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**COVERING THE REVOLUTION OF ROSES
(DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES BETWEEN GEORGIAN STATE AND
INDEPENDENT TELEVISION COMPANIES)**

A Thesis

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Mass Communication

in

Theanship School of Mass Communication

by

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ABSTRACT

The study analyzed how independent and state media's news programs differ in the way they framed the Georgian Revolution of Roses. The paper analyzed what sources, frames and key words journalists used to describe the protest in order to investigate if the coverage was objective or biased in any particular direction.

Study provides evidence that by framing protests in a different way, politicians and journalists give different meanings to the same issues and suggest what is at issue. Each party of the political elite tried to promote their own political viewpoints. By preferring sources from the ruling party and their supporters and repeating frames and key words suggested by the ruling party, state television supported the ruling party. By quoting frequently reformers and their supporters and framing the event in a way offered by the reformers, the independent media supported the viewpoints of the reformers.

This participatory position of the independent station is supported by developmental theory, which says media in countries in transition have to assist to the process of democracy. (Baran & Davis, 2003). In the case of Georgia, the opposition was considered eager to fulfill democratic reforms and so the independent media supported their political views.

However, the free press theory suggests that bias is against all professional norms of journalism, regardless the intentions of media to have bias for the "right" side of an issue. (Leigh, 1974). A free press has to offer balanced and objective reports of the event or issue. Otherwise, it will not be credible and lose the public trust, which is most valuable to a free press. (Leigh, 1974). The coverage of the Revolution of Roses in the

independent station was not beneficial to the development of a free press. It becomes even more obvious how important an unbiased press is now that the former reformers have become the government. The state TV is still maintaining the ruling party's political viewpoints and the independent television became part of the government's public relations machine by conveying mostly positive news about the policymakers and policies.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to analyze how independent and state media's prime-time news programs differ in the way they framed the Georgian Revolution of Roses. The protests of the 2003 election outcomes in Georgia, the so-called Revolution of Roses, came at a time when two TV companies – state-owned “The First Channel” and independent Rustavi 2 -- were dramatically polarized: the state-owned station supported the point of view of the government and the independent station maintained the position of the opposition. The primary aim of the paper is to analyze what sources, frames, key words and terms journalists used to describe the large-scale protest in order to investigate if the coverage was fair, accurate and balanced or biased in any particular direction.

Exploration of media biases is one of the important questions for contemporary Georgian media. “Public deliberation (reasoning and discussion about the merits of public policy) is essential to democracy, in order to ensure that the public's policy preferences – upon which democratic decisions are based – are informed, enlightened, and authentic.” (Page, 1996, p.1). However, in modern societies, public deliberation is mediated, even limited, to the expression of the viewpoints of professional communicators – politicians, experts, journalists, etc. -- via media. It is extremely important for the ordinary citizen to know if the news program they are watching has any particular preferences regarding their news sources and the way they present the news event. Understanding media preferences and biases becomes especially essential during conflicts and crises, because people living in unstable times become dependent on the media. (Ball-Rockeach & DeFleur, 1976).

The study will compare the independent and state-owned media's framing of the revolution of Georgia; and analyze how these differences influence the final news product.

The key reason for the revolution was that president Eduard Shevardnadze and his party “For the New Georgia” tried to tamper with the 2003 parliamentary elections and make it appear that his own party had been re-elected. Opposition factions of the parliament, headed by reformers, insisted on canceling the official results. They, together with Georgian non-governmental organizations monitoring the elections, said that parallel vote counts and exit polls, which were showing different results, were more credible. According to those results, the opposition was the winner.

Citizens of Georgia who were loyal to the opposition protested the 2003 election outcomes. The protests took place throughout the whole country. The revolution took as its symbol a red rose held by Mikheil Saakashvili, the leader of the protest movement, when he and his supporters stormed into the Parliament building. Eventually, Shevardnadze was forced to resign.

State-owned TV company “The First Channel” and independent TV company Rustavi 2 were covering the Revolution of Roses in a dramatically polarized way: the state-owned television company became the mouthpiece of the old regime and the independent television station turned out to be in the vanguard of the revolution (Lincoln, 2004; Devdariani, 2004). They both well illustrate the argument of Schudson (2003) about the media: “by selecting, highlighting, framing, shading, and shaping in reportage, they create an impression that real people – readers and viewers – then take to be real and to which they respond in their lives” (Schudson, 2003, p.2). These two TV companies created two different realities of the revolution. It is important to know what were the particular differences between state-owned and independent media in framing of the revolution and what was the general effect of it on their news programs. Knowing this will allow the audience to understand if any of these television

stations provided them with objective information, whether coverage of the revolution was fair and balanced, or whether the facts were biased in a favorable way for any of the opposing parties.

The study is important for several reasons. In a democratic society, the exchange of information and ideas through the free press as well as free and open public debate is a crucial element of mass participation and a requirement for democratic responsiveness to public preferences (Sartori, 1987). Existence of a free press, which provides the citizens with objective information, is even more important for countries that are moving towards democracy. Georgia is one of them. Without this exchange of information and ideas, citizens won't be able to understand fully the value or harm of particular policies or decisions of the government, and can't judge virtues of political candidates and policymakers; this means they can't make informed decisions regarding the policies affecting their lives, can't take part fully in the political, economic and social processes of the country, can't influence the development of the country and don't have enough power to facilitate democracy.

Researchers have indicated that journalists, reporters, commentators, experts and television pundits have a substantial impact upon the policy preferences of the general public (Page, 1996; Said, 1997; Mannheim, 1991). So it becomes important to study media messages during the Revolution time. This research will allow us to begin to understand the role of the media during crises and social changes such as the Revolution of Roses. It is extremely important for Georgia, a country where democracy still is in its transition stage, since one of the essential conditions of successful democracy is free media as a space for public deliberation. The study will introduce new material to the field of Georgian media research and suggest some further research questions. Until recently, there have been no academic and scientific studies of

mass communication in Georgia except Sulkhaniashvili's (2003) and Koplataidze's (2004) master's theses. This thesis expands upon their work. The present study will help academics to look at some trends in the Georgian media environment, using the example of the most polarized and most-watched television companies. The results of the study can provide some evidence for future research.

This research also will help professionals in the field to understand how sources and their own cultural or social biases can influence the outcome of the news. Journalists can determine if, as Mindich (1998) suggests, a responsible journalist has to offer something more than passive "objectivity." He proposes that journalists can interpret reality, not just transmit pure facts, but they have to explain how they interpret reality and why the public should believe them.

The study will provide common citizens with knowledge of what kind of news programs they watch and how news is packaged. This will help them to be aware of the differences between state-owned and private television. They will have a clearer understanding of whether watching the news programs provided by either of the TV channels enable them to receive objective, fair and balanced information. They will be more aware of whether they need to take steps to ensure they receive "a truthful, comprehensive, and intelligent account of the day's events in a context which gives them meaning;" (Leigh, 1974, p. 21). The audience will understand how the media present and clarify the goals and values of society during a crisis; they can see if the media are a forum for free and open debate or are limited to the specific political or economical preferences of their owners and reporters. This, in turn, will help them make more informed and enlightened decisions regarding policymakers and policies.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

Political Background

Georgia, one of the former republics of Soviet Union, declared independence from the Soviet Union in 1992. Eduard Shevardnadze became the president of Georgia in 1995, following the first president, Zviad Gamsaxurdia, who ruled the country from 1992-95. Shevardnadze was well-known and popular in the West for his role in helping dismantle the former Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall in the late 1980s, when he was the Foreign Affairs Minister of the Soviet Union. In Georgia his ruling style was known as a “balancing style of governance” that refers to his ability to balance two opposing factions of the parliament – the old communist bureaucracy and the new generation of Western- oriented politicians who called for reforms. The old communist bureaucracy controlled all law enforcement and security agencies. The reformers demanded radical changes in the political and economic life of Georgia, the abandoning communist-styled governing and the reforming of law enforcement agencies to protect civil rights.

The conflict between these two factions became stronger in 1998-2000, when the reformers declared that the president and his associates were unable to lead the country toward democracy, and that instead of making the reforms, the country was facing rising levels of corruption in almost every sphere of political and economic development. They formed a radical opposition: “The National Movement” party led by parliament member Mikheil Saakashvili, and “Burjanadze-The Democrats” party lead by speaker of the parliament Nino Burjanadze and parliament member Zurab Jvania.

The president was no longer able to maintain the balance. He changed the name of his party from “Citizen’s Union” to “For the New Georgia” and began promoting the party for the 2003 parliamentary elections.

In addition to the three main political parties -- “For the New Georgia,” “The National Movement” and “Burjanadze – The Democrats” - there were four other political parties that were relatively popular among the citizens of Georgia: The New Rights, The Labor Party, Industry Will Save Georgia and Revival Party. These parties were somewhat represented in the Georgian parliament after 1995. Reformers often refer to these parties as allies of the ruling party and not real opposition (Khoperia, 2003). Other small parties, such as Greens, Unity, etc. were such small parties that they were not considered to be competitive.

The elections of 2003 became critical for the country. The popular consensus was that the president’s party was to blame for corruption, poverty and impediment of the country’s development. "There were two truly unusual things about this election," said Tinatin Khidasheli, president of the Young Lawyers Association, one of the non-governmental organizations monitoring the elections. (Antelava, 2003, p.1). "One is that this is the first time that Georgia's people had a choice, a genuine choice - not between various pro-governmental parties, but among real opposition parties who have different agendas. And also the voter turnout was incredibly high." (Antelava, 2003, p.1).

