandria.

The name of freedom is worth all the world;
If one has little, let him think that much.

I saw the whole audience so carried away by enthusiasm that they stood upright to their full height, and raising their voices above the actors, burst into shout after shout of applause combining praise of the maxim with praise of the poet, who glorifies not only freedom for what it does, but even its name.46

Aeschylus and the other early sources show us something essentially different from this enthusiasm. They show a steady, unyielding faith in divine justice that is productive unto redemption and repair. Only after centuries of exploration of the nature of divine justice is the commitment in its favor given a name which embraces both the commitment and its consequences. That name is freedom.

46See chapter II, section 2.
LIST OF WORKS CITED


Murray, Gilbert. *Aeschylus, the Creator of Tragedy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940.


VITA OF VERNON GAYLOR

Personal Data

Birth Date: August 13, 1943
Marital Status: Married - One Child

Education

Palco Rural High School, Palco, Kansas - Graduated 1961
A.B., Kansas State College at Pittsburg - 1965
M.S., Kansas State College at Pittsburg - 1969
Ph.D., Louisiana State University - 1977

Dissertation Title

"The Origins of Freedom in Mediterranean Antiquity: A Comparative Study of Political Symbolisms Obtaining in the Exodus of Israel and in the Solonic Reform in Athens"

Professional Experience

Instructor in Political Science, Carl Albert Junior College, Poteau, Oklahoma - 1971-72
Part-Time Instructor in Political Science, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville - 1972-75
Instructor in Political Science, University of Arkansas Overseas Graduate Program in International Relations - Fall Semester, 1973
Instructor in Political Science, Division of Continuing Education, University of Arkansas - 1974-76
Assistant Professor of Political Science, Southwest Missouri State University - 1976-77

Members of Doctoral Committee

Chairman: René de Visme Williamson, Professor of Political Science
Cecil L. Eubanks, Assistant Professor of Political Science
E. Ramón Arango, Associate Professor of Political Science
Louis E. Newman, Associate Professor of Political Science
Representative of Minor Department: Edward H. Henderson, Associate Professor of Philosophy