President Shevardnadze and his party “For the New Georgia” tried to tamper with the 2003 parliamentary elections and make it appear that his own party had been re-elected. Since 1995, when Shevardnadze became president of Georgia, the country had gone through two civil wars and was in a deep political, economic, and social crisis. It was hardly a surprise that eventually the issue of election tampering would be seen as another failure of Shevardnadze and

his ruling party to respect its citizens. Protests of 2003 election outcomes turned into calls for the resignation of Shevardnadze and his government. (Sulxanishvili, 2003). At the end of the Election Day, 2nd November, the National Movement Party and their supporters gathered in the Griboedov Theater. They installed a big screen in order to show the independent television station's news program, which transmitted results of the exit polls and parallel vote count organized by international companies and the Georgian non-governmental organization "Fair Elections." According to these organizations, the National Movement party was the winner. While the party was celebrating its victory, members of Shevardnadze's party "For the New Georgia" began saying that the official results of the elections were different and that "For the New Georgia" had won the elections. "You'll see it tomorrow," said one of the leaders of "For the New Georgia" on a live talk show on the independent station. (Khoperia, 2003).

The next day the National Movement party began organizing protests alleging election tampering in Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia. The Central Election Committee publicized preliminary results of the elections. According to the CEC, the president's party was re-elected. The "Burjanadze – the Democrats" party formed an alliance with the National Movement party and joined the protests. The alliance called for widespread protests all over the country. Citizens of Georgia living in the regions led by Saakashvili organized long protest caravans and gathered in the capital.

By the 23rd of November, several thousand people gathered in front of parliament calling for the resignation of Shevardnadze. Despite the objections of the National Movement party, Burjanadze – The Democrats, Georgian non- governmental organizations monitoring the elections, international observers, and others, Shevardnadze tried to organize the first meeting of his new parliament. Saakashvili, the leader of the National Movement party, and his supporters

stormed the parliament building carrying red roses as a symbol of non-violence and insisted on the resignation of the president. Shevardnadze's bodyguards had to escort the president out of the parliament building. At the end of the day, Saakashvili and Jvania, a leader of Burjanadze - The Democrats, went to visit Shevardnadze at his home and received an official letter of the president's resignation signed by Shevardnadze. After the president stepped down, the speaker of the parliament Burjanadze canceled the results of the 2003 elections and declared new elections would be held in early 2004. Mikheil Saakashvili and a new generation of Western-oriented reformer politicians came to power. Saakashvili became president.

The Western and local media considered it a crucial step toward democratic changes in Georgia. "The Rose Revolution represented a victory not only for the Georgian people but also for democracy globally. The revolution that took as its symbol a red rose demonstrated that, by aggressively contesting elections, exercising basic freedoms of speech and assembly, and applying smart strategic thinking, a democratic opposition can defeat a weak semi-democratic kleptocracy" (Lincoln, 2004, p.347). Experts consider television to be one of the most important media for the protest leaders during the revolution (Devdariani, 2004). In particular, researchers refer to the independent television company Rustavi2. The station's coverage of the protests was almost nonstop. They often invited opposition leaders and their supporters and provided them with unlimited opportunity to express their viewpoints. The protest leaders used this time to inform Georgians about upcoming demonstrations and actions (Lincoln, 2004). "The station always showed images of demonstrators tightly packed together, shying away from aerial shots that might have shown that the protesters were crowded in a relatively small space. Rustavi 2's image of the vigil differed just enough from reality to give viewers the impression that there

really was a mass movement actively supporting Saakashvili and the opposition.” (Lincoln, 2004, p.345)

Media Development

During the period of the Communist regime in Georgia (1921-91), the First Channel was state-owned and fully controlled by the state. Television broadcasting was in its authoritarian phase; the government completely dominated the media for the purpose of forcing those media to serve the ruling communist party (Siebert, Peterson & Schramm, 1956). Censorship was the natural everyday practice of media professionals. “Much of the Soviet Union's seven-decade existence saw an extreme example of highly organized communication control. Media constraints were so centralized and thorough that serious alternatives to the official line of the ruling Communist Party of the Soviet Union, on even a small scale, did not exist.” (Gibbs, 1999, p.3). At the end of the Communist period, during “perestroika” (economic restructuring) and “glasnost” (openness to criticism of the Soviet government), Mikhail Gorbachev’s government was in the forefront of change. Gorbachev aggressively promoted glasnost as a component of his reconstruction of Soviet economics. Gibbs (1999) argues that he started to use the media in order to overcome controversy within the party and affirm his own reforms. He accomplished this by allowing critiques of the government to appear in the media of that period. “Of new contents and topics permitted under glasnost, Gorbachev was most approving of those which favored the reform course or which highlighted problems associated with his political adversaries... Gorbachev was highly sensitive to media use he considered counter-productive to his aims.” (Gibbs, 1999, p.89). Thus, Gorbachev’s conditional reform broadened the public and mass media discussion of selected topics, but still monitored the process carefully. There was no more official body censoring the media, but there was an unwritten agreement between the

media and Gorbachev on which issues could be made public and which could not, which practices media could criticize and which were taboo. The control was less severe than censorship, but it still existed.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, when independence returned to Georgia, the Georgian press had almost every feature of the libertarian press (Bokeria, Targamadze & Ramishvili, 1997). Along with the state-owned television channel some private-owned channels were established. Many different news programs were created. Some of the TV news programs and especially their weekly analytical editions, mostly aired live, were creating the venues for fair debate. “In the last few years, particularly starting in the spring of 1997, certain changes have taken place that show the process of democratic development is entering a new phase,” wrote Giga Bokeria, one of the leaders of the Liberty Institute, a non-governmental organization protecting civil rights and freedom of the press. “The development of civil society requires more publicity in public life. The media is doing its part to end the problem of an under-informed society by presenting diverse viewpoints and forming an open system of disseminating information” (Bokeria, Targamadze & Ramishvili, 1997, p.29). Thus, a free marketplace of ideas was created.

Developmental theory serves as a good description of Georgian media in the late 1990s (Baran & Davis, 2003). This theory says that when a nation is in transition from an authoritarian regime to a well-established democracy, and its economic development is low, media must be more supportive than critical of their government. (Baran & Davis, 2003). Journalists should help the government to promote development of the country. The development concept describes systems in which government and media work together to guarantee successful development of a given nation. (Baran & Davis, 2003). Hence the successful development of the country was not

associated with the government of Georgia and President Shevardnadze, but with the reformers and the media allied with them that supported their positions.

Since the late '90s Georgian media has quoted mostly oppositional sources. Koplatadze (2004) studied frames in Georgian media in the coverage leading up to the 2003 elections. He found that the Georgian press cited the opposition and used antigovernment key words that indicate that opposition influenced the news construction more than the government (Koplatadze, 2004).

However, the Georgian government still had certain mechanisms to manipulate the independent media. "Although the state monopoly on printing and distribution, which presented a powerful mechanism for control of the press, is gone, there are other significant levers in the hands of the authorities, for instance, lawsuits against the media." (Bokeria, Targamadze & Ramishvili, 1997, p. 19). Georgian media are more vulnerable to lawsuits than Western media, because the government has more influence on judges than governments in the West and can ensure a favorable outcome. Also, the tax police have strong powers and can paralyze the activities of media that are under inspection. "Investigation of economic violation" was the official reason given by the Georgian government when the Investigative Department of the Ministry of National Security tried to paralyze the broadcasting of the most popular independent TV Channel Rustavi 2 in 2001 (Sulxanishvili, 2003).

Mass demonstrations took place in Tbilisi. Citizens tried to support the channel and thus defend a free press. The leaders of the Revolution of Roses called the protests in defense of a free press in 2001 a general rehearsal for the revolution; the nationwide protests in November, 2003 were carried out in order to defend the right of the citizen to elect their favorite candidates in a free and objective election process.

Theoretical Background

The purpose of the study is to examine the differences, if any, in the coverage of the Revolution of Roses by the state-owned television and independent Georgian television. This study employs theoretical perspectives derived from framing and indexing theories.

Framing Theory. The process by which the political players and also media professionals and audiences define and give meaning to issues and connect them to a larger political environment has come to be known as framing (Entman, 1993). The theory is essential to the present study, because by looking at the presence and absence of certain frames the researcher will be able to examine the differences, if any, in news stories aired on the state-owned and private-owned television companies.

The idea of framing first appeared in Goffman's (1974) seminal work. The underlying presumption was that the organization of messages affects the viewers' subsequent thoughts and actions. In general, framing involves the organization and packaging of information. Gamson and Modigliani (1987) make this point clear when they say frames are the "central organizing idea or storyline that provides meaning" (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987, p. 143) or "a central organizing idea for making sense of relevant events and suggesting what is at issue" (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989, p. 57). Their general idea is that a frame is a useful discursive device that helps professional communicators in constructing the meaning of an event or an issue and channels the audience toward desirable understanding of it. (Gitlin, 2003). Framing is "the process by which a source defines the essential problem underlying a particular social or political issue and outlines a set of considerations purportedly relevant to that issue" (Nelson, Oxley, & Clawson, 1997a, p. 222). Nelson and his colleagues (1997b) provide the best, most comprehensive common definition, and the one that shows the way toward linking framing and

deliberation. In other words, "framing is the process by which a communication source ... defines and constructs a political issue or public controversy" (Nelson, Clawson & Oxley, 1997b p. 567). This definition points to the heart of framing - the construction of political, social, economic and other important issues. This idea of associations is critical to understanding framing. A model of framing can be built on the premise that to frame a message in a given way entails certain associations rather than others. For example, Georgian newspapers' coverage of the 2003 elections provided substantial background for the opposition parties. "By stressing government responsibility, the media facilitated oppositional parties' efforts to spread their anti-governmental messages, to reduce trust in government, and hence to succeed in supporters' mobilization across the country." (Koplatadze, 2004, p.35).

"Frames define the problem, diagnose its cause, offer and justify treatments for the problem and predict their likely effects" (Entman, 1993, p.52). Evidence suggests the power of frames to shape a citizen's policy support and related political perceptions (Callaghan & Schnell, 2001; Nelson & Kinder, 1996; Nelson et al., 1997b). Political elites can effectively use frames to promote their own political ends. And by repeating or neglecting certain frames suggested by politicians, the media either promote or prevent from promoting certain political ends of politicians. This study will look at what kind of frames the independent television station's news program and the news program of the state-owned television station chose. It will examine whether the choice of certain frames promoted the political goals of the government or its opposition.

One of the important findings of Koplatadze's (2004) study is that the government responsibility frame dominated the Georgian press of the period leading up to the 2003 elections. This, together with frequent usage of anti-governmental sources and keywords, indicates that the

opposition influenced the news construction much more than the government. He said that media of that period not only selected the issue and shaped it favorably to the opposition, but also identified the directions of the responsibility for the cause of the problem (Koplatadze, 2004).

Indexing Theory. A massive amount of scholarly work (Callaghan & Schnell, 2001; Blumler & Gurevitch, 1974) shows that even when citizens do engage in democratic practices, want to be informed and therefore pay attention to political news, they are often, whether politically educated or not, under the influence of the media and other political actors who dominate the news discourse. The indexing theory takes as a basic assumption the need of journalists to quote authoritative sources and argues that as a result, news outputs are a function of “official” views on a given issue. (Bennett, 1990; Zaller & Chiu, 1996). Reporters index their coverage of the range of opinion that exists in the government (Bennett, 1990). If the points of view of the authoritative sources are dominant in media, public discussion can be highly dependent on the discursive behavior of political elites. Zaller (1992) and Entman (1993) maintain that the positions of elite political actors in and out of government define the key parameters and points of reference in discussion and thought for media and citizens alike. Thus, these scholars present a ‘top down’ view of the relationship between elite discourse and mass opinions. Exactly such elite discourse was dominant in Georgian media in 2001-2003 years. (Sulkhanishvili, 2003; Koplatadze, 2004).

Bennett (1990) and Lawrence (2000) found that dramatic, unsettling news events could provide journalists with story material while encouraging them to seek out sources that can contextualize those events. However, according to the theory of indexing, reporters use non-political sources for strengthening the agenda of the political elite (Bennett, 1990). The Revolution of Roses was providing journalists with exactly such unsettling and dramatic news

events. Georgian media of that period could seek out not only sources from political elite of the country, but also from independent experts, ordinary citizens, etc. to provide broad understanding of the revolution. This study will examine if the reporters referred to non-political sources for strengthening certain positions of the political elite. The second rule formulated by Bennett (1996) involves keying a story to disagreements among officials – particularly officials with the power to affect the outcome of the developing news event. Such conflict serves as a signal for journalists to expand a story to include the views of experts, social groups, opinion polls and other sources that reflect the observed differences between powerful politicians.

A study conducted by Kim and Weaver (2003) found results similar to the indexing theory results. The authors compared news sources in five different countries in 1997 during the Asian economic crisis. They found that news reporters in all five countries used routine source channels – press conferences, official proceedings or press releases - more than informal ones – informal leaks, unofficial interviews, etc. They also found that news reporters quoted more elite news sources, executives, decision-makers or spokespersons than employees and unaffiliated individuals. This study is important to the present study of news sources used by two different Georgian television companies from the perspective of the indexing theory. The current study will examine whether the Georgian media also indexed news sources to the political elite rather than ordinary citizens.

Scholars agree that politicians and interest groups try to control the shape and tone of the debates, because they want to structure outcomes favorable to their political interests (Molotch & Lester, 1975). “Control over political rhetoric is an essential tool to influence public opinion.” (Callaghan & Schnell, 2001, p.184). That a party or politician is the winner in the discussion about a certain policy, which can guide the discussion in a certain direction by means of inserting

certain terms regarding the issue (Kinder & Sanders, 1990). This is the reason why interest groups are eager to insert their language and symbols into media coverage of an issue, which can increase an issue's visibility, salience and potentially incline the political balance in a group's favor (Kollman, 1998; Baumgartner & Jones, 1993). This is the reason that political parties or certain politicians prefer certain newspapers or television companies regarding the four crucial criteria: easy access, a large audience, high credibility and control of the final product (Cook, 1989). This means that the politicians look for coverage in such newspapers, television and radio companies, which have high ratings, are considered credible and believable and are loyal to those politicians. Loyalty to a certain politician or a political party more likely guarantees that the newspaper, television or radio station is eager to have quotes of their favorites more often than the quotes of less sympathetic politicians and thus, provide their favorites with easy access to the news outlet. This, in turn, means that the politician will more likely be able to insert his language – terms and symbols -- into a news story and have the opportunity to convey the message in a favorable way. This study will scrutinize the language of Georgian media in the coverage of the protest.

Scholars argue that media too have their own professional standards and commercial and ideological interests, and in the final stage of production the media itself can have a “media-constructed” version of reality (Blumler & Gurevitch, 1974; Tuchman, 1972). Blumler and Gurevitch (1974) discriminate two media models: symbiotic and adversary. They described the adversary model as a model based on the conflict of interests between politicians and media. “Politicians should be carefully watched when they abuse their power, exceed their mandates, commit blunders they would prefer to conceal, and elevate themselves to positions of non-accountable authority.” (Blumler & Gurevitch, 1974, p. 470). The authors say that the media has

symbiotic relations with political actors if there is a reason and possibility of bargaining (Blumler & Gurevitch, 1974). They provide politicians with access to the public via media in exchange for information.

Based on Koplatadze's (2004) findings about the adversary position of Georgian media during election 2003 coverage toward President Shevardnadze, we might expect the same tendency to occur regarding the private-owned TV station. Taking into consideration literature on state-owned media (Siebert et al., 1956, Gibbs, 1999) we might also expect that state TV will have a symbiotic relationship with the existing government of the country.

Empirical Evidence

The few scholarly works regarding Georgian media mostly examine general development of a free media system and are less specific in analyzing its particular message strategies (Jones, 2000; Lincoln, 2004; Devdariani, 2004; Bokeria, Targamadze & Ramishvili, 1997).

Jones (2000), Lincoln, (2000) and Devdariani (2004) give an overview of Georgia's political development from the perspective of establishing the democratic state and mention Georgian media briefly as an active player in the process. Bokeria and his colleagues (1997) present data on Georgian media, their infrastructure, give an overview of the law regarding the media, and give examples of media restraints enacted by the government of Georgia. These articles are based mostly on interviews with politicians, media representatives, experts and interest groups (Jones, 2000), existing political data and personal observations (Devdariani, 2004, Lincoln, 2004). Bokeria and colleagues collect more comprehensive data on Georgian media, but none of the articles study in depth media production and news programs in particular. They address more general economic, political and legal frameworks of Georgian media, rather than analyze any particular media product.

However, some works can be found that scrutinize frames and sources or general characteristics of different types of media in the post-Soviet region. For example, Romania, Russia and Poland, like Georgia, are countries that underwent similar development from communist autocracies toward established democracies. Hypothetically, it may be true that media in these countries have some similar characteristics.

For example, Gross (1999) gives six characteristics of Romanian media in 1996-2000 that resemble some characteristics of Georgian media. As Gross (1999) argues, the media and journalists generally fail to serve as models of democratic beliefs and values. He claims that “journalism (a) contributes to suspicions about democracy; (b) often increases rather than decreases the intolerance for opposing parties, beliefs and preferences; (c) does not contribute to an atmosphere that increases willingness to compromise with political opponents or that enhances pragmatism and flexibility; (d) increases mistrust of the political environment and cooperation; (e) does nothing to encourage moderation in political position and partisan identification or civility in political discourse; and (f) contributes little to political efficiency and participation” (Gross, 1999, p. 23).

Lipman and McFaul (2001) studied how the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, treated the independent Russian media, and in particular the television company NTV. They analyze Putin’s actions and speeches from the perspective of understanding the concept of free and independent press. They also describe the NTV coverage of the Chechen War and parliamentary and presidential elections in Russia to provide a better understanding of the context and background of Putin’s reactions. In Russia, as in many emerging democracies, independent press often became a synonym for oppositional press (Gross, 1996, Coman, 2000). This happened to the independent television company NTV. NTV’s director general, Igor Malashenko, crossed the

border between political campaigning and media when he became one of the members of then-president Boris Yeltsin's reelection team without resigning from his television post. He encouraged the television company to give positive coverage to Yeltsin and very critical reporting of the leader of the Communist Party Gennady Zyuganov, the opposing candidate during the campaign. (Lipman & McFaul, 2001, p.119). The researchers see the partisanship of Russian media as an effort toward "keeping communists out of power" and "protecting their survival as an independent media." (Lipman & McFaul, 2001, p.119). The authors conclude that because of the nonexistence of an independent judiciary system or popular support of a free Russian press, the effort of one TV company was not enough to protect the right of free speech and Putin was able to control private Russian media.

Goban-Klas (1997) emphasized a similar inclination in Polish media. He argues that media in Poland is partisan and this partisanship reflects inherent social tensions and competing political groups' perceptions that in the struggle for power media have become "the main instrument for politics. Their vision of the media is one-dimensional, over-politicized and simplified, believing in a missionary role for journalists and an ideologized press." (Goban-Klas, 1997, p. 37).

The importance of political elite news sources is stressed in Ellis's (1999) study of Russian media. The author argues that "the primary function of mass media in Russia is not to attract and hold large audiences for advertisers, but to attract and hold large audiences for individual politicians, who either control or strive to control the mass media." (Ellis, 1999, p.104). This particular finding is important to the present study, because during the Revolution of Roses, it was extremely important for politicians to have the support of citizens and their best tool for this was the Georgian private media (Lincoln, 2004, Devdariani, 2004).

The results of monitoring Russian television news during the campaign periods for the 1995 Duma campaign and the 1996 presidential race show that state-owned and privately-owned TV companies generally failed to contribute fully to the legitimization of the electoral process (Oates & Roselle, 2000). During the parliamentary campaign, state-controlled Russian Public Television (ORT) focused on pro-government parties and neglected coverage of the competition. Although the election coverage on the private NTV station was more balanced, the elections were relatively ignored in favor of aggressive coverage of the war in Chechnya. By the 1996 presidential election, the two stations both abandoned the pretense of neutrality to promote the presidential candidacy of Boris Yeltsin. “What emerges from this study is evidence of a missed opportunity to consolidate the growth of an independent media in Russia—and the failure of voters to obtain disinterested information from primary television outlets in a fragile democracy.” (Oates & Roselle, 2000, p.30). The present study will examine if the same path occurred regarding Georgian TV companies.

The reason for the weak role of Russian media in facilitating the process of democracy is that the development of social groups and organizations, especially political parties and interest groups, is very fragmented and fragile. (Symon, 2004; Skyner, 2003). They were unable to create strong opposition voices. This absence of a strong opposition made it difficult for the Russian media to find opposition voices to balance the point of view of Putin and to maintain the freedom of expression in Russian media. That is why the Russian media tend to present favorable images of the president and his majority party in the Parliament (Skyner, 2003, Symon, 2004).

In Georgia, on the contrary, civil society and free media are allied, and whenever the media is in trouble, civil society tries to support it. For example, when the government attempted to close down the independent television company Rustavi2 in 2001, Georgian civil society

created street protests and tried to protect freedom of expression (Sulkhanishvili, 2003). On the other hand, knowing that its very existence depended on a strong civil society, the independent media promoted the values of a strong civil society. For example, Koplatadze's (2004) study of election 2003 coverage in Georgian media concludes that both journalists and reformers understood that fabrication of the election would weaken the establishment of democracy in Georgia. They were aware that only a united effort by the media and civil society could stop the government from fabricating the election. The researcher said that this was the reason why a symbiotic relationship was formed between the media and the opposition. The peaceful resignation of President Shevardnadze indicated that their goal was achieved (Koplatadze, 2004). The present study will test the following four hypotheses:

H1a: The prime-time stories on the news program of the state-owned television company had more sources from the representatives or/and supporters of the ruling party than from the reformers.

H1b: The prime-time stories on the news program of the private-owned television company had more sources from the representatives and/or supporters of the reformers than from the ruling party.

These hypotheses are derived from the indexing theory that suggests that the media is indexing its sources to the political elite. (Callaghan & Schnell, 2001; Blumler & Gurevitch, 1974; Bennett, 1990; Zaller & Chiu, 1996). The state-owned media repeats the position of the government and the independent media strengthens the position of the opposition (Oates & Roselle, 2000).

H2a: The state-owned television company used more pro-governmental keywords and terms than pro-reform keywords.

H2b: The private-owned television company used more anti-governmental keywords than pro-government keywords.

The indexing theory also suggests that politicians and several interest groups try to control the shape and tone of the debates, because they want to structure outcomes favorable to their political interests (Callaghan et al., 2001). This is the reason why interest groups are eager to insert their language and symbols into media coverage of an issue, which can increase an issue's visibility, salience and potentially incline the political balance in a group's favor (Kollman, 1998; Baumgartner & Jones, 1993).

H3: The private-owned and state-owned TV channels framed the protest differently.

Framing theory suggests that by framing, journalists are giving meaning to an issue. Journalists are presenting different realities by providing different highlights, different selections of sources, issues, stories and pictures (Entman, 1993; Schudson, 2003).

CHAPTER 3: METHOD

In order to analyze how Georgian independent and state-owned media's prime time news programs differed during the period of crisis in the country, the researcher used a content analysis. According to Kellinger (1986), a content analysis enables the researcher to study "communication in a systematic, objective, and quantitative manner for the purpose of measuring variables" (Kellinger in Wimmer & Dominick, 2000, p.135). This study employs a descriptive content analysis rather than an inferential one, because of the small number of the news stories; there were 250 prime-time news stories aired on the two TV programs during the protests, so it was feasible to study the entire universe of stories and sampling was not necessary. The descriptive content analyses also are "reality checks, whereby portrayal of groups, phenomena, traits, or characteristics are assessed against a standard taken from real life.... Moreover, descriptive content analyses sometimes serve as a prelude to other types of research, often in domains not previously explored" (Riffe, 1998, p.10). The method is best for the research questions because Georgian media and in particular its behavior during the protests are not well-researched fields, and descriptive content analysis can help assess the situation by applying standard indicators to the behavior of TV companies in this particular case.

Several important factors determine the choice of news programs of the state-owned and one of the independent television stations. The President of Georgia and his election bloc "For New Georgia" together with the opposition parties constantly accused the independent television of framing the event in a certain way (Shengelia, November 2003; Khoperia, 2003). Shevardnadze and his counterparts were blaming this television for being a mouthpiece for the reformers (Shengelia, November 2003). They said that independent television showed and quoted only governmental opposition. Nobody had any kind of arguments against two other

independent television companies: Imedi TV and Mze. The reformers accused state television of being a puppet in the hands of Shevardnadze (Khoperia, 2003). They said that state-owned television showed and quoted only the president and his supporters (Khoperia, 2003). The study is interested in examining these television stations because of the degree of polarized attitudes towards them. The selection of these two TV stations gives us a good possibility to analyze what degree of access each TV company granted to the sources, and if they give the sources the possibility to control the final product. Also, television news is more likely than other media to assist citizens in forming opinions on the candidates and the issues (Hennessey, 1985), and more so during crisis, when demand for simultaneous information is high and citizens are more likely to depend on media. (Ball Rockeach & DeFleur, 1976). The private TV company, afterwards, in its promotional ads referred to itself as “the television of winners.”

The study covers 44 prime-time news programs aired in the evening hours, generally between 7 and 11 P.M., when the largest television audience is available, between the 2nd and 23rd of November 2003. Elections took place on 2nd of November 2003. This was also the date when Georgian reformers, their supporters and non-governmental organizations started to protest the results of voting. The 23rd of November was the date when the old government was replaced by the reformers. Because of the nature of the prime-time news programs, each TV company tried to air what was, in their opinion, the most important and interesting information. So it is a good possibility to look at the news sources and event frames in these programs in order to see what the preferences of each newscast were.

The unit of analysis of the present study is the news story. All stories from 22 state-owned station's news programs and from 22 news programs of the independent television station were analyzed. In order to examine what kind of sources reporters used and how they used them,

the researcher reduced the categories of sources into the supporters of the president and his party and the supporters of the opposing “National Movement” and “Burjanadze - the Democrats” parties and their allies. Other factions were eliminated because they were less influential and not competitive during the studied period. The first group includes President Eduard Shevardnadze, Prime Minister Avtandil Jorbenadze, active representatives Irine Sarishvili, Levan Mamaladze, Vitali Khazaradze, plus any local, foreign expert, media representative, ordinary citizen, etc. that expressed the view of the bloc For New Georgia - that elections were fair and the protests were organized not for justice, but for the demands of certain politicians who wanted power or were interested in creating destabilization in the country. The supporters of reform include sources from the representatives of reformers: Mikheil Saakashvili, Nino Burjanadze, Zurab Jvania and Koba Davitashvili, plus non-governmental organizations, media, experts, and anybody who expressed their view that the results were not fair and that the government violated the rights of voters.

The researcher also identified keywords for each side of the event, based on terms appearing frequently in news stories. The terms used to involve frames and keywords in this study constituted frequent words, phrases and themes identified by the researcher in a close reading of the texts. The following keywords were determined as pro-governmental:

1) “Manipulated people”- This term is often used for blaming certain politicians for manipulating the public to protest government, using the public to achieve their political ends, and therefore emphasizing the weakness of public opinion. It refers to the idea that people would not protest the results of the Central Election Committee on their own and would only do so if someone made them do so. An example is: “A small amount of manipulated people are gathering in front of the Parliament;” “Jvania is using young people to achieve his goals.”

2) “Civil war/bloodshed/chaos/destabilization” – Terms are used to identify demonstrations and people gathering as a reason for future civil war and bloodshed. The opposition is accused of splitting Georgian public into two adversary groups who will defend themselves by means of arms, and bloodshed will be inevitable. Each appearance of these words should be coded. Example: “in 1992 we experienced what this kind of destabilization causes. We don’t want one more civil war, one more bloodshed.”

3) “Motivation/will of coming into power” - Oppositional politicians were accused of opposing the government and the results of the election because their motivation was to take power. Example: “Jvania is opposing the official results of the 2nd November because he wants to come to power. Unlike the results of exit polls ordered by him, the results of the Central Election Committee show it is possible that he will stay out of the Parliament.”

4) “Fair elections with minor violations/transparent, democratic elections/Fair elections since Shevardnadze” - Governmental sources were claiming that overall the elections were fair, but had some minor violations that did not affect the final outcome. Example: “Despite the minor violations, in whole, the 2nd November elections were the most fair elections of the past years.”

5) Call for negotiation and agreement - The president often stressed that he was eager to meet the organizers of the protests and calls for negotiations. By doing so, he stressed that despite his efforts the opposition was radical and unwilling to start the dialogue. Example: “I was waiting for Jvania and others yesterday. They promised to come, but did not show up.”

6) Other – the researcher tried to include every key word or the key term in analyses, but to avoid missing something the coding sheet had this category to specify if there was any keyword or term that did not match the above-mentioned categories.

The sources were defined as follows:

Supporters of the ruling party includes only those celebrities, official representatives of foreign countries, local and foreign experts, local and foreign media who/which made statements supporting the ruling party.

Supporters of the reformers include only those celebrities, official representatives of foreign countries, local and foreign experts, local and foreign media who/which made statements supporting the reformers. More specific categories are explained in detail in the code book created for the present study. See appendix B.

During the close watching of the programs, the researcher found that the reformers frequently used the following keywords and phrases:

1) Worthy people: opposition used the term to say that people taking part in demonstration are worthy people who came out into the streets to defend their dignity, and their dignity was defined as a right to vote and a right to have a better life. “Georgians are worthy people. They won’t let the government ignore their choice.”

2) The will of Georgian people/peaceful protest: supporters of opposition often used the term to define manifestations and demonstrations against the government as the will of people who were defending their rights. Example: “The Government is neglecting the will of Georgian people, who are standing in front of the Parliament, despite the rain, wind and cold, to defend their voice.” The protests were often defined as a peaceful way of changing the government. Example: “Our protest is peaceful. We will stand firm, but peacefully;” “The Georgian people thought that the elections were the means of replacing the government peacefully. Shevardnadze ignored this. He is ignoring the demands of Georgian people. We don’t want to have such

government. Join us in a peaceful protest, in a peaceful way of replacing the existing government.”

3) Fair battle: opposition and their supporters defined demonstrations as a fair battle for defense of the right to vote and fair results of elections. Example: “This is a fair battle to defend our voices.”

4) Falsification of elections/election lists/Violation of election rights: the news coverage during this period was mainly concerned with the results of the elections. Many sources were claiming that elections were dramatically falsified and this very falsification was the reason that people went out into the streets. Example: “It is evident that the results of the elections are totally fabricated in order to falsify the elections.” Often the protesters said Shevardnadze and the alliance For the New Georgia violated the rights of voters to ensure their own victory. Example: “Shevardnadze violated the election rights of the voter, he took away our voices and by doing so, his party obtained the first place.”

5) “Necessity for the government’s resignation:” This phrase was mostly used by opposition sources to claim that there was no way for the government to stay in power and it must resign. This term stresses high responsibility for the government in the conflict. Example: “The Georgian people could stand the cold, the dark, the starvation, but it could not stand the violation of its dignity. The Government has no right to stay in power. We demand its unconditional resignation.”

6) Other: In regard to avoid missing any key words in favor of protesters and against the government and was not included in the above-mentioned categories, here the coders specify it.

Four dominant frames were used that were identified in previous framing studies (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). They are: responsibility, conflict, human interest and economic

consequences frame. The recent studies of Georgian media (Sulkhanishvili, 2003; Koplatadze, 2004) indicated that morality frame was not typical in Georgian media, so they were not considered as an important frame for the present study. For identifying the correct frame, each sentence within each news story was coded.

The responsibility frame portrayed an issue or problem in a way that attributed causality to a certain political party or group. “The chief of the local election committee himself closed the election district and deprived the voters to vote;” “If the government wants public reaction, it will receive the public reaction;” “If the president was able to listen to your voices earlier, you would not be standing here now.”

The conflict frame was defined as emphasizing disagreement or differences of opinion between the alliance For New Georgia and the opposition, and also within these opposing groups. Example: “Saakashvili doesn’t like the methods of Burjanadze. Burjanadze doesn’t like his radical tone;” “Disagreement within the positions of the members of party “For New Georgia” regarding the negotiations with opposition is obvious;” “We exhausted all resources and possibilities of agreement. The president is not willing to yield to his own people.”

The economic consequences frame was defined as focusing on the financial aspects or impact it might have on an individual, group, institution, region, or the whole country. Example: “During these days, the economic index of the country became worse;” “The protests ruin the country’s economy.”

The coding of content was conducted according to the procedures described by Riffe (1998). The author and a PhD student in mathematics coded the stories. They were the only two Georgian speakers at the university where the study was conducted. To ensure the accuracy of coding procedures and its results, the coders trained for a month. They coded 20 percent of the

stories together until consensus was reached, problems worked out, and categories refined. After reaching consensus, the coders coded separately the remainder of the stories. All categories were ratio measures, because the coders counted the number of times each category occurred.

For calculating inter-coder reliability the researcher used Pearson correlations for interval data. The researcher counted the number of times something occurred. Pearson's correlations were obtained as follows: supporters of the ruling party $r = 1.0$, $p < .01$; supporters of the reformers $r = .88$, $p < .01$; other sources in this category $r = .91$, $p < .05$; representatives of the ruling party conveying and supporting party statements $r = .98$, $p < .01$; representatives of the reformers conveying and supporting statements of the reformers and their allies $r = .87$, $p < .01$; ordinary citizens supporting the ruling party $r = .84$; $p < .05$; ordinary citizens supporting the reformers $r = .93$; $p < .01$; the ruling party supporter political parties $r = .88$, $p < .01$; the reformers supporter political parties $r = 1.0$, $p < .01$; $p < .01$; political parties supporting neither of them or particular statements from both of them $r = .86$, $p < .01$; representatives of the central election committee supporting the ruling party $r = 1.0$; $p < .01$; representatives of the central election committee supporting the reformers $r =$; $p <$; manipulated people $r = 1.0$, $p < .01$; worthy people $r = .87$, $p < .05$; civil war/chaos/bloodshed $r = .83$, $p < .01$; peaceful protest $r = .81$, $p < .01$; motivation of coming into power $r = .95$, $p < .05$; fair battle $r = 1.0$; $p < .01$; fair elections/fair elections with minor violations $r = .97$, $p < .01$; falsified elections $r = .95$, $p < .01$; call for negotiation $r = .94$, $p < .01$; necessity of Shevardnadze's resignation $r = .98$; $p < .01$; frame of responsibility $r = .87$, $p < .01$; conflict frame $r = .95$, $p < .01$; frame of economic subsequences $r = .94$, $p < .01$. Human-interest frame did not occur during the training process of the coder, so it was not coded during the actual coding. Because this study is primarily concerned with describing content rather than generalizing, data will be analyzed using percentages.

CHAPTER 4: DESCRIPTIVE VARIABLES

Overall, there were 252 news stories covering Revolution of Roses in both state-owned and private-owned television companies. The independent television station aired 147 stories; the state-owned television station aired 105 stories. Both television companies indexed their sources to representatives of political elite – Georgian government including the president and his party and opposition parties: 61 % of the state-owned television sources came from ruling party and reformers representatives; the independent television station had 75 % of ruling party and reformers representatives; (Table 1). Similarity of source categories are obvious, however there is a difference within the categories regarding supporters of each opposing parties. (Table 2).

TABLE 1: Percentages of source categories (supporters of the ruling party as well as supporters of the reformers) in state-owned and independent station:

Sources	State-owned Station %	Independent Station %
Political Elite – Ruling Party and Reformers Representatives	61	75
Media, Foreign Countries’ Representatives, Local Experts and Celebrities	34	38
Representatives of Other Political Parties	22	25
Ordinary Citizens	19	18
Representatives of Central Election Committee and its regional Branches	12	15

TABLE 2: Percentages of sources within each category in state-owned and independent TV company:

Sources	Ruling party supporters%		Reformers supporters %	
	State-owned	Independent	State-owned	Independent
	television %	Television %	television %	television %
Number of local celebrities and experts, foreign country's representatives, media sources	27	5	8	33
Number of representatives of a) the ruling party and b) the reformers	a) 48	a) 34	b) 13	b) 41
Number of ordinary citizens	15	3	4	22
Number of other political parties	19	12	3	7
Number of representatives of central election committee	11	9	1	7
Number of other sources	5	3	1	1

This study also measured the statements by these sources aired by each television company. It found that 81% of the state-owned television station news stories had pro-government key-words; Most frequent- 52 % - was a term framing the protests as a real danger of creating “civil war, bloodshed, destabilization or chaos” in the country; then came Shevardnadze’s “call for negotiations” to resolve the conflict – 44 %;

On the independent TV company, 78 % of stories had anti-government key words. The most frequently used was the term falsification of elections/election lists – 56 % conveying the message that Georgian citizens were deprived of the right to vote; then followed “peaceful protest/will of Georgian people” – 49 %, stressing that the protests were expression of the people’s will and it was peaceful. (Table 3).

TABLE 3: Percentages of pro-governmental and anti-governmental key-words in each TV Company:

Pro-governmental key-words	State %	Indep. %	Anti-governmental key-words	State %	Indep. %
Civil war, bloodshed, destabilization or chaos	52	19	Falsification of elections/election lists	21	56
Call for negotiation	44	18	Peaceful protest/will of Georgian people	16	49
Fair elections with minor violations	36	18	Fair battle	10	33
Motivation of coming into power	15	3	Call for resignation of president Shevardnadze	6	26
Manipulated people	9	3	Worthy people	11	19

State-owned and Independent television framed the Revolution of Roses differently. (Table 4). Overall, 61 % of news stories on both television stations quoted ruling party supporters, 55 % supporters of the reformers. Only 29 % were sources not supporting any of the parties. 55 % of the stories aired pro-governmental key words and terms and 62 % were anti-governmental key words. The least frequent frame in both news programs was the frame of economic consequences - 11 %.

CHAPTER 5: FINDINGS

H1a: The prime-time stories in the news program of the state-owned television company had more sources from the representatives or/and supporters of the ruling party than the reformers.

This hypothesis was supported. Seventy-five percent of the state television's stories had sources from representatives and/or supporters of the ruling party; 26% of its stories had sources from the representatives and/or supporters of the reformers.

H1b: The prime-time stories in the news program of the private-owned television company had more sources from the representatives and/or supporters of the reformers than from the ruling party.

This hypothesis was supported. 75% of the private-owned television company's stories contained sources from the representatives and/or supporters of the reformers; 52% of its stories used sources from the representatives and/or supporters of the ruling party.

H2a: The state-owned television company used more pro-governmental keywords and terms than pro-reform keywords.

This hypothesis was supported. The state-owned television used pro-governmental keywords and terms in 81% of its stories; 40% of its stories had pro-reformers key-words.

H2b: The private-owned television company used more anti-governmental keywords than pro-government words.

This hypothesis was supported. The private-owned television used anti-governmental key words in 78% of its stories; 38% of the stories had pro-governmental key-words.

H3: The private-owned and state-owned TV channels framed the protest differently.

This hypothesis was supported. The most frequent frame of the protest coverage in the state-owned television was the responsibility frame; 73% of the state television stories were framed as issues of responsibility; 68% were conflict frames and 22% were frames of economic consequences. The most frequent frame of the protest coverage in the private owned television company was conflict - 88% of its stories contained this frame. The second most prevalent frame was the responsibility frame - 68% of the stories had this frame; and only 3% of the stories had frames of economic consequences. (Table 4).

TABLE 4: Percentages of frames in state-owned and independent TV Company:

Frames	Independent television %	State-owned television %
Responsibility	68	73
Conflict	88	68
Economic consequences	3	30

CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION

Both TV stations failed to provide a forum for the public discussion where all voices can participate without serious limitations. According to the indexing theory, they both indexed their coverage to the opinion of the political elite. Two major political groups were fighting with each other for power during the Revolution of Roses. The president and the ruling party “For the New Georgia” represented one group and the reformers and their parties - “National movement” and “Burjanadze – the Democrats” represented the other. Georgian state-owned and independent television companies quoted more frequently exactly these political groups: the president and representatives of his ruling party and the representatives of reformers. However, there were differences. In particular, state-owned television company had many more stories that quoted sources from the ruling party than the opposition and the private-owned television company had more stories that quoted sources from the opposition. Thus, each television company chose a different communication model with the president and his party. The state-owned television used the exchange model with the president of the country and its supporters, mainly the ruling party. The sources, in this case the president and his supporters, were providing the state-owned television’s journalists with desired material, often exclusives in exchange for access and favorable coverage. To the contrary, the independent television maintained the adversary model of relationships with the president and his party. Thus, both television companies, by choosing the different models of relationships with the president and his party, were presenting a polarized picture of reality.

Despite their different approach to the protests both stations selected their news sources from a similar circle of political actors. However, they chose different representatives of these spheres: state-owned television, to strengthen the position of the ruling party, chose celebrities,

experts and media who supported the ruling party. The independent television, on the contrary, chose those sources that strengthened the position of the reformers. The difference was found in the frequency of those political parties which were not representing directly any of the conflicting sides: The New Rights, Labor Party, Industry Saves Georgia, Revival Union, Ertoba. The state-owned television quoted representatives of these parties more frequently than the independent one. This has several explanations, both ideological and practical. The study found that sources included in this category and labeled as “other political parties” mainly made statements supporting the president and his party. So, ideologically, the state television repeated its main approach to protest coverage and chose to quote “other political parties” more often than the independent station did to strengthen the position of the ruling party. Independent television might have also had a practical reason. This television company had problems with these sources because they were boycotting the independent television company, saying they were covering the protests in a way preferable to the reformers.

Despite the obvious partisanship of the state and independent media, the independent television was somewhat more balanced in referring to the ruling party’s and reformers’ representatives: The state-owned television’s proportion of references to ruling party representatives and reformers representatives was consistently more skewed than independent television. For example, state TV referred to the ruling party 48 % of the time and reformers 13 % of the time, while independent TV referred to the ruling party 34% of the time versus 41% references to reformers. The difference in selection of sources by independent television was not as great as by state-owned television. The difference might have been even less if the representatives of the ruling party and their supporters did not boycott the private-owned television company. The boycott became the reason that journalists of independent television

could not interview the ruling party representatives and their supporters. Political parties who were allies of the ruling party - The New Rights, Labor Party, Industry Saves Georgia, Revival Union – held a joint press conference on November 11 after the first week of the protest, and announced the boycott of independent television. They said the reason for the boycott was that the station had non-stop coverage of the protest that was a promotion of the event. Another reason for the boycott, they said, was that the station referred more often to the reformers and their supporters than to the opposing politicians. The ruling party representatives offered no official announcements of a boycott, but they were ignoring questions of journalists from the independent station at the briefings and press conferences. They also tried to get rid of their cameras when the independent station’s journalists attempted to interview them in front of their office, in the street, in the parliament building, etc.

The indexing theory could explain this evidence. As the theory suggests, journalists need to quote authoritative sources. Such official sources in the government were the ruling party representatives, not the reformers. Also, the final resolution of the conflict depended more on the political will of the ruling party to admit that reformers won the elections. So the journalists and the public were interested in hearing their positions. Thus, the independent station looked for them and was eager to refer to them, while the state-owned television station did not have any “need” to quote the reformers, who were considered as organizers of disorder.

The preferences and partisanship of each television station was more straightforward in selection of celebrities and experts: in state television the proportion of stories referring to the ruling party supporter celebrities was 27% and the reformer supporter celebrities was 8%; in independent television the same proportion was 5% ruling party supporters to 33% reform party supporters. The same trend of unbalanced sources is obvious in the rest of categories. (See table

2). The partisanship of these television stations was obvious also in usage of the key words and thematic clusters. (See Table 3). The key words expressing or strengthening the position or point of view of the government occurred more often in state-owned than independent television. Anti-governmental key terms were more prevalent on the private-owned television company.

Analyses of the key words and thematic clusters highlighted an important issue. The independent television organized its coverage of the Revolution of Roses around the reason of the protests being the falsification of elections. By stressing that elections were falsified and voters' rights violated, the television station called citizens to mobilize and defend their rights. The protests became a representation of the will of the whole Georgian people. Thus, the meaning and importance of the protests were magnified and framed as a fair battle for justice. The state television station, on the contrary, was organizing its coverage around the protests itself. The news program was trying to discredit the protest by associating it with civil war, destabilization and chaos. But at the same time, the station was calling the opposition for negotiations. Stating that the protests were the result of the outcome of the elections was only the third most frequent key word. However, the elections were called fair and legitimate. This means that the independent station aimed at mobilization of citizens by emphasizing that elections were tampered with. The state television station, on the contrary, aimed at discrediting the revolution by saying that the elections were fair and the leaders of the protests were denying the election outcome only because they were motivated by the desire to gain power.

Shevardnadze and the ruling party, by framing the elections as "fair elections" and a protest as "gathering of manipulated people" attributed responsibility for the possible consequences to the reformers that led the protests. The responsibility frame was one of the most prevailing media frames in the state-owned television. According to the ruling party messages

that were repeated in the state television's newscasts the protests would lead to "a civil war, bloodshed and chaos" in the country. The ruling party supporters said the reformers were "motivated to come to power" and did not respond to the president's "call for negotiation" to resolve the conflict - the second most frequent frame on state television. In the opinion of the ruling party supporters, the reformers were facilitating the economic impediment of the country - the third most frequent frame on state television. The independent television station took a stand for reformers, even became active political partner of the reformers and supported democratic changes in the country by certain means. For example, the station neglected the frame of heavy economic consequences of the protests offered by the government and repeated on state television to prevent the spread of the protests. This frame was presented in only 2% of the stories on the independent station. Also the station emphasized the conflict - the most prevalent frame (88%) - between civil society and Shevardnadze's government, which failed to acknowledge defeat in elections, and tried to remain in power. They did it by using such thematic clusters as: at the "peaceful protests" "worthy people" were expressing their "will" that "Shevardnadze's government's resignation was a necessity." The station attributed the responsibility - the second most frequent frame occurring in 68% of the stories in independent television - for this conflict to the government, which "tampered with the elections" and "violated election rights" of the citizens.

Thus the evidence shows that the state-owned television company favored the state position in every way – the number and kinds of sources, the frames and the key words. The private-owned television company did the opposite – favored the opposition by the same means: sources, frames and key words.

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

The study provides evidence that by framing elections and protests in a different way, political players and media professionals define and give different meanings to the same issues and suggest what is at issue. Thus each party of the political elite tried to promote their own political viewpoints. By preferring sources from the ruling party and their supporters and repeating frames and key words suggested by the ruling party, state television supported Shevardnadze and his party. To the contrary, by quoting more frequently reformers and their supporters and framing the event in a way offered by the reformers, the independent media supported the viewpoints of the reformers. Several reasons may explain why coverage of the event was so biased by these television companies. One of the reasons might be the normal journalistic routines within each medium. The state television throughout its history was facing the hegemony of the ruling party. In the Communist era it was the party, while in the independent era it was the president of the country. It became very difficult and even impossible to overcome its heavy heritage even during the turbulent period of large-scale protests. To overcome these problems, today, the new government of the country is reorganizing state television into a public broadcasting operation. Several groups in Georgian society, including non-governmental organizations, nominated candidates for public broadcasting's board of supervisors. The parliament selected and appointed nine board members, who among other things were responsible for selecting the director of the public radio and Television Company, who has to be independent at least from the obvious influence of any political party. This election was crucial for the new public television, and old problems were still apparent. The board was unable to select a candidate in the first round because of in-fighting over candidates' loyalties. The board members said that none of the short listed candidates had significant

experience in management of a big company. Lasha Bakradze, one of the candidates on the short list, said that the board was looking for the candidate who was loyal to the new government, in particular, the president and his National Movement party. In the second round, one of the most influential members of the new public television's board, Tamar Kintsurashvili, was elected. Besides being a board member, she also is the close relative of Giga Bokeria, one of the leaders of the National Movement. Almost all of the candidates said that the new director of public television was not selected objectively and the ruling National Movement influenced and interfered in the process. Lia Mukhashavria, one of the candidates, even appealed to the courts, saying that it was illegal for the board to appoint as director one of its own members. Gia Nodia, a public TV board member, admitted that Kintsurashvili also does not have any significant experience in management, which was the reason given for denying the previous candidates. This happened under the new government led by the reformers, even though it looks like something one would expect from the previous government. Thus, it is hardly believable that the process of transformation of state television into public broadcasting will be successful. Nobody can insist that the public television will definitely be transformed into a medium free from the government's pressure.

From the day it was founded, the independent television station performed the function of watchdog of the government; because of this, it gained popularity in the country. During the protests the television company took it to extremes. The independent station became an active ally of the opposition while it was in the process of changing the existing government. The independent station was not an impartial information provider; it was as biased as state television.

It was essential for Georgia at that time to have a media that functioned as a watchdog. The reformers, local and international experts monitoring the elections, and citizens who were trying to participate in elections and make a difference in the country despite the obstacles such as insufficient election lists, were insisting that the election process was full of violations. (Khoperia, 2003; Shengelia, 2003). The experts had plenty of evidence of violations such as election reports that were fabricated so that it was easy for ordinary citizens to trace (Khoperia, 2003). Parallel vote count results and exit polls showed similar outcomes - the National Movement party won the elections (Report of Fair Elections, 2003). Yet the official government version was that the president and his party were the winners (Report of Central Election Committee, 2003). People who were ready to change the government peacefully put a lot of effort and energy into doing so, including standing in long lines on Election Day. Before the elections, they made sure they were on the lists of voters, and called the Central Election Committee and wrote requests if they were not on the lists (Shengelia, 2003; Khoperia, 2003). The turnout was heavy – 95% (Report of Central Election Committee, 2003; Report of Fair Elections, 2003). They did all this in hopes of ending the corruption in the country and improving living conditions while enjoying democracy and freedom. Instead, the president told them—they were wrong. Their votes do not matter. The opinions of local and foreign experts do not matter. The only thing that matters is the will of the government to stay in power. In this case, as in case of the social movements in U.S., the media need to create the means for large-scale communication, to take a more active, even participatory role to help reformers find their way to the public and help the public unite for justice, democracy and freedom. State television failed to fulfill this goal, while independent television took on the burden.

This participatory position of the independent station is applauded by developmental theory. The theory suggests that media in countries facing a transition from autocracy toward established democracy have to facilitate the promotion of democratic values and take a political stand to move the country toward democracy. In the case of Georgia, opposition and their supporters were considered to be democrats and eager to fulfill democratic reforms.

The developmental theory has much in common also with Mindich's (1998) position. In such a critical and fragile time for democracy as Georgia faced in November of 2003, a responsible journalist must offer something more than passive "objectivity." (Mindich, 1998). A journalist should take a stand for civil rights, democracy and a country's development by giving civic voices access to the public, to move the country toward the establishment of the values of democracy. Despite the fact that there were not many "citizen's voices" in the coverage of the Revolution of Roses, and instead there were the voices of the opposing political elite, it was these politicians who were expressing the position of Georgia's citizens. This became obvious during the protests, and afterwards, when the majority of Georgian citizens voted for the National Movement and Burjanadze the Democrats - the leaders of the revolution - and Mikheil Saakashvili was elected president in 2004.

However, another way of looking at the problem is through the lens of Free Press Theory. Bias is against all professional norms of journalism, regardless of whether the bias is for the "right" or "wrong" side of the issue. A free press has to offer balanced, fair and objective accounts of the event or issue. Otherwise, it will not have the trust of the public, which is most valuable to a free press. One of the premises upon which the reforms in Georgia are founded is to gain more freedom of expression for everyone, using the Western press as a model. The coverage of the Revolution of Roses in the independent station was not conducive to the

development of a free press. It becomes even more obvious how important an unbiased press is now that the former reformers have become the government. The independent television company not only abandoned its watchdog function, but became part of the government's public relations machine by conveying mostly positive news about the policymakers and policies. So, after the former political opposition became the majority in the Government, the independent television continues symbiotic relationship with them. The state owned television also continues its regular routine – conveying the point of view of whoever is in the majority of the government. The government became more severe to free media. They are using well the obvious fact that the majority of Georgian journalists do not have that high standard of professionalism as their western counterparts have and the professional unions of journalists and other media representatives are very weak. They attack the media whenever there is a story criticizing the government from the perspective of professionalism of the journalists. Their methods are more sophisticated than Shevardnadze's methods were. Also they are well using public relation strategies for conveying convenient for them messages to public via media channels who support them. Looking from this perspective it would be interesting to elaborate and add to the existing field of media theory the new theory, which will well describe and explain the condition and development of media in countries in transition, such as Georgia is. In this country the current stage of media development is the mix of developmental and authoritative theories.

For true facilitation of reforms and democracy, the media needs to be truly independent, fair and unbiased, providing the public with objective and sufficient information in order to give them the opportunity to reach informed and enlightened decisions upon which democracy is based. The present study gives evidence that both state-owned and independent media failed to do this during the Revolution of Roses.

Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research

The present study cannot be generalized to Georgian media because it is limited to one particular event and only two television companies. For a better understanding of the journalistic routines of each television station a qualitative approach can be helpful. Particularly, interviews with the journalists as well as program managers and editors can better highlight communication strategies of each medium.

The sample of television companies also can be broadened by researching the other two private commercial television stations in order to have a better understanding of how the Georgian media and television companies in particular covered the protests.

Further research on the development of Georgian independent media after the Revolution of Roses can bring to light whether the Georgian independent media in general and not only during a crisis, is indeed able to maintain freedom from external restraints and achieve the freedom to facilitate universal values and general principles of democracy.

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APPENDIX A: CODING SHEET

Coder:
Godi 1 nino 2

News Program:
Moambe 1 Kurieri 2

Date

Story ID

SOURCES

SUPPORTERS OF THE RULING PARTY	SUPPORTERS OF REFORMERS	Other
Number of local celebrities and experts, foreign country’s representatives, media sources	Number of local celebrities and experts, foreign country’s representatives, media sources	Number of local celebrities and experts, foreign country’s representatives, media sources
Number of representatives of the ruling party	Number of representatives of the reformers	Number of representatives of ruling party or reformers
Number of ordinary citizens	Number of ordinary citizens	Number of ordinary citizens
Number of other political parties	Number of other political parties	Number of other political parties
Number of representatives of central election committee	Number of representatives of central election committee	Number of representatives of central election committee
Number of other sources	Number of other sources	Number of other sources

Key Words and Terms (count every time the key-word appears using the hash marks):

PROGOVERNMENTAL	ANTOGOVERNMENTAL
Manipulated people	Worthy People
Destabilization/Civil war/bloodshed/chaos	Peaceful protest/the will of Georgian people
Motivation/will of coming into power	Fair battle
Fair elections with minor violations/transparent, democratic elections/fair elections ever since Shevardnadze	Falsification of elections/violation of election rights/election lists
Call for negotiation and agreement	Necessity for government resignation
Other	Other

FRAMES (count existence of each using hash marks)

NUMBER of responsibility frame

NUMBER of conflict frame

Number of economic subsequences

APPENDIX B: CODEBOOK

Coder: Record your name.

Story ID: record a number of the story within the news program.

News program: record the name of the news program, where the story was aired.

Date: record day, when the program was aired

Sources:

1. Local celebrities and experts, foreign country's representatives, media

Number of the representatives of local celebrities and experts, foreign country's representatives, media sources supporting ruling party -record if a reporter used as a source local celebrities (artists, sportsmen, writers, example: Ramaz Chkhikvadze, Robert Sturua, Gia Bughadze, etc.) and experts (president's advisors, economists, civil rights organizations, example: Gia Nodia, Ramaz Sakvarelidze, Tinatin Khidasheli, Zura Chiaberashvili, etc), foreign country's representatives (Mission of European Union, any foreign observers, foreign country's ambassadors, example: Richard Miles, etc.), media (any quoted newspaper, television station, magazine, online media, example: Guardian, CNN, NTV, etc.) supporting ruling party, making a statement that has positive evaluation of the elections and negative of the protests, that repeats or agrees with the statements of ruling party that elections were fair even with minor violations, president has situation under control, reformers and protests will cause destabilization and economic hindering of the country. (example: the head of EU Mission said that that elections took place, though there were some minor violations that did not effect the general outcome of the elections)

2. Number of the representatives of local celebrities and experts, foreign country's representatives, media sources supporting reformers -record if a reporter used as a source local

celebrities and experts, foreign country's representatives, media sources supporting reformers, making a statement that has negative evaluation of the president's and ruling party behavior and positive evaluation of the protests, repeats or agrees with the statements of reformers that the elections were violation of voters' rights, the results did not express true will of people, citizens have to defend their rights by means of peaceful protests

3. Number of other sources – record the number of local celebrities and experts, foreign country's representatives, media sources, not supporting any of opposing parties' viewpoints, blaming them both or agrees with certain claims from both parties' statements (example: Sturua saying that we must avoid bloodshed)

Self:

1. Number of the representatives of the bloc "For New Georgia" supporting the ruling party - Record the number of sources from the bloc "For New Georgia" (President Shevardnadze, Prime Minister Jorbenadze, active representatives: Sarishvili, Mamaladze, Xazaradze, etc.) making statements against the reformers and their supporters and expressing the point of view of the ruling party

2. Number of the representatives of the reformers supporting reformers - record the number of sources from the representatives of reformers (Saakashvili, Burjanadze, Jvania, Davitashvili, etc.) expressing point of view of their party and allies, making statements about falsification of elections and against the ruling party or their allies.

3. Number of other sources – record if the story has sources from the ruling or reformer's parties who do not support the view point of their parties or their allies and support certain claims from both of them or criticizing both of them (mostly such claims come from the representatives of ruling party, Nadareishvili, Karkarashvili, etc. especially on the second week

(9-16 November) of protests, when Shevardnadze calls for negotiation. Example: Both sides should compromise, government have to find a common language with the protesters.)

Ordinary citizens

1. Number of ordinary citizens supporting the bloc “For New Georgia” - record if the reporter refers to ordinary citizens (ordinary citizens, who do not represent any party or institution, students, etc.) as a source who demonstrate their support for New Georgia, saying they had not any problems during voting, elections were fair and they support Shevardnadze and are against the protests

2. Number of the representatives of ordinary citizens supporting the reformers - record if the reporter refers to people (participants of demonstrations, ordinary citizens, students) as a source who claimed that their rights were violated and their voice was lost during unfair elections, they support reformers or are against the ruling party

3. Number of other sources - record the number of citizens, not supporting any of opposing parties’ viewpoints, supporting certain claims from both of them, criticizing both of them, talking about other than election or protest issues (example: No, I don’t want civil war; Zugdidi made fair choice; etc.)

Representative of any other political party

1. Number of the representatives of other political parties supporting the bloc “For New Georgia” - Record the number of representatives of other oppositional parties such as New Rights, Labor Party, Revival Union, Industry will save Georgia, Unity (Ertoba), who make statements in favor of ruling party, saying that exit polls don’t express everything, reformers were part of the ruling party before who fabricated elections. Example: (Davit Gamkrelidze – These elections were fair in comparison of fabrication of elections before by the reformers.)

2. Number of the representatives of other political parties supporting the reformers - Record the number of representatives of other oppositional parties such as New Rights, Labor Party, Revival Union, Industry will save Georgia, Unity (Ertoba), who make statements in favor of reformers and protests and against the ruling party and Shevardnadze

3. Number of other sources - Record the number of representatives of other oppositional parties such as New Rights, Labor Party, Revival Union, Industry will save Georgia, Unity (Ertoba), who support certain claims of both parties or criticizing both of them (Natelashvili saying that ruling party and reformers both are the same party now split for power and parliamentary seats)

Representative of Central Election Committee

1. Number of the representatives of central election committee supporting the bloc “For New Georgia” - Record the number of representatives of the Central Election Committee or its local representatives who say, elections were fair and representative, though with minor violations, or make any claim in favor of the ruling party and against reformers and protests (Devdariani – the protesters are trying to influence us, but I can’t write the outcomes of the elections as they want me to write them)

2. Number of the representatives of central election committee supporting the reformers - Record the number of representatives of the Central election committee or its local representatives who say, elections were unfair and under-representative, give examples of falsification, etc. make any statement in favor of the reformers (mostly these are representatives of national movement party and the democrats in the election committee)

3. Number of other sources – record if the representatives of central election committee or its branches support certain claims from both of the parties or criticize both of them

Other sources

1. Number of other sources supporting the bloc “For New Georgia” - record the number of any other source that not match the above categories who claims support of the bloc For New Georgia and said elections were fair and the protesters will cause destabilization (most often these are representatives of executive branch – gangebeli, meri, etc.) example: Zugdidi is quiet, reformers could not make citizens to come out into the streets and join the protests

2. Number of the representatives of other sources supporting the reformers - record the number of any other source that not matched the above categories who claims support of the reformers and said elections were unfair

3. Number of other sources not falling into any of above-mentioned categories – record the number of other sources not falling into any of above-mentioned categories

Key words: count the number of key words and key terms using hash marks: //////////////

Key words and key terms indicate either pro-governmental or anti governmental position.

Pro-Government key terms:

1) “Manipulated people” - this term is often used for blaming certain politicians for manipulating public to protest government, using public to achieve their political ends and therefore emphasizing the weakness of public opinion. Example: “A bunch of manipulated people is gathering in front of the Parliament.”

2) “Civil war/bloodshed/destabilization/chaos” – the term is used to identify demonstrations and public gatherings as a reason for future civil war and bloodshed. Those opposed to government politicians are blamed for splitting the Georgian public into two adversary groups that will defend themselves by means of arms and thus bloodshed will be

inevitable. Example: “in 1992 we experienced what this kind of destabilization causes. We don’t want one more civil war, one more bloodshed.”

3) “Motivation/will of coming into power” - it was said that the only reason oppositional politicians were opposing the government and the results of the election was their motivation to come into power. Example: “Jvania is opposing the official results of the 2nd November, because he wants to come to power. Unlike the results of exit polls ordered by him, the results of the Central Election Committee show it is possible that he will stay out of the Parliament.”

4) “Fair elections with minor violations/transparent, democratic elections” - Governmental sources were claiming that overall the elections were fair, but had some minor violations that did not affect the final outcome. Example: “Despite the minor violations, in whole, the 2nd November elections were the most fair elections of the past years.”

5) Call for negotiation and agreement - the president often stresses that he was eager to meet the organizers of the protests and calls for negotiations. By doing so, he stresses that despite his efforts the opposition was radical and unwilling to start the dialogue. Example: “I was waiting for Jvania, Burjanadze and others yesterday. They promised to come, but did not show up.”

6) Other: record the number of any keyword or term that did not match the above-mentioned categories.

Anti-government keywords:

1) Worthy people: Record the number of times when people taking part in demonstrations were called worthy people who came out into the streets to defend their dignity,

and their dignity was defined as the right to vote. Example: “Georgians are worthy people. They won’t let the government ignore their choice.”

2) The will of Georgian people/peaceful protest - record the number of times when the statements that manifestations and demonstrations against the government were defined as a will of people to defend their rights. Example: “The Government is neglecting the will of Georgian people, who are standing in front of the Parliament, despite the rain, wind and cold, to defend their voice.”

Record the number of times when the protests were defined as a peaceful way of changing the government. Oppositional forces, claiming that people thought it was possible to change the government peacefully by voting, often used this term. Government took this possibility from people by falsification of elections. Now people were trying to reinstate justice. Example: “Join us in a peaceful protest, in a peaceful way of replacing the existing government.”

3) Fair battle: record the number of times when demonstrations were defined as a fair battle for defense of the right to vote and to fair elections. Example: “This is a fair battle to defend our voices.”

4) Falsification of elections/ election lists/violation of voter’s rights: record the number of times when source was claiming that elections were dramatically falsified. Example: “It is evident that the results of the elections are totally fabricated in order to falsify the elections.” Record if the source was claiming that government violated the right of vote. Example: “Shevardnadze violated the election rights of the voter, he took away our voices and by doing so, his party obtained the first place.”

5) Call for resignation of the president: record the number of times when any of the sources said it was time for the president’s resignation. Example: “The president can’t hear our

voices any more. He can't rule the country according to the needs of its own citizen's. The president has to resign." Include also the scan of protesting people. Example: "Retire! Retire!" or "Go away!"

6) Other: record the number of times when there was any other key word or term that was in favor of protesters and against the government.

Frames (count existence of each)

Besides the key words and key terms, the context of a particular broadcast story might indicate a certain frame. Therefore, the unit of analysis should be each story. Select one of the following categories: responsibility frame, conflict frame, economic consequences frame or human-interest frame.

Responsibility frame: Places blame or attributes cause. Portrays an issue or problem in a way that attributes responsibility for its cause to government, individuals, or interest groups. Example for the responsibility frame: "The chief of the local election committee himself closed the election district and deprived the voters their right to vote."

Conflict frame: stresses conflict or disagreement between individuals, institutions or different groups and the government, in order to capture more audience interest. Example for the conflict frame: "Saakashvili doesn't like the methods of Burjanadze. Burjanadze doesn't like his radical tone."

Economic consequences frame: pictures an event, problem or issue focusing on the economic impact it might have on an individual, group, institution, region, or country. Example for the economic consequences frame: "During these days, the economic index of the country became worse."

VITA

Nino Danelia was born on November 25, 1972, in Tbilisi, Republic of Georgia. In 1996 she graduated from Tbilisi State Academy of Fine Arts, Department of Arts and Architecture. After graduation with honors she started to work at the daily newspaper *Resonance* as a cultural affairs observer. From 1996 to 2000 she was an arts reporter, cultural affairs observer and the head of the arts review department. From 2000 to 2002 she worked for the radio green wave as an co-editor and co-anchor of the morning radio Talk-show and as an editor and anchor of the program “Veil”; During 2003 she was the producer, editor and anchor of the weekly informational analytical program *Kviris ambebi*.

At the same time she actively collaborated with the Georgian non-governmental organization Arts without Frontiers. She managed several projects concerned with the gender and other social equality issues. She also organized several exhibitions of modern Georgian Art.

In March 2003 she was selected as a teaching assistant at the Caucasus School of Journalism and Media Management. The same year she received a scholarship from International Center of Journalists to earn a master’s degree in mass communication at Louisiana State University. That degree will be conferred at the December 2005 Commencement.